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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: "James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>,
	"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	"Al Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@amacapital.net>,
	"Anton Ivanov" <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	"Jeff Dike" <jdike@addtoit.com>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Michael Kerrisk" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
	"Richard Weinberger" <richard@nod.at>,
	"Shuah Khan" <shuah@kernel.org>,
	"Vincent Dagonneau" <vincent.dagonneau@ssi.gouv.fr>,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v30 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management
Date: Fri, 19 Mar 2021 11:40:19 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <202103191114.C87C5E2B69@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210316204252.427806-3-mic@digikod.net>

On Tue, Mar 16, 2021 at 09:42:42PM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
> 
> A Landlock ruleset is mainly a red-black tree with Landlock rules as
> nodes.  This enables quick update and lookup to match a requested
> access, e.g. to a file.  A ruleset is usable through a dedicated file
> descriptor (cf. following commit implementing syscalls) which enables a
> process to create and populate a ruleset with new rules.
> 
> A domain is a ruleset tied to a set of processes.  This group of rules
> defines the security policy enforced on these processes and their future
> children.  A domain can transition to a new domain which is the
> intersection of all its constraints and those of a ruleset provided by
> the current process.  This modification only impact the current process.
> This means that a process can only gain more constraints (i.e. lose
> accesses) over time.
> 
> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210316204252.427806-3-mic@digikod.net

(Aside: you appear to be self-adding your Link: tags -- AIUI, this is
normally done by whoever pulls your series. I've only seen Link: tags
added when needing to refer to something else not included in the
series.)

> [...]
> +static void put_rule(struct landlock_rule *const rule)
> +{
> +	might_sleep();
> +	if (!rule)
> +		return;
> +	landlock_put_object(rule->object);
> +	kfree(rule);
> +}

I'd expect this to be named "release" rather than "put" since it doesn't
do any lifetime reference counting.

> +static void build_check_ruleset(void)
> +{
> +	const struct landlock_ruleset ruleset = {
> +		.num_rules = ~0,
> +		.num_layers = ~0,
> +	};
> +
> +	BUILD_BUG_ON(ruleset.num_rules < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_RULES);
> +	BUILD_BUG_ON(ruleset.num_layers < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS);
> +}

This is checking that the largest possible stored value is correctly
within the LANDLOCK_MAX_* macro value?

> [...]

The locking all looks right, and given your test coverage and syzkaller
work, it's hard for me to think of ways to prove it out any better. :)

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>


-- 
Kees Cook

  reply	other threads:[~2021-03-19 18:41 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-03-16 20:42 [PATCH v30 00/12] Landlock LSM Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-16 20:42 ` [PATCH v30 01/12] landlock: Add object management Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-19 18:13   ` Kees Cook
2021-03-19 18:57     ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-16 20:42 ` [PATCH v30 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-19 18:40   ` Kees Cook [this message]
2021-03-19 19:03     ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-19 19:15       ` Kees Cook
2021-03-24 20:31       ` James Morris
2021-03-25  9:29         ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-23  0:13   ` Jann Horn
2021-03-16 20:42 ` [PATCH v30 03/12] landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-19 18:45   ` Kees Cook
2021-03-19 19:07     ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-16 20:42 ` [PATCH v30 04/12] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-19 18:45   ` Kees Cook
2021-03-16 20:42 ` [PATCH v30 05/12] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-19 17:24   ` Kees Cook
2021-03-16 20:42 ` [PATCH v30 06/12] fs,security: Add sb_delete hook Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-19 17:24   ` Kees Cook
2021-03-16 20:42 ` [PATCH v30 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-18 23:10   ` James Morris
2021-03-19 18:57   ` Kees Cook
2021-03-19 19:19     ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-23 19:30       ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-23  0:13   ` Jann Horn
2021-03-23 15:55     ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-23 17:49       ` Jann Horn
2021-03-23 19:22         ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-24  3:10           ` Jann Horn
2021-03-16 20:42 ` [PATCH v30 08/12] landlock: Add syscall implementations Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-19 19:06   ` Kees Cook
2021-03-19 21:53     ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-24 15:03       ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-16 20:42 ` [PATCH v30 09/12] arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-16 20:42 ` [PATCH v30 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add user space tests Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-19 17:56   ` Kees Cook
2021-03-19 18:41     ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-19 19:11       ` Kees Cook
2021-03-19 21:57         ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-16 20:42 ` [PATCH v30 11/12] samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-19 17:26   ` Kees Cook
2021-03-16 20:42 ` [PATCH v30 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-19 18:03   ` Kees Cook
2021-03-19 18:54     ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-23 19:25       ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-24 16:21       ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-18 23:26 ` [PATCH v30 00/12] Landlock LSM James Morris
2021-03-18 23:26   ` James Morris
2021-03-19 15:52   ` Mickaël Salaün

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