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From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	"Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	"Kleen, Andi" <andi.kleen@intel.com>,
	"Yamahata, Isaku" <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>,
	Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>,
	Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>,
	Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>,
	David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [RFCv2 04/13] x86/kvm: Use bounce buffers for KVM memory protection
Date: Fri, 16 Apr 2021 18:40:57 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210416154106.23721-5-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210416154106.23721-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>

Mirror SEV, use SWIOTLB always if KVM memory protection is enabled.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                   |  1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h |  7 +++--
 arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c              |  2 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c      |  3 +-
 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c          | 44 ---------------------------
 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c   | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 6 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index d197b3beb904..c51d14db5620 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -812,6 +812,7 @@ config KVM_GUEST
 	select ARCH_CPUIDLE_HALTPOLL
 	select X86_HV_CALLBACK_VECTOR
 	select X86_MEM_ENCRYPT_COMMON
+	select SWIOTLB
 	default y
 	help
 	  This option enables various optimizations for running under the KVM
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index 31c4df123aa0..a748b30c2f23 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -47,10 +47,8 @@ int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size);
 
 void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void);
 
-/* Architecture __weak replacement functions */
-void __init mem_encrypt_init(void);
-
 void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void);
+
 bool sme_active(void);
 bool sev_active(void);
 bool sev_es_active(void);
@@ -91,6 +89,9 @@ static inline void mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void) { }
 
 #endif	/* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
 
+/* Architecture __weak replacement functions */
+void __init mem_encrypt_init(void);
+
 /*
  * The __sme_pa() and __sme_pa_nodebug() macros are meant for use when
  * writing to or comparing values from the cr3 register.  Having the
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
index aed6034fcac1..ba179f5ca198 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
 #include <linux/kprobes.h>
 #include <linux/nmi.h>
 #include <linux/swait.h>
+#include <linux/swiotlb.h>
 #include <asm/timer.h>
 #include <asm/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/traps.h>
@@ -765,6 +766,7 @@ static void __init kvm_init_platform(void)
 		pr_info("KVM memory protection enabled\n");
 		mem_protected = true;
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_KVM_MEM_PROTECTED);
+		swiotlb_force = SWIOTLB_FORCE;
 	}
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c
index c2cfa5e7c152..814060a6ceb0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 #include <asm/dma.h>
 #include <asm/xen/swiotlb-xen.h>
 #include <asm/iommu_table.h>
+#include <asm/kvm_para.h>
 
 int swiotlb __read_mostly;
 
@@ -49,7 +50,7 @@ int __init pci_swiotlb_detect_4gb(void)
 	 * buffers are allocated and used for devices that do not support
 	 * the addressing range required for the encryption mask.
 	 */
-	if (sme_active())
+	if (sme_active() || kvm_mem_protected())
 		swiotlb = 1;
 
 	return swiotlb;
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index 9ca477b9b8ba..3478f20fb46f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -409,47 +409,3 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void)
 
 	free_init_pages("unused decrypted", vaddr, vaddr_end);
 }
-
-static void print_mem_encrypt_feature_info(void)
-{
-	pr_info("AMD Memory Encryption Features active:");
-
-	/* Secure Memory Encryption */
-	if (sme_active()) {
-		/*
-		 * SME is mutually exclusive with any of the SEV
-		 * features below.
-		 */
-		pr_cont(" SME\n");
-		return;
-	}
-
-	/* Secure Encrypted Virtualization */
-	if (sev_active())
-		pr_cont(" SEV");
-
-	/* Encrypted Register State */
-	if (sev_es_active())
-		pr_cont(" SEV-ES");
-
-	pr_cont("\n");
-}
-
-/* Architecture __weak replacement functions */
-void __init mem_encrypt_init(void)
-{
-	if (!sme_me_mask)
-		return;
-
-	/* Call into SWIOTLB to update the SWIOTLB DMA buffers */
-	swiotlb_update_mem_attributes();
-
-	/*
-	 * With SEV, we need to unroll the rep string I/O instructions.
-	 */
-	if (sev_active())
-		static_branch_enable(&sev_enable_key);
-
-	print_mem_encrypt_feature_info();
-}
-
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c
index 6bf0718bb72a..351b77361a5d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 #include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
 #include <linux/dma-direct.h>
 #include <asm/kvm_para.h>
+#include <asm/mem_encrypt.h>
 
 /* Override for DMA direct allocation check - ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED */
 bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
@@ -37,3 +38,50 @@ bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
 
 	return false;
 }
+
+static void print_mem_encrypt_feature_info(void)
+{
+	if (kvm_mem_protected()) {
+		pr_info("KVM memory protection enabled\n");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	pr_info("AMD Memory Encryption Features active:");
+
+	/* Secure Memory Encryption */
+	if (sme_active()) {
+		/*
+		 * SME is mutually exclusive with any of the SEV
+		 * features below.
+		 */
+		pr_cont(" SME\n");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/* Secure Encrypted Virtualization */
+	if (sev_active())
+		pr_cont(" SEV");
+
+	/* Encrypted Register State */
+	if (sev_es_active())
+		pr_cont(" SEV-ES");
+
+	pr_cont("\n");
+}
+
+void __init mem_encrypt_init(void)
+{
+	if (!sme_me_mask && !kvm_mem_protected())
+		return;
+
+	/* Call into SWIOTLB to update the SWIOTLB DMA buffers */
+	swiotlb_update_mem_attributes();
+
+	/*
+	 * With SEV, we need to unroll the rep string I/O instructions.
+	 */
+	if (sev_active())
+		static_branch_enable(&sev_enable_key);
+
+	print_mem_encrypt_feature_info();
+}
-- 
2.26.3


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-04-16 15:41 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-04-16 15:40 [RFCv2 00/13] TDX and guest memory unmapping Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-16 15:40 ` [RFCv2 01/13] x86/mm: Move force_dma_unencrypted() to common code Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-16 15:40 ` [RFCv2 02/13] x86/kvm: Introduce KVM memory protection feature Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-16 16:10   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-04-19 10:10     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-16 15:40 ` [RFCv2 03/13] x86/kvm: Make DMA pages shared Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-16 15:40 ` Kirill A. Shutemov [this message]
2021-04-16 16:21   ` [RFCv2 04/13] x86/kvm: Use bounce buffers for KVM memory protection Dave Hansen
2021-04-16 15:40 ` [RFCv2 05/13] x86/kvmclock: Share hvclock memory with the host Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-16 15:40 ` [RFCv2 06/13] x86/realmode: Share trampoline area if KVM memory protection enabled Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-19 16:49   ` Dave Hansen
2021-04-16 15:41 ` [RFCv2 07/13] mm: Add hwpoison_entry_to_pfn() and hwpoison_entry_to_page() Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-16 15:41 ` [RFCv2 08/13] mm/gup: Add FOLL_ALLOW_POISONED Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-16 15:41 ` [RFCv2 09/13] shmem: Fail shmem_getpage_gfp() on poisoned pages Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-16 15:41 ` [RFCv2 10/13] mm: Keep page reference for hwpoison entries Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-16 15:41 ` [RFCv2 11/13] mm: Replace hwpoison entry with present PTE if page got unpoisoned Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-16 15:41 ` [RFCv2 12/13] KVM: passdown struct kvm to hva_to_pfn_slow() Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-16 15:41 ` [RFCv2 13/13] KVM: unmap guest memory using poisoned pages Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-16 17:30   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-04-19 11:32     ` Xiaoyao Li
2021-04-19 14:26     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-19 16:01       ` Sean Christopherson
2021-04-19 16:40         ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-19 18:09           ` Sean Christopherson
2021-04-19 18:12             ` David Hildenbrand
2021-04-19 18:53             ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-19 20:09               ` Sean Christopherson
2021-04-19 22:57                 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-20 17:13                   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-05-21 12:31                     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-05-26 19:46                       ` Sean Christopherson
2021-05-31 20:07                         ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-06-02 17:51                           ` Sean Christopherson
2021-06-02 23:33                             ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-06-03 19:46                               ` Sean Christopherson
2021-06-04 14:29                                 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-06-04 17:16                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-06-04 17:54                         ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-16 16:46 ` [RFCv2 00/13] TDX and guest memory unmapping Matthew Wilcox

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