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Peter Anvin" , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann , Andy Lutomirski , Balbir Singh , Borislav Petkov , Cyrill Gorcunov , Dave Hansen , Eugene Syromiatnikov , Florian Weimer , "H . J . Lu" , Jann Horn , Jonathan Corbet , Kees Cook , Mike Kravetz , Nadav Amit , Oleg Nesterov , Pavel Machek , Peter Zijlstra , Randy Dunlap , "Ravi V . Shankar" , Dave Martin , Weijiang Yang , "Kirill A . Shutemov" , joao.moreira@intel.com, John Allen , kcc@google.com, eranian@google.com Cc: rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, Yu-cheng Yu Subject: [PATCH 12/35] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW Date: Sun, 30 Jan 2022 13:18:15 -0800 Message-Id: <20220130211838.8382-13-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.1 In-Reply-To: <20220130211838.8382-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> References: <20220130211838.8382-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Yu-cheng Yu When Shadow Stack is introduced, [R/O + _PAGE_DIRTY] PTE is reserved for shadow stack. Copy-on-write PTEs have [R/O + _PAGE_COW]. When a PTE goes from [R/W + _PAGE_DIRTY] to [R/O + _PAGE_COW], it could become a transient shadow stack PTE in two cases: The first case is that some processors can start a write but end up seeing a read-only PTE by the time they get to the Dirty bit, creating a transient shadow stack PTE. However, this will not occur on processors supporting Shadow Stack, and a TLB flush is not necessary. The second case is that when _PAGE_DIRTY is replaced with _PAGE_COW non- atomically, a transient shadow stack PTE can be created as a result. Thus, prevent that with cmpxchg. Dave Hansen, Jann Horn, Andy Lutomirski, and Peter Zijlstra provided many insights to the issue. Jann Horn provided the cmpxchg solution. Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe --- Yu-cheng v30: - Replace (pmdval_t) cast with CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELES > 2 (Borislav Petkov). arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h index 5c3886f6ccda..e1061b9cba6a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h @@ -1295,6 +1295,24 @@ static inline void ptep_clear(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, static inline void ptep_set_wrprotect(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep) { + /* + * If Shadow Stack is enabled, pte_wrprotect() moves _PAGE_DIRTY + * to _PAGE_COW (see comments at pte_wrprotect()). + * When a thread reads a RW=1, Dirty=0 PTE and before changing it + * to RW=0, Dirty=0, another thread could have written to the page + * and the PTE is RW=1, Dirty=1 now. Use try_cmpxchg() to detect + * PTE changes and update old_pte, then try again. + */ + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) { + pte_t old_pte, new_pte; + + old_pte = READ_ONCE(*ptep); + do { + new_pte = pte_wrprotect(old_pte); + } while (!try_cmpxchg(&ptep->pte, &old_pte.pte, new_pte.pte)); + + return; + } clear_bit(_PAGE_BIT_RW, (unsigned long *)&ptep->pte); } @@ -1347,6 +1365,26 @@ static inline pud_t pudp_huge_get_and_clear(struct mm_struct *mm, static inline void pmdp_set_wrprotect(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, pmd_t *pmdp) { +#if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS > 2 + /* + * If Shadow Stack is enabled, pmd_wrprotect() moves _PAGE_DIRTY + * to _PAGE_COW (see comments at pmd_wrprotect()). + * When a thread reads a RW=1, Dirty=0 PMD and before changing it + * to RW=0, Dirty=0, another thread could have written to the page + * and the PMD is RW=1, Dirty=1 now. Use try_cmpxchg() to detect + * PMD changes and update old_pmd, then try again. + */ + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) { + pmd_t old_pmd, new_pmd; + + old_pmd = READ_ONCE(*pmdp); + do { + new_pmd = pmd_wrprotect(old_pmd); + } while (!try_cmpxchg(&pmdp->pmd, &old_pmd.pmd, new_pmd.pmd)); + + return; + } +#endif clear_bit(_PAGE_BIT_RW, (unsigned long *)pmdp); } -- 2.17.1