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From: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
To: keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	zohar@linux.ibm.com, dhowells@redhat.com, dwmw2@infradead.org,
	herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net,
	jarkko@kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com
Cc: eric.snowberg@oracle.com, keescook@chromium.org,
	gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
	scott.branden@broadcom.com, weiyongjun1@huawei.com,
	nayna@linux.ibm.com, ebiggers@google.com, ardb@kernel.org,
	nramas@linux.microsoft.com, lszubowi@redhat.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com, pjones@redhat.com,
	konrad.wilk@oracle.com
Subject: [PATCH v6 13/13] integrity: Only use machine keyring when uefi_check_trust_mok_keys is true
Date: Tue, 14 Sep 2021 17:14:16 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210914211416.34096-14-eric.snowberg@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210914211416.34096-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com>

With the introduction of uefi_check_trust_mok_keys, it signifies the end-
user wants to trust the machine keyring as trusted keys.  If they have
chosen to trust the machine keyring, load the qualifying keys into it
during boot, then link it to the secondary keyring .  If the user has not
chosen to trust the machine keyring, it will be empty and not linked to
the secondary keyring.

Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
---
v4: Initial version
v5: Rename to machine keyring
v6: Unmodified from v5
---
 security/integrity/digsig.c                      |  2 +-
 security/integrity/integrity.h                   |  5 +++++
 .../integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c   |  2 +-
 .../integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c   | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
index 109b58840d45..1de09c7b5f93 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ static int __init __integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id,
 	} else {
 		if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM)
 			set_platform_trusted_keys(keyring[id]);
-		if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE)
+		if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE && trust_moklist())
 			set_machine_trusted_keys(keyring[id]);
 		if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA)
 			load_module_cert(keyring[id]);
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 730771eececd..2e214c761158 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -287,9 +287,14 @@ static inline void __init add_to_platform_keyring(const char *source,
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING
 void __init add_to_machine_keyring(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len);
+bool __init trust_moklist(void);
 #else
 static inline void __init add_to_machine_keyring(const char *source,
 						  const void *data, size_t len)
 {
 }
+static inline bool __init trust_moklist(void)
+{
+	return false;
+}
 #endif
diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
index 445d413aec74..d78dd66fb048 100644
--- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
+++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
 __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
 {
 	if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0) {
-		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING))
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING) && trust_moklist())
 			return add_to_machine_keyring;
 		else
 			return add_to_platform_keyring;
diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c
index 68b8f2d449dc..7b413dacade8 100644
--- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c
+++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c
@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@
 #include <linux/efi.h>
 #include "../integrity.h"
 
+bool trust_mok;
+
 static __init int machine_keyring_init(void)
 {
 	int rc;
@@ -67,3 +69,17 @@ static __init bool uefi_check_trust_mok_keys(void)
 	 */
 	return (status == EFI_SUCCESS && (!(attr & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE)));
 }
+
+bool __init trust_moklist(void)
+{
+	static bool initialized;
+
+	if (!initialized) {
+		initialized = true;
+
+		if (uefi_check_trust_mok_keys())
+			trust_mok = true;
+	}
+
+	return trust_mok;
+}
-- 
2.18.4


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-09-14 21:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-09-14 21:14 [PATCH v6 00/13] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK Eric Snowberg
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 01/13] integrity: Introduce a Linux keyring called machine Eric Snowberg
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 02/13] integrity: Do not allow machine keyring updates following init Eric Snowberg
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 03/13] KEYS: CA link restriction Eric Snowberg
2021-09-16  4:21   ` kernel test robot
2021-09-16  4:21     ` kernel test robot
2021-09-16  5:46   ` kernel test robot
2021-09-16  5:46     ` kernel test robot
2021-09-16 20:05   ` Nayna
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 04/13] integrity: restrict INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE to restrict_link_by_ca Eric Snowberg
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 05/13] integrity: add new keyring handler for mok keys Eric Snowberg
2021-09-16  3:16   ` kernel test robot
2021-09-16  3:16     ` kernel test robot
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 06/13] KEYS: Rename get_builtin_and_secondary_restriction Eric Snowberg
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 07/13] KEYS: add a reference to machine keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 08/13] KEYS: Introduce link restriction for machine keys Eric Snowberg
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 09/13] KEYS: integrity: change link restriction to trust the machine keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 10/13] KEYS: link secondary_trusted_keys to machine trusted keys Eric Snowberg
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 11/13] integrity: store reference to machine keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 12/13] integrity: Trust MOK keys if MokListTrustedRT found Eric Snowberg
2021-09-16 22:19   ` Peter Jones
2021-09-17  2:00     ` Eric Snowberg
2021-09-17 15:03       ` Peter Jones
2021-09-17 16:06         ` Eric Snowberg
2021-09-14 21:14 ` Eric Snowberg [this message]
2021-09-15 17:57 ` [PATCH v6 00/13] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-09-15 21:28   ` Eric Snowberg
2021-09-16 15:15     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-09-16 22:14       ` Peter Jones
2021-09-17  1:58         ` Eric Snowberg
2021-09-21 21:03         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-09-16 20:03 ` Nayna
2021-09-17  1:55   ` Eric Snowberg
2021-09-17 18:02     ` Mimi Zohar

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