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Donenfeld" To: Eric Biggers , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" , Theodore Ts'o , Dominik Brodowski Subject: [PATCH v3] random: introduce drain_entropy() helper to declutter crng_reseed() Date: Mon, 21 Feb 2022 15:49:45 +0100 Message-Id: <20220221144945.2277232-1-Jason@zx2c4.com> In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org In preparation for separating responsibilities, break out the entropy count management part of crng_reseed() into its own function. No functional changes. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld --- v3 adjusts the drain_entropy() comment to note that we're only setting the entropy count to zero, per Eric's request. drivers/char/random.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index e5f8197dd49c..adc58914a7c0 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -260,6 +260,7 @@ static struct { }; static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes); +static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes); static void crng_reseed(void); @@ -456,23 +457,13 @@ static void crng_slow_load(const void *cp, size_t len) static void crng_reseed(void) { unsigned long flags; - int entropy_count; unsigned long next_gen; u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE]; bool finalize_init = false; - /* - * First we make sure we have POOL_MIN_BITS of entropy in the pool, - * and then we drain all of it. Only then can we extract a new key. - */ - do { - entropy_count = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count); - if (entropy_count < POOL_MIN_BITS) - return; - } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, entropy_count, 0) != entropy_count); - extract_entropy(key, sizeof(key)); - wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait); - kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT); + /* Only reseed if we can, to prevent brute forcing a small amount of new bits. */ + if (!drain_entropy(key, sizeof(key))) + return; /* * We copy the new key into the base_crng, overwriting the old one, @@ -900,6 +891,25 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes) memzero_explicit(&block, sizeof(block)); } +/* + * First we make sure we have POOL_MIN_BITS of entropy in the pool, and then we + * set the entropy count to zero (but don't actually touch any data). Only then + * can we extract a new key with extract_entropy(). + */ +static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes) +{ + unsigned int entropy_count; + do { + entropy_count = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count); + if (entropy_count < POOL_MIN_BITS) + return false; + } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, entropy_count, 0) != entropy_count); + extract_entropy(buf, nbytes); + wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait); + kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT); + return true; +} + #define warn_unseeded_randomness(previous) \ _warn_unseeded_randomness(__func__, (void *)_RET_IP_, (previous)) -- 2.35.1