From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C5BE5C4332F for ; Mon, 21 Feb 2022 10:08:01 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1352428AbiBUKIW (ORCPT ); Mon, 21 Feb 2022 05:08:22 -0500 Received: from mxb-00190b01.gslb.pphosted.com ([23.128.96.19]:35532 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1353325AbiBUJ5W (ORCPT ); Mon, 21 Feb 2022 04:57:22 -0500 Received: from casper.infradead.org (casper.infradead.org [IPv6:2001:8b0:10b:1236::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1CDAA47042 for ; Mon, 21 Feb 2022 01:25:21 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=infradead.org; s=casper.20170209; h=In-Reply-To:Content-Type:MIME-Version: References:Message-ID:Subject:Cc:To:From:Date:Sender:Reply-To: Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-ID:Content-Description; bh=sWzl2v9v4HujX86aJfCOVrh1k6oCTv+xUn/76FQ75FM=; b=LZ6EwgV7EF75a3KISk36Gc2ZRH O02ROAuni+7t1lYSu4iSkXJSsm9LKxVh6mbLsiZ/TSksq0H5yo8fA9t7t29+lJiylcd5RR+l8g4Ou a/VuJU9/DJjFuSFAFIBtWhQP5aFl0gpYQUuqhXX/bwO5+X9knRreKYcdIwIhrSbAYJ3jzxYGnmDSd DCeWqZ6huOtgmDzWvOP+Z9W5BjsOx1wc9/i6nNbOlOSNJX8OXflVbi/J6CismkoaeDHlfIvHC2xf/ LE6ERqYgfXP6rno0hu66kiZ8MjBoNzbqsC1Bs88eeSQFFofdiAnDPVOIrSsbIkxvXb/M7lmSLnOcI W+9dBmrA==; Received: from j217100.upc-j.chello.nl ([24.132.217.100] helo=worktop.programming.kicks-ass.net) by casper.infradead.org with esmtpsa (Exim 4.94.2 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1nM4wJ-001esK-0l; Mon, 21 Feb 2022 09:25:03 +0000 Received: by worktop.programming.kicks-ass.net (Postfix, from userid 1000) id 65C59988B05; Mon, 21 Feb 2022 10:24:56 +0100 (CET) Date: Mon, 21 Feb 2022 10:24:56 +0100 From: Peter Zijlstra To: Kees Cook Cc: "Edgecombe, Rick P" , "Poimboe, Josh" , "hjl.tools@gmail.com" , "x86@kernel.org" , "joao@overdrivepizza.com" , "Cooper, Andrew" , "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" , "mark.rutland@arm.com" , "samitolvanen@google.com" , "ndesaulniers@google.com" , "Milburn, Alyssa" Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/29] x86: Kernel IBT Message-ID: <20220221092456.GJ23216@worktop.programming.kicks-ass.net> References: <20220218164902.008644515@infradead.org> <7a241b81ccd21da02bc27379b0a837c09fe4f135.camel@intel.com> <20220219095827.GI23216@worktop.programming.kicks-ass.net> <1C202B85-FCB1-4282-9CA6-ED9115F203BB@chromium.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <1C202B85-FCB1-4282-9CA6-ED9115F203BB@chromium.org> Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Mon, Feb 21, 2022 at 12:42:25AM -0800, Kees Cook wrote: > >+void cet_disable(void) > >+{ > >+ cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_CET); > > I'd rather keep the pinning... Uff. is that still enforced at this point? > >+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_S_CET, 0); > >+} > > Eh, why not just require kexec to be IBT safe? That seems a reasonable > exercise if we ever expect UEFI to enforce IBT when starting the > kernel on a normal boot... Well, it makes it impossible to kexec into an 'old' kernel. That might not be very nice.