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From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: Nico Pache <npache@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Rafael Aquini <aquini@redhat.com>,
	Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>, Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>,
	Christoph von Recklinghausen <crecklin@redhat.com>,
	Don Dutile <ddutile@redhat.com>,
	"Herton R . Krzesinski" <herton@redhat.com>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Joel Savitz <jsavitz@redhat.com>,
	Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org>,
	stable@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8] oom_kill.c: futex: Don't OOM reap the VMA containing the robust_list_head
Date: Fri, 8 Apr 2022 10:15:49 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220408081549.GM2731@worktop.programming.kicks-ass.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220408032809.3696798-1-npache@redhat.com>

On Thu, Apr 07, 2022 at 11:28:09PM -0400, Nico Pache wrote:
> The pthread struct is allocated on PRIVATE|ANONYMOUS memory [1] which can
> be targeted by the oom reaper. This mapping is used to store the futex
> robust list head; the kernel does not keep a copy of the robust list and
> instead references a userspace address to maintain the robustness during
> a process death. A race can occur between exit_mm and the oom reaper that
> allows the oom reaper to free the memory of the futex robust list before
> the exit path has handled the futex death:
> 
>     CPU1                               CPU2
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>     page_fault
>     do_exit "signal"
>     wake_oom_reaper
>                                         oom_reaper
>                                         oom_reap_task_mm (invalidates mm)
>     exit_mm
>     exit_mm_release
>     futex_exit_release
>     futex_cleanup
>     exit_robust_list
>     get_user (EFAULT- can't access memory)
> 
> If the get_user EFAULT's, the kernel will be unable to recover the
> waiters on the robust_list, leaving userspace mutexes hung indefinitely.
> 
> Use the robust_list address stored in the kernel to skip the VMA that holds
> it, allowing a successful futex_cleanup.
> 
> Theoretically a failure can still occur if there are locks mapped as
> PRIVATE|ANON; however, the robust futexes are a best-effort approach.
> This patch only strengthens that best-effort.
> 
> The following case can still fail:
> robust head (skipped) -> private lock (reaped) -> shared lock (skipped)

This is still all sorts of confused.. it's a list head, the entries can
be in any random other VMA. You must not remove *any* user memory before
doing the robust thing. Not removing the VMA that contains the head is
pointless in the extreme.

Did you not read the previous discussion?

  reply	other threads:[~2022-04-08  8:16 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-04-08  3:28 [PATCH v8] oom_kill.c: futex: Don't OOM reap the VMA containing the robust_list_head Nico Pache
2022-04-08  8:15 ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2022-04-08  8:37   ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-04-08  8:52     ` Nico Pache
2022-04-08  9:36       ` Michal Hocko
2022-04-08  9:40         ` Nico Pache
2022-04-08  9:59           ` Michal Hocko
2022-04-08 10:36             ` Nico Pache
2022-04-08 10:51               ` Michal Hocko
2022-04-08 11:26                 ` Nico Pache
2022-04-08 11:48                   ` Michal Hocko
2022-04-08  8:41   ` Nico Pache
2022-04-08 13:54     ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-04-08 16:13       ` Joel Savitz
2022-04-08 21:41         ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-04-11  6:48           ` Michal Hocko
2022-04-11  7:47             ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-04-11  9:08               ` Michal Hocko
2022-04-12  0:02                 ` Nico Pache
2022-04-13 16:00                 ` Nico Pache
2022-04-11 23:51       ` Nico Pache
2022-04-12 16:20         ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-04-12 17:03           ` Nico Pache
2022-04-08 14:41 ` kernel test robot

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