* [PATCH] smackfs: restrict bytes count in smackfs write functions
@ 2021-01-24 14:36 Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov
2021-01-25 18:08 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 1 reply; 10+ messages in thread
From: Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov @ 2021-01-24 14:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey
Cc: jmorris, serge, andreyknvl, linux-security-module, linux-kernel,
syzbot+a71a442385a0b2815497
syzbot found WARNINGs in several smackfs write operations where
bytes count is passed to memdup_user_nul which exceeds
GFP MAX_ORDER. Check count size if bigger SMK_LONGLABEL,
for smk_write_syslog if bigger than PAGE_SIZE - 1.
Reported-by: syzbot+a71a442385a0b2815497@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov <snovitoll@gmail.com>
---
security/smack/smackfs.c | 8 ++++++--
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index 5d44b7d258ef..88678c6f1b8c 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -1167,7 +1167,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
return -EPERM;
if (*ppos != 0)
return -EINVAL;
- if (count < SMK_NETLBLADDRMIN)
+ if (count < SMK_NETLBLADDRMIN || count > SMK_LONGLABEL)
return -EINVAL;
data = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
@@ -1427,7 +1427,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_net6addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
return -EPERM;
if (*ppos != 0)
return -EINVAL;
- if (count < SMK_NETLBLADDRMIN)
+ if (count < SMK_NETLBLADDRMIN || count > SMK_LONGLABEL)
return -EINVAL;
data = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
@@ -2647,6 +2647,8 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_syslog(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
+ if (count > PAGE_SIZE - 1)
+ return -EINVAL;
data = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
if (IS_ERR(data))
@@ -2744,6 +2746,8 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_relabel_self(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
*/
if (*ppos != 0)
return -EINVAL;
+ if (count > SMK_LONGLABEL)
+ return -EINVAL;
data = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
if (IS_ERR(data))
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] smackfs: restrict bytes count in smackfs write functions
2021-01-24 14:36 [PATCH] smackfs: restrict bytes count in smackfs write functions Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov
@ 2021-01-25 18:08 ` Casey Schaufler
2021-01-25 22:42 ` Tetsuo Handa
0 siblings, 1 reply; 10+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2021-01-25 18:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov
Cc: jmorris, serge, andreyknvl, linux-security-module, linux-kernel,
syzbot+a71a442385a0b2815497, Casey Schaufler
On 1/24/2021 6:36 AM, Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov wrote:
> syzbot found WARNINGs in several smackfs write operations where
> bytes count is passed to memdup_user_nul which exceeds
> GFP MAX_ORDER. Check count size if bigger SMK_LONGLABEL,
> for smk_write_syslog if bigger than PAGE_SIZE - 1.
>
> Reported-by: syzbot+a71a442385a0b2815497@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> Signed-off-by: Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov <snovitoll@gmail.com>
Thank you for the patch. Unfortunately, SMK_LONGLABEL isn't
the right value in some of these cases.
> ---
> security/smack/smackfs.c | 8 ++++++--
> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
> index 5d44b7d258ef..88678c6f1b8c 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
> @@ -1167,7 +1167,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
> return -EPERM;
> if (*ppos != 0)
> return -EINVAL;
> - if (count < SMK_NETLBLADDRMIN)
> + if (count < SMK_NETLBLADDRMIN || count > SMK_LONGLABEL)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> data = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
> @@ -1427,7 +1427,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_net6addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
> return -EPERM;
> if (*ppos != 0)
> return -EINVAL;
> - if (count < SMK_NETLBLADDRMIN)
> + if (count < SMK_NETLBLADDRMIN || count > SMK_LONGLABEL)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> data = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
> @@ -2647,6 +2647,8 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_syslog(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
>
> if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
> return -EPERM;
> + if (count > PAGE_SIZE - 1)
> + return -EINVAL;
>
> data = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
> if (IS_ERR(data))
> @@ -2744,6 +2746,8 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_relabel_self(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
> */
> if (*ppos != 0)
> return -EINVAL;
> + if (count > SMK_LONGLABEL)
> + return -EINVAL;
>
> data = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
> if (IS_ERR(data))
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] smackfs: restrict bytes count in smackfs write functions
2021-01-25 18:08 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2021-01-25 22:42 ` Tetsuo Handa
2021-01-28 11:58 ` [PATCH v2] " Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov
0 siblings, 1 reply; 10+ messages in thread
From: Tetsuo Handa @ 2021-01-25 22:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov
Cc: jmorris, serge, andreyknvl, linux-security-module, linux-kernel,
syzbot+a71a442385a0b2815497, Michal Hocko
On 2021/01/26 3:08, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 1/24/2021 6:36 AM, Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov wrote:
>> syzbot found WARNINGs in several smackfs write operations where
>> bytes count is passed to memdup_user_nul which exceeds
>> GFP MAX_ORDER. Check count size if bigger SMK_LONGLABEL,
>> for smk_write_syslog if bigger than PAGE_SIZE - 1.
>>
>> Reported-by: syzbot+a71a442385a0b2815497@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
>> Signed-off-by: Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov <snovitoll@gmail.com>
>
> Thank you for the patch. Unfortunately, SMK_LONGLABEL isn't
> the right value in some of these cases.
>
Since it uses sscanf(), I think that whitespaces must be excluded from upper limit
check. I'm proposing adding __GFP_NOWARM on the memdup_user_nul() side at
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210120103436.11830-1-penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp .
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v2] smackfs: restrict bytes count in smackfs write functions
2021-01-25 22:42 ` Tetsuo Handa
@ 2021-01-28 11:58 ` Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov
2021-01-28 12:59 ` Tetsuo Handa
0 siblings, 1 reply; 10+ messages in thread
From: Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov @ 2021-01-28 11:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: penguin-kernel
Cc: andreyknvl, casey, jmorris, linux-kernel, linux-security-module,
mhocko, serge, snovitoll, syzbot+a71a442385a0b2815497
syzbot found WARNINGs in several smackfs write operations where
bytes count is passed to memdup_user_nul which exceeds
GFP MAX_ORDER. Check count size if bigger than PAGE_SIZE.
Per smackfs doc, smk_write_net4addr accepts any label or -CIPSO,
smk_write_net6addr accepts any label or -DELETE. I couldn't find
any general rule for other label lengths except SMK_LABELLEN,
SMK_LONGLABEL, SMK_CIPSOMAX which are documented.
Let's constrain, in general, smackfs label lengths for PAGE_SIZE.
Although fuzzer crashes write to smackfs/netlabel on 0x400000 length.
Here is a quick way to reproduce the WARNING:
python -c "print('A' * 0x400000)" > /sys/fs/smackfs/netlabel
Reported-by: syzbot+a71a442385a0b2815497@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov <snovitoll@gmail.com>
---
security/smack/smackfs.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index 5d44b7d258ef..22ded2c26089 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -1167,7 +1167,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
return -EPERM;
if (*ppos != 0)
return -EINVAL;
- if (count < SMK_NETLBLADDRMIN)
+ if (count < SMK_NETLBLADDRMIN || count > PAGE_SIZE - 1)
return -EINVAL;
data = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
@@ -1427,7 +1427,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_net6addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
return -EPERM;
if (*ppos != 0)
return -EINVAL;
- if (count < SMK_NETLBLADDRMIN)
+ if (count < SMK_NETLBLADDRMIN || count > PAGE_SIZE - 1)
return -EINVAL;
data = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
@@ -1834,6 +1834,10 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_ambient(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
+ /* Enough data must be present */
+ if (count == 0 || count > PAGE_SIZE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
data = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
if (IS_ERR(data))
return PTR_ERR(data);
@@ -2005,6 +2009,9 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
+ if (count > PAGE_SIZE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
data = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
if (IS_ERR(data))
return PTR_ERR(data);
@@ -2092,6 +2099,9 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_unconfined(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
+ if (count > PAGE_SIZE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
data = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
if (IS_ERR(data))
return PTR_ERR(data);
@@ -2648,6 +2658,10 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_syslog(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
+ /* Enough data must be present */
+ if (count == 0 || count > PAGE_SIZE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
data = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
if (IS_ERR(data))
return PTR_ERR(data);
@@ -2740,10 +2754,13 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_relabel_self(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
return -EPERM;
/*
+ * No partial write.
* Enough data must be present.
*/
if (*ppos != 0)
return -EINVAL;
+ if (count == 0 || count > PAGE_SIZE)
+ return -EINVAL;
data = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
if (IS_ERR(data))
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2] smackfs: restrict bytes count in smackfs write functions
2021-01-28 11:58 ` [PATCH v2] " Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov
@ 2021-01-28 12:59 ` Tetsuo Handa
2021-01-28 13:27 ` Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov
0 siblings, 1 reply; 10+ messages in thread
From: Tetsuo Handa @ 2021-01-28 12:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov
Cc: andreyknvl, casey, jmorris, linux-kernel, linux-security-module,
mhocko, serge, syzbot+a71a442385a0b2815497
On 2021/01/28 20:58, Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov wrote:
> @@ -2005,6 +2009,9 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
> if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
> return -EPERM;
>
> + if (count > PAGE_SIZE)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> data = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
> if (IS_ERR(data))
> return PTR_ERR(data);
> @@ -2740,10 +2754,13 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_relabel_self(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
> return -EPERM;
>
> /*
> + * No partial write.
> * Enough data must be present.
> */
> if (*ppos != 0)
> return -EINVAL;
> + if (count == 0 || count > PAGE_SIZE)
> + return -EINVAL;
>
> data = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
> if (IS_ERR(data))
>
Doesn't this change break legitimate requests like
char buffer[20000];
memset(buffer, ' ', sizeof(buffer));
memcpy(buffer + sizeof(buffer) - 10, "foo", 3);
write(fd, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
?
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2] smackfs: restrict bytes count in smackfs write functions
2021-01-28 12:59 ` Tetsuo Handa
@ 2021-01-28 13:27 ` Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov
2021-01-28 14:24 ` Tetsuo Handa
0 siblings, 1 reply; 10+ messages in thread
From: Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov @ 2021-01-28 13:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: penguin-kernel
Cc: andreyknvl, casey, jmorris, linux-kernel, linux-security-module,
mhocko, serge, snovitoll, syzbot+a71a442385a0b2815497
> > /*
> > + * No partial write.
> > * Enough data must be present.
> > */
> > if (*ppos != 0)
> > return -EINVAL;
> > + if (count == 0 || count > PAGE_SIZE)
> > + return -EINVAL;
> >
> > data = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
> > if (IS_ERR(data))
> >
>
> Doesn't this change break legitimate requests like
>
> char buffer[20000];
>
> memset(buffer, ' ', sizeof(buffer));
> memcpy(buffer + sizeof(buffer) - 10, "foo", 3);
> write(fd, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
>
> ?
It does, in this case. Then I need to patch another version with
whitespace stripping before, after label. I just followed the same thing
that I see in security/selinux/selinuxfs.c sel_write_enforce() etc.
It has the same memdup_user_nul() and count >= PAGE_SIZE check prior to that.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2] smackfs: restrict bytes count in smackfs write functions
2021-01-28 13:27 ` Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov
@ 2021-01-28 14:24 ` Tetsuo Handa
2021-01-29 2:10 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 1 reply; 10+ messages in thread
From: Tetsuo Handa @ 2021-01-28 14:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov
Cc: andreyknvl, casey, jmorris, linux-kernel, linux-security-module,
mhocko, serge, syzbot+a71a442385a0b2815497
On 2021/01/28 22:27, Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov wrote:
>> Doesn't this change break legitimate requests like
>>
>> char buffer[20000];
>>
>> memset(buffer, ' ', sizeof(buffer));
>> memcpy(buffer + sizeof(buffer) - 10, "foo", 3);
>> write(fd, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
>>
>> ?
>
> It does, in this case. Then I need to patch another version with
> whitespace stripping before, after label. I just followed the same thing
> that I see in security/selinux/selinuxfs.c sel_write_enforce() etc.
>
> It has the same memdup_user_nul() and count >= PAGE_SIZE check prior to that.
Since sel_write_enforce() accepts string representation of an integer value, PAGE_SIZE is sufficient.
But since smk_write_onlycap() and smk_write_relabel_self() accept list of space-delimited words,
you need to prove why PAGE_SIZE does not break userspace in your patch.
Also, due to the "too small to fail" memory-allocation rule, memdup_user_nul() for
count < PAGE_SIZE * 8 bytes is "never fails with -ENOMEM unless SIGKILLed by the OOM
killer". Also, memdup_user_nul() for count >= PAGE_SIZE * (1 << MAX_ORDER) - 1 bytes is
"never succeeds". Thus, you can safely add
if (count >= PAGE_SIZE * (1 << MAX_ORDER) - 1)
return -EINVAL; // or -ENOMEM if you want compatibility
to smackfs write functions. But it is a strange requirement that the caller of
memdup_user_nul() has to be aware of upper limit in a way that we won't hit
/*
* There are several places where we assume that the order value is sane
* so bail out early if the request is out of bound.
*/
if (unlikely(order >= MAX_ORDER)) {
WARN_ON_ONCE(!(gfp_mask & __GFP_NOWARN));
return NULL;
}
path. memdup_user_nul() side should do
if (count >= PAGE_SIZE * (1 << MAX_ORDER) - 1)
return -ENOMEM;
check and return -ENOMEM if memdup_user_nul() does not want to use __GFP_NOWARN.
I still believe that memdup_user_nul() side should be fixed.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2] smackfs: restrict bytes count in smackfs write functions
2021-01-28 14:24 ` Tetsuo Handa
@ 2021-01-29 2:10 ` Casey Schaufler
2021-02-02 19:13 ` Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov
0 siblings, 1 reply; 10+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2021-01-29 2:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tetsuo Handa, Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov
Cc: andreyknvl, jmorris, linux-kernel, linux-security-module, mhocko,
serge, syzbot+a71a442385a0b2815497, Casey Schaufler
On 1/28/2021 6:24 AM, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> On 2021/01/28 22:27, Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov wrote:
>>> Doesn't this change break legitimate requests like
>>>
>>> char buffer[20000];
>>>
>>> memset(buffer, ' ', sizeof(buffer));
>>> memcpy(buffer + sizeof(buffer) - 10, "foo", 3);
>>> write(fd, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
>>>
>>> ?
>> It does, in this case. Then I need to patch another version with
>> whitespace stripping before, after label. I just followed the same thing
>> that I see in security/selinux/selinuxfs.c sel_write_enforce() etc.
>>
>> It has the same memdup_user_nul() and count >= PAGE_SIZE check prior to that.
> Since sel_write_enforce() accepts string representation of an integer value, PAGE_SIZE is sufficient.
> But since smk_write_onlycap() and smk_write_relabel_self() accept list of space-delimited words,
> you need to prove why PAGE_SIZE does not break userspace in your patch.
if PAGE_SIZE >= SMK_LOADSIZE all legitimate requests can be made
using PAGE_SIZE as a limit. Your example with 19990 spaces before
the data demonstrates that the interface is inadequately documented.
Tizen and Automotive Grade Linux are going to be fine with a PAGE_SIZE
limit. The best way to address this concern is to go ahead with the
PAGE_SIZE limit and create ABI documents for the smackfs interfaces.
I will take your patch for the former and create a patch for the latter.
>
> Also, due to the "too small to fail" memory-allocation rule, memdup_user_nul() for
> count < PAGE_SIZE * 8 bytes is "never fails with -ENOMEM unless SIGKILLed by the OOM
> killer". Also, memdup_user_nul() for count >= PAGE_SIZE * (1 << MAX_ORDER) - 1 bytes is
> "never succeeds". Thus, you can safely add
>
> if (count >= PAGE_SIZE * (1 << MAX_ORDER) - 1)
> return -EINVAL; // or -ENOMEM if you want compatibility
>
> to smackfs write functions. But it is a strange requirement that the caller of
> memdup_user_nul() has to be aware of upper limit in a way that we won't hit
>
> /*
> * There are several places where we assume that the order value is sane
> * so bail out early if the request is out of bound.
> */
> if (unlikely(order >= MAX_ORDER)) {
> WARN_ON_ONCE(!(gfp_mask & __GFP_NOWARN));
> return NULL;
> }
>
> path. memdup_user_nul() side should do
>
> if (count >= PAGE_SIZE * (1 << MAX_ORDER) - 1)
> return -ENOMEM;
>
> check and return -ENOMEM if memdup_user_nul() does not want to use __GFP_NOWARN.
> I still believe that memdup_user_nul() side should be fixed.
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2] smackfs: restrict bytes count in smackfs write functions
2021-01-29 2:10 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2021-02-02 19:13 ` Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov
2021-02-02 19:33 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 1 reply; 10+ messages in thread
From: Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov @ 2021-02-02 19:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey
Cc: andreyknvl, jmorris, linux-kernel, linux-security-module, mhocko,
penguin-kernel, serge, snovitoll, syzbot+a71a442385a0b2815497
> if PAGE_SIZE >= SMK_LOADSIZE all legitimate requests can be made
> using PAGE_SIZE as a limit. Your example with 19990 spaces before
> the data demonstrates that the interface is inadequately documented.
> Tizen and Automotive Grade Linux are going to be fine with a PAGE_SIZE
> limit. The best way to address this concern is to go ahead with the
> PAGE_SIZE limit and create ABI documents for the smackfs interfaces.
> I will take your patch for the former and create a patch for the latter.
Please let me know if there is anything else required for this patch.
AFAIU, we agreed with PAGE_SIZE as the limit.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2] smackfs: restrict bytes count in smackfs write functions
2021-02-02 19:13 ` Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov
@ 2021-02-02 19:33 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2021-02-02 19:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov
Cc: andreyknvl, jmorris, linux-kernel, linux-security-module, mhocko,
penguin-kernel, serge, syzbot+a71a442385a0b2815497,
Casey Schaufler
On 2/2/2021 11:13 AM, Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov wrote:
>> if PAGE_SIZE >= SMK_LOADSIZE all legitimate requests can be made
>> using PAGE_SIZE as a limit. Your example with 19990 spaces before
>> the data demonstrates that the interface is inadequately documented.
>> Tizen and Automotive Grade Linux are going to be fine with a PAGE_SIZE
>> limit. The best way to address this concern is to go ahead with the
>> PAGE_SIZE limit and create ABI documents for the smackfs interfaces.
>> I will take your patch for the former and create a patch for the latter.
> Please let me know if there is anything else required for this patch.
> AFAIU, we agreed with PAGE_SIZE as the limit.
I am in the process of adding your patch to smack-next for 5.12.
I will have a separate documentation patch.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2021-02-02 19:36 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2021-01-24 14:36 [PATCH] smackfs: restrict bytes count in smackfs write functions Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov
2021-01-25 18:08 ` Casey Schaufler
2021-01-25 22:42 ` Tetsuo Handa
2021-01-28 11:58 ` [PATCH v2] " Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov
2021-01-28 12:59 ` Tetsuo Handa
2021-01-28 13:27 ` Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov
2021-01-28 14:24 ` Tetsuo Handa
2021-01-29 2:10 ` Casey Schaufler
2021-02-02 19:13 ` Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov
2021-02-02 19:33 ` Casey Schaufler
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