Re: [RFC PATCH bpf-next seccomp 00/12] eBPF seccomp filters

From: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.pizza>
To: Tianyin Xu <tyxu@illinois.edu>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	YiFei Zhu <zhuyifei1999@gmail.com>,
	"containers@lists.linux.dev" <containers@lists.linux.dev>,
	bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>, "Zhu, YiFei" <yifeifz2@illinois.edu>,
	LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	"Kuo, Hsuan-Chi" <hckuo2@illinois.edu>,
	Claudio Canella <claudio.canella@iaik.tugraz.at>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	Daniel Gruss <daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at>,
	Dimitrios Skarlatos <dskarlat@cs.cmu.edu>,
	Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@redhat.com>,
	Hubertus Franke <frankeh@us.ibm.com>,
	Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	"Jia, Jinghao" <jinghao7@illinois.edu>,
	"Torrellas, Josep" <torrella@illinois.edu>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>,
	Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@ibm.com>,
	Tom Hromatka <tom.hromatka@oracle.com>,
	Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH bpf-next seccomp 00/12] eBPF seccomp filters
Date: Mon, 17 May 2021 09:40:24 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210517154024.GE1964106@cisco> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGMVDEGzGB4+6gJPTw6Tdng5ur9Jua+mCbqwPoNZ16EFaDcmjA@mail.gmail.com>

On Sun, May 16, 2021 at 03:38:00AM -0500, Tianyin Xu wrote:
> On Sat, May 15, 2021 at 10:49 AM Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> wrote:
> >
> > On 5/10/21 10:21 PM, YiFei Zhu wrote:
> > > On Mon, May 10, 2021 at 12:47 PM Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> wrote:
> > >> On Mon, May 10, 2021 at 10:22 AM YiFei Zhu <zhuyifei1999@gmail.com> wrote:
> > >>>
> > >>> From: YiFei Zhu <yifeifz2@illinois.edu>
> > >>>
> > >>> Based on: https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://lists.linux-foundation.org/pipermail/containers/2018-February/038571.html__;!!DZ3fjg!thbAoRgmCeWjlv0qPDndNZW1j6Y2Kl_huVyUffr4wVbISf-aUiULaWHwkKJrNJyo$
> > >>>
> > >>> This patchset enables seccomp filters to be written in eBPF.
> > >>> Supporting eBPF filters has been proposed a few times in the past.
> > >>> The main concerns were (1) use cases and (2) security. We have
> > >>> identified many use cases that can benefit from advanced eBPF
> > >>> filters, such as:
> > >>
> > >> I haven't reviewed this carefully, but I think we need to distinguish
> > >> a few things:
> > >>
> > >> 1. Using the eBPF *language*.
> > >>
> > >> 2. Allowing the use of stateful / non-pure eBPF features.
> > >>
> > >> 3. Allowing the eBPF programs to read the target process' memory.
> > >>
> > >> I'm generally in favor of (1).  I'm not at all sure about (2), and I'm
> > >> even less convinced by (3).
> > >>
> > >>>
> > >>>   * exec-only-once filter / apply filter after exec
> > >>
> > >> This is (2).  I'm not sure it's a good idea.
> > >
> > > The basic idea is that for a container runtime it may wait to execute
> > > a program in a container without that program being able to execve
> > > another program, stopping any attack that involves loading another
> > > binary. The container runtime can block any syscall but execve in the
> > > exec-ed process by using only cBPF.
> > >
> > > The use case is suggested by Andrea Arcangeli and Giuseppe Scrivano.
> > > @Andrea and @Giuseppe, could you clarify more in case I missed
> > > something?
> >
> > We've discussed having a notifier-using filter be able to replace its
> > filter.  This would allow this and other use cases without any
> > additional eBPF or cBPF code.
> >
> 
> A notifier is not always a solution (even ignoring its perf overhead).
> 
> One problem, pointed out by Andrea Arcangeli, is that notifiers need
> userspace daemons. So, it can hardly be used by daemonless container
> engines like Podman.

I'm not sure I buy this argument. Podman already has a conmon instance
for each container, this could be a child of that conmon process, or
live inside conmon itself.

Tycho