All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
	Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
	Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
	Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>,
	Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@intel.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v23 22/28] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support
Date: Tue, 16 Mar 2021 08:10:48 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210316151054.5405-23-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210316151054.5405-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>

Introduce basic shadow stack enabling/disabling/allocation routines.
A task's shadow stack is allocated from memory with VM_SHSTK flag and has
a fixed size of min(RLIMIT_STACK, 4GB).

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h       |  28 ++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h |   5 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/Makefile         |   2 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cet.c            | 147 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 182 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cet.c

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5750fbcbb952
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _ASM_X86_CET_H
+#define _ASM_X86_CET_H
+
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+struct task_struct;
+/*
+ * Per-thread CET status
+ */
+struct cet_status {
+	unsigned long	shstk_base;
+	unsigned long	shstk_size;
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET
+int cet_setup_shstk(void);
+void cet_disable_shstk(void);
+void cet_free_shstk(struct task_struct *p);
+#else
+static inline void cet_disable_shstk(void) {}
+static inline void cet_free_shstk(struct task_struct *p) {}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
+
+#endif /* _ASM_X86_CET_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index dc6d149bf851..3fce5062261b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ struct vm86;
 #include <asm/unwind_hints.h>
 #include <asm/vmxfeatures.h>
 #include <asm/vdso/processor.h>
+#include <asm/cet.h>
 
 #include <linux/personality.h>
 #include <linux/cache.h>
@@ -535,6 +536,10 @@ struct thread_struct {
 
 	unsigned int		sig_on_uaccess_err:1;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET
+	struct cet_status	cet;
+#endif
+
 	/* Floating point and extended processor state */
 	struct fpu		fpu;
 	/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
index 2ddf08351f0b..ed77517e527a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
@@ -150,6 +150,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER)	+= unwind_frame.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_GUESS)		+= unwind_guess.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT)		+= sev-es.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_CET)			+= cet.o
+
 ###
 # 64 bit specific files
 ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_64),y)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d25a03215984
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * cet.c - Control-flow Enforcement (CET)
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2019, Intel Corporation.
+ * Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
+#include <linux/compat.h>
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+#include <asm/user.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/internal.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/types.h>
+#include <asm/cet.h>
+
+static void start_update_msrs(void)
+{
+	fpregs_lock();
+	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD))
+		__fpregs_load_activate();
+}
+
+static void end_update_msrs(void)
+{
+	fpregs_unlock();
+}
+
+static unsigned long cet_get_shstk_addr(void)
+{
+	struct fpu *fpu = &current->thread.fpu;
+	unsigned long ssp = 0;
+
+	fpregs_lock();
+
+	if (fpregs_state_valid(fpu, smp_processor_id())) {
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, ssp);
+	} else {
+		struct cet_user_state *p;
+
+		p = get_xsave_addr(&fpu->state.xsave, XFEATURE_CET_USER);
+		if (p)
+			ssp = p->user_ssp;
+	}
+
+	fpregs_unlock();
+	return ssp;
+}
+
+static unsigned long alloc_shstk(unsigned long size, int flags)
+{
+	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+	unsigned long addr, populate;
+
+	/* VM_SHSTK requires MAP_ANONYMOUS, MAP_PRIVATE */
+	flags |= MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE;
+
+	mmap_write_lock(mm);
+	addr = do_mmap(NULL, 0, size, PROT_READ, flags, VM_SHSTK, 0,
+		       &populate, NULL);
+	mmap_write_unlock(mm);
+
+	if (populate)
+		mm_populate(addr, populate);
+
+	return addr;
+}
+
+int cet_setup_shstk(void)
+{
+	unsigned long addr, size;
+	struct cet_status *cet = &current->thread.cet;
+
+	if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	size = round_up(min(rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK), 1UL << 32), PAGE_SIZE);
+	addr = alloc_shstk(size, 0);
+
+	if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr))
+		return PTR_ERR((void *)addr);
+
+	cet->shstk_base = addr;
+	cet->shstk_size = size;
+
+	start_update_msrs();
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, addr + size);
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, CET_SHSTK_EN);
+	end_update_msrs();
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void cet_disable_shstk(void)
+{
+	struct cet_status *cet = &current->thread.cet;
+	u64 msr_val;
+
+	if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) ||
+	    !cet->shstk_size || !cet->shstk_base)
+		return;
+
+	start_update_msrs();
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, msr_val);
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, msr_val & ~CET_SHSTK_EN);
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, 0);
+	end_update_msrs();
+
+	cet_free_shstk(current);
+}
+
+void cet_free_shstk(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	struct cet_status *cet = &tsk->thread.cet;
+
+	if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) ||
+	    !cet->shstk_size || !cet->shstk_base)
+		return;
+
+	if (!tsk->mm || tsk->mm != current->mm)
+		return;
+
+	while (1) {
+		int r;
+
+		r = vm_munmap(cet->shstk_base, cet->shstk_size);
+
+		/*
+		 * Retry if mmap_lock is not available.
+		 */
+		if (r == -EINTR) {
+			cond_resched();
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(r);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	cet->shstk_base = 0;
+	cet->shstk_size = 0;
+}
-- 
2.21.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-03-16 15:14 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 66+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-03-16 15:10 [PATCH v23 00/28] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-03-16 15:10 ` [PATCH v23 01/28] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2021-03-16 15:10 ` [PATCH v23 02/28] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode control-flow protection Yu-cheng Yu
2021-03-16 15:10 ` [PATCH v23 03/28] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2021-03-16 15:10 ` [PATCH v23 04/28] x86/cpufeatures: Introduce X86_FEATURE_CET and setup functions Yu-cheng Yu
2021-03-16 15:10 ` [PATCH v23 05/28] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Yu-cheng Yu
2021-03-16 15:10 ` [PATCH v23 06/28] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler Yu-cheng Yu
2021-03-16 15:10 ` [PATCH v23 07/28] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages Yu-cheng Yu
2021-03-22  9:13   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-03-22 14:52     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-03-16 15:10 ` [PATCH v23 08/28] x86/mm: Move pmd_write(), pud_write() up in the file Yu-cheng Yu
2021-03-22 11:28   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-03-16 15:10 ` [PATCH v23 09/28] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-03-22 11:29   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-03-16 15:10 ` [PATCH v23 10/28] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2021-03-22 11:30   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-03-16 15:10 ` [PATCH v23 11/28] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-03-22 11:31   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-03-16 15:10 ` [PATCH v23 12/28] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-03-22 10:15   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-03-22 10:46     ` Peter Zijlstra
2021-03-22 11:38       ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-03-16 15:10 ` [PATCH v23 13/28] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2021-03-22 11:33   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-03-16 15:10 ` [PATCH v23 14/28] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2021-03-22 10:38   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-03-22 17:27     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-03-16 15:10 ` [PATCH v23 15/28] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-03-17 15:56   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-03-22 10:46   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-03-16 15:10 ` [PATCH v23 16/28] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly Yu-cheng Yu
2021-03-18  9:47   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-03-18 11:16     ` Borislav Petkov
2021-03-16 15:10 ` [PATCH v23 17/28] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-03-22 10:55   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-03-16 15:10 ` [PATCH v23 18/28] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
2021-03-22 10:57   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-03-26 15:46     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-03-29 10:10       ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-03-16 15:10 ` [PATCH v23 19/28] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-03-16 15:10 ` [PATCH v23 20/28] mm/mprotect: Exclude shadow stack from preserve_write Yu-cheng Yu
2021-03-16 15:10 ` [PATCH v23 21/28] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap() Yu-cheng Yu
2021-03-18 11:42   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-03-18 15:59     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-03-18 16:13       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-03-16 15:10 ` Yu-cheng Yu [this message]
2021-03-18 12:32   ` [PATCH v23 22/28] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support Borislav Petkov
2021-03-18 19:05     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-03-19  9:28       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-03-19 15:15         ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-03-16 15:10 ` [PATCH v23 23/28] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-03-19 12:51   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-03-16 15:10 ` [PATCH v23 24/28] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property() Yu-cheng Yu
2021-03-16 15:10 ` [PATCH v23 25/28] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-03-16 15:10 ` [PATCH v23 26/28] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for " Yu-cheng Yu
2021-03-16 15:10 ` [PATCH v23 27/28] mm: Move arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() to arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h Yu-cheng Yu
2021-03-16 15:10 ` [PATCH v23 28/28] mm: Introduce PROT_SHSTK for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-03-22 11:27   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-03-16 21:15 ` [PATCH v23 00/28] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Peter Zijlstra
2021-03-16 21:34   ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-03-17  9:18     ` Ingo Molnar
2021-03-17 10:14       ` Peter Zijlstra
2021-03-19 16:24       ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-03-19 21:43   ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-03-23 20:49     ` Peter Zijlstra
2021-03-23 21:03       ` Yu, Yu-cheng

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20210316151054.5405-23-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com \
    --to=yu-cheng.yu@intel.com \
    --cc=Dave.Martin@arm.com \
    --cc=arnd@arndb.de \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=bsingharora@gmail.com \
    --cc=corbet@lwn.net \
    --cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=esyr@redhat.com \
    --cc=fweimer@redhat.com \
    --cc=gorcunov@gmail.com \
    --cc=haitao.huang@intel.com \
    --cc=hjl.tools@gmail.com \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=jannh@google.com \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=linux-api@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-arch@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=luto@kernel.org \
    --cc=mike.kravetz@oracle.com \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=nadav.amit@gmail.com \
    --cc=oleg@redhat.com \
    --cc=pavel@ucw.cz \
    --cc=pengfei.xu@intel.com \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=ravi.v.shankar@intel.com \
    --cc=rdunlap@infradead.org \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com \
    --cc=weijiang.yang@intel.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.