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From: Konstantin Ryabitsev <konstantin@linuxfoundation.org>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>,
	tools@linux.kernel.org, users@linux.kernel.org
Subject: Re: merging pull requests
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 2021 13:19:42 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20211001171942.oyq7qtly64tyqi72@nitro.local> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <202109301630.C2646F8B5@keescook>

On Thu, Sep 30, 2021 at 04:42:58PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> The only "hole" I see with the integrity checking is that since only tags
> or mbox headers are signed, and those aren't part of the merge, there
> isn't a easy way that I see to follow the integrity chain for a given
> resulting tree. (Which is technically different from the "trust" chain.)

This is unavoidable with the current workflow because commit messages will
necessarily get modified when S-o-b and other trailers get injected. I do not
think attempting the "commits must remain immutable" approach is worthwhile,
as I think there's more value in allowing maintainers to tweak the code they
receive.

> For example, for stuff going into my tree:
> - If it's from an mbox, I can easily check that the patches haven't changed
>   in flight when the author used b4/patatt to wrap the email delivery.
> - If it's from a remote tag, I can check the tag signature.
> This is all fine.
> 
> Now I publish my tree, and sign a tag for it for a pull request. Whoever
> does that pull can only check my tag and has to trust I checked what
> went into my tree.

I think there are two different attestation targets here. What I've been
working on is in-transit attestation, with the goal to make patches
tamper-evident. What you're describing sounds to me more like
cryptographically-backed signoffs. I think tools like sigstore [1] and
external attestation documents are actually better suited for this.

I don't want to wander too far down that path at the moment, but it's perhaps
something to consider in the future. With patatt in-header signatures, you
*can* perform attestation if each commit includes a Link: to the original
patch message (and that message is cryptographically attested).

[1] https://www.sigstore.dev/

-K

  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-10-01 17:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-09-30 17:33 merging pull requests Kees Cook
2021-09-30 20:00 ` Konstantin Ryabitsev
2021-09-30 23:09   ` Kees Cook
2021-09-30 23:22     ` Stephen Rothwell
2021-09-30 23:29       ` Kees Cook
2021-09-30 23:29     ` Stephen Rothwell
2021-09-30 23:42       ` Kees Cook
2021-10-01 11:59         ` Jason Gunthorpe
2021-10-02  0:15           ` Kees Cook
2021-10-01 17:01         ` Steven Rostedt
2021-10-01 17:07         ` James Bottomley
2021-10-02  0:17           ` Kees Cook
2021-10-01 17:19         ` Konstantin Ryabitsev [this message]
2021-10-02  2:35           ` Kees Cook
2021-09-30 23:31     ` Olof Johansson
2021-10-01  0:09       ` Kees Cook
2021-10-01  0:27         ` Olof Johansson
2021-10-01 17:05           ` Steven Rostedt
2021-10-02  0:12             ` Kees Cook
2021-10-01 18:26     ` Konstantin Ryabitsev
2021-10-01 18:47       ` Linus Torvalds
2021-10-01 19:30         ` Konstantin Ryabitsev
2021-10-02  0:08           ` Kees Cook
2021-10-02  6:22         ` Willy Tarreau
2021-10-02  0:11       ` Kees Cook

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