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From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
	Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>,
	Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Subject: [patch V2 06/14] x86/fpu: Sanitize xstateregs_set()
Date: Sun, 06 Jun 2021 01:47:48 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210606001323.528989427@linutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: 20210605234742.712464974@linutronix.de

xstateregs_set() operates on a stopped task and tries to copy the provided
buffer into the tasks fpu.state.xsave buffer.

Any error while copying or invalid state detected after copying results in
wiping the target tasks FPU state completely including supervisor states.

That's just wrong. The caller supplied invalid data or has a problem with
unmapped memory, so there is absolutely no justification to wreckage the
target.

Fix this with the following modifications:

 1) If data has to be copied from userspace, allocate a buffer and copy from
    user first.

 2) Use copy_kernel_to_xstate() unconditionally so that header checking
    works correctly.

 3) Return on error without wreckaging the target state.

This prevents corrupting supervisor states and lets the caller deal with
the problem it caused in the first place.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
---
V2: Move the validate_user_xstate_header() static here - Borislav
    Use copy_from_user() - Dave, Yu
    Rename xbuf to tmpbuf - Borislav
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h |    4 ---
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c      |   41 +++++++++++++++-----------------------
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c      |   12 ++++++-----
 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h
@@ -112,8 +112,4 @@ void copy_supervisor_to_kernel(struct xr
 void copy_dynamic_supervisor_to_kernel(struct xregs_state *xstate, u64 mask);
 void copy_kernel_to_dynamic_supervisor(struct xregs_state *xstate, u64 mask);
 
-
-/* Validate an xstate header supplied by userspace (ptrace or sigreturn) */
-int validate_user_xstate_header(const struct xstate_header *hdr);
-
 #endif
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c
@@ -6,8 +6,12 @@
 #include <asm/fpu/signal.h>
 #include <asm/fpu/regset.h>
 #include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
+
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+
 #include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
 
+
 /*
  * The xstateregs_active() routine is the same as the regset_fpregs_active() routine,
  * as the "regset->n" for the xstate regset will be updated based on the feature
@@ -108,7 +112,7 @@ int xstateregs_set(struct task_struct *t
 		  const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf)
 {
 	struct fpu *fpu = &target->thread.fpu;
-	struct xregs_state *xsave;
+	struct xregs_state *tmpbuf = NULL;
 	int ret;
 
 	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE))
@@ -120,32 +124,21 @@ int xstateregs_set(struct task_struct *t
 	if (pos != 0 || count != fpu_user_xstate_size)
 		return -EFAULT;
 
-	xsave = &fpu->state.xsave;
-
-	fpu__prepare_write(fpu);
-
-	if (using_compacted_format()) {
-		if (kbuf)
-			ret = copy_kernel_to_xstate(xsave, kbuf);
-		else
-			ret = copy_user_to_xstate(xsave, ubuf);
-	} else {
-		ret = user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf, xsave, 0, -1);
-		if (!ret)
-			ret = validate_user_xstate_header(&xsave->header);
+	if (!kbuf) {
+		tmpbuf = vmalloc(count);
+		if (!tmpbuf)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		if (copy_from_user(tmpbuf, ubuf, count)) {
+			ret = -EFAULT;
+			goto out;
+		}
 	}
 
-	/*
-	 * mxcsr reserved bits must be masked to zero for security reasons.
-	 */
-	xsave->i387.mxcsr &= mxcsr_feature_mask;
-
-	/*
-	 * In case of failure, mark all states as init:
-	 */
-	if (ret)
-		fpstate_init(&fpu->state);
+	fpu__prepare_write(fpu);
+	ret = copy_kernel_to_xstate(&fpu->state.xsave, kbuf ?: tmpbuf);
 
+out:
+	vfree(tmpbuf);
 	return ret;
 }
 
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
@@ -515,7 +515,7 @@ int using_compacted_format(void)
 }
 
 /* Validate an xstate header supplied by userspace (ptrace or sigreturn) */
-int validate_user_xstate_header(const struct xstate_header *hdr)
+static int validate_user_xstate_header(const struct xstate_header *hdr)
 {
 	/* No unknown or supervisor features may be set */
 	if (hdr->xfeatures & ~xfeatures_mask_user())
@@ -1172,14 +1172,16 @@ int copy_kernel_to_xstate(struct xregs_s
 	 */
 	xsave->header.xfeatures |= hdr.xfeatures;
 
+	/* mxcsr reserved bits must be masked to zero for security reasons. */
+	xsave->i387.mxcsr &= mxcsr_feature_mask;
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
 /*
- * Convert from a ptrace or sigreturn standard-format user-space buffer to
- * kernel XSAVES format and copy to the target thread. This is called from
- * xstateregs_set(), as well as potentially from the sigreturn() and
- * rt_sigreturn() system calls.
+ * Convert from a sigreturn standard-format user-space buffer to kernel
+ * XSAVES format and copy to the target thread. This is called from the
+ * sigreturn() and rt_sigreturn() system calls.
  */
 int copy_user_to_xstate(struct xregs_state *xsave, const void __user *ubuf)
 {


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-06-06  0:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-06-05 23:47 [patch V2 00/14] x86/fpu: Mop up XSAVES and related damage Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-05 23:47 ` [patch V2 01/14] selftests/x86: Test signal frame XSTATE header corruption handling Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-05 23:47 ` [patch V2 02/14] x86/fpu: Prevent state corruption in __fpu__restore_sig() Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-07  8:49   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-05 23:47 ` [patch V2 03/14] x86/fpu: Invalidate FPU state after a failed XRSTOR from a user buffer Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-05 23:47 ` [patch V2 04/14] x86/pkru: Make the fpinit state update work Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-07 15:18   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-05 23:47 ` [patch V2 05/14] x86/fpu: Limit xstate copy size in xstateregs_set() Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-05 23:47 ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
2021-06-07 19:39   ` [patch V2 06/14] x86/fpu: Sanitize xstateregs_set() Borislav Petkov
2021-06-05 23:47 ` [patch V2 07/14] x86/fpu: Add address range checks to copy_user_to_xstate() Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-05 23:47 ` [patch V2 08/14] x86/fpu: Move inlines where they belong Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-05 23:47 ` [patch V2 09/14] x86/cpu: Sanitize X86_FEATURE_OSPKE Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-05 23:47 ` [patch V2 10/14] x86/fpu: Rename fpu__clear_all() to fpu_flush_thread() Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-05 23:47 ` [patch V2 11/14] x86/pkru: Provide pkru_get_init_value() Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-05 23:47 ` [patch V2 12/14] x86/fpu: Clean up the fpu__clear() variants Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-05 23:47 ` [patch V2 13/14] x86/fpu: Rename xstate copy functions which are related to UABI Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-05 23:47 ` [patch V2 14/14] x86/fpu: Deduplicate copy_uabi_from_user/kernel_to_xstate() Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-07 13:02 ` [patch V2 00/14] x86/fpu: Mop up XSAVES and related damage Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-07 13:36   ` Dave Hansen
2021-06-07 14:08     ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-07 16:38       ` Dave Hansen
2021-06-07 22:51         ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-08 14:47           ` Dave Hansen
2021-06-08 11:17         ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-08 12:27           ` Thomas Gleixner

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