From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-18.2 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7EDE1C4338F for ; Sun, 22 Aug 2021 10:07:30 +0000 (UTC) Received: from phobos.denx.de (phobos.denx.de [85.214.62.61]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A6E2C601FA for ; Sun, 22 Aug 2021 10:07:29 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.4.1 mail.kernel.org A6E2C601FA Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=kernel.org Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=lists.denx.de Received: from h2850616.stratoserver.net (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by phobos.denx.de (Postfix) with ESMTP id DE01E82E3F; Sun, 22 Aug 2021 12:07:26 +0200 (CEST) Authentication-Results: phobos.denx.de; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=kernel.org Authentication-Results: phobos.denx.de; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=u-boot-bounces@lists.denx.de Authentication-Results: phobos.denx.de; dkim=pass (2048-bit key; unprotected) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="GvzYTn11"; dkim-atps=neutral Received: by phobos.denx.de (Postfix, from userid 109) id EB86F82EBB; Sun, 22 Aug 2021 12:07:24 +0200 (CEST) Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by phobos.denx.de (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A652282E3F for ; Sun, 22 Aug 2021 12:07:17 +0200 (CEST) Authentication-Results: phobos.denx.de; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=kernel.org Authentication-Results: phobos.denx.de; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=pali@kernel.org Received: by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id C098B601FA; Sun, 22 Aug 2021 10:07:15 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1629626836; bh=m5yXO+iKCOARrrDGoP8B12qpDBCEK4on4j4k/ckCOss=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=GvzYTn112evjQrcyA7PwyyBaWMrLBcsnUPRZOYpVg8gNm8IVrAiGvffwhmLD5l8Qz kkco7ROdvPVh5ZUlbqV2xy5RN1cpam4hcyy6TqTHdzdBOWsnZicU1zZpXKLAzy0ikH WbHwv8pjGAxTB6blXcRqrDE8HFwm9+MGxSfEvyypWSZtq/Ar4JvJOn2jYPK8rPQhLE vbzpesWPkt403qurCkpqhGbit/Xo2dj0hblG89cuC6RAJMGEGKQMqFEiITXS4MxwCr HRY2YZp2hiSJDP2E+7EdN1m0H5DTSeREp8zBFHUGwrdPS4vr7/LoeWvNuV2hua+37q Z+jIWozFoQMMQ== Received: by pali.im (Postfix) id 23B897C5; Sun, 22 Aug 2021 12:07:13 +0200 (CEST) Date: Sun, 22 Aug 2021 12:07:12 +0200 From: Pali =?utf-8?B?Um9ow6Fy?= To: Samuel Holland Cc: u-boot@lists.denx.de, Jagan Teki , Andre Przywara , AKASHI Takahiro , Alexandru Gagniuc , Baruch Siach , Bharat Gooty , Chris Packham , Fabio Estevam , Frieder Schrempf , Jernej Skrabec , Marek =?utf-8?B?QmVow7pu?= , "NXP i.MX U-Boot Team" , Naoki Hayama , Patrick Delaunay , Priyanka Jain , Rayagonda Kokatanur , Simon Glass , Stefan Roese , Stefano Babic , Sughosh Ganu , Trevor Woerner , lauri.hintsala@silabs.com Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/4] tools: mkimage: Add Allwinner TOC0 support Message-ID: <20210822100712.6ho23p2y56ghyuny@pali> References: <20210822044649.13585-1-samuel@sholland.org> <20210822044649.13585-3-samuel@sholland.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20210822044649.13585-3-samuel@sholland.org> User-Agent: NeoMutt/20180716 X-BeenThere: u-boot@lists.denx.de X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.34 Precedence: list List-Id: U-Boot discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: u-boot-bounces@lists.denx.de Sender: "U-Boot" X-Virus-Scanned: clamav-milter 0.103.2 at phobos.denx.de X-Virus-Status: Clean Hello! On Saturday 21 August 2021 23:46:46 Samuel Holland wrote: > Most Allwinner sunxi SoCs have separate boot ROMs in non-secure and > secure mode. The "non-secure" or "normal" boot ROM (NBROM) uses the > existing sunxi_egon image type. The secure boot ROM (SBROM) uses a > completely different image type, known as TOC0. > > A TOC0 image is composed of a header and two or more items. One item > is the firmware binary. The others form a chain linking the firmware > signature to the root-of-trust public key (ROTPK), which has its hash > burned in the SoC's eFuses. Signatures are made using RSA-2048 + SHA256. > > The pseudo-ASN.1 structure is manually assembled; this is done to work > around bugs/quirks in the boot ROM, which vary between SoCs. This TOC0 > implementation has been verified to work with the A50, A64, H5, H6, > and H616 SBROMs, and it may work with other SoCs. > > Signed-off-by: Samuel Holland > --- > > Changes in v2: > - Moved certificate and key item structures out of sunxi_image.h > - Renamed "main" and "item" variables for clarity > - Improved error messages, and added a hint about key generation > - Added a comment explaining the purpose of the various key files > - Mentioned testing this code on A50 in the commit message > > arch/arm/Kconfig | 1 + > common/image.c | 1 + > include/image.h | 1 + > include/sunxi_image.h | 36 ++ > tools/Makefile | 3 +- > tools/sunxi_toc0.c | 907 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 6 files changed, 948 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > create mode 100644 tools/sunxi_toc0.c > > diff --git a/arch/arm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/Kconfig > index d692139199c..799fe7d43af 100644 > --- a/arch/arm/Kconfig > +++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig > @@ -1014,6 +1014,7 @@ config ARCH_SUNXI > select SUNXI_GPIO > select SYS_NS16550 > select SYS_THUMB_BUILD if !ARM64 > + select TOOLS_LIBCRYPTO > select USB if DISTRO_DEFAULTS > select USB_KEYBOARD if DISTRO_DEFAULTS && USB_HOST > select USB_STORAGE if DISTRO_DEFAULTS && USB_HOST > diff --git a/common/image.c b/common/image.c > index 59c52a1f9ad..8f1634c1206 100644 > --- a/common/image.c > +++ b/common/image.c > @@ -191,6 +191,7 @@ static const table_entry_t uimage_type[] = { > { IH_TYPE_MTKIMAGE, "mtk_image", "MediaTek BootROM loadable Image" }, > { IH_TYPE_COPRO, "copro", "Coprocessor Image"}, > { IH_TYPE_SUNXI_EGON, "sunxi_egon", "Allwinner eGON Boot Image" }, > + { IH_TYPE_SUNXI_TOC0, "sunxi_toc0", "Allwinner TOC0 Boot Image" }, > { -1, "", "", }, > }; > > diff --git a/include/image.h b/include/image.h > index e20f0b69d58..a4efc090309 100644 > --- a/include/image.h > +++ b/include/image.h > @@ -284,6 +284,7 @@ enum { > IH_TYPE_IMX8IMAGE, /* Freescale IMX8Boot Image */ > IH_TYPE_COPRO, /* Coprocessor Image for remoteproc*/ > IH_TYPE_SUNXI_EGON, /* Allwinner eGON Boot Image */ > + IH_TYPE_SUNXI_TOC0, /* Allwinner TOC0 Boot Image */ > > IH_TYPE_COUNT, /* Number of image types */ > }; > diff --git a/include/sunxi_image.h b/include/sunxi_image.h > index 5b2055c0af3..399ad0be999 100644 > --- a/include/sunxi_image.h > +++ b/include/sunxi_image.h > @@ -9,9 +9,12 @@ > * > * Shared between mkimage and the SPL. > */ > + > #ifndef SUNXI_IMAGE_H > #define SUNXI_IMAGE_H > > +#include > + > #define BOOT0_MAGIC "eGON.BT0" > #define BROM_STAMP_VALUE 0x5f0a6c39 > #define SPL_SIGNATURE "SPL" /* marks "sunxi" SPL header */ > @@ -79,4 +82,37 @@ struct boot_file_head { > /* Compile time check to assure proper alignment of structure */ > typedef char boot_file_head_not_multiple_of_32[1 - 2*(sizeof(struct boot_file_head) % 32)]; (Just suggestion for future, not related to this patch series: above check could be rewritten/cleaned to use static assert) > > +struct toc0_main_info { > + uint8_t name[8]; > + __le32 magic; > + __le32 checksum; > + __le32 serial; > + __le32 status; > + __le32 num_items; > + __le32 length; > + uint8_t platform[4]; > + uint8_t reserved[8]; > + uint8_t end[4]; > +}; > + > +#define TOC0_MAIN_INFO_NAME "TOC0.GLH" > +#define TOC0_MAIN_INFO_MAGIC 0x89119800 > +#define TOC0_MAIN_INFO_END "MIE;" > + > +struct toc0_item_info { > + __le32 name; > + __le32 offset; > + __le32 length; > + __le32 status; > + __le32 type; > + __le32 load_addr; > + uint8_t reserved[4]; > + uint8_t end[4]; > +}; These structures are raw image structures, right? Therefore they should be marked as __packed? > +#define TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_CERT 0x00010101 > +#define TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_FIRMWARE 0x00010202 > +#define TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_KEY 0x00010303 > +#define TOC0_ITEM_INFO_END "IIE;" > + > #endif > diff --git a/tools/Makefile b/tools/Makefile > index ad0e9cf9490..fc3b66af6af 100644 > --- a/tools/Makefile > +++ b/tools/Makefile > @@ -98,7 +98,8 @@ AES_OBJS-$(CONFIG_TOOLS_LIBCRYPTO) := $(addprefix lib/aes/, \ > LIBCRYPTO_OBJS-$(CONFIG_TOOLS_LIBCRYPTO) := \ > lib/fdt-libcrypto.o \ > kwbimage.o \ > - mxsimage.o > + mxsimage.o \ > + sunxi_toc0.o > > ROCKCHIP_OBS = lib/rc4.o rkcommon.o rkimage.o rksd.o rkspi.o > > diff --git a/tools/sunxi_toc0.c b/tools/sunxi_toc0.c > new file mode 100644 > index 00000000000..5aa39cba775 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/tools/sunxi_toc0.c > @@ -0,0 +1,907 @@ > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ > +/* > + * (C) Copyright 2018 Arm Ltd. > + * (C) Copyright 2020-2021 Samuel Holland > + */ > + > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > + > +#include > +#include > +#include > + > +#include > +#include > + > +#include "imagetool.h" > +#include "mkimage.h" > + > +/* > + * NAND requires 8K padding. For other devices, BROM requires only > + * 512B padding, but let's use the larger padding to cover everything. > + */ > +#define PAD_SIZE 8192 > + > +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "mkimage (TOC0): %s: " fmt > +#define pr_err(fmt, args...) fprintf(stderr, pr_fmt(fmt), "error", ##args) > +#define pr_warn(fmt, args...) fprintf(stderr, pr_fmt(fmt), "warning", ##args) > +#define pr_info(fmt, args...) fprintf(stderr, pr_fmt(fmt), "info", ##args) > + > +struct toc0_key_item { > + __le32 vendor_id; > + __le32 key0_n_len; > + __le32 key0_e_len; > + __le32 key1_n_len; > + __le32 key1_e_len; > + __le32 sig_len; > + uint8_t key0[512]; > + uint8_t key1[512]; > + uint8_t reserved[32]; > + uint8_t sig[256]; > +}; This also looks like raw structure which should be marked as __packed. > +/* > + * This looks somewhat like an X.509 certificate, but it is not valid BER. > + * > + * Some differences: > + * - Some X.509 certificate fields are missing or rearranged. > + * - Some sequences have the wrong tag. > + * - Zero-length sequences are accepted. > + * - Large strings and integers must be an even number of bytes long. > + * - Positive integers are not zero-extended to maintain their sign. > + * > + * See https://linux-sunxi.org/TOC0 for more information. > + */ > +struct toc0_small_tag { > + uint8_t tag; > + uint8_t length; > +}; > + > +typedef struct toc0_small_tag toc0_small_int; > +typedef struct toc0_small_tag toc0_small_oct; > +typedef struct toc0_small_tag toc0_small_seq; > +typedef struct toc0_small_tag toc0_small_exp; > + > +#define TOC0_SMALL_INT(len) { 0x02, (len) } > +#define TOC0_SMALL_SEQ(len) { 0x30, (len) } > +#define TOC0_SMALL_EXP(tag, len) { 0xa0 | (tag), len } > + > +struct toc0_large_tag { > + uint8_t tag; > + uint8_t prefix; > + uint8_t length_hi; > + uint8_t length_lo; > +}; > + > +typedef struct toc0_large_tag toc0_large_int; > +typedef struct toc0_large_tag toc0_large_bit; > +typedef struct toc0_large_tag toc0_large_seq; > + > +#define TOC0_LARGE_INT(len) { 0x02, 0x82, (len) >> 8, (len) & 0xff } > +#define TOC0_LARGE_BIT(len) { 0x03, 0x82, (len) >> 8, (len) & 0xff } > +#define TOC0_LARGE_SEQ(len) { 0x30, 0x82, (len) >> 8, (len) & 0xff } > + > +struct toc0_cert_item { > + toc0_large_seq tag_totalSequence; > + struct toc0_totalSequence { > + toc0_large_seq tag_mainSequence; > + struct toc0_mainSequence { > + toc0_small_exp tag_explicit0; > + struct toc0_explicit0 { > + toc0_small_int tag_version; > + uint8_t version; > + } explicit0; > + toc0_small_int tag_serialNumber; > + uint8_t serialNumber; > + toc0_small_seq tag_signature; > + toc0_small_seq tag_issuer; > + toc0_small_seq tag_validity; > + toc0_small_seq tag_subject; > + toc0_large_seq tag_subjectPublicKeyInfo; > + struct toc0_subjectPublicKeyInfo { > + toc0_small_seq tag_algorithm; > + toc0_large_seq tag_publicKey; > + struct toc0_publicKey { > + toc0_large_int tag_n; > + uint8_t n[256]; > + toc0_small_int tag_e; > + uint8_t e[3]; > + } publicKey; > + } subjectPublicKeyInfo; > + toc0_small_exp tag_explicit3; > + struct toc0_explicit3 { > + toc0_small_seq tag_extension; > + struct toc0_extension { > + toc0_small_int tag_digest; > + uint8_t digest[32]; > + } extension; > + } explicit3; > + } mainSequence; > + toc0_large_bit tag_sigSequence; > + struct toc0_sigSequence { > + toc0_small_seq tag_algorithm; > + toc0_large_bit tag_signature; > + uint8_t signature[256]; > + } sigSequence; > + } totalSequence; > +}; > + > +#define sizeof_field(TYPE, MEMBER) sizeof((((TYPE *)0)->MEMBER)) > + > +static const struct toc0_cert_item cert_item_template = { > + TOC0_LARGE_SEQ(sizeof(struct toc0_totalSequence)), > + { > + TOC0_LARGE_SEQ(sizeof(struct toc0_mainSequence)), > + { > + TOC0_SMALL_EXP(0, sizeof(struct toc0_explicit0)), > + { > + TOC0_SMALL_INT(sizeof_field(struct toc0_explicit0, version)), > + 0, > + }, > + TOC0_SMALL_INT(sizeof_field(struct toc0_mainSequence, serialNumber)), > + 0, > + TOC0_SMALL_SEQ(0), > + TOC0_SMALL_SEQ(0), > + TOC0_SMALL_SEQ(0), > + TOC0_SMALL_SEQ(0), > + TOC0_LARGE_SEQ(sizeof(struct toc0_subjectPublicKeyInfo)), > + { > + TOC0_SMALL_SEQ(0), > + TOC0_LARGE_SEQ(sizeof(struct toc0_publicKey)), > + { > + TOC0_LARGE_INT(sizeof_field(struct toc0_publicKey, n)), > + {}, > + TOC0_SMALL_INT(sizeof_field(struct toc0_publicKey, e)), > + {}, > + }, > + }, > + TOC0_SMALL_EXP(3, sizeof(struct toc0_explicit3)), > + { > + TOC0_SMALL_SEQ(sizeof(struct toc0_extension)), > + { > + TOC0_SMALL_INT(sizeof_field(struct toc0_extension, digest)), > + {}, > + }, > + }, > + }, > + TOC0_LARGE_BIT(sizeof(struct toc0_sigSequence)), > + { > + TOC0_SMALL_SEQ(0), > + TOC0_LARGE_BIT(sizeof_field(struct toc0_sigSequence, signature)), > + {}, > + }, > + }, > +}; > + > +#define TOC0_DEFAULT_NUM_ITEMS 3 > +#define TOC0_DEFAULT_HEADER_LEN \ > + ALIGN( \ > + sizeof(struct toc0_main_info) + \ > + sizeof(struct toc0_item_info) * TOC0_DEFAULT_NUM_ITEMS + \ > + sizeof(struct toc0_cert_item) + \ > + sizeof(struct toc0_key_item), \ > + 32) > + > +static char *fw_key_file = "fw_key.pem"; > +static char *key_item_file = "key_item.bin"; > +static char *root_key_file = "root_key.pem"; > + > +/* > + * Create a key item in @buf, containing the public keys @root_key and @fw_key, > + * and signed by the RSA key @root_key. > + */ > +static int toc0_create_key_item(uint8_t *buf, uint32_t *len, > + RSA *root_key, RSA *fw_key) > +{ > + struct toc0_key_item *key_item = (void *)buf; > + uint8_t digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; > + int ret = EXIT_FAILURE; > + unsigned int sig_len; > + int n_len, e_len; > + > + /* Store key 0. */ > + n_len = BN_bn2bin(RSA_get0_n(root_key), key_item->key0); > + e_len = BN_bn2bin(RSA_get0_e(root_key), key_item->key0 + n_len); > + if (n_len + e_len > sizeof(key_item->key0)) { > + pr_err("Root key is too big for key item\n"); > + goto err; > + } > + key_item->key0_n_len = cpu_to_le32(n_len); > + key_item->key0_e_len = cpu_to_le32(e_len); > + > + /* Store key 1. */ > + n_len = BN_bn2bin(RSA_get0_n(fw_key), key_item->key1); > + e_len = BN_bn2bin(RSA_get0_e(fw_key), key_item->key1 + n_len); > + if (n_len + e_len > sizeof(key_item->key1)) { > + pr_err("Firmware key is too big for key item\n"); > + goto err; > + } > + key_item->key1_n_len = cpu_to_le32(n_len); > + key_item->key1_e_len = cpu_to_le32(e_len); > + > + /* Sign the key item. */ > + key_item->sig_len = cpu_to_le32(RSA_size(root_key)); > + SHA256(buf, key_item->sig - buf, digest); > + if (!RSA_sign(NID_sha256, digest, sizeof(digest), > + key_item->sig, &sig_len, root_key)) { > + pr_err("Failed to sign key item\n"); > + goto err; > + } > + if (sig_len != sizeof(key_item->sig)) { > + pr_err("Bad key item signature length\n"); > + goto err; > + } > + > + *len = sizeof(*key_item); > + ret = EXIT_SUCCESS; > + > +err: > + return ret; > +} > + > +/* > + * Verify the key item in @buf, containing two public keys @key0 and @key1, > + * and signed by the RSA key @key0. If @root_key is provided, only signatures > + * by that key will be accepted. @key1 is returned in @key. > + */ > +static int toc0_verify_key_item(const uint8_t *buf, uint32_t len, > + RSA *root_key, RSA **fw_key) > +{ > + struct toc0_key_item *key_item = (void *)buf; > + uint8_t digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; > + int ret = EXIT_FAILURE; > + int n_len, e_len; > + RSA *key0 = NULL; > + RSA *key1 = NULL; > + BIGNUM *n, *e; > + > + if (len < sizeof(*key_item)) > + goto err; > + > + /* Load key 0. */ > + n_len = le32_to_cpu(key_item->key0_n_len); > + e_len = le32_to_cpu(key_item->key0_e_len); > + if (n_len + e_len > sizeof(key_item->key0)) { > + pr_err("Bad root key size in key item\n"); > + goto err; > + } > + n = BN_bin2bn(key_item->key0, n_len, NULL); > + e = BN_bin2bn(key_item->key0 + n_len, e_len, NULL); > + key0 = RSA_new(); > + if (!key0) > + goto err; > + if (!RSA_set0_key(key0, n, e, NULL)) > + goto err; > + > + /* If a root key was provided, compare it to key 0. */ > + if (root_key && (BN_cmp(n, RSA_get0_n(root_key)) || > + BN_cmp(e, RSA_get0_e(root_key)))) { > + pr_err("Wrong root key in key item\n"); > + goto err; > + } > + > + /* Verify the key item signature. */ > + SHA256(buf, key_item->sig - buf, digest); > + if (!RSA_verify(NID_sha256, digest, sizeof(digest), > + key_item->sig, le32_to_cpu(key_item->sig_len), key0)) { > + pr_err("Bad key item signature\n"); > + goto err; > + } > + > + if (fw_key) { > + /* Load key 1. */ > + n_len = le32_to_cpu(key_item->key1_n_len); > + e_len = le32_to_cpu(key_item->key1_e_len); > + if (n_len + e_len > sizeof(key_item->key1)) { > + pr_err("Bad firmware key size in key item\n"); > + goto err; > + } > + n = BN_bin2bn(key_item->key1, n_len, NULL); > + e = BN_bin2bn(key_item->key1 + n_len, e_len, NULL); > + key1 = RSA_new(); > + if (!key1) > + goto err; > + if (!RSA_set0_key(key1, n, e, NULL)) > + goto err; > + > + if (*fw_key) { > + /* If a FW key was provided, compare it to key 1. */ > + if (BN_cmp(n, RSA_get0_n(*fw_key)) || > + BN_cmp(e, RSA_get0_e(*fw_key))) { > + pr_err("Wrong firmware key in key item\n"); > + goto err; > + } > + } else { > + /* Otherwise, send key1 back to the caller. */ > + *fw_key = key1; > + key1 = NULL; > + } > + } > + > + ret = EXIT_SUCCESS; > + > +err: > + RSA_free(key0); > + RSA_free(key1); > + > + return ret; > +} > + > +/* > + * Create a certificate in @buf, describing the firmware with SHA256 digest > + * @digest, and signed by the RSA key @fw_key. > + */ > +static int toc0_create_cert_item(uint8_t *buf, uint32_t *len, RSA *fw_key, > + uint8_t digest[static SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]) > +{ > + struct toc0_cert_item *cert_item = (void *)buf; > + uint8_t cert_digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; > + struct toc0_totalSequence *totalSequence; > + struct toc0_sigSequence *sigSequence; > + struct toc0_extension *extension; > + struct toc0_publicKey *publicKey; > + int ret = EXIT_FAILURE; > + unsigned int sig_len; > + > + memcpy(cert_item, &cert_item_template, sizeof(*cert_item)); > + *len = sizeof(*cert_item); > + > + /* > + * Fill in the public key. > + * > + * Only 2048-bit RSA keys are supported. Since this uses a fixed-size > + * structure, it may fail for non-standard exponents. > + */ > + totalSequence = &cert_item->totalSequence; > + publicKey = &totalSequence->mainSequence.subjectPublicKeyInfo.publicKey; > + if (BN_bn2binpad(RSA_get0_n(fw_key), publicKey->n, sizeof(publicKey->n)) < 0 || > + BN_bn2binpad(RSA_get0_e(fw_key), publicKey->e, sizeof(publicKey->e)) < 0) { > + pr_err("Firmware key is too big for certificate\n"); > + goto err; > + } > + > + /* Fill in the firmware digest. */ > + extension = &totalSequence->mainSequence.explicit3.extension; > + memcpy(&extension->digest, digest, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH); > + > + /* > + * Sign the certificate. > + * > + * In older SBROM versions (and by default in newer versions), > + * the last 4 bytes of the certificate are not signed. > + * > + * (The buffer passed to SHA256 starts at tag_mainSequence, but > + * the buffer size does not include the length of that tag.) > + */ > + SHA256((uint8_t *)totalSequence, sizeof(struct toc0_mainSequence), cert_digest); > + sigSequence = &totalSequence->sigSequence; > + if (!RSA_sign(NID_sha256, cert_digest, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, > + sigSequence->signature, &sig_len, fw_key)) { > + pr_err("Failed to sign certificate\n"); > + goto err; > + } > + if (sig_len != sizeof(sigSequence->signature)) { > + pr_err("Bad certificate signature length\n"); > + goto err; > + } > + > + ret = EXIT_SUCCESS; > + > +err: > + return ret; > +} > + > +/* > + * Verify the certificate in @buf, describing the firmware with SHA256 digest > + * @digest, and signed by the RSA key contained within. If @fw_key is provided, > + * only that key will be accepted. > + * > + * This function is only expected to work with images created by mkimage. > + */ > +static int toc0_verify_cert_item(const uint8_t *buf, uint32_t len, RSA *fw_key, > + uint8_t digest[static SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]) > +{ > + const struct toc0_cert_item *cert_item = (const void *)buf; > + uint8_t cert_digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; > + const struct toc0_totalSequence *totalSequence; > + const struct toc0_sigSequence *sigSequence; > + const struct toc0_extension *extension; > + const struct toc0_publicKey *publicKey; > + int ret = EXIT_FAILURE; > + RSA *key = NULL; > + BIGNUM *n, *e; > + > + /* Extract the public key from the certificate. */ > + totalSequence = &cert_item->totalSequence; > + publicKey = &totalSequence->mainSequence.subjectPublicKeyInfo.publicKey; > + n = BN_bin2bn(publicKey->n, sizeof(publicKey->n), NULL); > + e = BN_bin2bn(publicKey->e, sizeof(publicKey->e), NULL); > + key = RSA_new(); > + if (!key) > + goto err; > + if (!RSA_set0_key(key, n, e, NULL)) > + goto err; > + > + /* If a key was provided, compare it to the embedded key. */ > + if (fw_key && (BN_cmp(RSA_get0_n(key), RSA_get0_n(fw_key)) || > + BN_cmp(RSA_get0_e(key), RSA_get0_e(fw_key)))) { > + pr_err("Wrong firmware key in certificate\n"); > + goto err; > + } > + > + /* If a digest was provided, compare it to the embedded digest. */ > + extension = &totalSequence->mainSequence.explicit3.extension; > + if (digest && memcmp(&extension->digest, digest, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)) { > + pr_err("Wrong firmware digest in certificate\n"); > + goto err; > + } > + > + /* Verify the certificate's signature. See the comment above. */ > + SHA256((uint8_t *)totalSequence, sizeof(struct toc0_mainSequence), cert_digest); > + sigSequence = &totalSequence->sigSequence; > + if (!RSA_verify(NID_sha256, cert_digest, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, > + sigSequence->signature, > + sizeof(sigSequence->signature), key)) { > + pr_err("Bad certificate signature\n"); > + goto err; > + } > + > + ret = EXIT_SUCCESS; > + > +err: > + RSA_free(key); > + > + return ret; > +} > + > +/* > + * Always create a TOC0 containing 3 items. The extra item will be ignored on > + * SoCs which do not support it. > + */ > +static int toc0_create(uint8_t *buf, uint32_t len, RSA *root_key, RSA *fw_key, > + uint8_t *key_item, uint32_t key_item_len, > + uint8_t *fw_item, uint32_t fw_item_len, uint32_t fw_addr) > +{ > + struct toc0_main_info *main_info = (void *)buf; > + struct toc0_item_info *item_info = (void *)(main_info + 1); > + uint8_t digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; > + uint32_t *buf32 = (void *)buf; > + RSA *orig_fw_key = fw_key; > + int ret = EXIT_FAILURE; > + uint32_t checksum = 0; > + uint32_t item_offset; > + uint32_t item_length; > + int i; > + > + /* Hash the firmware for inclusion in the certificate. */ > + SHA256(fw_item, fw_item_len, digest); > + > + /* Create the main TOC0 header, containing three items. */ > + memcpy(main_info->name, TOC0_MAIN_INFO_NAME, sizeof(main_info->name)); > + main_info->magic = cpu_to_le32(TOC0_MAIN_INFO_MAGIC); > + main_info->checksum = cpu_to_le32(BROM_STAMP_VALUE); > + main_info->num_items = cpu_to_le32(TOC0_DEFAULT_NUM_ITEMS); > + memcpy(main_info->end, TOC0_MAIN_INFO_END, sizeof(main_info->end)); > + > + /* The first item links the ROTPK to the signing key. */ > + item_offset = sizeof(*main_info) + > + sizeof(*item_info) * TOC0_DEFAULT_NUM_ITEMS; > + /* Using an existing key item avoids needing the root private key. */ > + if (key_item) { > + item_length = sizeof(*key_item); > + if (toc0_verify_key_item(key_item, item_length, > + root_key, &fw_key)) > + goto err; > + memcpy(buf + item_offset, key_item, item_length); > + } else if (toc0_create_key_item(buf + item_offset, &item_length, > + root_key, fw_key)) { > + goto err; > + } > + > + item_info->name = cpu_to_le32(TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_KEY); > + item_info->offset = cpu_to_le32(item_offset); > + item_info->length = cpu_to_le32(item_length); > + memcpy(item_info->end, TOC0_ITEM_INFO_END, sizeof(item_info->end)); > + > + /* The second item contains a certificate signed by the firmware key. */ > + item_offset = item_offset + item_length; > + if (toc0_create_cert_item(buf + item_offset, &item_length, > + fw_key, digest)) > + goto err; > + > + item_info++; > + item_info->name = cpu_to_le32(TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_CERT); > + item_info->offset = cpu_to_le32(item_offset); > + item_info->length = cpu_to_le32(item_length); > + memcpy(item_info->end, TOC0_ITEM_INFO_END, sizeof(item_info->end)); > + > + /* The third item contains the actual boot code. */ > + item_offset = ALIGN(item_offset + item_length, 32); > + item_length = fw_item_len; > + if (buf + item_offset != fw_item) > + memmove(buf + item_offset, fw_item, item_length); > + > + item_info++; > + item_info->name = cpu_to_le32(TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_FIRMWARE); > + item_info->offset = cpu_to_le32(item_offset); > + item_info->length = cpu_to_le32(item_length); > + item_info->load_addr = cpu_to_le32(fw_addr); > + memcpy(item_info->end, TOC0_ITEM_INFO_END, sizeof(item_info->end)); > + > + /* Pad to the required block size with 0xff to be flash-friendly. */ > + item_offset = item_offset + item_length; > + item_length = ALIGN(item_offset, PAD_SIZE) - item_offset; > + memset(buf + item_offset, 0xff, item_length); > + > + /* Fill in the total padded file length. */ > + item_offset = item_offset + item_length; > + main_info->length = cpu_to_le32(item_offset); > + > + /* Verify enough space was provided when creating the image. */ > + assert(len >= item_offset); > + > + /* Calculate the checksum. Yes, it's that simple. */ > + for (i = 0; i < item_offset / 4; ++i) > + checksum += le32_to_cpu(buf32[i]); > + main_info->checksum = cpu_to_le32(checksum); > + > + ret = EXIT_SUCCESS; > + > +err: > + if (fw_key != orig_fw_key) > + RSA_free(fw_key); > + > + return ret; > +} > + > +static const struct toc0_item_info * > +toc0_find_item(const struct toc0_main_info *main_info, uint32_t name, > + uint32_t *offset, uint32_t *length) > +{ > + const struct toc0_item_info *item_info = (void *)(main_info + 1); > + uint32_t item_offset, item_length; > + uint32_t num_items, main_length; > + int i; > + > + num_items = le32_to_cpu(main_info->num_items); > + main_length = le32_to_cpu(main_info->length); > + > + for (i = 0; i < num_items; ++i, ++item_info) { > + if (le32_to_cpu(item_info->name) != name) > + continue; > + > + item_offset = le32_to_cpu(item_info->offset); > + item_length = le32_to_cpu(item_info->length); > + > + if (item_offset > main_length || > + item_length > main_length - item_offset) > + continue; > + > + *offset = item_offset; > + *length = item_length; > + > + return item_info; > + } > + > + return NULL; > +} > + > +static int toc0_verify(const uint8_t *buf, uint32_t len, RSA *root_key) > +{ > + const struct toc0_main_info *main_info = (void *)buf; > + const struct toc0_item_info *item_info; > + uint8_t digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; > + uint32_t main_length = le32_to_cpu(main_info->length); > + uint32_t checksum = BROM_STAMP_VALUE; > + uint32_t *buf32 = (void *)buf; > + uint32_t length, offset; > + int ret = EXIT_FAILURE; > + RSA *fw_key = NULL; > + int i; > + > + if (len < main_length) > + goto err; > + > + /* Verify the main header. */ > + if (memcmp(main_info->name, TOC0_MAIN_INFO_NAME, sizeof(main_info->name))) > + goto err; > + if (le32_to_cpu(main_info->magic) != TOC0_MAIN_INFO_MAGIC) > + goto err; > + /* Verify the checksum without modifying the buffer. */ > + for (i = 0; i < main_length / 4; ++i) > + checksum += le32_to_cpu(buf32[i]); > + if (checksum != 2 * le32_to_cpu(main_info->checksum)) > + goto err; > + /* The length must be at least 512 byte aligned. */ > + if (main_length % 512) > + goto err; > + if (memcmp(main_info->end, TOC0_MAIN_INFO_END, sizeof(main_info->end))) > + goto err; > + > + /* Verify the key item if present (it is optional). */ > + item_info = toc0_find_item(main_info, TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_KEY, > + &offset, &length); > + if (!item_info) > + fw_key = root_key; > + else if (toc0_verify_key_item(buf + offset, length, root_key, &fw_key)) > + goto err; > + > + /* Hash the firmware to compare with the certificate. */ > + item_info = toc0_find_item(main_info, TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_FIRMWARE, > + &offset, &length); > + if (!item_info) { > + pr_err("Missing firmware item\n"); > + goto err; > + } > + SHA256(buf + offset, length, digest); > + > + /* Verify the certificate item. */ > + item_info = toc0_find_item(main_info, TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_CERT, > + &offset, &length); > + if (!item_info) { > + pr_err("Missing certificate item\n"); > + goto err; > + } > + if (toc0_verify_cert_item(buf + offset, length, fw_key, digest)) > + goto err; > + > + ret = EXIT_SUCCESS; > + > +err: > + if (fw_key != root_key) > + RSA_free(fw_key); > + > + return ret; > +} > + > +static int toc0_check_params(struct image_tool_params *params) > +{ > + if (!params->dflag) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + /* > + * If a key directory was provided, look for key files there. > + * Otherwise, look for them in the current directory. The key files are > + * the "quoted" terms in the description below. > + * > + * A summary of the chain of trust on most SoCs: > + * 1) eFuse contains a SHA256 digest of the public "root key". > + * 2) Private "root key" signs the certificate item (generated here). > + * 3) Certificate item contains a SHA256 digest of the firmware item. > + * > + * A summary of the chain of trust on the H6 (by default; a bit in the > + * BROM_CONFIG eFuse makes it work like above): > + * 1) eFuse contains a SHA256 digest of the public "root key". > + * 2) Private "root key" signs the "key item" (generated here). > + * 3) "Key item" contains the public "root key" and public "fw key". > + * 4) Private "fw key" signs the certificate item (generated here). > + * 5) Certificate item contains a SHA256 digest of the firmware item. > + * > + * This means there are three valid ways to generate a TOC0: > + * 1) Provide the private "root key" only. This works everywhere. > + * For H6, the "root key" will also be used as the "fw key". > + * 2) FOR H6 ONLY: Provide the private "root key" and a separate > + * private "fw key". > + * 3) FOR H6 ONLY: Provide the private "fw key" and a pre-existing > + * "key item" containing the corresponding public "fw key". > + * In this case, the private "root key" can be kept offline. The > + * "key item" can be extracted from a TOC0 image generated using > + * method #2 above. > + * > + * Note that until the ROTPK_HASH eFuse is programmed, any "root key" > + * will be accepted by the BROM. > + */ > + if (params->keydir) { > + if (asprintf(&fw_key_file, "%s/%s", params->keydir, fw_key_file) < 0) > + return -ENOMEM; > + if (asprintf(&key_item_file, "%s/%s", params->keydir, key_item_file) < 0) > + return -ENOMEM; > + if (asprintf(&root_key_file, "%s/%s", params->keydir, root_key_file) < 0) > + return -ENOMEM; > + } > + > + return 0; > +} > + > +static int toc0_verify_header(unsigned char *buf, int image_size, > + struct image_tool_params *params) > +{ > + int ret = EXIT_FAILURE; > + RSA *root_key = NULL; > + FILE *fp; > + > + /* A root public key is optional. */ > + fp = fopen(root_key_file, "rb"); > + if (fp) { > + pr_info("Verifying image with existing root key\n"); > + root_key = PEM_read_RSAPrivateKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL); > + if (!root_key) > + root_key = PEM_read_RSAPublicKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL); > + fclose(fp); > + if (!root_key) { > + pr_err("Failed to read public key from '%s'\n", > + root_key_file); > + goto err; > + } > + } > + > + ret = toc0_verify(buf, image_size, root_key); > + > +err: > + RSA_free(root_key); > + > + return ret; > +} > + > +static const char *toc0_item_name(uint32_t name) > +{ > + if (name == TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_CERT) > + return "Certificate"; > + if (name == TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_FIRMWARE) > + return "Firmware"; > + if (name == TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_KEY) > + return "Key"; > + return "(unknown)"; > +} > + > +static void toc0_print_header(const void *buf) > +{ > + const struct toc0_main_info *main_info = buf; > + const struct toc0_item_info *item_info = (void *)(main_info + 1); > + uint32_t head_length, main_length, num_items; > + uint32_t item_offset, item_length, item_name; > + int load_addr = -1; > + int i; > + > + num_items = le32_to_cpu(main_info->num_items); > + head_length = sizeof(*main_info) + num_items * sizeof(*item_info); > + main_length = le32_to_cpu(main_info->length); > + > + printf("Allwinner TOC0 Image\n" > + "Size: %d bytes\n" > + "Contents: %d items\n" > + " 00000000:%08x Headers\n", > + main_length, num_items, head_length); > + > + for (i = 0; i < num_items; ++i, ++item_info) { > + item_offset = le32_to_cpu(item_info->offset); > + item_length = le32_to_cpu(item_info->length); > + item_name = le32_to_cpu(item_info->name); > + > + if (item_name == TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_FIRMWARE) > + load_addr = le32_to_cpu(item_info->load_addr); > + > + printf(" %08x:%08x %s\n", > + item_offset, item_length, > + toc0_item_name(item_name)); > + } > + > + if (num_items && item_offset + item_length < main_length) { > + item_offset = item_offset + item_length; > + item_length = main_length - item_offset; > + > + printf(" %08x:%08x Padding\n", > + item_offset, item_length); > + } > + > + if (load_addr != -1) > + printf("Load address: 0x%08x\n", load_addr); > +} > + > +static void toc0_set_header(void *buf, struct stat *sbuf, int ifd, > + struct image_tool_params *params) > +{ > + uint32_t key_item_len = 0; > + uint8_t *key_item = NULL; > + int ret = EXIT_FAILURE; > + RSA *root_key = NULL; > + RSA *fw_key = NULL; > + FILE *fp; > + > + /* Either a key item or the root private key is required. */ > + fp = fopen(key_item_file, "rb"); > + if (fp) { > + pr_info("Creating image using existing key item\n"); > + key_item_len = sizeof(struct toc0_key_item); > + key_item = OPENSSL_malloc(key_item_len); > + if (!key_item || fread(key_item, key_item_len, 1, fp) != 1) { > + pr_err("Failed to read key item from '%s'\n", > + root_key_file); > + goto err; > + } > + fclose(fp); > + fp = NULL; > + } > + > + fp = fopen(root_key_file, "rb"); > + if (fp) { > + root_key = PEM_read_RSAPrivateKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL); > + if (!root_key) > + root_key = PEM_read_RSAPublicKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL); > + fclose(fp); > + fp = NULL; > + } > + > + /* When using an existing key item, the root key is optional. */ > + if (!key_item && (!root_key || !RSA_get0_d(root_key))) { > + pr_err("Failed to read private key from '%s'\n", > + root_key_file); > + pr_info("Try 'openssl genrsa -out root_key.pem'\n"); > + goto err; > + } > + > + /* The certificate/firmware private key is always required. */ > + fp = fopen(fw_key_file, "rb"); > + if (fp) { > + fw_key = PEM_read_RSAPrivateKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL); > + fclose(fp); > + fp = NULL; > + } > + if (!fw_key) { > + /* If the root key is a private key, it can be used instead. */ > + if (root_key && RSA_get0_d(root_key)) { > + pr_info("Using root key as firmware key\n"); > + fw_key = root_key; > + } else { > + pr_err("Failed to read private key from '%s'\n", > + fw_key_file); > + goto err; > + } > + } > + > + /* Warn about potential compatibility issues. */ > + if (key_item || fw_key != root_key) > + pr_warn("Only H6 supports separate root and firmware keys\n"); > + > + ret = toc0_create(buf, params->file_size, root_key, fw_key, > + key_item, key_item_len, > + buf + TOC0_DEFAULT_HEADER_LEN, > + params->orig_file_size, params->addr); > + > +err: > + OPENSSL_free(key_item); > + OPENSSL_free(root_key); > + if (fw_key != root_key) > + OPENSSL_free(fw_key); > + if (fp) > + fclose(fp); > + > + if (ret != EXIT_SUCCESS) > + exit(ret); > +} > + > +static int toc0_check_image_type(uint8_t type) > +{ > + return type == IH_TYPE_SUNXI_TOC0 ? 0 : 1; > +} > + > +static int toc0_vrec_header(struct image_tool_params *params, > + struct image_type_params *tparams) > +{ > + tparams->hdr = calloc(tparams->header_size, 1); > + > + /* Save off the unpadded data size for SHA256 calculation. */ > + params->orig_file_size = params->file_size - TOC0_DEFAULT_HEADER_LEN; > + > + /* Return padding to 8K blocks. */ > + return ALIGN(params->file_size, PAD_SIZE) - params->file_size; > +} > + > +U_BOOT_IMAGE_TYPE( > + sunxi_toc0, > + "Allwinner TOC0 Boot Image support", > + TOC0_DEFAULT_HEADER_LEN, > + NULL, > + toc0_check_params, > + toc0_verify_header, > + toc0_print_header, > + toc0_set_header, > + NULL, Are you planning to implement this missing (extract_subimage) dumpimage function in future? > + toc0_check_image_type, > + NULL, > + toc0_vrec_header > +); > -- > 2.31.1 >