All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Jian Cai <jiancai@google.com>
To: unlisted-recipients:; (no To-header on input)
Cc: ndesaulniers@google.com, manojgupta@google.com,
	llozano@google.com, clang-built-linux@googlegroups.com,
	"Jian Cai" <jiancai@google.com>,
	"Nathan Chancellor" <nathan@kernel.org>,
	"David Laight" <David.Laight@aculab.com>,
	"Will Deacon" <will@kernel.org>,
	"Russell King" <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>,
	"Russell King" <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	"Catalin Marinas" <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Masahiro Yamada" <masahiroy@kernel.org>,
	"Krzysztof Kozlowski" <krzk@kernel.org>,
	"Ard Biesheuvel" <ardb@kernel.org>,
	"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"Andreas Färber" <afaerber@suse.de>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@kernel.org>,
	"Fangrui Song" <maskray@google.com>,
	"Marc Zyngier" <maz@kernel.org>,
	"Mike Rapoport" <rppt@kernel.org>,
	"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Mark Rutland" <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	"David Brazdil" <dbrazdil@google.com>,
	"James Morse" <james.morse@arm.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v5] ARM: Implement SLS mitigation
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2021 18:31:07 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210223023125.2265845-1-jiancai@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210219230841.875875-1-jiancai@google.com>

This patch adds CONFIG_HARDEN_SLS_ALL that can be used to turn on
-mharden-sls=all, which mitigates the straight-line speculation
vulnerability, speculative execution of the instruction following some
unconditional jumps. Notice -mharden-sls= has other options as below,
and this config turns on the strongest option.

all: enable all mitigations against Straight Line Speculation that are implemented.
none: disable all mitigations against Straight Line Speculation.
retbr: enable the mitigation against Straight Line Speculation for RET and BR instructions.
blr: enable the mitigation against Straight Line Speculation for BLR instructions.

Links:
https://reviews.llvm.org/D93221
https://reviews.llvm.org/D81404
https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability/downloads/straight-line-speculation
https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability/frequently-asked-questions#SLS2

Suggested-by: Manoj Gupta <manojgupta@google.com>
Suggested-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Suggested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Suggested-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jian Cai <jiancai@google.com>
---

Changes v4->v5:
  Removed "default n" and made the description target indepdent in
  Kconfig.hardening.


 arch/arm/Makefile                  |  4 ++++
 arch/arm/include/asm/vmlinux.lds.h |  4 ++++
 arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S      |  1 +
 arch/arm64/Makefile                |  4 ++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S    |  5 +++++
 security/Kconfig.hardening         | 10 ++++++++++
 6 files changed, 28 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm/Makefile b/arch/arm/Makefile
index 4aaec9599e8a..11d89ef32da9 100644
--- a/arch/arm/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm/Makefile
@@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ CHECKFLAGS	+= -D__ARMEL__
 KBUILD_LDFLAGS	+= -EL
 endif
 
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_HARDEN_SLS_ALL), y)
+KBUILD_CFLAGS  += -mharden-sls=all
+endif
+
 #
 # The Scalar Replacement of Aggregates (SRA) optimization pass in GCC 4.9 and
 # later may result in code being generated that handles signed short and signed
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/vmlinux.lds.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/vmlinux.lds.h
index 4a91428c324d..c7f9717511ca 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/vmlinux.lds.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/vmlinux.lds.h
@@ -145,3 +145,7 @@
 		__edtcm_data = .;					\
 	}								\
 	. = __dtcm_start + SIZEOF(.data_dtcm);
+
+#define SLS_TEXT							\
+		ALIGN_FUNCTION();					\
+		*(.text.__llvm_slsblr_thunk_*)
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
index f7f4620d59c3..e71f2bc97bae 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ SECTIONS
 	.text : {			/* Real text segment		*/
 		_stext = .;		/* Text and read-only data	*/
 		ARM_TEXT
+		SLS_TEXT
 	}
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ALIGN_RODATA
diff --git a/arch/arm64/Makefile b/arch/arm64/Makefile
index 90309208bb28..ca7299b356a9 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm64/Makefile
@@ -34,6 +34,10 @@ $(warning LSE atomics not supported by binutils)
   endif
 endif
 
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_HARDEN_SLS_ALL), y)
+KBUILD_CFLAGS  += -mharden-sls=all
+endif
+
 cc_has_k_constraint := $(call try-run,echo				\
 	'int main(void) {						\
 		asm volatile("and w0, w0, %w0" :: "K" (4294967295));	\
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
index 4c0b0c89ad59..f8912e42ffcd 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
@@ -93,6 +93,10 @@ jiffies = jiffies_64;
 #define TRAMP_TEXT
 #endif
 
+#define SLS_TEXT					\
+	ALIGN_FUNCTION();				\
+	*(.text.__llvm_slsblr_thunk_*)
+
 /*
  * The size of the PE/COFF section that covers the kernel image, which
  * runs from _stext to _edata, must be a round multiple of the PE/COFF
@@ -144,6 +148,7 @@ SECTIONS
 			HIBERNATE_TEXT
 			TRAMP_TEXT
 			*(.fixup)
+			SLS_TEXT
 			*(.gnu.warning)
 		. = ALIGN(16);
 		*(.got)			/* Global offset table		*/
diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening
index 269967c4fc1b..146b75a79d9e 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig.hardening
+++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening
@@ -121,6 +121,16 @@ choice
 
 endchoice
 
+config HARDEN_SLS_ALL
+	bool "enable SLS vulnerability hardening"
+	default n
+	depends on $(cc-option,-mharden-sls=all)
+	help
+	  Enables straight-line speculation vulnerability hardening on ARM and ARM64
+	  architectures. It inserts speculation barrier sequences (SB or DSB+ISB
+	  depending on the target architecture) after RET and BR, and replacing
+	  BLR with BL+BR sequence.
+
 config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_VERBOSE
 	bool "Report forcefully initialized variables"
 	depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
-- 
2.30.0.617.g56c4b15f3c-goog


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Jian Cai <jiancai@google.com>
Cc: "Mark Rutland" <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	"Catalin Marinas" <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
	manojgupta@google.com, "Will Deacon" <will@kernel.org>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@kernel.org>,
	"Fangrui Song" <maskray@google.com>,
	"Marc Zyngier" <maz@kernel.org>,
	"Masahiro Yamada" <masahiroy@kernel.org>,
	"Russell King" <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	"Krzysztof Kozlowski" <krzk@kernel.org>,
	"Ard Biesheuvel" <ardb@kernel.org>,
	clang-built-linux@googlegroups.com, llozano@google.com,
	"David Brazdil" <dbrazdil@google.com>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>, "Jian Cai" <jiancai@google.com>,
	"Nathan Chancellor" <nathan@kernel.org>,
	"Russell King" <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, ndesaulniers@google.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	"David Laight" <David.Laight@aculab.com>,
	"James Morse" <james.morse@arm.com>,
	"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Andreas Färber" <afaerber@suse.de>,
	"Mike Rapoport" <rppt@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v5] ARM: Implement SLS mitigation
Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2021 18:31:07 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210223023125.2265845-1-jiancai@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210219230841.875875-1-jiancai@google.com>

This patch adds CONFIG_HARDEN_SLS_ALL that can be used to turn on
-mharden-sls=all, which mitigates the straight-line speculation
vulnerability, speculative execution of the instruction following some
unconditional jumps. Notice -mharden-sls= has other options as below,
and this config turns on the strongest option.

all: enable all mitigations against Straight Line Speculation that are implemented.
none: disable all mitigations against Straight Line Speculation.
retbr: enable the mitigation against Straight Line Speculation for RET and BR instructions.
blr: enable the mitigation against Straight Line Speculation for BLR instructions.

Links:
https://reviews.llvm.org/D93221
https://reviews.llvm.org/D81404
https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability/downloads/straight-line-speculation
https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability/frequently-asked-questions#SLS2

Suggested-by: Manoj Gupta <manojgupta@google.com>
Suggested-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Suggested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Suggested-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jian Cai <jiancai@google.com>
---

Changes v4->v5:
  Removed "default n" and made the description target indepdent in
  Kconfig.hardening.


 arch/arm/Makefile                  |  4 ++++
 arch/arm/include/asm/vmlinux.lds.h |  4 ++++
 arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S      |  1 +
 arch/arm64/Makefile                |  4 ++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S    |  5 +++++
 security/Kconfig.hardening         | 10 ++++++++++
 6 files changed, 28 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm/Makefile b/arch/arm/Makefile
index 4aaec9599e8a..11d89ef32da9 100644
--- a/arch/arm/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm/Makefile
@@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ CHECKFLAGS	+= -D__ARMEL__
 KBUILD_LDFLAGS	+= -EL
 endif
 
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_HARDEN_SLS_ALL), y)
+KBUILD_CFLAGS  += -mharden-sls=all
+endif
+
 #
 # The Scalar Replacement of Aggregates (SRA) optimization pass in GCC 4.9 and
 # later may result in code being generated that handles signed short and signed
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/vmlinux.lds.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/vmlinux.lds.h
index 4a91428c324d..c7f9717511ca 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/vmlinux.lds.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/vmlinux.lds.h
@@ -145,3 +145,7 @@
 		__edtcm_data = .;					\
 	}								\
 	. = __dtcm_start + SIZEOF(.data_dtcm);
+
+#define SLS_TEXT							\
+		ALIGN_FUNCTION();					\
+		*(.text.__llvm_slsblr_thunk_*)
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
index f7f4620d59c3..e71f2bc97bae 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ SECTIONS
 	.text : {			/* Real text segment		*/
 		_stext = .;		/* Text and read-only data	*/
 		ARM_TEXT
+		SLS_TEXT
 	}
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ALIGN_RODATA
diff --git a/arch/arm64/Makefile b/arch/arm64/Makefile
index 90309208bb28..ca7299b356a9 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm64/Makefile
@@ -34,6 +34,10 @@ $(warning LSE atomics not supported by binutils)
   endif
 endif
 
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_HARDEN_SLS_ALL), y)
+KBUILD_CFLAGS  += -mharden-sls=all
+endif
+
 cc_has_k_constraint := $(call try-run,echo				\
 	'int main(void) {						\
 		asm volatile("and w0, w0, %w0" :: "K" (4294967295));	\
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
index 4c0b0c89ad59..f8912e42ffcd 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
@@ -93,6 +93,10 @@ jiffies = jiffies_64;
 #define TRAMP_TEXT
 #endif
 
+#define SLS_TEXT					\
+	ALIGN_FUNCTION();				\
+	*(.text.__llvm_slsblr_thunk_*)
+
 /*
  * The size of the PE/COFF section that covers the kernel image, which
  * runs from _stext to _edata, must be a round multiple of the PE/COFF
@@ -144,6 +148,7 @@ SECTIONS
 			HIBERNATE_TEXT
 			TRAMP_TEXT
 			*(.fixup)
+			SLS_TEXT
 			*(.gnu.warning)
 		. = ALIGN(16);
 		*(.got)			/* Global offset table		*/
diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening
index 269967c4fc1b..146b75a79d9e 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig.hardening
+++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening
@@ -121,6 +121,16 @@ choice
 
 endchoice
 
+config HARDEN_SLS_ALL
+	bool "enable SLS vulnerability hardening"
+	default n
+	depends on $(cc-option,-mharden-sls=all)
+	help
+	  Enables straight-line speculation vulnerability hardening on ARM and ARM64
+	  architectures. It inserts speculation barrier sequences (SB or DSB+ISB
+	  depending on the target architecture) after RET and BR, and replacing
+	  BLR with BL+BR sequence.
+
 config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_VERBOSE
 	bool "Report forcefully initialized variables"
 	depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
-- 
2.30.0.617.g56c4b15f3c-goog


_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel

  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-02-23  2:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 58+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-02-12  5:14 [PATCH] ARM: Implement Clang's SLS mitigation Jian Cai
2021-02-12  5:14 ` Jian Cai
2021-02-12  5:55 ` Nathan Chancellor
2021-02-12  5:55   ` Nathan Chancellor
2021-02-12 10:41   ` David Laight
2021-02-12 10:41     ` David Laight
2021-02-12 19:52     ` [PATCH v2] " Jian Cai
2021-02-12 19:52       ` Jian Cai
2021-02-17  9:49       ` Will Deacon
2021-02-17  9:49         ` Will Deacon
2021-02-17 11:05         ` David Laight
2021-02-17 11:05           ` David Laight
2021-03-25 14:01         ` Linus Walleij
2021-03-25 14:01           ` Linus Walleij
2021-02-17 18:20       ` Nick Desaulniers
2021-02-17 18:20         ` Nick Desaulniers
2021-02-19 20:18       ` [PATCH v3] ARM: Implement " Jian Cai
2021-02-19 20:18         ` Jian Cai
2021-02-19 20:30         ` Nathan Chancellor
2021-02-19 20:30           ` Nathan Chancellor
2021-02-19 23:08         ` [PATCH v4] " Jian Cai
2021-02-19 23:08           ` Jian Cai
2021-02-21 10:13           ` Russell King - ARM Linux admin
2021-02-21 10:13             ` Russell King - ARM Linux admin
2021-02-22 11:58           ` Will Deacon
2021-02-22 11:58             ` Will Deacon
2021-02-22 21:50             ` Jian Cai
2021-02-22 21:50               ` Jian Cai
2021-02-23 10:04               ` Will Deacon
2021-02-23 10:04                 ` Will Deacon
2021-03-03 15:18                 ` Linus Walleij
2021-03-03 15:18                   ` Linus Walleij
2021-03-03 15:29                   ` David Laight
2021-03-03 15:29                     ` David Laight
2021-03-03 15:31                     ` Linus Walleij
2021-03-03 15:31                       ` Linus Walleij
2021-02-23  2:31           ` Jian Cai [this message]
2021-02-23  2:31             ` [PATCH v5] " Jian Cai
2021-02-23  2:35             ` Jian Cai
2021-02-23  2:35               ` Jian Cai
2021-03-03 15:04               ` Linus Walleij
2021-03-03 15:04                 ` Linus Walleij
2021-03-04 23:22                 ` Jian Cai
2021-03-04 23:22                   ` Jian Cai
2021-03-06 12:25                   ` Linus Walleij
2021-03-06 12:25                     ` Linus Walleij
2021-03-10  4:43                     ` Jian Cai
2021-03-10  4:43                       ` Jian Cai
2021-03-22 11:45                       ` Linus Walleij
2021-03-22 11:45                         ` Linus Walleij
2021-03-23 22:39                         ` Jian Cai
2021-03-23 22:39                           ` Jian Cai
2021-03-05  0:53               ` [PATCH v6] " Jian Cai
2021-03-05  0:53                 ` Jian Cai
2021-03-05  9:52                 ` Will Deacon
2021-03-05  9:52                   ` Will Deacon
2021-03-06 12:27                   ` Linus Walleij
2021-03-06 12:27                     ` Linus Walleij

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20210223023125.2265845-1-jiancai@google.com \
    --to=jiancai@google.com \
    --cc=David.Laight@aculab.com \
    --cc=afaerber@suse.de \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=ardb@kernel.org \
    --cc=arnd@arndb.de \
    --cc=catalin.marinas@arm.com \
    --cc=clang-built-linux@googlegroups.com \
    --cc=dbrazdil@google.com \
    --cc=james.morse@arm.com \
    --cc=jmorris@namei.org \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=krzk@kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux@armlinux.org.uk \
    --cc=llozano@google.com \
    --cc=manojgupta@google.com \
    --cc=mark.rutland@arm.com \
    --cc=masahiroy@kernel.org \
    --cc=maskray@google.com \
    --cc=maz@kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@kernel.org \
    --cc=nathan@kernel.org \
    --cc=ndesaulniers@google.com \
    --cc=rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk \
    --cc=rppt@kernel.org \
    --cc=serge@hallyn.com \
    --cc=will@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.