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From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
	Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [patch 3/8] x86/fpu: Invalidate FPU state after a failed XRSTOR from a user buffer
Date: Wed, 02 Jun 2021 11:55:46 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210602101618.627715436@linutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: 20210602095543.149814064@linutronix.de

From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>

If XRSTOR fails due to sufficiently complicated paging errors (e.g.
concurrent TLB invalidation), it may fault with #PF but still modify
portions of the user extended state.

If this happens in __fpu_restore_sig() with a victim task's FPU registers
loaded and the task is preempted by the victim task, the victim task
resumes with partially corrupt extended state.

Invalidate the FPU registers when XRSTOR fails to prevent this scenario.

Fixes: 1d731e731c4c ("x86/fpu: Add a fastpath to __fpu__restore_sig()")
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
---
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c |   21 +++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c
@@ -369,6 +369,27 @@ static int __fpu__restore_sig(void __use
 			fpregs_unlock();
 			return 0;
 		}
+
+		if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD)) {
+			/*
+			 * The FPU registers do not belong to current, and
+			 * we just did an FPU restore operation, restricted
+			 * to the user portion of the register file, and
+			 * failed.  In the event that the ucode was
+			 * unfriendly and modified the registers at all, we
+			 * need to make sure that we aren't corrupting an
+			 * innocent non-current task's registers.
+			 */
+			__cpu_invalidate_fpregs_state();
+		} else {
+			/*
+			 * As above, we may have just clobbered current's
+			 * user FPU state.  We will either successfully
+			 * load it or clear it below, so no action is
+			 * required here.
+			 */
+		}
+
 		fpregs_unlock();
 	} else {
 		/*


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-06-02 10:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-06-02  9:55 [patch 0/8] x86/fpu: Mop up XSAVES and related damage Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02  9:55 ` [patch 1/8] selftests/x86: Test signal frame XSTATE header corruption handling Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02 12:38   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-02 14:15     ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-03 13:16       ` Shuah Khan
2021-06-02 15:59   ` [patch V2 " Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02 16:02     ` [patch V2a " Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02  9:55 ` [patch 2/8] x86/fpu: Prevent state corruption in __fpu__restore_sig() Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02 13:12   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-02 14:46     ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02 15:58   ` [patch V2 " Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02  9:55 ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
2021-06-02 15:06   ` [patch 3/8] x86/fpu: Invalidate FPU state after a failed XRSTOR from a user buffer Borislav Petkov
2021-06-03 17:30     ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-06-03 19:28       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-02  9:55 ` [patch 4/8] x86/fpu: Limit xstate copy size in xstateregs_set() Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02 17:44   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-02  9:55 ` [patch 5/8] x86/fpu: Sanitize xstateregs_set() Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02 16:01   ` [patch V2 " Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-03 11:32     ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-03 17:24   ` [patch " Andy Lutomirski
2021-06-02  9:55 ` [patch 6/8] x86/fpu: Add address range checks to copy_user_to_xstate() Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02  9:55 ` [patch 7/8] x86/fpu: Clean up the fpu__clear() variants Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02  9:55 ` [patch 8/8] x86/fpu: Deduplicate copy_xxx_to_xstate() Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-03 16:56   ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-06-02 21:28 ` [patch 0/8] x86/fpu: Mop up XSAVES and related damage Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-06-04 14:05   ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-04 16:27     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-06-04 17:46     ` Dave Hansen
2021-06-04 18:14       ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-04 22:04 ` Dave Hansen
2021-06-05 10:18   ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-05 11:56     ` Thomas Gleixner

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