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From: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com>,
	"Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>,
	Saravana Kannan <saravanak@google.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>, Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>,
	Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v2] arm64: spectre: Prevent lockdep splat on v4 mitigation enable path
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 2021 14:03:46 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210218140346.5224-1-will@kernel.org> (raw)

The Spectre-v4 workaround is re-configured when resuming from suspend,
as the firmware may have re-enabled the mitigation despite the user
previously asking for it to be disabled.

Enabling or disabling the workaround can result in an undefined
instruction exception on CPUs which implement PSTATE.SSBS but only allow
it to be configured by adjusting the SPSR on exception return. We handle
this by installing an 'undef hook' which effectively emulates the access.

Installing this hook requires us to take a couple of spinlocks both to
avoid corrupting the internal list of hooks but also to ensure that we
don't run into an unhandled exception. Unfortunately, when resuming from
suspend, we haven't yet called rcu_idle_exit() and so lockdep gets angry
about "suspicious RCU usage". In doing so, it tries to print a warning,
which leads it to get even more suspicious, this time about itself:

 |  rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
 |  RCU used illegally from extended quiescent state!
 |  1 lock held by swapper/0:
 |   #0: (logbuf_lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: vprintk_emit+0x88/0x198
 |
 |  Call trace:
 |   dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1d8
 |   show_stack+0x18/0x24
 |   dump_stack+0xe0/0x17c
 |   lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x11c/0x134
 |   trace_lock_release+0xa0/0x160
 |   lock_release+0x3c/0x290
 |   _raw_spin_unlock+0x44/0x80
 |   vprintk_emit+0xbc/0x198
 |   vprintk_default+0x44/0x6c
 |   vprintk_func+0x1f4/0x1fc
 |   printk+0x54/0x7c
 |   lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x30/0x134
 |   trace_lock_acquire+0xa0/0x188
 |   lock_acquire+0x50/0x2fc
 |   _raw_spin_lock+0x68/0x80
 |   spectre_v4_enable_mitigation+0xa8/0x30c
 |   __cpu_suspend_exit+0xd4/0x1a8
 |   cpu_suspend+0xa0/0x104
 |   psci_cpu_suspend_enter+0x3c/0x5c
 |   psci_enter_idle_state+0x44/0x74
 |   cpuidle_enter_state+0x148/0x2f8
 |   cpuidle_enter+0x38/0x50
 |   do_idle+0x1f0/0x2b4

Prevent these splats by running __cpu_suspend_exit() with RCU watching.

Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Saravana Kannan <saravanak@google.com>
Suggested-by: "Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Fixes: c28762070ca6 ("arm64: Rewrite Spectre-v4 mitigation code")
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
---

v2: Use RCU_NONIDLE() instead of eliding the spinlock

 arch/arm64/kernel/suspend.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/suspend.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/suspend.c
index a67b37a7a47e..d7564891ffe1 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/suspend.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/suspend.c
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ int cpu_suspend(unsigned long arg, int (*fn)(unsigned long))
 		if (!ret)
 			ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	} else {
-		__cpu_suspend_exit();
+		RCU_NONIDLE(__cpu_suspend_exit());
 	}
 
 	unpause_graph_tracing();
-- 
2.30.0.478.g8a0d178c01-goog


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             reply	other threads:[~2021-02-18 14:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-02-18 14:03 Will Deacon [this message]
2021-02-18 15:08 ` [PATCH v2] arm64: spectre: Prevent lockdep splat on v4 mitigation enable path Paul E. McKenney
2021-02-18 15:37 ` Marc Zyngier
2021-02-18 15:44 ` Mark Rutland
2021-02-19 19:16 ` Will Deacon

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