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From: akpm@linux-foundation.org
To: arnd@arndb.de, elver@google.com, georgepope@android.com,
	keescook@chromium.org, mm-commits@vger.kernel.org,
	natechancellor@gmail.com, ndesaulniers@google.com,
	sfr@canb.auug.org.au
Subject: [merged] ubsan-disable-unsigned-overflow-check-for-i386.patch removed from -mm tree
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 2021 13:35:16 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210125213516.5KslXdQy0%akpm@linux-foundation.org> (raw)


The patch titled
     Subject: ubsan: disable unsigned-overflow check for i386
has been removed from the -mm tree.  Its filename was
     ubsan-disable-unsigned-overflow-check-for-i386.patch

This patch was dropped because it was merged into mainline or a subsystem tree

------------------------------------------------------
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Subject: ubsan: disable unsigned-overflow check for i386

Building ubsan kernels even for compile-testing introduced these warnings
in my randconfig environment:

crypto/blake2b_generic.c:98:13: error: stack frame size of 9636 bytes in function 'blake2b_compress' [-Werror,-Wframe-larger-than=]
static void blake2b_compress(struct blake2b_state *S,
crypto/sha512_generic.c:151:13: error: stack frame size of 1292 bytes in function 'sha512_generic_block_fn' [-Werror,-Wframe-larger-than=]
static void sha512_generic_block_fn(struct sha512_state *sst, u8 const *src,
lib/crypto/curve25519-fiat32.c:312:22: error: stack frame size of 2180 bytes in function 'fe_mul_impl' [-Werror,-Wframe-larger-than=]
static noinline void fe_mul_impl(u32 out[10], const u32 in1[10], const u32 in2[10])
lib/crypto/curve25519-fiat32.c:444:22: error: stack frame size of 1588 bytes in function 'fe_sqr_impl' [-Werror,-Wframe-larger-than=]
static noinline void fe_sqr_impl(u32 out[10], const u32 in1[10])

Further testing showed that this is caused by
-fsanitize=unsigned-integer-overflow, but is isolated to the 32-bit x86
architecture.

The one in blake2b immediately overflows the 8KB stack area architectures,
so better ensure this never happens by disabling the option for 32-bit
x86.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210112202922.2454435-1-arnd@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201230154749.746641-1-arnd@kernel.org/
Fixes: d0a3ac549f38 ("ubsan: enable for all*config builds")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: George Popescu <georgepope@android.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
---

 lib/Kconfig.ubsan |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/lib/Kconfig.ubsan~ubsan-disable-unsigned-overflow-check-for-i386
+++ a/lib/Kconfig.ubsan
@@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ config UBSAN_SIGNED_OVERFLOW
 config UBSAN_UNSIGNED_OVERFLOW
 	bool "Perform checking for unsigned arithmetic overflow"
 	depends on $(cc-option,-fsanitize=unsigned-integer-overflow)
+	depends on !X86_32 # avoid excessive stack usage on x86-32/clang
 	help
 	  This option enables -fsanitize=unsigned-integer-overflow which checks
 	  for overflow of any arithmetic operations with unsigned integers. This
_

Patches currently in -mm which might be from arnd@arndb.de are



                 reply	other threads:[~2021-01-25 22:28 UTC|newest]

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