From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, joao@overdrivepizza.com, hjl.tools@gmail.com,
jpoimboe@redhat.com, andrew.cooper3@citrix.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, ndesaulniers@google.com,
samitolvanen@google.com
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 2/6] x86: Base IBT bits
Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2022 15:32:06 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202202081527.A65F1176F@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20211122170805.088195171@infradead.org>
On Mon, Nov 22, 2021 at 06:03:03PM +0100, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> Add Kconfig, Makefile and basic instruction support for x86 IBT.
>
> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
> ---
> arch/x86/Kconfig | 10 ++++++++++
> arch/x86/Makefile | 5 ++++-
> arch/x86/include/asm/ibt.h | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 3 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> @@ -1848,6 +1848,16 @@ config X86_UMIP
> specific cases in protected and virtual-8086 modes. Emulated
> results are dummy.
>
> +config CC_HAS_IBT
> + def_bool $(cc-option, -fcf-protection=branch)
> +
> +config X86_IBT
> + prompt "Indirect Branch Tracking"
> + bool
> + depends on X86_64 && CC_HAS_IBT
> + help
> + Increase kernel text size for giggles
How about:
For systems that support CET, enable Indirect Branch Tracking,
which blocks all JOP and indirect call pointer attacks that
are not pointing at function entry points (i.e. marked with
ENDBR). This also eliminates the use of all of the "misaligned"
gadgets that might be reachable in the middle of instructions.
> +
> config X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
> prompt "Memory Protection Keys"
> def_bool y
> --- a/arch/x86/Makefile
> +++ b/arch/x86/Makefile
> @@ -50,8 +50,11 @@ export BITS
> #
> KBUILD_CFLAGS += -mno-sse -mno-mmx -mno-sse2 -mno-3dnow -mno-avx
>
> -# Intel CET isn't enabled in the kernel
> +ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_IBT),y)
> +KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-fcf-protection=branch)
> +else
> KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-fcf-protection=none)
> +endif
>
> ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_32),y)
> BITS := 32
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/ibt.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> +#ifndef _ASM_X86_IBT_H
> +#define _ASM_X86_IBT_H
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_IBT
> +
> +#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
> +
> +// XXX note about GAS version required
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> +#define ASM_ENDBR ".byte 0xf3, 0x0f, 0x1e, 0xfa\n\t"
> +#else
> +#define ASM_ENDBR ".byte 0xf3, 0x0f, 0x1e, 0xfb\n\t"
> +#endif
> +
> +#else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> +#define ENDBR .byte 0xf3, 0x0f, 0x1e, 0xfa
> +#else
> +#define ENDBR .byte 0xf3, 0x0f, 0x1e, 0xfb
> +#endif
> +
> +#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
> +
> +#else /* !IBT */
> +
> +#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
> +
> +#define ASM_ENDBR
> +
> +#else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
> +
> +#define ENDBR
> +
> +#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
> +
> +#endif /* CONFIG_X86_IBT */
> +#endif /* _ASM_X86_IBT_H */
>
>
--
Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-02-08 23:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-11-22 17:03 [RFC][PATCH 0/6] x86: Kernel IBT beginnings Peter Zijlstra
2021-11-22 17:03 ` [RFC][PATCH 1/6] x86: Annotate _THIS_IP_ Peter Zijlstra
2021-11-23 13:53 ` Mark Rutland
2021-11-23 14:14 ` Peter Zijlstra
2021-11-24 18:18 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2021-11-22 17:03 ` [RFC][PATCH 2/6] x86: Base IBT bits Peter Zijlstra
2022-02-08 23:32 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2021-11-22 17:03 ` [RFC][PATCH 3/6] x86: Add ENDBR to IRET-to-Self Peter Zijlstra
2021-11-22 18:09 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-02-08 23:33 ` Kees Cook
2021-11-22 17:03 ` [RFC][PATCH 4/6] objtool: Read the _THIS_IP_ hints Peter Zijlstra
2021-11-22 17:03 ` [RFC][PATCH 5/6] x86: Sprinkle ENDBR dust Peter Zijlstra
2021-11-23 14:00 ` Mark Rutland
2021-11-23 14:21 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-02-08 23:38 ` Kees Cook
2021-11-22 17:03 ` [RFC][PATCH 6/6] objtool: Add IBT validation / fixups Peter Zijlstra
2021-11-24 19:30 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2022-02-08 23:43 ` Kees Cook
2022-02-09 5:09 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2022-02-09 11:41 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-02-09 11:45 ` Peter Zijlstra
2021-12-24 2:05 ` joao
2022-02-08 23:42 ` Kees Cook
2022-02-09 2:21 ` Joao Moreira
2022-02-09 4:05 ` Kees Cook
2022-02-09 5:18 ` Joao Moreira
2022-02-11 13:38 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-02-14 21:38 ` Sami Tolvanen
2022-02-14 22:25 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-02-15 16:56 ` Sami Tolvanen
2022-02-15 20:03 ` Kees Cook
2022-02-15 21:05 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-02-15 23:05 ` Kees Cook
2022-02-15 23:38 ` Joao Moreira
2022-02-16 12:24 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-02-15 20:53 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-02-15 22:45 ` Joao Moreira
2022-02-16 0:57 ` Andrew Cooper
2022-03-02 3:06 ` Peter Collingbourne
2022-03-02 3:32 ` Joao Moreira
2022-06-08 17:53 ` Fāng-ruì Sòng
2022-06-09 0:05 ` Sami Tolvanen
2021-11-23 7:58 ` [RFC][PATCH 0/6] x86: Kernel IBT beginnings Christoph Hellwig
2021-11-23 9:02 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-02-08 23:48 ` Kees Cook
2022-02-09 0:09 ` Nick Desaulniers
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