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From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
	Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>,
	Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>,
	syzbot+2067e764dbcd10721e2e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>, Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Subject: [patch V3 5/6] x86/fpu: Add address range checks to copy_user_to_xstate()
Date: Tue, 08 Jun 2021 16:36:22 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210608144346.140254130@linutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: 20210608143617.565868844@linutronix.de

From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>

copy_user_to_xstate() uses __copy_from_user(), which provides a negligible
speedup.  Fortunately, both call sites are at least almost correct.
__fpu__restore_sig() checks access_ok() with a length of
xstate_sigframe_size() and ptrace regset access uses fpu_user_xstate_size.
These should be valid upper bounds on the length, so, at worst, this would
cause spurious failures and not accesses to kernel memory.

Nonetheless, this is far more fragile than necessary and none of these
callers are in a hotpath. 

Use copy_from_user() instead.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c |    6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
@@ -1190,7 +1190,7 @@ int copy_user_to_xstate(struct xregs_sta
 	offset = offsetof(struct xregs_state, header);
 	size = sizeof(hdr);
 
-	if (__copy_from_user(&hdr, ubuf + offset, size))
+	if (copy_from_user(&hdr, ubuf + offset, size))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
 	if (validate_user_xstate_header(&hdr))
@@ -1205,7 +1205,7 @@ int copy_user_to_xstate(struct xregs_sta
 			offset = xstate_offsets[i];
 			size = xstate_sizes[i];
 
-			if (__copy_from_user(dst, ubuf + offset, size))
+			if (copy_from_user(dst, ubuf + offset, size))
 				return -EFAULT;
 		}
 	}
@@ -1213,7 +1213,7 @@ int copy_user_to_xstate(struct xregs_sta
 	if (xfeatures_mxcsr_quirk(hdr.xfeatures)) {
 		offset = offsetof(struct fxregs_state, mxcsr);
 		size = MXCSR_AND_FLAGS_SIZE;
-		if (__copy_from_user(&xsave->i387.mxcsr, ubuf + offset, size))
+		if (copy_from_user(&xsave->i387.mxcsr, ubuf + offset, size))
 			return -EFAULT;
 	}
 


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-06-08 14:49 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-06-08 14:36 [patch V3 0/6] x86/fpu: Mop up XSAVES and related damage Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-08 14:36 ` [patch V3 1/6] x86/fpu: Prevent state corruption in __fpu__restore_sig() Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-09 14:46   ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-08 14:36 ` [patch V3 2/6] x86/fpu: Invalidate FPU state after a failed XRSTOR from a user buffer Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-09 14:46   ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Andy Lutomirski
2021-06-08 14:36 ` [patch V3 3/6] x86/process: Check PF_KTHREAD and not current->mm for kernel threads Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-09 14:46   ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-10 17:10   ` [patch V3 3/6] " Andy Lutomirski
2021-06-10 20:54     ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-11  1:04       ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-06-08 14:36 ` [patch V3 4/6] x86/pkru: Make PKRU=0 actually work Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-08 15:40   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-08 19:15     ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-08 20:06       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-08 16:06   ` Dave Hansen
2021-06-08 19:06     ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-08 21:37   ` Babu Moger
2021-06-09 14:46   ` [tip: x86/urgent] x86/pkru: Write hardware init value to PKRU when xstate is init tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-08 14:36 ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
2021-06-09 12:56   ` [tip: x86/fpu] x86/fpu: Add address range checks to copy_user_to_xstate() tip-bot2 for Andy Lutomirski
2021-06-08 14:36 ` [patch V3 6/6] selftests/x86: Test signal frame XSTATE header corruption handling Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-09  8:38   ` David Edmondson
2021-06-09 12:56   ` [tip: x86/fpu] " tip-bot2 for Andy Lutomirski
2021-06-08 16:08 ` [patch V3 0/6] x86/fpu: Mop up XSAVES and related damage Dave Hansen
2021-06-08 18:46 ` Rik van Riel
2021-06-09 19:18 ` [PATCH] x86/fpu: Reset state for all signal restore failures Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-10  6:39   ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner

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