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From: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
To: elver@google.com, "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
	Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>,
	 Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	 Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	 Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	 kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	 linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org,
	 linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	llvm@lists.linux.dev,  x86@kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v3 04/25] kcsan: Add core support for a subset of weak memory modeling
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 2021 12:44:12 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20211130114433.2580590-5-elver@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20211130114433.2580590-1-elver@google.com>

Add support for modeling a subset of weak memory, which will enable
detection of a subset of data races due to missing memory barriers.

KCSAN's approach to detecting missing memory barriers is based on
modeling access reordering, and enabled if `CONFIG_KCSAN_WEAK_MEMORY=y`,
which depends on `CONFIG_KCSAN_STRICT=y`. The feature can be enabled or
disabled at boot and runtime via the `kcsan.weak_memory` boot parameter.

Each memory access for which a watchpoint is set up, is also selected
for simulated reordering within the scope of its function (at most 1
in-flight access).

We are limited to modeling the effects of "buffering" (delaying the
access), since the runtime cannot "prefetch" accesses (therefore no
acquire modeling). Once an access has been selected for reordering, it
is checked along every other access until the end of the function scope.
If an appropriate memory barrier is encountered, the access will no
longer be considered for reordering.

When the result of a memory operation should be ordered by a barrier,
KCSAN can then detect data races where the conflict only occurs as a
result of a missing barrier due to reordering accesses.

Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
---
v3:
* Remove kcsan_noinstr hackery, since we now try to avoid adding any
  instrumentation to .noinstr.text in the first place.
* Restrict config WEAK_MEMORY to only be enabled with tooling where
  we actually remove instrumentation from noinstr.
* Don't define kcsan_weak_memory bool if !KCSAN_WEAK_MEMORY.

v2:
* Define kcsan_noinstr as noinline if we rely on objtool nop'ing out
  calls, to avoid things like LTO inlining it.
---
 include/linux/kcsan-checks.h |  10 +-
 include/linux/kcsan.h        |  10 +-
 include/linux/sched.h        |   3 +
 kernel/kcsan/core.c          | 209 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 lib/Kconfig.kcsan            |  20 ++++
 scripts/Makefile.kcsan       |   9 +-
 6 files changed, 242 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/kcsan-checks.h b/include/linux/kcsan-checks.h
index 5f5965246877..a1c6a89fde71 100644
--- a/include/linux/kcsan-checks.h
+++ b/include/linux/kcsan-checks.h
@@ -99,7 +99,15 @@ void kcsan_set_access_mask(unsigned long mask);
 
 /* Scoped access information. */
 struct kcsan_scoped_access {
-	struct list_head list;
+	union {
+		struct list_head list; /* scoped_accesses list */
+		/*
+		 * Not an entry in scoped_accesses list; stack depth from where
+		 * the access was initialized.
+		 */
+		int stack_depth;
+	};
+
 	/* Access information. */
 	const volatile void *ptr;
 	size_t size;
diff --git a/include/linux/kcsan.h b/include/linux/kcsan.h
index 13cef3458fed..c07c71f5ba4f 100644
--- a/include/linux/kcsan.h
+++ b/include/linux/kcsan.h
@@ -49,8 +49,16 @@ struct kcsan_ctx {
 	 */
 	unsigned long access_mask;
 
-	/* List of scoped accesses. */
+	/* List of scoped accesses; likely to be empty. */
 	struct list_head scoped_accesses;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KCSAN_WEAK_MEMORY
+	/*
+	 * Scoped access for modeling access reordering to detect missing memory
+	 * barriers; only keep 1 to keep fast-path complexity manageable.
+	 */
+	struct kcsan_scoped_access reorder_access;
+#endif
 };
 
 /**
diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index 78c351e35fec..0cd40b010487 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -1339,6 +1339,9 @@ struct task_struct {
 #ifdef CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS
 	struct irqtrace_events		kcsan_save_irqtrace;
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KCSAN_WEAK_MEMORY
+	int				kcsan_stack_depth;
+#endif
 #endif
 
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KUNIT)
diff --git a/kernel/kcsan/core.c b/kernel/kcsan/core.c
index bd359f8ee63a..36a75e79a0bd 100644
--- a/kernel/kcsan/core.c
+++ b/kernel/kcsan/core.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #include <linux/delay.h>
 #include <linux/export.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/instrumentation.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/list.h>
 #include <linux/moduleparam.h>
@@ -20,6 +21,8 @@
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 
+#include <asm/sections.h>
+
 #include "encoding.h"
 #include "kcsan.h"
 #include "permissive.h"
@@ -40,6 +43,13 @@ module_param_named(udelay_interrupt, kcsan_udelay_interrupt, uint, 0644);
 module_param_named(skip_watch, kcsan_skip_watch, long, 0644);
 module_param_named(interrupt_watcher, kcsan_interrupt_watcher, bool, 0444);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KCSAN_WEAK_MEMORY
+static bool kcsan_weak_memory = true;
+module_param_named(weak_memory, kcsan_weak_memory, bool, 0644);
+#else
+#define kcsan_weak_memory false
+#endif
+
 bool kcsan_enabled;
 
 /* Per-CPU kcsan_ctx for interrupts */
@@ -351,6 +361,67 @@ void kcsan_restore_irqtrace(struct task_struct *task)
 #endif
 }
 
+static __always_inline int get_kcsan_stack_depth(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_KCSAN_WEAK_MEMORY
+	return current->kcsan_stack_depth;
+#else
+	BUILD_BUG();
+	return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static __always_inline void add_kcsan_stack_depth(int val)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_KCSAN_WEAK_MEMORY
+	current->kcsan_stack_depth += val;
+#else
+	BUILD_BUG();
+#endif
+}
+
+static __always_inline struct kcsan_scoped_access *get_reorder_access(struct kcsan_ctx *ctx)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_KCSAN_WEAK_MEMORY
+	return ctx->disable_scoped ? NULL : &ctx->reorder_access;
+#else
+	return NULL;
+#endif
+}
+
+static __always_inline bool
+find_reorder_access(struct kcsan_ctx *ctx, const volatile void *ptr, size_t size,
+		    int type, unsigned long ip)
+{
+	struct kcsan_scoped_access *reorder_access = get_reorder_access(ctx);
+
+	if (!reorder_access)
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * Note: If accesses are repeated while reorder_access is identical,
+	 * never matches the new access, because !(type & KCSAN_ACCESS_SCOPED).
+	 */
+	return reorder_access->ptr == ptr && reorder_access->size == size &&
+	       reorder_access->type == type && reorder_access->ip == ip;
+}
+
+static inline void
+set_reorder_access(struct kcsan_ctx *ctx, const volatile void *ptr, size_t size,
+		   int type, unsigned long ip)
+{
+	struct kcsan_scoped_access *reorder_access = get_reorder_access(ctx);
+
+	if (!reorder_access || !kcsan_weak_memory)
+		return;
+
+	reorder_access->ptr		= ptr;
+	reorder_access->size		= size;
+	reorder_access->type		= type | KCSAN_ACCESS_SCOPED;
+	reorder_access->ip		= ip;
+	reorder_access->stack_depth	= get_kcsan_stack_depth();
+}
+
 /*
  * Pull everything together: check_access() below contains the performance
  * critical operations; the fast-path (including check_access) functions should
@@ -389,8 +460,10 @@ static noinline void kcsan_found_watchpoint(const volatile void *ptr,
 	 * The access_mask check relies on value-change comparison. To avoid
 	 * reporting a race where e.g. the writer set up the watchpoint, but the
 	 * reader has access_mask!=0, we have to ignore the found watchpoint.
+	 *
+	 * reorder_access is never created from an access with access_mask set.
 	 */
-	if (ctx->access_mask)
+	if (ctx->access_mask && !find_reorder_access(ctx, ptr, size, type, ip))
 		return;
 
 	/*
@@ -440,11 +513,13 @@ kcsan_setup_watchpoint(const volatile void *ptr, size_t size, int type, unsigned
 	const bool is_assert = (type & KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT) != 0;
 	atomic_long_t *watchpoint;
 	u64 old, new, diff;
-	unsigned long access_mask;
 	enum kcsan_value_change value_change = KCSAN_VALUE_CHANGE_MAYBE;
+	bool interrupt_watcher = kcsan_interrupt_watcher;
 	unsigned long ua_flags = user_access_save();
 	struct kcsan_ctx *ctx = get_ctx();
+	unsigned long access_mask = ctx->access_mask;
 	unsigned long irq_flags = 0;
+	bool is_reorder_access;
 
 	/*
 	 * Always reset kcsan_skip counter in slow-path to avoid underflow; see
@@ -467,6 +542,17 @@ kcsan_setup_watchpoint(const volatile void *ptr, size_t size, int type, unsigned
 		goto out;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * The local CPU cannot observe reordering of its own accesses, and
+	 * therefore we need to take care of 2 cases to avoid false positives:
+	 *
+	 *	1. Races of the reordered access with interrupts. To avoid, if
+	 *	   the current access is reorder_access, disable interrupts.
+	 *	2. Avoid races of scoped accesses from nested interrupts (below).
+	 */
+	is_reorder_access = find_reorder_access(ctx, ptr, size, type, ip);
+	if (is_reorder_access)
+		interrupt_watcher = false;
 	/*
 	 * Avoid races of scoped accesses from nested interrupts (or scheduler).
 	 * Assume setting up a watchpoint for a non-scoped (normal) access that
@@ -482,7 +568,7 @@ kcsan_setup_watchpoint(const volatile void *ptr, size_t size, int type, unsigned
 	 * information is lost if dirtied by KCSAN.
 	 */
 	kcsan_save_irqtrace(current);
-	if (!kcsan_interrupt_watcher)
+	if (!interrupt_watcher)
 		local_irq_save(irq_flags);
 
 	watchpoint = insert_watchpoint((unsigned long)ptr, size, is_write);
@@ -503,7 +589,7 @@ kcsan_setup_watchpoint(const volatile void *ptr, size_t size, int type, unsigned
 	 * Read the current value, to later check and infer a race if the data
 	 * was modified via a non-instrumented access, e.g. from a device.
 	 */
-	old = read_instrumented_memory(ptr, size);
+	old = is_reorder_access ? 0 : read_instrumented_memory(ptr, size);
 
 	/*
 	 * Delay this thread, to increase probability of observing a racy
@@ -515,8 +601,17 @@ kcsan_setup_watchpoint(const volatile void *ptr, size_t size, int type, unsigned
 	 * Re-read value, and check if it is as expected; if not, we infer a
 	 * racy access.
 	 */
-	access_mask = ctx->access_mask;
-	new = read_instrumented_memory(ptr, size);
+	if (!is_reorder_access) {
+		new = read_instrumented_memory(ptr, size);
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * Reordered accesses cannot be used for value change detection,
+		 * because the memory location may no longer be accessible and
+		 * could result in a fault.
+		 */
+		new = 0;
+		access_mask = 0;
+	}
 
 	diff = old ^ new;
 	if (access_mask)
@@ -585,11 +680,20 @@ kcsan_setup_watchpoint(const volatile void *ptr, size_t size, int type, unsigned
 	 */
 	remove_watchpoint(watchpoint);
 	atomic_long_dec(&kcsan_counters[KCSAN_COUNTER_USED_WATCHPOINTS]);
+
 out_unlock:
-	if (!kcsan_interrupt_watcher)
+	if (!interrupt_watcher)
 		local_irq_restore(irq_flags);
 	kcsan_restore_irqtrace(current);
 	ctx->disable_scoped--;
+
+	/*
+	 * Reordered accesses cannot be used for value change detection,
+	 * therefore never consider for reordering if access_mask is set.
+	 * ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE are not real accesses, ignore them as well.
+	 */
+	if (!access_mask && !is_assert)
+		set_reorder_access(ctx, ptr, size, type, ip);
 out:
 	user_access_restore(ua_flags);
 }
@@ -597,7 +701,6 @@ kcsan_setup_watchpoint(const volatile void *ptr, size_t size, int type, unsigned
 static __always_inline void
 check_access(const volatile void *ptr, size_t size, int type, unsigned long ip)
 {
-	const bool is_write = (type & KCSAN_ACCESS_WRITE) != 0;
 	atomic_long_t *watchpoint;
 	long encoded_watchpoint;
 
@@ -608,12 +711,14 @@ check_access(const volatile void *ptr, size_t size, int type, unsigned long ip)
 	if (unlikely(size == 0))
 		return;
 
+again:
 	/*
 	 * Avoid user_access_save in fast-path: find_watchpoint is safe without
 	 * user_access_save, as the address that ptr points to is only used to
 	 * check if a watchpoint exists; ptr is never dereferenced.
 	 */
-	watchpoint = find_watchpoint((unsigned long)ptr, size, !is_write,
+	watchpoint = find_watchpoint((unsigned long)ptr, size,
+				     !(type & KCSAN_ACCESS_WRITE),
 				     &encoded_watchpoint);
 	/*
 	 * It is safe to check kcsan_is_enabled() after find_watchpoint in the
@@ -627,9 +732,42 @@ check_access(const volatile void *ptr, size_t size, int type, unsigned long ip)
 	else {
 		struct kcsan_ctx *ctx = get_ctx(); /* Call only once in fast-path. */
 
-		if (unlikely(should_watch(ctx, ptr, size, type)))
+		if (unlikely(should_watch(ctx, ptr, size, type))) {
 			kcsan_setup_watchpoint(ptr, size, type, ip);
-		else if (unlikely(ctx->scoped_accesses.prev))
+			return;
+		}
+
+		if (!(type & KCSAN_ACCESS_SCOPED)) {
+			struct kcsan_scoped_access *reorder_access = get_reorder_access(ctx);
+
+			if (reorder_access) {
+				/*
+				 * reorder_access check: simulates reordering of
+				 * the access after subsequent operations.
+				 */
+				ptr = reorder_access->ptr;
+				type = reorder_access->type;
+				ip = reorder_access->ip;
+				/*
+				 * Upon a nested interrupt, this context's
+				 * reorder_access can be modified (shared ctx).
+				 * We know that upon return, reorder_access is
+				 * always invalidated by setting size to 0 via
+				 * __tsan_func_exit(). Therefore we must read
+				 * and check size after the other fields.
+				 */
+				barrier();
+				size = READ_ONCE(reorder_access->size);
+				if (size)
+					goto again;
+			}
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Always checked last, right before returning from runtime;
+		 * if reorder_access is valid, checked after it was checked.
+		 */
+		if (unlikely(ctx->scoped_accesses.prev))
 			kcsan_check_scoped_accesses();
 	}
 }
@@ -916,19 +1054,60 @@ DEFINE_TSAN_VOLATILE_READ_WRITE(8);
 DEFINE_TSAN_VOLATILE_READ_WRITE(16);
 
 /*
- * The below are not required by KCSAN, but can still be emitted by the
- * compiler.
+ * Function entry and exit are used to determine the validty of reorder_access.
+ * Reordering of the access ends at the end of the function scope where the
+ * access happened. This is done for two reasons:
+ *
+ *	1. Artificially limits the scope where missing barriers are detected.
+ *	   This minimizes false positives due to uninstrumented functions that
+ *	   contain the required barriers but were missed.
+ *
+ *	2. Simplifies generating the stack trace of the access.
  */
 void __tsan_func_entry(void *call_pc);
-void __tsan_func_entry(void *call_pc)
+noinline void __tsan_func_entry(void *call_pc)
 {
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KCSAN_WEAK_MEMORY))
+		return;
+
+	instrumentation_begin();
+	add_kcsan_stack_depth(1);
+	instrumentation_end();
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__tsan_func_entry);
+
 void __tsan_func_exit(void);
-void __tsan_func_exit(void)
+noinline void __tsan_func_exit(void)
 {
+	struct kcsan_scoped_access *reorder_access;
+
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KCSAN_WEAK_MEMORY))
+		return;
+
+	instrumentation_begin();
+	reorder_access = get_reorder_access(get_ctx());
+	if (!reorder_access)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (get_kcsan_stack_depth() <= reorder_access->stack_depth) {
+		/*
+		 * Access check to catch cases where write without a barrier
+		 * (supposed release) was last access in function: because
+		 * instrumentation is inserted before the real access, a data
+		 * race due to the write giving up a c-s would only be caught if
+		 * we do the conflicting access after.
+		 */
+		check_access(reorder_access->ptr, reorder_access->size,
+			     reorder_access->type, reorder_access->ip);
+		reorder_access->size = 0;
+		reorder_access->stack_depth = INT_MIN;
+	}
+out:
+	add_kcsan_stack_depth(-1);
+	instrumentation_end();
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__tsan_func_exit);
+
 void __tsan_init(void);
 void __tsan_init(void)
 {
diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.kcsan b/lib/Kconfig.kcsan
index e0a93ffdef30..e4394ea8068b 100644
--- a/lib/Kconfig.kcsan
+++ b/lib/Kconfig.kcsan
@@ -191,6 +191,26 @@ config KCSAN_STRICT
 	  closely aligns with the rules defined by the Linux-kernel memory
 	  consistency model (LKMM).
 
+config KCSAN_WEAK_MEMORY
+	bool "Enable weak memory modeling to detect missing memory barriers"
+	default y
+	depends on KCSAN_STRICT
+	# We can either let objtool nop __tsan_func_{entry,exit}() and builtin
+	# atomics instrumentation in .noinstr.text, or use a compiler that can
+	# implement __no_kcsan to really remove all instrumentation.
+	depends on STACK_VALIDATION || CC_IS_GCC
+	help
+	  Enable support for modeling a subset of weak memory, which allows
+	  detecting a subset of data races due to missing memory barriers.
+
+	  Depends on KCSAN_STRICT, because the options strenghtening certain
+	  plain accesses by default (depending on !KCSAN_STRICT) reduce the
+	  ability to detect any data races invoving reordered accesses, in
+	  particular reordered writes.
+
+	  Weak memory modeling relies on additional instrumentation and may
+	  affect performance.
+
 config KCSAN_REPORT_VALUE_CHANGE_ONLY
 	bool "Only report races where watcher observed a data value change"
 	default y
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.kcsan b/scripts/Makefile.kcsan
index 37cb504c77e1..4c7f0d282e42 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile.kcsan
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.kcsan
@@ -9,7 +9,12 @@ endif
 
 # Keep most options here optional, to allow enabling more compilers if absence
 # of some options does not break KCSAN nor causes false positive reports.
-export CFLAGS_KCSAN := -fsanitize=thread \
-	$(call cc-option,$(call cc-param,tsan-instrument-func-entry-exit=0) -fno-optimize-sibling-calls) \
+kcsan-cflags := -fsanitize=thread -fno-optimize-sibling-calls \
 	$(call cc-option,$(call cc-param,tsan-compound-read-before-write=1),$(call cc-option,$(call cc-param,tsan-instrument-read-before-write=1))) \
 	$(call cc-param,tsan-distinguish-volatile=1)
+
+ifndef CONFIG_KCSAN_WEAK_MEMORY
+kcsan-cflags += $(call cc-option,$(call cc-param,tsan-instrument-func-entry-exit=0))
+endif
+
+export CFLAGS_KCSAN := $(kcsan-cflags)
-- 
2.34.0.rc2.393.gf8c9666880-goog


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-11-30 11:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-11-30 11:44 [PATCH v3 00/25] kcsan: Support detecting a subset of missing memory barriers Marco Elver
2021-11-30 11:44 ` [PATCH v3 01/25] kcsan: Refactor reading of instrumented memory Marco Elver
2021-11-30 11:44 ` [PATCH v3 02/25] kcsan: Remove redundant zero-initialization of globals Marco Elver
2021-11-30 11:44 ` [PATCH v3 03/25] kcsan: Avoid checking scoped accesses from nested contexts Marco Elver
2021-11-30 11:44 ` Marco Elver [this message]
2021-12-03  8:56   ` [PATCH v3 04/25] kcsan: Add core support for a subset of weak memory modeling Marco Elver
2021-12-03 16:50     ` Paul E. McKenney
2021-12-03 21:08       ` Paul E. McKenney
2021-12-03 23:42         ` Marco Elver
2021-12-03 23:42         ` Paul E. McKenney
2021-12-03 23:45           ` Marco Elver
2021-12-04  1:14             ` Paul E. McKenney
2021-11-30 11:44 ` [PATCH v3 05/25] kcsan: Add core memory barrier instrumentation functions Marco Elver
2021-11-30 11:44 ` [PATCH v3 06/25] kcsan, kbuild: Add option for barrier instrumentation only Marco Elver
2021-11-30 11:44 ` [PATCH v3 07/25] kcsan: Call scoped accesses reordered in reports Marco Elver
2021-11-30 11:44 ` [PATCH v3 08/25] kcsan: Show location access was reordered to Marco Elver
2021-12-06  5:03   ` Boqun Feng
2021-12-06  7:16     ` Marco Elver
2021-12-06 14:31       ` Boqun Feng
2021-12-06 16:04         ` Marco Elver
2021-12-06 17:16           ` Boqun Feng
2021-12-06 17:38             ` Paul E. McKenney
2021-11-30 11:44 ` [PATCH v3 09/25] kcsan: Document modeling of weak memory Marco Elver
2021-11-30 11:44 ` [PATCH v3 10/25] kcsan: test: Match reordered or normal accesses Marco Elver
2021-11-30 11:44 ` [PATCH v3 11/25] kcsan: test: Add test cases for memory barrier instrumentation Marco Elver
2021-11-30 11:44 ` [PATCH v3 12/25] kcsan: Ignore GCC 11+ warnings about TSan runtime support Marco Elver
2021-11-30 11:44 ` [PATCH v3 13/25] kcsan: selftest: Add test case to check memory barrier instrumentation Marco Elver
2021-11-30 11:44 ` [PATCH v3 14/25] locking/barriers, kcsan: Add instrumentation for barriers Marco Elver
2021-11-30 11:44 ` [PATCH v3 15/25] locking/barriers, kcsan: Support generic instrumentation Marco Elver
2021-11-30 11:44 ` [PATCH v3 16/25] locking/atomics, kcsan: Add instrumentation for barriers Marco Elver
2021-11-30 11:44 ` [PATCH v3 17/25] asm-generic/bitops, " Marco Elver
2021-11-30 11:44 ` [PATCH v3 18/25] x86/barriers, kcsan: Use generic instrumentation for non-smp barriers Marco Elver
2021-11-30 11:44 ` [PATCH v3 19/25] x86/qspinlock, kcsan: Instrument barrier of pv_queued_spin_unlock() Marco Elver
2021-11-30 11:44 ` [PATCH v3 20/25] mm, kcsan: Enable barrier instrumentation Marco Elver
2021-11-30 11:44 ` [PATCH v3 21/25] sched, kcsan: Enable memory " Marco Elver
2021-11-30 11:44 ` [PATCH v3 22/25] objtool, kcsan: Add memory barrier instrumentation to whitelist Marco Elver
2021-11-30 11:44 ` [PATCH v3 23/25] objtool, kcsan: Remove memory barrier instrumentation from noinstr Marco Elver
2021-11-30 11:44 ` [PATCH v3 24/25] compiler_attributes.h: Add __disable_sanitizer_instrumentation Marco Elver
2021-11-30 11:44 ` [PATCH v3 25/25] kcsan: Support WEAK_MEMORY with Clang where no objtool support exists Marco Elver

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