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From: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
To: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
	Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	"Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
	James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
	Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@linux.ibm.com>,
	Jim Cadden <jcadden@ibm.com>,
	linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] efi: Reserve confidential computing secret area
Date: Mon,  9 Aug 2021 19:01:56 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210809190157.279332-3-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210809190157.279332-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>

When efi-stub copies an EFI-provided confidential computing (coco)
secret area, reserve that memory block for future use within the kernel.

Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
---
 arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c   |  1 +
 drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile |  2 +-
 drivers/firmware/efi/coco.c   | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c    |  3 +++
 include/linux/efi.h           |  3 +++
 5 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/coco.c

diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
index 147c30a81f15..35e082e5f603 100644
--- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ static const unsigned long * const efi_tables[] = {
 #ifdef CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS
 	&efi.mokvar_table,
 #endif
+	&efi.coco_secret,
 };
 
 u64 efi_setup;		/* efi setup_data physical address */
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile
index 467e94259679..8703ffcca351 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ KASAN_SANITIZE_runtime-wrappers.o	:= n
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI_BGRT) 		+= efi-bgrt.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_EFI)			+= efi.o vars.o reboot.o memattr.o tpm.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_EFI)			+= memmap.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_EFI)			+= memmap.o coco.o
 ifneq ($(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_LOADER),)
 obj-$(CONFIG_EFI)			+= capsule.o
 endif
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/coco.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/coco.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..42f477d6188c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/coco.c
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Confidential computing (coco) secret area handling
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 IBM Corporation
+ * Author: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "efi: " fmt
+
+#include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/memblock.h>
+#include <asm/early_ioremap.h>
+
+/*
+ * Reserve the confidential computing secret area memory
+ */
+int __init efi_coco_secret_area_reserve(void)
+{
+	struct linux_efi_coco_secret_area *secret_area;
+	unsigned long secret_area_size;
+
+	if (efi.coco_secret == EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR)
+		return 0;
+
+	secret_area = early_memremap(efi.coco_secret, sizeof(*secret_area));
+	if (!secret_area) {
+		pr_err("Failed to map confidential computing secret area\n");
+		efi.coco_secret = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR;
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	secret_area_size = sizeof(*secret_area) + secret_area->size;
+	memblock_reserve(efi.coco_secret, secret_area_size);
+
+	pr_info("Reserved memory of EFI-provided confidential computing secret area");
+
+	early_memunmap(secret_area, sizeof(*secret_area));
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
index 847f33ffc4ae..07e17ad225a6 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
@@ -526,6 +526,7 @@ static const efi_config_table_type_t common_tables[] __initconst = {
 #ifdef CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS
 	{LINUX_EFI_MOK_VARIABLE_TABLE_GUID,	&efi.mokvar_table,	"MOKvar"	},
 #endif
+	{LINUX_EFI_COCO_SECRET_AREA_GUID,	&efi.coco_secret,	"CocoSecret"	},
 	{},
 };
 
@@ -613,6 +614,8 @@ int __init efi_config_parse_tables(const efi_config_table_t *config_tables,
 
 	efi_tpm_eventlog_init();
 
+	efi_coco_secret_area_reserve();
+
 	if (mem_reserve != EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR) {
 		unsigned long prsv = mem_reserve;
 
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
index 9021dd521302..e86600af5dfd 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -550,6 +550,7 @@ extern struct efi {
 	unsigned long			tpm_log;		/* TPM2 Event Log table */
 	unsigned long			tpm_final_log;		/* TPM2 Final Events Log table */
 	unsigned long			mokvar_table;		/* MOK variable config table */
+	unsigned long			coco_secret;		/* Confidential computing secret table */
 
 	efi_get_time_t			*get_time;
 	efi_set_time_t			*set_time;
@@ -1189,6 +1190,8 @@ extern int efi_tpm_final_log_size;
 
 extern unsigned long rci2_table_phys;
 
+extern int efi_coco_secret_area_reserve(void);
+
 /*
  * efi_runtime_service() function identifiers.
  * "NONE" is used by efi_recover_from_page_fault() to check if the page
-- 
2.25.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-08-09 19:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-08-09 19:01 [PATCH 0/3] Allow access to confidential computing secret area in SEV guests Dov Murik
2021-08-09 19:01 ` [PATCH 1/3] efi/libstub: Copy confidential computing secret area Dov Murik
2021-08-09 19:01 ` Dov Murik [this message]
2021-08-09 19:01 ` [PATCH 3/3] virt: Add sev_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets Dov Murik
2021-08-13 13:05   ` Andrew Scull
2021-08-16  9:56     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2021-08-16  9:56       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2021-08-19 13:02       ` Andrew Scull
2021-08-19 13:02         ` Andrew Scull
2021-08-20 18:36         ` Dov Murik
2021-08-23 19:21           ` Andrew Scull
2021-08-23 19:21             ` Andrew Scull
2021-09-02 12:59   ` Greg KH
2021-09-02 18:14     ` Dov Murik
2021-09-02 12:57 ` [PATCH 0/3] Allow access to confidential computing secret area in SEV guests Greg KH
2021-09-02 14:35   ` James Bottomley
2021-09-02 15:05     ` Greg KH
2021-09-02 15:19       ` James Bottomley
2021-09-02 16:09         ` Greg KH
2021-09-02 16:19           ` James Bottomley
2021-09-02 16:31             ` Greg KH

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