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From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: zohar@linux.ibm.com, serge@hallyn.com,
	christian.brauner@ubuntu.com, containers@lists.linux.dev,
	dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, ebiederm@xmission.com,
	krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com, roberto.sassu@huawei.com,
	mpeters@redhat.com, lhinds@redhat.com, lsturman@redhat.com,
	puiterwi@redhat.com, jejb@linux.ibm.com, jamjoom@us.ibm.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com,
	rgb@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	jmorris@namei.org, Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: [PATCH v11 19/27] integrity: Add optional callback function to integrity_inode_free()
Date: Wed,  2 Mar 2022 08:46:54 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220302134703.1273041-20-stefanb@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220302134703.1273041-1-stefanb@linux.ibm.com>

Add an optional callback function to integrity_inode_free() that,
if provided, must be called and determines whether the iint can be
freed. Adjust all callers of this function to provide a NULL pointer
since none of the existing callers needs this check.

Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
---
 include/linux/integrity.h |  8 ++++++--
 security/integrity/iint.c | 15 +++++++++++++--
 security/security.c       |  2 +-
 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/integrity.h b/include/linux/integrity.h
index 2ea0f2f65ab6..9fe826b9146e 100644
--- a/include/linux/integrity.h
+++ b/include/linux/integrity.h
@@ -19,10 +19,13 @@ enum integrity_status {
 	INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN,
 };
 
+struct integrity_iint_cache;
+typedef bool (*iint_removable_cb)(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint);
+
 /* List of EVM protected security xattrs */
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY
 extern struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_inode_get(struct inode *inode);
-extern void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode);
+extern void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode, iint_removable_cb check);
 extern void __init integrity_load_keys(void);
 
 #else
@@ -32,7 +35,8 @@ static inline struct integrity_iint_cache *
 	return NULL;
 }
 
-static inline void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
+static inline void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode,
+					iint_removable_cb check)
 {
 	return;
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
index 371cbceaf479..4580df0e716e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
@@ -143,21 +143,32 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_inode_get(struct inode *inode)
 /**
  * integrity_inode_free - called on security_inode_free
  * @inode: pointer to the inode
+ * @check: optional callback function to check whether the iint can be freed
  *
  * Free the integrity information(iint) associated with an inode.
  */
-void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
+void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode, iint_removable_cb check)
 {
 	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+	bool freeit = true;
 
 	if (!IS_IMA(inode))
 		return;
 
 	write_lock(&integrity_iint_lock);
+
 	iint = __integrity_iint_find(inode);
-	rb_erase(&iint->rb_node, &integrity_iint_tree);
+
+	if (check)
+		freeit = check(iint);
+	if (freeit)
+		rb_erase(&iint->rb_node, &integrity_iint_tree);
+
 	write_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock);
 
+	if (!freeit)
+		return;
+
 	ima_free_ns_status_list(&iint->ns_list, &iint->ns_list_lock);
 
 	iint_free(iint);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 22261d79f333..eede67bf2eb8 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1027,7 +1027,7 @@ static void inode_free_by_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
 
 void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
 {
-	integrity_inode_free(inode);
+	integrity_inode_free(inode, NULL);
 	call_void_hook(inode_free_security, inode);
 	/*
 	 * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
-- 
2.31.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-03-02 13:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-03-02 13:46 [PATCH v11 00/27] ima: Namespace IMA with audit support in IMA-ns Stefan Berger
2022-03-02 13:46 ` [PATCH v11 01/27] ima: Return error code obtained from securityfs functions Stefan Berger
2022-03-02 13:46 ` [PATCH v11 02/27] securityfs: rework dentry creation Stefan Berger
2022-03-02 13:46 ` [PATCH v11 03/27] securityfs: Extend securityfs with namespacing support Stefan Berger
2022-03-02 13:46 ` [PATCH v11 04/27] ima: Define ima_namespace struct and start moving variables into it Stefan Berger
2022-03-02 13:46 ` [PATCH v11 05/27] ima: Move arch_policy_entry into ima_namespace Stefan Berger
2022-03-02 13:46 ` [PATCH v11 06/27] ima: Move ima_htable " Stefan Berger
2022-03-02 13:46 ` [PATCH v11 07/27] ima: Move measurement list related variables " Stefan Berger
2022-03-02 13:46 ` [PATCH v11 08/27] ima: Move some IMA policy and filesystem " Stefan Berger
2022-03-02 13:46 ` [PATCH v11 09/27] ima: Move IMA securityfs files into ima_namespace or onto stack Stefan Berger
2022-03-02 13:46 ` [PATCH v11 10/27] ima: Move ima_lsm_policy_notifier into ima_namespace Stefan Berger
2022-03-02 13:46 ` [PATCH v11 11/27] ima: Switch to lazy lsm policy updates for better performance Stefan Berger
2022-03-02 13:46 ` [PATCH v11 12/27] ima: Define mac_admin_ns_capable() as a wrapper for ns_capable() Stefan Berger
2022-03-02 13:46 ` [PATCH v11 13/27] ima: Only accept AUDIT rules for non-init_ima_ns namespaces for now Stefan Berger
2022-03-02 13:46 ` [PATCH v11 14/27] userns: Add pointer to ima_namespace to user_namespace Stefan Berger
2022-03-02 13:46 ` [PATCH v11 15/27] ima: Implement hierarchical processing of file accesses Stefan Berger
2022-03-02 13:46 ` [PATCH v11 16/27] ima: Implement ima_free_policy_rules() for freeing of an ima_namespace Stefan Berger
2022-03-02 13:46 ` [PATCH v11 17/27] ima: Add functions for creating and " Stefan Berger
2022-03-02 13:46 ` [PATCH v11 18/27] integrity/ima: Define ns_status for storing namespaced iint data Stefan Berger
2022-03-02 13:46 ` Stefan Berger [this message]
2022-03-02 13:46 ` [PATCH v11 20/27] ima: Namespace audit status flags Stefan Berger
2022-03-02 13:46 ` [PATCH v11 21/27] ima: Remove unused iints from the integrity_iint_cache Stefan Berger
2022-03-02 13:46 ` [PATCH v11 22/27] ima: Setup securityfs for IMA namespace Stefan Berger
2022-03-02 13:46 ` [PATCH v11 23/27] ima: Introduce securityfs file to activate an " Stefan Berger
2022-03-02 19:16   ` kernel test robot
2022-03-02 13:46 ` [PATCH v11 24/27] ima: Show owning user namespace's uid and gid when displaying policy Stefan Berger
2022-03-02 13:47 ` [PATCH v11 25/27] ima: Limit number of policy rules in non-init_ima_ns Stefan Berger
2022-03-02 13:47 ` [PATCH v11 26/27] ima: Restrict informational audit messages to init_ima_ns Stefan Berger
2022-03-02 23:11   ` kernel test robot
2022-03-02 13:47 ` [PATCH v11 27/27] ima: Enable IMA namespaces Stefan Berger

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