From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4F247C433F5 for ; Mon, 1 Nov 2021 09:23:26 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 21AB76121E for ; Mon, 1 Nov 2021 09:23:26 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231903AbhKAJZ5 (ORCPT ); Mon, 1 Nov 2021 05:25:57 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:59000 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232419AbhKAJXQ (ORCPT ); Mon, 1 Nov 2021 05:23:16 -0400 Received: by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 1814861184; Mon, 1 Nov 2021 09:20:35 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1635758436; bh=II7iTCVLEc2al9USodFxVDseblv1psbvsiNLubtJpHY=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=Lq1nE0Uf7Bs3rznp+/swCpfpH38v5+yy9GGLc6g29ptCjU162u1hi137QESIw27er fe4uPxujHa95IAPtUMuC+Ig6V3XOcSr8qB/MJj2ngBiWKS7Ky/G/lB4XqXV3Hknyam wpMLdErtMMRy8eIM7WJ6vEU3meLsggJIxGw/s0AQ= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Xin Long , Marcelo Ricardo Leitner , Jakub Kicinski , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 4.14 22/25] sctp: fix the processing for COOKIE_ECHO chunk Date: Mon, 1 Nov 2021 10:17:34 +0100 Message-Id: <20211101082452.217520170@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.33.1 In-Reply-To: <20211101082447.070493993@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20211101082447.070493993@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Xin Long [ Upstream commit a64b341b8695e1c744dd972b39868371b4f68f83 ] 1. In closed state: in sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce(): When asoc is NULL, making packet for abort will use chunk's vtag in sctp_ootb_pkt_new(). But when asoc exists, vtag from the chunk should be verified before using peer.i.init_tag to make packet for abort in sctp_ootb_pkt_new(), and just discard it if vtag is not correct. 2. In the other states: in sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook(): asoc always exists, but duplicate cookie_echo's vtag will be handled by sctp_tietags_compare() and then take actions, so before that we only verify the vtag for the abort sent for invalid chunk length. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Xin Long Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 14 ++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c index b1200c4122b0..4b519ec35ab7 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c @@ -704,6 +704,9 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce(struct net *net, struct sock *sk; int error = 0; + if (asoc && !sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc)) + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + /* If the packet is an OOTB packet which is temporarily on the * control endpoint, respond with an ABORT. */ @@ -718,7 +721,8 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce(struct net *net, * in sctp_unpack_cookie(). */ if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr))) - return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, + commands); /* If the endpoint is not listening or if the number of associations * on the TCP-style socket exceed the max backlog, respond with an @@ -2080,9 +2084,11 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook( * enough for the chunk header. Cookie length verification is * done later. */ - if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr))) - return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, - commands); + if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr))) { + if (!sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc)) + asoc = NULL; + return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + } /* "Decode" the chunk. We have no optional parameters so we * are in good shape. -- 2.33.0