From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com [148.163.158.5]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1F78E2CAD for ; Tue, 4 Jan 2022 17:04:53 +0000 (UTC) Received: from pps.filterd (m0098420.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.1.2/8.16.1.2) with SMTP id 204Enfm4004395; Tue, 4 Jan 2022 17:04:35 GMT DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=ibm.com; h=from : to : cc : subject : date : message-id : in-reply-to : references : mime-version : content-transfer-encoding; s=pp1; bh=29DoXfIyP8xt897nTk0juf69RV20kB7+olSryz9Ebx8=; b=dzfzN6164cwFfYQ2dOhrIxyJxidw3Loqom3XqbrENHgsM+wwITEzPZqQdAQg4ORPBLp/ imqwx+FeZ0CVotFXkIaH266trHAlh6t6Bxfasblyw0RoUUOGNPolyarfjaa7HgiV7+Wp 9nCmxkzNbeUoha+nVXA1Msnr9ebhX7xFm2OnrLFBYGNhsy+l9UPrvUTHCsPE5iZACnnn C4C4kd2+IYesEeb5K38RNPoC07gJkJ1Wis2cBLrzmkQ0LitXxdjXXyBEpUwY4JkZ8QZe fEnDM08useIFzHmum9xU9KjbBqzxT638yLPK3nImSGE9evy8KlYWkprHanoaxrkrZVlS IQ== Received: from pps.reinject (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 3dcrb6jkau-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Tue, 04 Jan 2022 17:04:34 +0000 Received: from m0098420.ppops.net (m0098420.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by pps.reinject (8.16.0.43/8.16.0.43) with SMTP id 204GjxQe032684; Tue, 4 Jan 2022 17:04:34 GMT Received: from ppma01dal.us.ibm.com (83.d6.3fa9.ip4.static.sl-reverse.com [169.63.214.131]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 3dcrb6jkag-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Tue, 04 Jan 2022 17:04:34 +0000 Received: from pps.filterd (ppma01dal.us.ibm.com [127.0.0.1]) by ppma01dal.us.ibm.com (8.16.1.2/8.16.1.2) with SMTP id 204H2jhK030187; Tue, 4 Jan 2022 17:04:33 GMT Received: from b01cxnp23034.gho.pok.ibm.com (b01cxnp23034.gho.pok.ibm.com [9.57.198.29]) by ppma01dal.us.ibm.com with ESMTP id 3daekatdpt-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Tue, 04 Jan 2022 17:04:33 +0000 Received: from b01ledav006.gho.pok.ibm.com (b01ledav006.gho.pok.ibm.com [9.57.199.111]) by b01cxnp23034.gho.pok.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id 204H4V8k27263312 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Tue, 4 Jan 2022 17:04:31 GMT Received: from b01ledav006.gho.pok.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 79B7BAC05B; Tue, 4 Jan 2022 17:04:31 +0000 (GMT) Received: from b01ledav006.gho.pok.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 52F5BAC06A; Tue, 4 Jan 2022 17:04:31 +0000 (GMT) Received: from sbct-3.pok.ibm.com (unknown [9.47.158.153]) by b01ledav006.gho.pok.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Tue, 4 Jan 2022 17:04:31 +0000 (GMT) From: Stefan Berger To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: zohar@linux.ibm.com, serge@hallyn.com, christian.brauner@ubuntu.com, containers@lists.linux.dev, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, ebiederm@xmission.com, krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com, roberto.sassu@huawei.com, mpeters@redhat.com, lhinds@redhat.com, lsturman@redhat.com, puiterwi@redhat.com, jejb@linux.ibm.com, jamjoom@us.ibm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com, rgb@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, Stefan Berger Subject: [PATCH v8 19/19] ima: Enable IMA namespaces Date: Tue, 4 Jan 2022 12:04:16 -0500 Message-Id: <20220104170416.1923685-20-stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.31.1 In-Reply-To: <20220104170416.1923685-1-stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> References: <20220104170416.1923685-1-stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: containers@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 X-Proofpoint-ORIG-GUID: Zku6R3aE21TDAQnK5L9Gm_Whg0oy4SY9 X-Proofpoint-GUID: qVDzUp-w36UfOEkZNbNn_OIPZMbZfynp X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=baseguard engine=ICAP:2.0.205,Aquarius:18.0.790,Hydra:6.0.425,FMLib:17.11.62.513 definitions=2022-01-04_08,2022-01-04_01,2021-12-02_01 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 spamscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 phishscore=0 adultscore=0 lowpriorityscore=0 priorityscore=1501 bulkscore=0 clxscore=1015 suspectscore=0 malwarescore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-2110150000 definitions=main-2201040114 From: Stefan Berger Introduce the IMA_NS in Kconfig for IMA namespace enablement. Enable the lazy initialization of an IMA namespace when a user mounts SecurityFS. Now a user_namespace will get a pointer to an ima_namespace and therefore add an implementation of get_current_ns() that returns this pointer. get_current_ns() may now return a NULL pointer for as long as the IMA namespace hasn't been created, yet. Therefore, return early from those functions that may now get a NULL pointer from this call. The NULL pointer can typically be treated similar to not having an IMA policy set and simply return early from a function. Implement ima_ns_from_file() for SecurityFS-related files where we can now get the IMA namespace via the user namespace pointer associated with the superblock of the SecurityFS filesystem instance. Since the functions using ima_ns_from_file() will only be called after an ima_namesapce has been allocated they will never get a NULL pointer for the ima_namespace. Switch access to userns->ima_ns to use acquire/release semantics to ensure that a newly created ima_namespace structure is fully visible upon access. Replace usage of current_user_ns() with ima_ns_from_user_ns() that implements a method to derive the user_namespace from the given ima_namespace. It leads to the same result. Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger --- include/linux/ima.h | 9 ++++++- init/Kconfig | 13 ++++++++++ kernel/user_namespace.c | 2 ++ security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++----- security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++------- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++------ security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c | 3 ++- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 13 +++++----- 8 files changed, 112 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index 5354e83d1694..7b9713b290ae 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include struct linux_binprm; @@ -71,7 +72,13 @@ static inline const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void) static inline struct user_namespace *ima_ns_to_user_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns) { - return current_user_ns(); + struct user_namespace *user_ns; + + user_ns = current_user_ns(); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS + WARN_ON(user_ns->ima_ns != ns); +#endif + return user_ns; } #else diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig index 4b7bac10c72d..e27155e0ddba 100644 --- a/init/Kconfig +++ b/init/Kconfig @@ -1247,6 +1247,19 @@ config NET_NS Allow user space to create what appear to be multiple instances of the network stack. +config IMA_NS + bool "IMA namespace" + depends on USER_NS + depends on IMA + default n + help + Allow the creation of an IMA namespace for each user namespace. + Namespaced IMA enables having IMA features work separately + in each IMA namespace. + Currently, only the audit status flags are stored in the namespace, + which allows the same file to be audited each time it is accessed + in a new namespace. + endif # NAMESPACES config CHECKPOINT_RESTORE diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c index 6b2e3ca7ee99..653f8fa83b69 100644 --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include static struct kmem_cache *user_ns_cachep __read_mostly; static DEFINE_MUTEX(userns_state_mutex); @@ -196,6 +197,7 @@ static void free_user_ns(struct work_struct *work) kfree(ns->projid_map.forward); kfree(ns->projid_map.reverse); } + free_ima_ns(ns); retire_userns_sysctls(ns); key_free_user_ns(ns); ns_free_inum(&ns->ns); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 344c8c4bd030..d993655ec796 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -509,21 +509,20 @@ struct user_namespace *ima_user_ns_from_file(const struct file *filp) return file_inode(filp)->i_sb->s_user_ns; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS + static inline struct ima_namespace *ima_ns_from_user_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns) { - if (user_ns == &init_user_ns) - return &init_ima_ns; - return NULL; + /* Pairs with smp_store_releases() in create_ima_ns(). */ + return smp_load_acquire(&user_ns->ima_ns); } static inline struct ima_namespace *get_current_ns(void) { - return &init_ima_ns; + return ima_ns_from_user_ns(current_user_ns()); } -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS - struct ima_namespace *create_ima_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns); struct ns_status *ima_get_ns_status(struct ima_namespace *ns, @@ -532,6 +531,11 @@ struct ns_status *ima_get_ns_status(struct ima_namespace *ns, void ima_free_ns_status_tree(struct ima_namespace *ns); +static inline struct ima_namespace *ima_ns_from_file(const struct file *filp) +{ + return ima_user_ns_from_file(filp)->ima_ns; +} + #define IMA_NS_STATUS_ACTIONS IMA_AUDIT #define IMA_NS_STATUS_FLAGS IMA_AUDITED @@ -542,6 +546,20 @@ unsigned long set_iint_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, #else +static inline struct ima_namespace +*ima_ns_from_user_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns) +{ + if (user_ns == &init_user_ns) + return &init_ima_ns; + return NULL; +} + + +static inline struct ima_namespace *get_current_ns(void) +{ + return &init_ima_ns; +} + static inline struct ima_namespace * create_ima_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns) { @@ -572,6 +590,11 @@ static inline unsigned long set_iint_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, return flags; } +static inline struct ima_namespace *ima_ns_from_file(const struct file *filp) +{ + return &init_ima_ns; +} + #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_NS */ #endif /* __LINUX_IMA_H */ diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c index 468508f6a7e8..ee3af81d1c3e 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ static ssize_t ima_show_htable_violations(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { - struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns; + struct ima_namespace *ns = ima_ns_from_file(filp); return ima_show_htable_value(buf, count, ppos, &ns->ima_htable.violations); @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ static ssize_t ima_show_measurements_count(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { - struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns; + struct ima_namespace *ns = ima_ns_from_file(filp); return ima_show_htable_value(buf, count, ppos, &ns->ima_htable.len); } @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_measurements_count_ops = { /* returns pointer to hlist_node */ static void *ima_measurements_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos) { - struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns; + struct ima_namespace *ns = ima_ns_from_file(m->file); loff_t l = *pos; struct ima_queue_entry *qe; @@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ static void *ima_measurements_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos) static void *ima_measurements_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos) { - struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns; + struct ima_namespace *ns = ima_ns_from_file(m->file); struct ima_queue_entry *qe = v; /* lock protects when reading beyond last element @@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ static ssize_t ima_read_policy(struct ima_namespace *ns, char *path) static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t datalen, loff_t *ppos) { - struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns; + struct ima_namespace *ns = ima_ns_from_file(file); char *data; ssize_t result; @@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ static const struct seq_operations ima_policy_seqops = { static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) { struct user_namespace *user_ns = ima_user_ns_from_file(filp); - struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns; + struct ima_namespace *ns = ima_ns_from_file(filp); if (!(filp->f_flags & O_WRONLY)) { #ifndef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY @@ -406,7 +406,7 @@ static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) */ static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) { - struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns; + struct ima_namespace *ns = ima_ns_from_file(file); const char *cause = ns->valid_policy ? "completed" : "failed"; if ((file->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY) @@ -459,12 +459,29 @@ int ima_fs_ns_init(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct dentry *root) struct dentry *ascii_runtime_measurements = NULL; struct dentry *runtime_measurements_count = NULL; struct dentry *violations = NULL; + bool created_ns = false; + + /* + * While multiple superblocks can exist they are keyed by userns in + * s_fs_info for securityfs. The first time a userns mounts a + * securityfs instance we lazily allocate the ima_namespace for the + * userns since that's the only way a userns can meaningfully use ima. + * The vfs ensures we're the only one to call fill_super() and hence + * ima_fs_ns_init(), so we don't need any memory barriers here, i.e. + * user_ns->ima_ns can't change while we're in here. + */ + if (!ns) { + ns = create_ima_ns(user_ns); + if (IS_ERR(ns)) + return PTR_ERR(ns); + created_ns = true; + } /* FIXME: update when evm and integrity are namespaced */ if (user_ns != &init_user_ns) { int_dir = securityfs_create_dir("integrity", root); if (IS_ERR(int_dir)) - return PTR_ERR(int_dir); + goto free_ns; } else int_dir = integrity_dir; @@ -526,6 +543,10 @@ int ima_fs_ns_init(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct dentry *root) if (user_ns != &init_user_ns) securityfs_remove(int_dir); +free_ns: + if (created_ns) + free_ima_ns(user_ns); + return -1; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index bc3ab08f39c6..fc878577cdd7 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -483,7 +483,7 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) struct ima_namespace *ns = get_current_ns(); u32 secid; - if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) { + if (ns && file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) { security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid); return process_measurement(ns, file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK); @@ -519,7 +519,7 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot) int pcr; /* Is mprotect making an mmap'ed file executable? */ - if (!(ns->ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE) || !vma->vm_file || + if (!ns || !(ns->ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE) || !vma->vm_file || !(prot & PROT_EXEC) || (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) return 0; @@ -565,6 +565,9 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) int ret; u32 secid; + if (!ns) + return 0; + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid); ret = process_measurement(ns, bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK); @@ -591,6 +594,9 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) struct ima_namespace *ns = get_current_ns(); u32 secid; + if (!ns) + return 0; + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid); return process_measurement(ns, file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | @@ -656,7 +662,7 @@ int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size) { struct ima_namespace *ns = get_current_ns(); - if (!file) + if (!ns || !file) return -EINVAL; return __ima_inode_hash(ns, file_inode(file), buf, buf_size); @@ -685,7 +691,7 @@ int ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, char *buf, size_t buf_size) { struct ima_namespace *ns = get_current_ns(); - if (!inode) + if (!ns || !inode) return -EINVAL; return __ima_inode_hash(ns, inode, buf, buf_size); @@ -708,7 +714,7 @@ void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; int must_appraise; - if (!ns->ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) + if (!ns || !ns->ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) return; must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(ns, mnt_userns, inode, MAY_ACCESS, @@ -742,7 +748,7 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; int must_appraise; - if (!ns->ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) + if (!ns || !ns->ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) return; must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(ns, mnt_userns, inode, MAY_ACCESS, @@ -778,6 +784,9 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id, enum ima_hooks func; u32 secid; + if (!ns) + return 0; + /* * Do devices using pre-allocated memory run the risk of the * firmware being accessible to the device prior to the completion @@ -829,6 +838,9 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, enum ima_hooks func; u32 secid; + if (!ns) + return 0; + /* permit signed certs */ if (!file && read_id == READING_X509_CERTIFICATE) return 0; @@ -1071,7 +1083,7 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) struct ima_namespace *ns = get_current_ns(); struct fd f; - if (!buf || !size) + if (!ns || !buf || !size) return; f = fdget(kernel_fd); @@ -1111,6 +1123,9 @@ int ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_label, { struct ima_namespace *ns = get_current_ns(); + if (!ns) + return -EINVAL; + if (!event_name || !event_label || !buf || !buf_len) return -ENOPARAM; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c index 205dd06ac41e..9a5105d0ea89 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c @@ -26,7 +26,8 @@ struct ima_namespace *create_ima_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns) if (err) goto fail_free; - user_ns->ima_ns = ns; + /* Pairs with smp_load_acquire() in ima_ns_from_user_ns(). */ + smp_store_release(&user_ns->ima_ns, ns); return ns; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index b7dbc687b6ff..5a9b511ebbae 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -1333,6 +1333,7 @@ static unsigned int ima_parse_appraise_algos(char *arg) static int ima_parse_rule(struct ima_namespace *ns, char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) { + struct user_namespace *user_ns = ima_ns_to_user_ns(ns); struct audit_buffer *ab; char *from; char *p; @@ -1582,7 +1583,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(struct ima_namespace *ns, result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum); if (!result) { - entry->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), + entry->uid = make_kuid(user_ns, (uid_t) lnum); if (!uid_valid(entry->uid) || (uid_t)lnum != lnum) @@ -1617,7 +1618,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(struct ima_namespace *ns, result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum); if (!result) { - entry->gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), + entry->gid = make_kgid(user_ns, (gid_t)lnum); if (!gid_valid(entry->gid) || (((gid_t)lnum) != lnum)) @@ -1644,7 +1645,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(struct ima_namespace *ns, result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum); if (!result) { - entry->fowner = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), + entry->fowner = make_kuid(user_ns, (uid_t)lnum); if (!uid_valid(entry->fowner) || (((uid_t)lnum) != lnum)) @@ -1670,7 +1671,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(struct ima_namespace *ns, result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum); if (!result) { - entry->fgroup = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), + entry->fgroup = make_kgid(user_ns, (gid_t)lnum); if (!gid_valid(entry->fgroup) || (((gid_t)lnum) != lnum)) @@ -1920,7 +1921,7 @@ static const char *const mask_tokens[] = { void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos) { - struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns; + struct ima_namespace *ns = ima_ns_from_file(m->file); loff_t l = *pos; struct ima_rule_entry *entry; struct list_head *ima_rules_tmp; @@ -1939,7 +1940,7 @@ void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos) void *ima_policy_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos) { - struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns; + struct ima_namespace *ns = ima_ns_from_file(m->file); struct ima_rule_entry *entry = v; rcu_read_lock(); -- 2.31.1