All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
	Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Subject: [patch 7/8] x86/fpu: Clean up the fpu__clear() variants
Date: Wed, 02 Jun 2021 11:55:50 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210602101619.066082349@linutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: 20210602095543.149814064@linutronix.de

From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>

fpu__clear() currently resets both register state and kernel XSAVE buffer
state.  It has two modes: one for all state (supervisor and user) and
another for user state only.  fpu__clear_all() uses the "all state"
(user_only=0) mode, while a number of signal paths use the user_only=1
mode.

Make fpu__clear() work only for user state (user_only=1) and remove the
"all state" (user_only=0) code.  Rename it to match so it can be used by
the signal paths.

Replace the "all state" (user_only=0) fpu__clear() functionality.  Use the
TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD functionality instead of making any actual hardware
registers changes in this path.

[ Changelog polished by Dave Hansen ]

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c |   62 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
 1 file changed, 42 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
@@ -354,45 +354,67 @@ static inline void copy_init_fpstate_to_
 }
 
 /*
- * Clear the FPU state back to init state.
- *
- * Called by sys_execve(), by the signal handler code and by various
- * error paths.
+ * Reset current's user FPU states to the init states.  current's
+ * supervisor states, if any, are not modified by this function.  The
+ * caller guarantees that the XSTATE header in memory is intact.
  */
-static void fpu__clear(struct fpu *fpu, bool user_only)
+void fpu__clear_user_states(struct fpu *fpu)
 {
 	WARN_ON_FPU(fpu != &current->thread.fpu);
 
 	if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FPU)) {
-		fpu__drop(fpu);
-		fpu__initialize(fpu);
+		fpu__clear_all(fpu);
 		return;
 	}
 
 	fpregs_lock();
 
-	if (user_only) {
-		if (!fpregs_state_valid(fpu, smp_processor_id()) &&
-		    xfeatures_mask_supervisor())
-			copy_kernel_to_xregs(&fpu->state.xsave,
-					     xfeatures_mask_supervisor());
-		copy_init_fpstate_to_fpregs(xfeatures_mask_user());
-	} else {
-		copy_init_fpstate_to_fpregs(xfeatures_mask_all);
+	/*
+	 * Ensure that current's supervisor states are loaded into
+	 * their corresponding registers.
+	 */
+	if (xfeatures_mask_supervisor() &&
+	    !fpregs_state_valid(fpu, smp_processor_id())) {
+		copy_kernel_to_xregs(&fpu->state.xsave,
+				     xfeatures_mask_supervisor());
 	}
 
+	/* Reset user states in registers. */
+	copy_init_fpstate_to_fpregs(xfeatures_mask_user());
+
+	/*
+	 * Now all FPU registers have their desired values.  Inform the
+	 * FPU state machine that current's FPU registers are in the
+	 * hardware registers.
+	 */
 	fpregs_mark_activate();
+
 	fpregs_unlock();
 }
 
-void fpu__clear_user_states(struct fpu *fpu)
-{
-	fpu__clear(fpu, true);
-}
 
+/*
+ * Reset current's FPU registers (user and supervisor) to their INIT values.
+ * This is used by execve(); out of an abundance of caution, it completely
+ * wipes and resets the XSTATE buffer in memory.
+ *
+ * Note that XSAVE (unlike XSAVES) expects the XSTATE buffer in memory to
+ * be valid, so there are certain forms of corruption of the XSTATE buffer
+ * in memory that would survive initializing the FPU registers and XSAVEing
+ * them to memory.
+ */
 void fpu__clear_all(struct fpu *fpu)
 {
-	fpu__clear(fpu, false);
+	fpregs_lock();
+	fpu__drop(fpu);
+	/*
+	 * This does not change the actual hardware registers; when
+	 * fpu__clear_all() returns, TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD will be set, and a
+	 * subsequent exit to user mode will reload the hardware registers
+	 * from memory.
+	 */
+	fpu__initialize(fpu);
+	fpregs_unlock();
 }
 
 /*


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-06-02 10:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-06-02  9:55 [patch 0/8] x86/fpu: Mop up XSAVES and related damage Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02  9:55 ` [patch 1/8] selftests/x86: Test signal frame XSTATE header corruption handling Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02 12:38   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-02 14:15     ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-03 13:16       ` Shuah Khan
2021-06-02 15:59   ` [patch V2 " Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02 16:02     ` [patch V2a " Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02  9:55 ` [patch 2/8] x86/fpu: Prevent state corruption in __fpu__restore_sig() Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02 13:12   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-02 14:46     ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02 15:58   ` [patch V2 " Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02  9:55 ` [patch 3/8] x86/fpu: Invalidate FPU state after a failed XRSTOR from a user buffer Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02 15:06   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-03 17:30     ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-06-03 19:28       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-02  9:55 ` [patch 4/8] x86/fpu: Limit xstate copy size in xstateregs_set() Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02 17:44   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-02  9:55 ` [patch 5/8] x86/fpu: Sanitize xstateregs_set() Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02 16:01   ` [patch V2 " Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-03 11:32     ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-03 17:24   ` [patch " Andy Lutomirski
2021-06-02  9:55 ` [patch 6/8] x86/fpu: Add address range checks to copy_user_to_xstate() Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02  9:55 ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
2021-06-02  9:55 ` [patch 8/8] x86/fpu: Deduplicate copy_xxx_to_xstate() Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-03 16:56   ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-06-02 21:28 ` [patch 0/8] x86/fpu: Mop up XSAVES and related damage Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-06-04 14:05   ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-04 16:27     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-06-04 17:46     ` Dave Hansen
2021-06-04 18:14       ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-04 22:04 ` Dave Hansen
2021-06-05 10:18   ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-05 11:56     ` Thomas Gleixner

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20210602101619.066082349@linutronix.de \
    --to=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=fenghua.yu@intel.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=luto@kernel.org \
    --cc=tony.luck@intel.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    --cc=yu-cheng.yu@intel.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.