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Sun, 05 Sep 2021 15:58:33 -0700 (PDT) From: "Armin Kuster" To: openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org Cc: Armin Kuster Subject: [dunfell][PATCH 2/2] grub2: Several cve fixes Date: Sun, 5 Sep 2021 15:58:30 -0700 Message-Id: <20210905225830.2265684-2-akuster808@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20210905225830.2265684-1-akuster808@gmail.com> References: <20210905225830.2265684-1-akuster808@gmail.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit From: Armin Kuster Source: Debian.org MR: 109156, 109169, 109336, 109349, 109362, 109375, 109388 Type: Security Fix https://sources.debian.org/patches/grub2/2.04-20/ Disposition: Backport from ChangeID: f87f309a172004f21ac28870b85477cb90438d50 Description: Affects < 2.06 Fixes these CVE's: CVE-2020-14372 CVE-2020-25632 CVE-2020-25647 CVE-2020-27749 CVE-2020-27779 CVE-2021-20225 CVE-2021-20233 Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster --- .../grub/files/CVE-2020-14372.patch | 79 ++++ .../grub/files/CVE-2020-14372_p1.patch | 432 ++++++++++++++++++ .../grub/files/CVE-2020-14372_p2.patch | 60 +++ .../grub/files/CVE-2020-14372_p3.patch | 57 +++ .../grub/files/CVE-2020-14372_p4.patch | 168 +++++++ .../grub/files/CVE-2020-25632.patch | 90 ++++ .../grub/files/CVE-2020-25647.patch | 117 +++++ .../grub/files/CVE-2020-27749_1.patch | 80 ++++ .../grub/files/CVE-2020-27749_2.patch | 123 +++++ .../grub/files/CVE-2020-27749_3.patch | 69 +++ .../grub/files/CVE-2020-27749_4.patch | 97 ++++ .../grub/files/CVE-2020-27749_5.patch | 311 +++++++++++++ .../grub/files/CVE-2020-27749_6.patch | 254 ++++++++++ .../grub/files/CVE-2020-27779.patch | 72 +++ .../grub/files/CVE-2021-20225.patch | 57 +++ .../grub/files/CVE-2021-20233.patch | 50 ++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 16 + 17 files changed, 2132 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-14372.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-14372_p1.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-14372_p2.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-14372_p3.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-14372_p4.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-25632.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-25647.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-27749_1.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-27749_2.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-27749_3.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-27749_4.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-27749_5.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-27749_6.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-27779.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2021-20225.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2021-20233.patch diff --git a/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-14372.patch b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-14372.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cb51686ca5 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-14372.patch @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +From b62501e6d869aa0968a17c8cb2379bde475dab20 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Javier Martinez Canillas +Date: Mon, 28 Sep 2020 20:08:41 +0200 +Subject: acpi: Don't register the acpi command when locked down +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +The command is not allowed when lockdown is enforced. Otherwise an +attacker can instruct the GRUB to load an SSDT table to overwrite +the kernel lockdown configuration and later load and execute +unsigned code. + +Fixes: CVE-2020-14372 + +Reported-by: Máté Kukri +Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper + +Patch-Name: 2021-02-security/006-acpi-Don-t-register-the-acpi-command-when-locked-down.patch + +Upstream-Status: Backport +CVE: CVE-2020-14372 +Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster + +--- + docs/grub.texi | 5 +++++ + grub-core/commands/acpi.c | 15 ++++++++------- + 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) + +Index: grub-2.04/docs/grub.texi +=================================================================== +--- grub-2.04.orig/docs/grub.texi ++++ grub-2.04/docs/grub.texi +@@ -3986,6 +3986,11 @@ Normally, this command will replace the + (RSDP) in the Extended BIOS Data Area to point to the new tables. If the + @option{--no-ebda} option is used, the new tables will be known only to + GRUB, but may be used by GRUB's EFI emulation. ++ ++Note: The command is not allowed when lockdown is enforced (@pxref{Lockdown}). ++ Otherwise an attacker can instruct the GRUB to load an SSDT table to ++ overwrite the kernel lockdown configuration and later load and execute ++ unsigned code. + @end deffn + + +Index: grub-2.04/grub-core/commands/acpi.c +=================================================================== +--- grub-2.04.orig/grub-core/commands/acpi.c ++++ grub-2.04/grub-core/commands/acpi.c +@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + + #ifdef GRUB_MACHINE_EFI + #include +@@ -775,13 +776,13 @@ static grub_extcmd_t cmd; + + GRUB_MOD_INIT(acpi) + { +- cmd = grub_register_extcmd ("acpi", grub_cmd_acpi, 0, +- N_("[-1|-2] [--exclude=TABLE1,TABLE2|" +- "--load-only=TABLE1,TABLE2] FILE1" +- " [FILE2] [...]"), +- N_("Load host ACPI tables and tables " +- "specified by arguments."), +- options); ++ cmd = grub_register_extcmd_lockdown ("acpi", grub_cmd_acpi, 0, ++ N_("[-1|-2] [--exclude=TABLE1,TABLE2|" ++ "--load-only=TABLE1,TABLE2] FILE1" ++ " [FILE2] [...]"), ++ N_("Load host ACPI tables and tables " ++ "specified by arguments."), ++ options); + } + + GRUB_MOD_FINI(acpi) diff --git a/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-14372_p1.patch b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-14372_p1.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..47bbc594dc --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-14372_p1.patch @@ -0,0 +1,432 @@ +From 4484c5c41f65b0975c0b300015764c0980765f0b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Javier Martinez Canillas +Date: Mon, 28 Sep 2020 20:08:02 +0200 +Subject: kern: Add lockdown support + +When the GRUB starts on a secure boot platform, some commands can be +used to subvert the protections provided by the verification mechanism and +could lead to booting untrusted system. + +To prevent that situation, allow GRUB to be locked down. That way the code +may check if GRUB has been locked down and further restrict the commands +that are registered or what subset of their functionality could be used. + +The lockdown support adds the following components: + +* The grub_lockdown() function which can be used to lockdown GRUB if, + e.g., UEFI Secure Boot is enabled. + +* The grub_is_lockdown() function which can be used to check if the GRUB + was locked down. + +* A verifier that flags OS kernels, the GRUB modules, Device Trees and ACPI + tables as GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_DEFER_AUTH to defer verification to other + verifiers. These files are only successfully verified if another registered + verifier returns success. Otherwise, the whole verification process fails. + + For example, PE/COFF binaries verification can be done by the shim_lock + verifier which validates the signatures using the shim_lock protocol. + However, the verification is not deferred directly to the shim_lock verifier. + The shim_lock verifier is hooked into the verification process instead. + +* A set of grub_{command,extcmd}_lockdown functions that can be used by + code registering command handlers, to only register unsafe commands if + the GRUB has not been locked down. + +Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper + +Patch-Name: 2021-02-security/002-kern-Add-lockdown-support.patch + +Upstream-Status: Backport +CVE: CVE-2020-14372 Patch #1 +Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster + +--- + conf/Makefile.common | 2 + + docs/grub-dev.texi | 27 +++++++++++++ + docs/grub.texi | 8 ++++ + grub-core/Makefile.am | 5 ++- + grub-core/Makefile.core.def | 1 + + grub-core/commands/extcmd.c | 23 +++++++++++ + grub-core/kern/command.c | 24 +++++++++++ + grub-core/kern/lockdown.c | 80 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + include/grub/command.h | 5 +++ + include/grub/extcmd.h | 7 ++++ + include/grub/lockdown.h | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++ + 11 files changed, 225 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + create mode 100644 grub-core/kern/lockdown.c + create mode 100644 include/grub/lockdown.h + +Index: grub-2.04/conf/Makefile.common +=================================================================== +--- grub-2.04.orig/conf/Makefile.common ++++ grub-2.04/conf/Makefile.common +@@ -84,7 +84,9 @@ CPPFLAGS_PARTTOOL_LIST = -Dgrub_parttool + CPPFLAGS_TERMINAL_LIST = '-Dgrub_term_register_input(...)=INPUT_TERMINAL_LIST_MARKER(__VA_ARGS__)' + CPPFLAGS_TERMINAL_LIST += '-Dgrub_term_register_output(...)=OUTPUT_TERMINAL_LIST_MARKER(__VA_ARGS__)' + CPPFLAGS_COMMAND_LIST = '-Dgrub_register_command(...)=COMMAND_LIST_MARKER(__VA_ARGS__)' ++CPPFLAGS_COMMAND_LIST += '-Dgrub_register_command_lockdown(...)=COMMAND_LOCKDOWN_LIST_MARKER(__VA_ARGS__)' + CPPFLAGS_COMMAND_LIST += '-Dgrub_register_extcmd(...)=EXTCOMMAND_LIST_MARKER(__VA_ARGS__)' ++CPPFLAGS_COMMAND_LIST += '-Dgrub_register_extcmd_lockdown(...)=EXTCOMMAND_LOCKDOWN_LIST_MARKER(__VA_ARGS__)' + CPPFLAGS_COMMAND_LIST += '-Dgrub_register_command_p1(...)=P1COMMAND_LIST_MARKER(__VA_ARGS__)' + CPPFLAGS_FDT_LIST := '-Dgrub_fdtbus_register(...)=FDT_DRIVER_LIST_MARKER(__VA_ARGS__)' + CPPFLAGS_MARKER = $(CPPFLAGS_FS_LIST) $(CPPFLAGS_VIDEO_LIST) \ +Index: grub-2.04/docs/grub-dev.texi +=================================================================== +--- grub-2.04.orig/docs/grub-dev.texi ++++ grub-2.04/docs/grub-dev.texi +@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ This edition documents version @value{VE + * PFF2 Font File Format:: + * Graphical Menu Software Design:: + * Verifiers framework:: ++* Lockdown framework:: + * Copying This Manual:: Copying This Manual + * Index:: + @end menu +@@ -2086,6 +2087,32 @@ Optionally at the end of the file @samp{ + the context. If you return no error during any of @samp{init}, @samp{write} and + @samp{fini} then the file is considered as having succeded verification. + ++@node Lockdown framework ++@chapter Lockdown framework ++ ++The GRUB can be locked down, which is a restricted mode where some operations ++are not allowed. For instance, some commands cannot be used when the GRUB is ++locked down. ++ ++The function ++@code{grub_lockdown()} is used to lockdown GRUB and the function ++@code{grub_is_lockdown()} function can be used to check whether lockdown is ++enabled or not. When enabled, the function returns @samp{GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED} ++and @samp{GRUB_LOCKDOWN_DISABLED} when is not enabled. ++ ++The following functions can be used to register the commands that can only be ++used when lockdown is disabled: ++ ++@itemize ++ ++@item @code{grub_cmd_lockdown()} registers command which should not run when the ++GRUB is in lockdown mode. ++ ++@item @code{grub_cmd_lockdown()} registers extended command which should not run ++when the GRUB is in lockdown mode. ++ ++@end itemize ++ + @node Copying This Manual + @appendix Copying This Manual + +Index: grub-2.04/docs/grub.texi +=================================================================== +--- grub-2.04.orig/docs/grub.texi ++++ grub-2.04/docs/grub.texi +@@ -5581,6 +5581,7 @@ environment variables and commands are l + * Using digital signatures:: Booting digitally signed code + * UEFI secure boot and shim:: Booting digitally signed PE files + * Measured Boot:: Measuring boot components ++* Lockdown:: Lockdown when booting on a secure setup + @end menu + + @node Authentication and authorisation +@@ -5794,6 +5795,13 @@ into @file{core.img} in order to avoid a + + Measured boot is currently only supported on EFI platforms. + ++@node Lockdown ++@section Lockdown when booting on a secure setup ++ ++The GRUB can be locked down when booted on a secure boot environment, for example ++if the UEFI secure boot is enabled. On a locked down configuration, the GRUB will ++be restricted and some operations/commands cannot be executed. ++ + @node Platform limitations + @chapter Platform limitations + +Index: grub-2.04/grub-core/Makefile.am +=================================================================== +--- grub-2.04.orig/grub-core/Makefile.am ++++ grub-2.04/grub-core/Makefile.am +@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/inc + KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/i18n.h + KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/kernel.h + KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/list.h ++KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/lockdown.h + KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/misc.h + if COND_emu + KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/compiler-rt-emu.h +@@ -375,8 +376,10 @@ command.lst: $(MARKER_FILES) + b=`basename $$pp .marker`; \ + sed -n \ + -e "/EXTCOMMAND_LIST_MARKER *( *\"/{s/.*( *\"\([^\"]*\)\".*/*\1: $$b/;p;}" \ ++ -e "/EXTCOMMAND_LOCKDOWN_LIST_MARKER *( *\"/{s/.*( *\"\([^\"]*\)\".*/*\1: $$b/;p;}" \ + -e "/P1COMMAND_LIST_MARKER *( *\"/{s/.*( *\"\([^\"]*\)\".*/*\1: $$b/;p;}" \ +- -e "/COMMAND_LIST_MARKER *( *\"/{s/.*( *\"\([^\"]*\)\".*/\1: $$b/;p;}" $$pp; \ ++ -e "/COMMAND_LIST_MARKER *( *\"/{s/.*( *\"\([^\"]*\)\".*/\1: $$b/;p;}" \ ++ -e "/COMMAND_LOCKDOWN_LIST_MARKER *( *\"/{s/.*( *\"\([^\"]*\)\".*/\1: $$b/;p;}" $$pp; \ + done) | sort -u > $@ + platform_DATA += command.lst + CLEANFILES += command.lst +Index: grub-2.04/grub-core/Makefile.core.def +=================================================================== +--- grub-2.04.orig/grub-core/Makefile.core.def ++++ grub-2.04/grub-core/Makefile.core.def +@@ -203,6 +203,7 @@ kernel = { + efi = term/efi/console.c; + efi = kern/acpi.c; + efi = kern/efi/acpi.c; ++ efi = kern/lockdown.c; + i386_coreboot = kern/i386/pc/acpi.c; + i386_multiboot = kern/i386/pc/acpi.c; + i386_coreboot = kern/acpi.c; +Index: grub-2.04/grub-core/commands/extcmd.c +=================================================================== +--- grub-2.04.orig/grub-core/commands/extcmd.c ++++ grub-2.04/grub-core/commands/extcmd.c +@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ + + #include + #include ++#include + #include + #include + #include +@@ -110,6 +111,28 @@ grub_register_extcmd (const char *name, + summary, description, parser, 1); + } + ++static grub_err_t ++grub_extcmd_lockdown (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt __attribute__ ((unused)), ++ int argc __attribute__ ((unused)), ++ char **argv __attribute__ ((unused))) ++{ ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED, ++ N_("%s: the command is not allowed when lockdown is enforced"), ++ ctxt->extcmd->cmd->name); ++} ++ ++grub_extcmd_t ++grub_register_extcmd_lockdown (const char *name, grub_extcmd_func_t func, ++ grub_command_flags_t flags, const char *summary, ++ const char *description, ++ const struct grub_arg_option *parser) ++{ ++ if (grub_is_lockdown () == GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED) ++ func = grub_extcmd_lockdown; ++ ++ return grub_register_extcmd (name, func, flags, summary, description, parser); ++} ++ + void + grub_unregister_extcmd (grub_extcmd_t ext) + { +Index: grub-2.04/grub-core/kern/command.c +=================================================================== +--- grub-2.04.orig/grub-core/kern/command.c ++++ grub-2.04/grub-core/kern/command.c +@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ + * along with GRUB. If not, see . + */ + ++#include + #include + #include + +@@ -77,6 +78,29 @@ grub_register_command_prio (const char * + return cmd; + } + ++static grub_err_t ++grub_cmd_lockdown (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), ++ int argc __attribute__ ((unused)), ++ char **argv __attribute__ ((unused))) ++ ++{ ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED, ++ N_("%s: the command is not allowed when lockdown is enforced"), ++ cmd->name); ++} ++ ++grub_command_t ++grub_register_command_lockdown (const char *name, ++ grub_command_func_t func, ++ const char *summary, ++ const char *description) ++{ ++ if (grub_is_lockdown () == GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED) ++ func = grub_cmd_lockdown; ++ ++ return grub_register_command_prio (name, func, summary, description, 0); ++} ++ + void + grub_unregister_command (grub_command_t cmd) + { +Index: grub-2.04/grub-core/kern/lockdown.c +=================================================================== +--- /dev/null ++++ grub-2.04/grub-core/kern/lockdown.c +@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ ++/* ++ * GRUB -- GRand Unified Bootloader ++ * Copyright (C) 2020 Free Software Foundation, Inc. ++ * ++ * GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify ++ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by ++ * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or ++ * (at your option) any later version. ++ * ++ * GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, ++ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of ++ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the ++ * GNU General Public License for more details. ++ * ++ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License ++ * along with GRUB. If not, see . ++ * ++ */ ++ ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++static int lockdown = GRUB_LOCKDOWN_DISABLED; ++ ++static grub_err_t ++lockdown_verifier_init (grub_file_t io __attribute__ ((unused)), ++ enum grub_file_type type, ++ void **context __attribute__ ((unused)), ++ enum grub_verify_flags *flags) ++{ ++ *flags = GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_SKIP_VERIFICATION; ++ ++ switch (type & GRUB_FILE_TYPE_MASK) ++ { ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_GRUB_MODULE: ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_LINUX_KERNEL: ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_MULTIBOOT_KERNEL: ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_XEN_HYPERVISOR: ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_BSD_KERNEL: ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_XNU_KERNEL: ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_PLAN9_KERNEL: ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_NTLDR: ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_TRUECRYPT: ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_FREEDOS: ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_PXECHAINLOADER: ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_PCCHAINLOADER: ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_COREBOOT_CHAINLOADER: ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_EFI_CHAINLOADED_IMAGE: ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_ACPI_TABLE: ++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_DEVICE_TREE_IMAGE: ++ *flags = GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_DEFER_AUTH; ++ ++ /* Fall through. */ ++ ++ default: ++ return GRUB_ERR_NONE; ++ } ++} ++ ++struct grub_file_verifier lockdown_verifier = ++ { ++ .name = "lockdown_verifier", ++ .init = lockdown_verifier_init, ++ }; ++ ++void ++grub_lockdown (void) ++{ ++ lockdown = GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED; ++ ++ grub_verifier_register (&lockdown_verifier); ++} ++ ++int ++grub_is_lockdown (void) ++{ ++ return lockdown; ++} +Index: grub-2.04/include/grub/command.h +=================================================================== +--- grub-2.04.orig/include/grub/command.h ++++ grub-2.04/include/grub/command.h +@@ -86,6 +86,11 @@ EXPORT_FUNC(grub_register_command_prio) + const char *summary, + const char *description, + int prio); ++grub_command_t ++EXPORT_FUNC(grub_register_command_lockdown) (const char *name, ++ grub_command_func_t func, ++ const char *summary, ++ const char *description); + void EXPORT_FUNC(grub_unregister_command) (grub_command_t cmd); + + static inline grub_command_t +Index: grub-2.04/include/grub/extcmd.h +=================================================================== +--- grub-2.04.orig/include/grub/extcmd.h ++++ grub-2.04/include/grub/extcmd.h +@@ -62,6 +62,13 @@ grub_extcmd_t EXPORT_FUNC(grub_register_ + const char *description, + const struct grub_arg_option *parser); + ++grub_extcmd_t EXPORT_FUNC(grub_register_extcmd_lockdown) (const char *name, ++ grub_extcmd_func_t func, ++ grub_command_flags_t flags, ++ const char *summary, ++ const char *description, ++ const struct grub_arg_option *parser); ++ + grub_extcmd_t EXPORT_FUNC(grub_register_extcmd_prio) (const char *name, + grub_extcmd_func_t func, + grub_command_flags_t flags, +Index: grub-2.04/include/grub/lockdown.h +=================================================================== +--- /dev/null ++++ grub-2.04/include/grub/lockdown.h +@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ ++/* ++ * GRUB -- GRand Unified Bootloader ++ * Copyright (C) 2020 Free Software Foundation, Inc. ++ * ++ * GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify ++ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by ++ * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or ++ * (at your option) any later version. ++ * ++ * GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, ++ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of ++ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the ++ * GNU General Public License for more details. ++ * ++ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License ++ * along with GRUB. If not, see . ++ */ ++ ++#ifndef GRUB_LOCKDOWN_H ++#define GRUB_LOCKDOWN_H 1 ++ ++#include ++ ++#define GRUB_LOCKDOWN_DISABLED 0 ++#define GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED 1 ++ ++#ifdef GRUB_MACHINE_EFI ++extern void ++EXPORT_FUNC (grub_lockdown) (void); ++extern int ++EXPORT_FUNC (grub_is_lockdown) (void); ++#else ++static inline void ++grub_lockdown (void) ++{ ++} ++ ++static inline int ++grub_is_lockdown (void) ++{ ++ return GRUB_LOCKDOWN_DISABLED; ++} ++#endif ++#endif /* ! GRUB_LOCKDOWN_H */ diff --git a/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-14372_p2.patch b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-14372_p2.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5dffbb1506 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-14372_p2.patch @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +From fbcb8c44aa9136f9421f60d4d0bb9d055dc8c2eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Javier Martinez Canillas +Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2021 19:59:48 +0100 +Subject: kern/lockdown: Set a variable if the GRUB is locked down + +It may be useful for scripts to determine whether the GRUB is locked +down or not. Add the lockdown variable which is set to "y" when the GRUB +is locked down. + +Suggested-by: Dimitri John Ledkov +Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper + +Patch-Name: 2021-02-security/003-kern-lockdown-Set-a-variable-if-the-GRUB-is-locked-down.patch + +Upstream-Status: Backport +CVE: CVE-2020-14372 Patch #2 +Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster + +--- + docs/grub.texi | 3 +++ + grub-core/kern/lockdown.c | 4 ++++ + 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+) + +Index: grub-2.04/docs/grub.texi +=================================================================== +--- grub-2.04.orig/docs/grub.texi ++++ grub-2.04/docs/grub.texi +@@ -5802,6 +5802,9 @@ The GRUB can be locked down when booted + if the UEFI secure boot is enabled. On a locked down configuration, the GRUB will + be restricted and some operations/commands cannot be executed. + ++The @samp{lockdown} variable is set to @samp{y} when the GRUB is locked down. ++Otherwise it does not exit. ++ + @node Platform limitations + @chapter Platform limitations + +Index: grub-2.04/grub-core/kern/lockdown.c +=================================================================== +--- grub-2.04.orig/grub-core/kern/lockdown.c ++++ grub-2.04/grub-core/kern/lockdown.c +@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ + */ + + #include ++#include + #include + #include + #include +@@ -71,6 +72,9 @@ grub_lockdown (void) + lockdown = GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED; + + grub_verifier_register (&lockdown_verifier); ++ ++ grub_env_set ("lockdown", "y"); ++ grub_env_export ("lockdown"); + } + + int diff --git a/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-14372_p3.patch b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-14372_p3.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2a8f1ed6d6 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-14372_p3.patch @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +From 0260afe3d0b3fe07a2c55eaf3582a21a35bfd4f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Javier Martinez Canillas +Date: Mon, 28 Sep 2020 20:08:29 +0200 +Subject: efi: Lockdown the GRUB when the UEFI Secure Boot is enabled + +If the UEFI Secure Boot is enabled then the GRUB must be locked down +to prevent executing code that can potentially be used to subvert its +verification mechanisms. + +Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper + +Patch-Name: 2021-02-security/004-efi-Lockdown-the-GRUB-when-the-UEFI-Secure-Boot-is-enabled.patch +Upstream-Status: Backport +CVE: CVE-2020-14372 Patch #3 +Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster + +--- + grub-core/kern/efi/init.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/grub-core/kern/efi/init.c b/grub-core/kern/efi/init.c +index 2c31847bf..811692054 100644 +--- a/grub-core/kern/efi/init.c ++++ b/grub-core/kern/efi/init.c +@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + #include + #include + #include +@@ -39,6 +40,23 @@ grub_efi_init (void) + /* Initialize the memory management system. */ + grub_efi_mm_init (); + ++ /* ++ * Lockdown the GRUB and register the shim_lock verifier ++ * if the UEFI Secure Boot is enabled. ++ */ ++ if (grub_efi_secure_boot ()) ++ { ++ grub_lockdown (); ++ ++ /* ++ * TODO: Move Debian to using the shim_lock verifier and ++ * enable the lockdown verifier. ++ */ ++#if 0 ++ grub_shim_lock_verifier_setup (); ++#endif ++ } ++ + efi_call_4 (grub_efi_system_table->boot_services->set_watchdog_timer, + 0, 0, 0, NULL); + diff --git a/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-14372_p4.patch b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-14372_p4.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..486c9f76aa --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-14372_p4.patch @@ -0,0 +1,168 @@ +From bcffa66a873f72f337eb79d4ce673b2db8b3e7b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Javier Martinez Canillas +Date: Mon, 28 Sep 2020 20:08:33 +0200 +Subject: efi: Use grub_is_lockdown() instead of hardcoding a disabled modules + list + +Now the GRUB can check if it has been locked down and this can be used to +prevent executing commands that can be utilized to circumvent the UEFI +Secure Boot mechanisms. So, instead of hardcoding a list of modules that +have to be disabled, prevent the usage of commands that can be dangerous. + +This not only allows the commands to be disabled on other platforms, but +also properly separate the concerns. Since the shim_lock verifier logic +should be only about preventing to run untrusted binaries and not about +defining these kind of policies. + +Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper + +Patch-Name: 2021-02-security/005-efi-Use-grub_is_lockdown-instead-of-hardcoding-a-disabled-modules-list.patch + +Upstream-Status: Backport +CVE: CVE-2020-14372 Patch #4 +Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster + +--- + docs/grub.texi | 17 ++++++++++------- + grub-core/commands/i386/wrmsr.c | 5 +++-- + grub-core/commands/iorw.c | 19 ++++++++++--------- + grub-core/commands/memrw.c | 19 ++++++++++--------- + 4 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) + +Index: grub-2.04/docs/grub.texi +=================================================================== +--- grub-2.04.orig/docs/grub.texi ++++ grub-2.04/docs/grub.texi +@@ -5256,6 +5256,9 @@ only applies to the particular cpu/core/ + Also, if you specify a reserved or unimplemented MSR address, it will + cause a general protection exception (which is not currently being handled) + and the system will reboot. ++ ++Note: The command is not allowed when lockdown is enforced (@pxref{Lockdown}). ++ This is done to prevent subverting various security mechanisms. + @end deffn + + @node xen_hypervisor +@@ -5750,13 +5753,13 @@ secure boot chain. + The GRUB, except the @command{chainloader} command, works with the UEFI secure + boot and the shim. This functionality is provided by the shim_lock module. It + is recommend to build in this and other required modules into the @file{core.img}. +-All modules not stored in the @file{core.img} and the ACPI tables for the +-@command{acpi} command have to be signed, e.g. using PGP. Additionally, the +-@command{iorw}, the @command{memrw} and the @command{wrmsr} commands are +-prohibited if the UEFI secure boot is enabled. This is done due to +-security reasons. All above mentioned requirements are enforced by the +-shim_lock module. And itself it is a persistent module which means that +-it cannot be unloaded if it was loaded into the memory. ++ ++All GRUB modules not stored in the @file{core.img}, OS kernels, ACPI tables, ++Device Trees, etc. have to be signed, e.g, using PGP. Additionally, the commands ++that can be used to subvert the UEFI secure boot mechanism, such as @command{iorw} ++and @command{memrw} will not be available when the UEFI secure boot is enabled. ++This is done for security reasons and are enforced by the GRUB Lockdown mechanism ++(@pxref{Lockdown}). + + @node Measured Boot + @section Measuring boot components +Index: grub-2.04/grub-core/commands/i386/wrmsr.c +=================================================================== +--- grub-2.04.orig/grub-core/commands/i386/wrmsr.c ++++ grub-2.04/grub-core/commands/i386/wrmsr.c +@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + #include + #include + #include +@@ -83,8 +84,8 @@ grub_cmd_msr_write (grub_command_t cmd _ + + GRUB_MOD_INIT(wrmsr) + { +- cmd_write = grub_register_command ("wrmsr", grub_cmd_msr_write, N_("ADDR VALUE"), +- N_("Write a value to a CPU model specific register.")); ++ cmd_write = grub_register_command_lockdown ("wrmsr", grub_cmd_msr_write, N_("ADDR VALUE"), ++ N_("Write a value to a CPU model specific register.")); + } + + GRUB_MOD_FINI(wrmsr) +Index: grub-2.04/grub-core/commands/iorw.c +=================================================================== +--- grub-2.04.orig/grub-core/commands/iorw.c ++++ grub-2.04/grub-core/commands/iorw.c +@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + + GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+"); + +@@ -131,17 +132,17 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT(memrw) + N_("PORT"), N_("Read 32-bit value from PORT."), + options); + cmd_write_byte = +- grub_register_command ("outb", grub_cmd_write, +- N_("PORT VALUE [MASK]"), +- N_("Write 8-bit VALUE to PORT.")); ++ grub_register_command_lockdown ("outb", grub_cmd_write, ++ N_("PORT VALUE [MASK]"), ++ N_("Write 8-bit VALUE to PORT.")); + cmd_write_word = +- grub_register_command ("outw", grub_cmd_write, +- N_("PORT VALUE [MASK]"), +- N_("Write 16-bit VALUE to PORT.")); ++ grub_register_command_lockdown ("outw", grub_cmd_write, ++ N_("PORT VALUE [MASK]"), ++ N_("Write 16-bit VALUE to PORT.")); + cmd_write_dword = +- grub_register_command ("outl", grub_cmd_write, +- N_("ADDR VALUE [MASK]"), +- N_("Write 32-bit VALUE to PORT.")); ++ grub_register_command_lockdown ("outl", grub_cmd_write, ++ N_("ADDR VALUE [MASK]"), ++ N_("Write 32-bit VALUE to PORT.")); + } + + GRUB_MOD_FINI(memrw) +Index: grub-2.04/grub-core/commands/memrw.c +=================================================================== +--- grub-2.04.orig/grub-core/commands/memrw.c ++++ grub-2.04/grub-core/commands/memrw.c +@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + + GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+"); + +@@ -133,17 +134,17 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT(memrw) + N_("ADDR"), N_("Read 32-bit value from ADDR."), + options); + cmd_write_byte = +- grub_register_command ("write_byte", grub_cmd_write, +- N_("ADDR VALUE [MASK]"), +- N_("Write 8-bit VALUE to ADDR.")); ++ grub_register_command_lockdown ("write_byte", grub_cmd_write, ++ N_("ADDR VALUE [MASK]"), ++ N_("Write 8-bit VALUE to ADDR.")); + cmd_write_word = +- grub_register_command ("write_word", grub_cmd_write, +- N_("ADDR VALUE [MASK]"), +- N_("Write 16-bit VALUE to ADDR.")); ++ grub_register_command_lockdown ("write_word", grub_cmd_write, ++ N_("ADDR VALUE [MASK]"), ++ N_("Write 16-bit VALUE to ADDR.")); + cmd_write_dword = +- grub_register_command ("write_dword", grub_cmd_write, +- N_("ADDR VALUE [MASK]"), +- N_("Write 32-bit VALUE to ADDR.")); ++ grub_register_command_lockdown ("write_dword", grub_cmd_write, ++ N_("ADDR VALUE [MASK]"), ++ N_("Write 32-bit VALUE to ADDR.")); + } + + GRUB_MOD_FINI(memrw) diff --git a/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-25632.patch b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-25632.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..30a6997185 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-25632.patch @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +From 1e3203e7ec93ba725eb27bd28210a42430bf6539 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Javier Martinez Canillas +Date: Tue, 29 Sep 2020 14:08:55 +0200 +Subject: dl: Only allow unloading modules that are not dependencies + +When a module is attempted to be removed its reference counter is always +decremented. This means that repeated rmmod invocations will cause the +module to be unloaded even if another module depends on it. + +This may lead to a use-after-free scenario allowing an attacker to execute +arbitrary code and by-pass the UEFI Secure Boot protection. + +While being there, add the extern keyword to some function declarations in +that header file. + +Fixes: CVE-2020-25632 + +Reported-by: Chris Coulson +Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper + +Patch-Name: 2021-02-security/014-dl-Only-allow-unloading-modules-that-are-not-dependencies.patch + +Upstream-Status: Backport +CVE: CVE-2020-25632 +Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster + +--- + grub-core/commands/minicmd.c | 7 +++++-- + grub-core/kern/dl.c | 9 +++++++++ + include/grub/dl.h | 8 +++++--- + 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +Index: grub-2.04/grub-core/commands/minicmd.c +=================================================================== +--- grub-2.04.orig/grub-core/commands/minicmd.c ++++ grub-2.04/grub-core/commands/minicmd.c +@@ -140,8 +140,11 @@ grub_mini_cmd_rmmod (struct grub_command + if (grub_dl_is_persistent (mod)) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, "cannot unload persistent module"); + +- if (grub_dl_unref (mod) <= 0) +- grub_dl_unload (mod); ++ if (grub_dl_ref_count (mod) > 1) ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, "cannot unload referenced module"); ++ ++ grub_dl_unref (mod); ++ grub_dl_unload (mod); + + return 0; + } +Index: grub-2.04/grub-core/kern/dl.c +=================================================================== +--- grub-2.04.orig/grub-core/kern/dl.c ++++ grub-2.04/grub-core/kern/dl.c +@@ -549,6 +549,15 @@ grub_dl_unref (grub_dl_t mod) + return --mod->ref_count; + } + ++int ++grub_dl_ref_count (grub_dl_t mod) ++{ ++ if (mod == NULL) ++ return 0; ++ ++ return mod->ref_count; ++} ++ + static void + grub_dl_flush_cache (grub_dl_t mod) + { +Index: grub-2.04/include/grub/dl.h +=================================================================== +--- grub-2.04.orig/include/grub/dl.h ++++ grub-2.04/include/grub/dl.h +@@ -203,9 +203,11 @@ grub_dl_t EXPORT_FUNC(grub_dl_load) (con + grub_dl_t grub_dl_load_core (void *addr, grub_size_t size); + grub_dl_t EXPORT_FUNC(grub_dl_load_core_noinit) (void *addr, grub_size_t size); + int EXPORT_FUNC(grub_dl_unload) (grub_dl_t mod); +-void grub_dl_unload_unneeded (void); +-int EXPORT_FUNC(grub_dl_ref) (grub_dl_t mod); +-int EXPORT_FUNC(grub_dl_unref) (grub_dl_t mod); ++extern void grub_dl_unload_unneeded (void); ++extern int EXPORT_FUNC(grub_dl_ref) (grub_dl_t mod); ++extern int EXPORT_FUNC(grub_dl_unref) (grub_dl_t mod); ++extern int EXPORT_FUNC(grub_dl_ref_count) (grub_dl_t mod); ++ + extern grub_dl_t EXPORT_VAR(grub_dl_head); + + #ifndef GRUB_UTIL diff --git a/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-25647.patch b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-25647.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..73b2abadf3 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-25647.patch @@ -0,0 +1,117 @@ +From 98a777237f96dcf82a01d42c887015f6bc45174f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Javier Martinez Canillas +Date: Fri, 11 Dec 2020 19:19:21 +0100 +Subject: usb: Avoid possible out-of-bound accesses caused by malicious devices + +The maximum number of configurations and interfaces are fixed but there is +no out-of-bound checking to prevent a malicious USB device to report large +values for these and cause accesses outside the arrays' memory. + +Fixes: CVE-2020-25647 + +Reported-by: Joseph Tartaro (IOActive) +Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel +Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper + +Patch-Name: 2021-02-security/015-usb-Avoid-possible-out-of-bound-accesses-caused-by-malicious-devices.patch + +Upstream-Status: Backport +CVE: CVE-2020-25647 +Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster +--- + grub-core/bus/usb/usb.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- + include/grub/usb.h | 10 +++++++--- + 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/bus/usb/usb.c b/grub-core/bus/usb/usb.c +index 8da5e4c74..7cb3cc230 100644 +--- a/grub-core/bus/usb/usb.c ++++ b/grub-core/bus/usb/usb.c +@@ -75,6 +75,9 @@ grub_usb_controller_iterate (grub_usb_controller_iterate_hook_t hook, + grub_usb_err_t + grub_usb_clear_halt (grub_usb_device_t dev, int endpoint) + { ++ if (endpoint >= GRUB_USB_MAX_TOGGLE) ++ return GRUB_USB_ERR_BADDEVICE; ++ + dev->toggle[endpoint] = 0; + return grub_usb_control_msg (dev, (GRUB_USB_REQTYPE_OUT + | GRUB_USB_REQTYPE_STANDARD +@@ -134,10 +137,10 @@ grub_usb_device_initialize (grub_usb_device_t dev) + return err; + descdev = &dev->descdev; + +- for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) ++ for (i = 0; i < GRUB_USB_MAX_CONF; i++) + dev->config[i].descconf = NULL; + +- if (descdev->configcnt == 0) ++ if (descdev->configcnt == 0 || descdev->configcnt > GRUB_USB_MAX_CONF) + { + err = GRUB_USB_ERR_BADDEVICE; + goto fail; +@@ -172,6 +175,12 @@ grub_usb_device_initialize (grub_usb_device_t dev) + /* Skip the configuration descriptor. */ + pos = dev->config[i].descconf->length; + ++ if (dev->config[i].descconf->numif > GRUB_USB_MAX_IF) ++ { ++ err = GRUB_USB_ERR_BADDEVICE; ++ goto fail; ++ } ++ + /* Read all interfaces. */ + for (currif = 0; currif < dev->config[i].descconf->numif; currif++) + { +@@ -217,7 +226,7 @@ grub_usb_device_initialize (grub_usb_device_t dev) + + fail: + +- for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) ++ for (i = 0; i < GRUB_USB_MAX_CONF; i++) + grub_free (dev->config[i].descconf); + + return err; +diff --git a/include/grub/usb.h b/include/grub/usb.h +index 512ae1dd0..6475c552f 100644 +--- a/include/grub/usb.h ++++ b/include/grub/usb.h +@@ -23,6 +23,10 @@ + #include + #include + ++#define GRUB_USB_MAX_CONF 8 ++#define GRUB_USB_MAX_IF 32 ++#define GRUB_USB_MAX_TOGGLE 256 ++ + typedef struct grub_usb_device *grub_usb_device_t; + typedef struct grub_usb_controller *grub_usb_controller_t; + typedef struct grub_usb_controller_dev *grub_usb_controller_dev_t; +@@ -167,7 +171,7 @@ struct grub_usb_configuration + struct grub_usb_desc_config *descconf; + + /* Interfaces associated to this configuration. */ +- struct grub_usb_interface interf[32]; ++ struct grub_usb_interface interf[GRUB_USB_MAX_IF]; + }; + + struct grub_usb_hub_port +@@ -191,7 +195,7 @@ struct grub_usb_device + struct grub_usb_controller controller; + + /* Device configurations (after opening the device). */ +- struct grub_usb_configuration config[8]; ++ struct grub_usb_configuration config[GRUB_USB_MAX_CONF]; + + /* Device address. */ + int addr; +@@ -203,7 +207,7 @@ struct grub_usb_device + int initialized; + + /* Data toggle values (used for bulk transfers only). */ +- int toggle[256]; ++ int toggle[GRUB_USB_MAX_TOGGLE]; + + /* Used by libusb wrapper. Schedulded for removal. */ + void *data; diff --git a/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-27749_1.patch b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-27749_1.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2cc07186f7 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-27749_1.patch @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +From 8d06222bb8fb5d610dcdadb221d1846e7de88980 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Chris Coulson +Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2020 00:59:24 +0000 +Subject: kern/parser: Fix a memory leak + +The getline() function supplied to grub_parser_split_cmdline() returns +a newly allocated buffer and can be called multiple times, but the +returned buffer is never freed. + +Signed-off-by: Chris Coulson +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper + +Patch-Name: 2021-02-security/093-kern-parser-Fix-a-memory-leak.patch + +Upstream-Status: Backport +CVE: CVE-2020-27749 patch#1 +Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster + +--- + grub-core/kern/parser.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++---- + 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +Index: grub-2.04/grub-core/kern/parser.c +=================================================================== +--- grub-2.04.orig/grub-core/kern/parser.c ++++ grub-2.04/grub-core/kern/parser.c +@@ -140,6 +140,7 @@ grub_parser_split_cmdline (const char *c + char buffer[1024]; + char *bp = buffer; + char *rd = (char *) cmdline; ++ char *rp = rd; + char varname[200]; + char *vp = varname; + char *args; +@@ -148,10 +149,18 @@ grub_parser_split_cmdline (const char *c + *argc = 0; + do + { +- if (!rd || !*rd) ++ if (rp == NULL || *rp == '\0') + { ++ if (rd != cmdline) ++ { ++ grub_free (rd); ++ rd = rp = NULL; ++ } + if (getline) +- getline (&rd, 1, getline_data); ++ { ++ getline (&rd, 1, getline_data); ++ rp = rd; ++ } + else + break; + } +@@ -159,12 +168,12 @@ grub_parser_split_cmdline (const char *c + if (!rd) + break; + +- for (; *rd; rd++) ++ for (; *rp != '\0'; rp++) + { + grub_parser_state_t newstate; + char use; + +- newstate = grub_parser_cmdline_state (state, *rd, &use); ++ newstate = grub_parser_cmdline_state (state, *rp, &use); + + /* If a variable was being processed and this character does + not describe the variable anymore, write the variable to +@@ -197,6 +206,9 @@ grub_parser_split_cmdline (const char *c + } + while (state != GRUB_PARSER_STATE_TEXT && !check_varstate (state)); + ++ if (rd != cmdline) ++ grub_free (rd); ++ + /* A special case for when the last character was part of a + variable. */ + add_var (varname, &bp, &vp, state, GRUB_PARSER_STATE_TEXT); diff --git a/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-27749_2.patch b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-27749_2.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..88a780bcec --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-27749_2.patch @@ -0,0 +1,123 @@ +From 45812770ce81194ede99bba4c868b3a244fc37ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Chris Coulson +Date: Tue, 5 Jan 2021 22:17:28 +0000 +Subject: kern/parser: Introduce process_char() helper + +grub_parser_split_cmdline() iterates over each command line character. +In order to add error checking and to simplify the subsequent error +handling, split the character processing in to a separate function. + +Signed-off-by: Chris Coulson +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper + +Patch-Name: 2021-02-security/094-kern-parser-Introduce-process_char-helper.patch + +Upstream-Status: Backport +CVE: CVE-2020-27749 patch#2 +Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster + +--- + grub-core/kern/parser.c | 74 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- + 1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) + +Index: grub-2.04/grub-core/kern/parser.c +=================================================================== +--- grub-2.04.orig/grub-core/kern/parser.c ++++ grub-2.04/grub-core/kern/parser.c +@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ + /* parser.c - the part of the parser that can return partial tokens */ + /* + * GRUB -- GRand Unified Bootloader +- * Copyright (C) 2005,2007,2009 Free Software Foundation, Inc. ++ * Copyright (C) 2005,2007,2009,2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + * + * GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by +@@ -129,6 +129,46 @@ add_var (char *varname, char **bp, char + *((*bp)++) = *val; + } + ++static grub_err_t ++process_char (char c, char *buffer, char **bp, char *varname, char **vp, ++ grub_parser_state_t state, int *argc, ++ grub_parser_state_t *newstate) ++{ ++ char use; ++ ++ *newstate = grub_parser_cmdline_state (state, c, &use); ++ ++ /* ++ * If a variable was being processed and this character does ++ * not describe the variable anymore, write the variable to ++ * the buffer. ++ */ ++ add_var (varname, bp, vp, state, *newstate); ++ ++ if (check_varstate (*newstate)) ++ { ++ if (use) ++ *((*vp)++) = use; ++ } ++ else if (*newstate == GRUB_PARSER_STATE_TEXT && ++ state != GRUB_PARSER_STATE_ESC && grub_isspace (use)) ++ { ++ /* ++ * Don't add more than one argument if multiple ++ * spaces are used. ++ */ ++ if (*bp != buffer && *((*bp) - 1) != '\0') ++ { ++ *((*bp)++) = '\0'; ++ (*argc)++; ++ } ++ } ++ else if (use) ++ *((*bp)++) = use; ++ ++ return GRUB_ERR_NONE; ++} ++ + grub_err_t + grub_parser_split_cmdline (const char *cmdline, + grub_reader_getline_t getline, void *getline_data, +@@ -171,35 +211,13 @@ grub_parser_split_cmdline (const char *c + for (; *rp != '\0'; rp++) + { + grub_parser_state_t newstate; +- char use; +- +- newstate = grub_parser_cmdline_state (state, *rp, &use); + +- /* If a variable was being processed and this character does +- not describe the variable anymore, write the variable to +- the buffer. */ +- add_var (varname, &bp, &vp, state, newstate); +- +- if (check_varstate (newstate)) +- { +- if (use) +- *(vp++) = use; +- } +- else ++ if (process_char (*rp, buffer, &bp, varname, &vp, state, argc, ++ &newstate) != GRUB_ERR_NONE) + { +- if (newstate == GRUB_PARSER_STATE_TEXT +- && state != GRUB_PARSER_STATE_ESC && grub_isspace (use)) +- { +- /* Don't add more than one argument if multiple +- spaces are used. */ +- if (bp != buffer && *(bp - 1)) +- { +- *(bp++) = '\0'; +- (*argc)++; +- } +- } +- else if (use) +- *(bp++) = use; ++ if (rd != cmdline) ++ grub_free (rd); ++ return grub_errno; + } + state = newstate; + } diff --git a/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-27749_3.patch b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-27749_3.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ff211a9bd4 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-27749_3.patch @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +From a93ec88ea67b578c495113663a7312777de22df3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Chris Coulson +Date: Thu, 7 Jan 2021 19:53:55 +0000 +Subject: kern/parser: Introduce terminate_arg() helper + +process_char() and grub_parser_split_cmdline() use similar code for +terminating the most recent argument. Add a helper function for this. + +Signed-off-by: Chris Coulson +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper + +Patch-Name: 2021-02-security/095-kern-parser-Introduce-terminate_arg-helper.patch + +Upstream-Status: Backport +CVE: CVE-2020-27749 patch#3 +Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster + +--- + grub-core/kern/parser.c | 23 +++++++++++++---------- + 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) + +Index: grub-2.04/grub-core/kern/parser.c +=================================================================== +--- grub-2.04.orig/grub-core/kern/parser.c ++++ grub-2.04/grub-core/kern/parser.c +@@ -129,6 +129,16 @@ add_var (char *varname, char **bp, char + *((*bp)++) = *val; + } + ++static void ++terminate_arg (char *buffer, char **bp, int *argc) ++{ ++ if (*bp != buffer && *((*bp) - 1) != '\0') ++ { ++ *((*bp)++) = '\0'; ++ (*argc)++; ++ } ++} ++ + static grub_err_t + process_char (char c, char *buffer, char **bp, char *varname, char **vp, + grub_parser_state_t state, int *argc, +@@ -157,11 +167,7 @@ process_char (char c, char *buffer, char + * Don't add more than one argument if multiple + * spaces are used. + */ +- if (*bp != buffer && *((*bp) - 1) != '\0') +- { +- *((*bp)++) = '\0'; +- (*argc)++; +- } ++ terminate_arg (buffer, bp, argc); + } + else if (use) + *((*bp)++) = use; +@@ -231,11 +237,8 @@ grub_parser_split_cmdline (const char *c + variable. */ + add_var (varname, &bp, &vp, state, GRUB_PARSER_STATE_TEXT); + +- if (bp != buffer && *(bp - 1)) +- { +- *(bp++) = '\0'; +- (*argc)++; +- } ++ /* Ensure that the last argument is terminated. */ ++ terminate_arg (buffer, &bp, argc); + + /* Reserve memory for the return values. */ + args = grub_malloc (bp - buffer); diff --git a/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-27749_4.patch b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-27749_4.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ac18909ce9 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-27749_4.patch @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +From d5d6b0d72ef3ae571720c443210b4222122cf9eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Chris Coulson +Date: Wed, 6 Jan 2021 13:54:26 +0000 +Subject: kern/parser: Refactor grub_parser_split_cmdline() cleanup + +Introduce a common function epilogue used for cleaning up on all +return paths, which will simplify additional error handling to be +introduced in a subsequent commit. + +Signed-off-by: Chris Coulson +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper + +Patch-Name: 2021-02-security/096-kern-parser-Refactor-grub_parser_split_cmdline-cleanup.patch + +Upstream-Status: Backport +CVE: CVE-2020-27749 patch#4 +Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster + +--- + grub-core/kern/parser.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------- + 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) + +Index: grub-2.04/grub-core/kern/parser.c +=================================================================== +--- grub-2.04.orig/grub-core/kern/parser.c ++++ grub-2.04/grub-core/kern/parser.c +@@ -220,38 +220,37 @@ grub_parser_split_cmdline (const char *c + + if (process_char (*rp, buffer, &bp, varname, &vp, state, argc, + &newstate) != GRUB_ERR_NONE) +- { +- if (rd != cmdline) +- grub_free (rd); +- return grub_errno; +- } ++ goto fail; ++ + state = newstate; + } + } + while (state != GRUB_PARSER_STATE_TEXT && !check_varstate (state)); + +- if (rd != cmdline) +- grub_free (rd); +- + /* A special case for when the last character was part of a + variable. */ + add_var (varname, &bp, &vp, state, GRUB_PARSER_STATE_TEXT); + ++ /* If there are no args, then we're done. */ ++ if (!*argc) ++ { ++ grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ + /* Ensure that the last argument is terminated. */ ++ + terminate_arg (buffer, &bp, argc); + + /* Reserve memory for the return values. */ + args = grub_malloc (bp - buffer); + if (!args) +- return grub_errno; ++ goto fail; + grub_memcpy (args, buffer, bp - buffer); + + *argv = grub_calloc (*argc + 1, sizeof (char *)); + if (!*argv) +- { +- grub_free (args); +- return grub_errno; +- } ++ goto fail; + + /* The arguments are separated with 0's, setup argv so it points to + the right values. */ +@@ -264,7 +263,18 @@ grub_parser_split_cmdline (const char *c + bp++; + } + +- return 0; ++ grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE; ++ ++ out: ++ if (rd != cmdline) ++ grub_free (rd); ++ ++ return grub_errno; ++ ++ fail: ++ grub_free (*argv); ++ grub_free (args); ++ goto out; + } + + /* Helper for grub_parser_execute. */ diff --git a/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-27749_5.patch b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-27749_5.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e6917c606b --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-27749_5.patch @@ -0,0 +1,311 @@ +From 4f38583d8066b81dcc04eadd2d29700f58991547 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Chris Coulson +Date: Thu, 7 Jan 2021 15:15:43 +0000 +Subject: kern/buffer: Add variable sized heap buffer + +Add a new variable sized heap buffer type (grub_buffer_t) with simple +operations for appending data, accessing the data and maintaining +a read cursor. + +Signed-off-by: Chris Coulson +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper + +Patch-Name: 2021-02-security/097-kern-buffer-Add-variable-sized-heap-buffer.patch + +Upstream-Status: Backport +CVE: CVE-2020-27749 patch#5 +Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster + +--- + grub-core/Makefile.core.def | 1 + + grub-core/kern/buffer.c | 117 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + include/grub/buffer.h | 144 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 3 files changed, 262 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 grub-core/kern/buffer.c + create mode 100644 include/grub/buffer.h + +diff --git a/grub-core/Makefile.core.def b/grub-core/Makefile.core.def +index e7e4d3cf5..248835aca 100644 +--- a/grub-core/Makefile.core.def ++++ b/grub-core/Makefile.core.def +@@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ kernel = { + riscv32_efi_startup = kern/riscv/efi/startup.S; + riscv64_efi_startup = kern/riscv/efi/startup.S; + ++ common = kern/buffer.c; + common = kern/command.c; + common = kern/corecmd.c; + common = kern/device.c; +diff --git a/grub-core/kern/buffer.c b/grub-core/kern/buffer.c +new file mode 100644 +index 000000000..9f5f8b867 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/grub-core/kern/buffer.c +@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@ ++/* ++ * GRUB -- GRand Unified Bootloader ++ * Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc. ++ * ++ * GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify ++ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by ++ * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or ++ * (at your option) any later version. ++ * ++ * GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, ++ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of ++ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the ++ * GNU General Public License for more details. ++ * ++ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License ++ * along with GRUB. If not, see . ++ */ ++ ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++grub_buffer_t ++grub_buffer_new (grub_size_t sz) ++{ ++ struct grub_buffer *ret; ++ ++ ret = (struct grub_buffer *) grub_malloc (sizeof (*ret)); ++ if (ret == NULL) ++ return NULL; ++ ++ ret->data = (grub_uint8_t *) grub_malloc (sz); ++ if (ret->data == NULL) ++ { ++ grub_free (ret); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ ++ ret->sz = sz; ++ ret->pos = 0; ++ ret->used = 0; ++ ++ return ret; ++} ++ ++void ++grub_buffer_free (grub_buffer_t buf) ++{ ++ grub_free (buf->data); ++ grub_free (buf); ++} ++ ++grub_err_t ++grub_buffer_ensure_space (grub_buffer_t buf, grub_size_t req) ++{ ++ grub_uint8_t *d; ++ grub_size_t newsz = 1; ++ ++ /* Is the current buffer size adequate? */ ++ if (buf->sz >= req) ++ return GRUB_ERR_NONE; ++ ++ /* Find the smallest power-of-2 size that satisfies the request. */ ++ while (newsz < req) ++ { ++ if (newsz == 0) ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, ++ N_("requested buffer size is too large")); ++ newsz <<= 1; ++ } ++ ++ d = (grub_uint8_t *) grub_realloc (buf->data, newsz); ++ if (d == NULL) ++ return grub_errno; ++ ++ buf->data = d; ++ buf->sz = newsz; ++ ++ return GRUB_ERR_NONE; ++} ++ ++void * ++grub_buffer_take_data (grub_buffer_t buf) ++{ ++ void *data = buf->data; ++ ++ buf->data = NULL; ++ buf->sz = buf->pos = buf->used = 0; ++ ++ return data; ++} ++ ++void ++grub_buffer_reset (grub_buffer_t buf) ++{ ++ buf->pos = buf->used = 0; ++} ++ ++grub_err_t ++grub_buffer_advance_read_pos (grub_buffer_t buf, grub_size_t n) ++{ ++ grub_size_t newpos; ++ ++ if (grub_add (buf->pos, n, &newpos)) ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("overflow is detected")); ++ ++ if (newpos > buf->used) ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, ++ N_("new read is position beyond the end of the written data")); ++ ++ buf->pos = newpos; ++ ++ return GRUB_ERR_NONE; ++} +diff --git a/include/grub/buffer.h b/include/grub/buffer.h +new file mode 100644 +index 000000000..f4b10cf28 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/include/grub/buffer.h +@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@ ++/* ++ * GRUB -- GRand Unified Bootloader ++ * Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc. ++ * ++ * GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify ++ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by ++ * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or ++ * (at your option) any later version. ++ * ++ * GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, ++ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of ++ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the ++ * GNU General Public License for more details. ++ * ++ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License ++ * along with GRUB. If not, see . ++ */ ++ ++#ifndef GRUB_BUFFER_H ++#define GRUB_BUFFER_H 1 ++ ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++struct grub_buffer ++{ ++ grub_uint8_t *data; ++ grub_size_t sz; ++ grub_size_t pos; ++ grub_size_t used; ++}; ++ ++/* ++ * grub_buffer_t represents a simple variable sized byte buffer with ++ * read and write cursors. It currently only implements ++ * functionality required by the only user in GRUB (append byte[s], ++ * peeking data at a specified position and updating the read cursor. ++ * Some things that this doesn't do yet are: ++ * - Reading a portion of the buffer by copying data from the current ++ * read position in to a caller supplied destination buffer and then ++ * automatically updating the read cursor. ++ * - Dropping the read part at the start of the buffer when an append ++ * requires more space. ++ */ ++typedef struct grub_buffer *grub_buffer_t; ++ ++/* Allocate a new buffer with the specified initial size. */ ++extern grub_buffer_t grub_buffer_new (grub_size_t sz); ++ ++/* Free the buffer and its resources. */ ++extern void grub_buffer_free (grub_buffer_t buf); ++ ++/* Return the number of unread bytes in this buffer. */ ++static inline grub_size_t ++grub_buffer_get_unread_bytes (grub_buffer_t buf) ++{ ++ return buf->used - buf->pos; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Ensure that the buffer size is at least the requested ++ * number of bytes. ++ */ ++extern grub_err_t grub_buffer_ensure_space (grub_buffer_t buf, grub_size_t req); ++ ++/* ++ * Append the specified number of bytes from the supplied ++ * data to the buffer. ++ */ ++static inline grub_err_t ++grub_buffer_append_data (grub_buffer_t buf, const void *data, grub_size_t len) ++{ ++ grub_size_t req; ++ ++ if (grub_add (buf->used, len, &req)) ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("overflow is detected")); ++ ++ if (grub_buffer_ensure_space (buf, req) != GRUB_ERR_NONE) ++ return grub_errno; ++ ++ grub_memcpy (&buf->data[buf->used], data, len); ++ buf->used = req; ++ ++ return GRUB_ERR_NONE; ++} ++ ++/* Append the supplied character to the buffer. */ ++static inline grub_err_t ++grub_buffer_append_char (grub_buffer_t buf, char c) ++{ ++ return grub_buffer_append_data (buf, &c, 1); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Forget and return the underlying data buffer. The caller ++ * becomes the owner of this buffer, and must free it when it ++ * is no longer required. ++ */ ++extern void *grub_buffer_take_data (grub_buffer_t buf); ++ ++/* Reset this buffer. Note that this does not deallocate any resources. */ ++void grub_buffer_reset (grub_buffer_t buf); ++ ++/* ++ * Return a pointer to the underlying data buffer at the specified ++ * offset from the current read position. Note that this pointer may ++ * become invalid if the buffer is mutated further. ++ */ ++static inline void * ++grub_buffer_peek_data_at (grub_buffer_t buf, grub_size_t off) ++{ ++ if (grub_add (buf->pos, off, &off)) ++ { ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("overflow is detected.")); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ ++ if (off >= buf->used) ++ { ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("peek out of range")); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ ++ return &buf->data[off]; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Return a pointer to the underlying data buffer at the current ++ * read position. Note that this pointer may become invalid if the ++ * buffer is mutated further. ++ */ ++static inline void * ++grub_buffer_peek_data (grub_buffer_t buf) ++{ ++ return grub_buffer_peek_data_at (buf, 0); ++} ++ ++/* Advance the read position by the specified number of bytes. */ ++extern grub_err_t grub_buffer_advance_read_pos (grub_buffer_t buf, grub_size_t n); ++ ++#endif /* GRUB_BUFFER_H */ diff --git a/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-27749_6.patch b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-27749_6.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8e21c948ce --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-27749_6.patch @@ -0,0 +1,254 @@ +From e44c6dbbb5c344aaca6bf20967f3b2a2f9a25eba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Chris Coulson +Date: Thu, 7 Jan 2021 19:21:03 +0000 +Subject: kern/parser: Fix a stack buffer overflow + +grub_parser_split_cmdline() expands variable names present in the supplied +command line in to their corresponding variable contents and uses a 1 kiB +stack buffer for temporary storage without sufficient bounds checking. If +the function is called with a command line that references a variable with +a sufficiently large payload, it is possible to overflow the stack +buffer via tab completion, corrupt the stack frame and potentially +control execution. + +Fixes: CVE-2020-27749 + +Reported-by: Chris Coulson +Signed-off-by: Chris Coulson +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper + +Patch-Name: 2021-02-security/098-kern-parser-Fix-a-stack-buffer-overflow.patch + +Upstream-Status: Backport +CVE: CVE-2020-27749 patch#6 +Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster + +--- + grub-core/kern/parser.c | 110 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- + 1 file changed, 67 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-) + +Index: grub-2.04/grub-core/kern/parser.c +=================================================================== +--- grub-2.04.orig/grub-core/kern/parser.c ++++ grub-2.04/grub-core/kern/parser.c +@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ + */ + + #include ++#include + #include + #include + #include +@@ -107,8 +108,8 @@ check_varstate (grub_parser_state_t s) + } + + +-static void +-add_var (char *varname, char **bp, char **vp, ++static grub_err_t ++add_var (grub_buffer_t varname, grub_buffer_t buf, + grub_parser_state_t state, grub_parser_state_t newstate) + { + const char *val; +@@ -116,31 +117,41 @@ add_var (char *varname, char **bp, char + /* Check if a variable was being read in and the end of the name + was reached. */ + if (!(check_varstate (state) && !check_varstate (newstate))) +- return; ++ return GRUB_ERR_NONE; ++ ++ if (grub_buffer_append_char (varname, '\0') != GRUB_ERR_NONE) ++ return grub_errno; + +- *((*vp)++) = '\0'; +- val = grub_env_get (varname); +- *vp = varname; ++ val = grub_env_get ((const char *) grub_buffer_peek_data (varname)); ++ grub_buffer_reset (varname); + if (!val) +- return; ++ return GRUB_ERR_NONE; + + /* Insert the contents of the variable in the buffer. */ +- for (; *val; val++) +- *((*bp)++) = *val; ++ return grub_buffer_append_data (buf, val, grub_strlen (val)); + } + +-static void +-terminate_arg (char *buffer, char **bp, int *argc) ++static grub_err_t ++terminate_arg (grub_buffer_t buffer, int *argc) + { +- if (*bp != buffer && *((*bp) - 1) != '\0') +- { +- *((*bp)++) = '\0'; +- (*argc)++; +- } ++ grub_size_t unread = grub_buffer_get_unread_bytes (buffer); ++ ++ if (unread == 0) ++ return GRUB_ERR_NONE; ++ ++ if (*(const char *) grub_buffer_peek_data_at (buffer, unread - 1) == '\0') ++ return GRUB_ERR_NONE; ++ ++ if (grub_buffer_append_char (buffer, '\0') != GRUB_ERR_NONE) ++ return grub_errno; ++ ++ (*argc)++; ++ ++ return GRUB_ERR_NONE; + } + + static grub_err_t +-process_char (char c, char *buffer, char **bp, char *varname, char **vp, ++process_char (char c, grub_buffer_t buffer, grub_buffer_t varname, + grub_parser_state_t state, int *argc, + grub_parser_state_t *newstate) + { +@@ -153,12 +164,13 @@ process_char (char c, char *buffer, char + * not describe the variable anymore, write the variable to + * the buffer. + */ +- add_var (varname, bp, vp, state, *newstate); ++ if (add_var (varname, buffer, state, *newstate) != GRUB_ERR_NONE) ++ return grub_errno; + + if (check_varstate (*newstate)) + { + if (use) +- *((*vp)++) = use; ++ return grub_buffer_append_char (varname, use); + } + else if (*newstate == GRUB_PARSER_STATE_TEXT && + state != GRUB_PARSER_STATE_ESC && grub_isspace (use)) +@@ -167,10 +179,10 @@ process_char (char c, char *buffer, char + * Don't add more than one argument if multiple + * spaces are used. + */ +- terminate_arg (buffer, bp, argc); ++ return terminate_arg (buffer, argc); + } + else if (use) +- *((*bp)++) = use; ++ return grub_buffer_append_char (buffer, use); + + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; + } +@@ -181,18 +193,21 @@ grub_parser_split_cmdline (const char *c + int *argc, char ***argv) + { + grub_parser_state_t state = GRUB_PARSER_STATE_TEXT; +- /* XXX: Fixed size buffer, perhaps this buffer should be dynamically +- allocated. */ +- char buffer[1024]; +- char *bp = buffer; ++ grub_buffer_t buffer, varname; + char *rd = (char *) cmdline; + char *rp = rd; +- char varname[200]; +- char *vp = varname; +- char *args; + int i; + + *argc = 0; ++ ++ buffer = grub_buffer_new (1024); ++ if (buffer == NULL) ++ return grub_errno; ++ ++ varname = grub_buffer_new (200); ++ if (varname == NULL) ++ goto fail; ++ + do + { + if (rp == NULL || *rp == '\0') +@@ -218,7 +233,7 @@ grub_parser_split_cmdline (const char *c + { + grub_parser_state_t newstate; + +- if (process_char (*rp, buffer, &bp, varname, &vp, state, argc, ++ if (process_char (*rp, buffer, varname, state, argc, + &newstate) != GRUB_ERR_NONE) + goto fail; + +@@ -229,7 +244,13 @@ grub_parser_split_cmdline (const char *c + + /* A special case for when the last character was part of a + variable. */ +- add_var (varname, &bp, &vp, state, GRUB_PARSER_STATE_TEXT); ++ if (add_var (varname, buffer, state, GRUB_PARSER_STATE_TEXT) != GRUB_ERR_NONE) ++ goto fail; ++ ++ /* Ensure that the last argument is terminated. */ ++ ++ if (terminate_arg (buffer, argc) != GRUB_ERR_NONE) ++ goto fail; + + /* If there are no args, then we're done. */ + if (!*argc) +@@ -238,15 +259,6 @@ grub_parser_split_cmdline (const char *c + goto out; + } + +- /* Ensure that the last argument is terminated. */ +- +- terminate_arg (buffer, &bp, argc); +- +- /* Reserve memory for the return values. */ +- args = grub_malloc (bp - buffer); +- if (!args) +- goto fail; +- grub_memcpy (args, buffer, bp - buffer); + + *argv = grub_calloc (*argc + 1, sizeof (char *)); + if (!*argv) +@@ -254,26 +266,39 @@ grub_parser_split_cmdline (const char *c + + /* The arguments are separated with 0's, setup argv so it points to + the right values. */ +- bp = args; + for (i = 0; i < *argc; i++) + { +- (*argv)[i] = bp; +- while (*bp) +- bp++; +- bp++; ++ char *arg; ++ ++ if (i > 0) ++ { ++ if (grub_buffer_advance_read_pos (buffer, 1) != GRUB_ERR_NONE) ++ goto fail; ++ } ++ ++ arg = (char *) grub_buffer_peek_data (buffer); ++ if (arg == NULL || ++ grub_buffer_advance_read_pos (buffer, grub_strlen (arg)) != GRUB_ERR_NONE) ++ goto fail; ++ ++ (*argv)[i] = arg; + } + ++ /* Keep memory for the return values. */ ++ grub_buffer_take_data (buffer); ++ + grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE; + + out: + if (rd != cmdline) + grub_free (rd); ++ grub_buffer_free (buffer); ++ grub_buffer_free (varname); + + return grub_errno; + + fail: + grub_free (*argv); +- grub_free (args); + goto out; + } + diff --git a/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-27779.patch b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-27779.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cf489a5468 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-27779.patch @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +From 4ad34d7d0aff5467cc2a2b3e0c55750856c19545 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Javier Martinez Canillas +Date: Wed, 14 Oct 2020 16:33:42 +0200 +Subject: mmap: Don't register cutmem and badram commands when lockdown is + enforced + +The cutmem and badram commands can be used to remove EFI memory regions +and potentially disable the UEFI Secure Boot. Prevent the commands to be +registered if the GRUB is locked down. + +Fixes: CVE-2020-27779 + +Reported-by: Teddy Reed +Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper + +Patch-Name: 2021-02-security/007-mmap-Don-t-register-cutmem-and-badram-commands-when-lockdown-is-enforced.patch + +Upstream-Status: Backport +CVE: CVE-2020-27779 +Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster +--- + docs/grub.texi | 4 ++++ + grub-core/mmap/mmap.c | 13 +++++++------ + 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +Index: grub-2.04/docs/grub.texi +=================================================================== +--- grub-2.04.orig/docs/grub.texi ++++ grub-2.04/docs/grub.texi +@@ -4051,6 +4051,10 @@ this page is to be filtered. This synta + that are often result of memory damage, due to physical distribution of memory + cells. + ++Note: The command is not allowed when lockdown is enforced (@pxref{Lockdown}). ++ This prevents removing EFI memory regions to potentially subvert the ++ security mechanisms provided by the UEFI secure boot. ++ + @node blocklist + @subsection blocklist + +Index: grub-2.04/grub-core/mmap/mmap.c +=================================================================== +--- grub-2.04.orig/grub-core/mmap/mmap.c ++++ grub-2.04/grub-core/mmap/mmap.c +@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + #include + #include + #include +@@ -534,12 +535,12 @@ static grub_command_t cmd, cmd_cut; + + GRUB_MOD_INIT(mmap) + { +- cmd = grub_register_command ("badram", grub_cmd_badram, +- N_("ADDR1,MASK1[,ADDR2,MASK2[,...]]"), +- N_("Declare memory regions as faulty (badram).")); +- cmd_cut = grub_register_command ("cutmem", grub_cmd_cutmem, +- N_("FROM[K|M|G] TO[K|M|G]"), +- N_("Remove any memory regions in specified range.")); ++ cmd = grub_register_command_lockdown ("badram", grub_cmd_badram, ++ N_("ADDR1,MASK1[,ADDR2,MASK2[,...]]"), ++ N_("Declare memory regions as faulty (badram).")); ++ cmd_cut = grub_register_command_lockdown ("cutmem", grub_cmd_cutmem, ++ N_("FROM[K|M|G] TO[K|M|G]"), ++ N_("Remove any memory regions in specified range.")); + + } + diff --git a/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2021-20225.patch b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2021-20225.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e7b213868e --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2021-20225.patch @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +From e46927de3e5bac21bc91986099c6b7ae014a4016 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Axtens +Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2021 16:07:29 +1100 +Subject: lib/arg: Block repeated short options that require an argument + +Fuzzing found the following crash: + + search -hhhhhhhhhhhhhf + +We didn't allocate enough option space for 13 hints because the +allocation code counts the number of discrete arguments (i.e. argc). +However, the shortopt parsing code will happily keep processing +a combination of short options without checking if those short +options require an argument. This means you can easily end writing +past the allocated option space. + +This fixes a OOB write which can cause heap corruption. + +Fixes: CVE-2021-20225 + +Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper + +Patch-Name: 2021-02-security/061-lib-arg-Block-repeated-short-options-that-require-an-argument.patch + +Upstream-Status: Backport +CVE: CVE-2021-20225 +Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster + +--- + grub-core/lib/arg.c | 13 +++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/grub-core/lib/arg.c b/grub-core/lib/arg.c +index 3288609a5..537c5e94b 100644 +--- a/grub-core/lib/arg.c ++++ b/grub-core/lib/arg.c +@@ -299,6 +299,19 @@ grub_arg_parse (grub_extcmd_t cmd, int argc, char **argv, + it can have an argument value. */ + if (*curshort) + { ++ /* ++ * Only permit further short opts if this one doesn't ++ * require a value. ++ */ ++ if (opt->type != ARG_TYPE_NONE && ++ !(opt->flags & GRUB_ARG_OPTION_OPTIONAL)) ++ { ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, ++ N_("missing mandatory option for `%s'"), ++ opt->longarg); ++ goto fail; ++ } ++ + if (parse_option (cmd, opt, 0, usr) || grub_errno) + goto fail; + } diff --git a/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2021-20233.patch b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2021-20233.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3f0abe0bde --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2021-20233.patch @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +From e8813743f74b8ac23bf40ed9ee86b759d0475666 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Axtens +Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2021 17:10:48 +1100 +Subject: commands/menuentry: Fix quoting in setparams_prefix() + +Commit 9acdcbf32542 (use single quotes in menuentry setparams command) +says that expressing a quoted single quote will require 3 characters. It +actually requires (and always did require!) 4 characters: + + str: a'b => a'\''b + len: 3 => 6 (2 for the letters + 4 for the quote) + +This leads to not allocating enough memory and thus out of bounds writes +that have been observed to cause heap corruption. + +Allocate 4 bytes for each single quote. + +Commit 22e7dbb2bb81 (Fix quoting in legacy parser.) does the same +quoting, but it adds 3 as extra overhead on top of the single byte that +the quote already needs. So it's correct. + +Fixes: CVE-2021-20233 +Fixes: 9acdcbf32542 (use single quotes in menuentry setparams command) + +Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper + +Patch-Name: 2021-02-security/063-commands-menuentry-Fix-quoting-in-setparams_prefix.patch + +Upstream-Status: Backport +CVE: CVE-2021-20233 +Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster + +--- + grub-core/commands/menuentry.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/commands/menuentry.c b/grub-core/commands/menuentry.c +index 9164df744..720e6d8ea 100644 +--- a/grub-core/commands/menuentry.c ++++ b/grub-core/commands/menuentry.c +@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ setparams_prefix (int argc, char **args) + len += 3; /* 3 = 1 space + 2 quotes */ + p = args[i]; + while (*p) +- len += (*p++ == '\'' ? 3 : 1); ++ len += (*p++ == '\'' ? 4 : 1); + } + + result = grub_malloc (len + 2); diff --git a/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc index 180e3752f8..d8c4337cf3 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +++ b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc @@ -31,6 +31,22 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://CVE-2020-15706-script-Avoid-a-use-after-free-when-redefining-a-func.patch \ file://CVE-2020-15707-linux-Fix-integer-overflows-in-initrd-size-handling.patch \ file://determinism.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-25632.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-25647.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-14372_p1.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-14372_p2.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-14372_p3.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-14372_p4.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-14372.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-27779.patch \ + file://CVE-2021-20225.patch \ + file://CVE-2021-20233.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-27749_1.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-27749_2.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-27749_3.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-27749_4.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-27749_5.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-27749_6.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea" -- 2.25.1