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David Alan Gilbert" , , , , Brijesh Singh Subject: [PATCH v8 21/40] x86/head: re-enable stack protection for 32/64-bit builds Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2021 09:43:13 -0600 Message-ID: <20211210154332.11526-22-brijesh.singh@amd.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20211210154332.11526-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com> References: <20211210154332.11526-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-coco@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Content-Type: text/plain X-Originating-IP: [10.180.168.240] X-ClientProxiedBy: SATLEXMB03.amd.com (10.181.40.144) To SATLEXMB03.amd.com (10.181.40.144) X-EOPAttributedMessage: 0 X-MS-PublicTrafficType: Email X-MS-Office365-Filtering-Correlation-Id: b6c2e1d2-bbcc-4ac1-9fef-08d9bbf3f04f X-MS-TrafficTypeDiagnostic: BYAPR12MB3269:EE_ X-Microsoft-Antispam-PRVS: X-MS-Oob-TLC-OOBClassifiers: OLM:10000; X-MS-Exchange-SenderADCheck: 1 X-MS-Exchange-AntiSpam-Relay: 0 X-Microsoft-Antispam: BCL:0; X-Microsoft-Antispam-Message-Info: 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 X-Forefront-Antispam-Report: CIP:165.204.84.17;CTRY:US;LANG:en;SCL:1;SRV:;IPV:CAL;SFV:NSPM;H:SATLEXMB03.amd.com;PTR:InfoDomainNonexistent;CAT:NONE;SFS:(4636009)(46966006)(36840700001)(40470700001)(356005)(81166007)(316002)(44832011)(426003)(336012)(83380400001)(54906003)(6666004)(2906002)(36860700001)(7416002)(110136005)(16526019)(186003)(26005)(70206006)(7406005)(7696005)(82310400004)(508600001)(70586007)(8676002)(86362001)(4326008)(40460700001)(5660300002)(1076003)(36756003)(2616005)(8936002)(47076005)(2101003)(36900700001);DIR:OUT;SFP:1101; X-OriginatorOrg: amd.com X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-OriginalArrivalTime: 10 Dec 2021 15:44:23.2403 (UTC) X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Network-Message-Id: b6c2e1d2-bbcc-4ac1-9fef-08d9bbf3f04f X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Id: 3dd8961f-e488-4e60-8e11-a82d994e183d X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-OriginalAttributedTenantConnectingIp: TenantId=3dd8961f-e488-4e60-8e11-a82d994e183d;Ip=[165.204.84.17];Helo=[SATLEXMB03.amd.com] X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-AuthSource: BN8NAM11FT042.eop-nam11.prod.protection.outlook.com X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-AuthAs: Anonymous X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-FromEntityHeader: HybridOnPrem X-MS-Exchange-Transport-CrossTenantHeadersStamped: BYAPR12MB3269 From: Michael Roth As of commit 103a4908ad4d ("x86/head/64: Disable stack protection for head$(BITS).o") kernel/head64.c is compiled with -fno-stack-protector to allow a call to set_bringup_idt_handler(), which would otherwise have stack protection enabled with CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG. While sufficient for that case, there may still be issues with calls to any external functions that were compiled with stack protection enabled that in-turn make stack-protected calls, or if the exception handlers set up by set_bringup_idt_handler() make calls to stack-protected functions. As part of 103a4908ad4d, stack protection was also disabled for kernel/head32.c as a precaution. Subsequent patches for SEV-SNP CPUID validation support will introduce both such cases. Attempting to disable stack protection for everything in scope to address that is prohibitive since much of the code, like SEV-ES #VC handler, is shared code that remains in use after boot and could benefit from having stack protection enabled. Attempting to inline calls is brittle and can quickly balloon out to library/helper code where that's not really an option. Instead, re-enable stack protection for head32.c/head64.c and make the appropriate changes to ensure the segment used for the stack canary is initialized in advance of any stack-protected C calls. for head64.c: - The BSP will enter from startup_64 and call into C code (startup_64_setup_env) shortly after setting up the stack, which may result in calls to stack-protected code. Set up %gs early to allow for this safely. - APs will enter from secondary_startup_64*, and %gs will be set up soon after. There is one call to C code prior to this (__startup_secondary_64), but it is only to fetch sme_me_mask, and unlikely to be stack-protected, so leave things as they are, but add a note about this in case things change in the future. for head32.c: - BSPs/APs will set %fs to __BOOT_DS prior to any C calls. In recent kernels, the compiler is configured to access the stack canary at %fs:__stack_chk_guard, which overlaps with the initial per-cpu __stack_chk_guard variable in the initial/'master' .data..percpu area. This is sufficient to allow access to the canary for use during initial startup, so no changes are needed there. Suggested-by: Joerg Roedel #for 64-bit %gs set up Signed-off-by: Michael Roth Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh --- arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 1 - arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile index 2ff3e600f426..4df8c8f7d2ac 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile @@ -48,7 +48,6 @@ endif # non-deterministic coverage. KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n -CFLAGS_head$(BITS).o += -fno-stack-protector CFLAGS_cc_platform.o += -fno-stack-protector CFLAGS_irq.o := -I $(srctree)/$(src)/../include/asm/trace diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S index 99de8fd461e8..9f8a7e48aca7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S @@ -65,6 +65,22 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(startup_64) leaq (__end_init_task - FRAME_SIZE)(%rip), %rsp leaq _text(%rip), %rdi + + /* + * initial_gs points to initial fixed_per_cpu struct with storage for + * the stack protector canary. Global pointer fixups are needed at this + * stage, so apply them as is done in fixup_pointer(), and initialize %gs + * such that the canary can be accessed at %gs:40 for subsequent C calls. + */ + movl $MSR_GS_BASE, %ecx + movq initial_gs(%rip), %rax + movq $_text, %rdx + subq %rdx, %rax + addq %rdi, %rax + movq %rax, %rdx + shrq $32, %rdx + wrmsr + pushq %rsi call startup_64_setup_env popq %rsi @@ -146,6 +162,14 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL) * added to the initial pgdir entry that will be programmed into CR3. */ pushq %rsi + /* + * NOTE: %gs at this point is a stale data segment left over from the + * real-mode trampoline, so the default stack protector canary location + * at %gs:40 does not yet coincide with the expected fixed_per_cpu struct + * that contains storage for the stack canary. So take care not to add + * anything to the C functions in this path that would result in stack + * protected C code being generated. + */ call __startup_secondary_64 popq %rsi -- 2.25.1