From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D93D4C433EF for ; Thu, 12 May 2022 02:34:25 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S242243AbiELCeW (ORCPT ); Wed, 11 May 2022 22:34:22 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:57604 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S241569AbiELCeU (ORCPT ); Wed, 11 May 2022 22:34:20 -0400 Received: from us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com (us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com [170.10.133.124]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9C433135680 for ; Wed, 11 May 2022 19:34:19 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1652322858; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=Mevjy/DGPy4eqIk5EbdLPFrJaGfCXH1nWhTn6iIdPnc=; b=fNp08zysk0ZKHqvGnESP/EJgu+pTCuVV4Ktavi8TI5z0i1uEBDlyfOWyL2lEyumCOkyJe/ skIQZBDEQQBIhVOWTUCSC3qyoYA76wIjK21Q4J9reuFzfbhfMlnQS7BMKg2oztuV+JqvUT xyOc5aA51ZOZMWOxZF+yGFQ/BJsPgUw= Received: from mail-pj1-f72.google.com (mail-pj1-f72.google.com [209.85.216.72]) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP with STARTTLS (version=TLSv1.2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id us-mta-112-ljxCVuoTN-K3LkGg_XOsMg-1; Wed, 11 May 2022 22:34:17 -0400 X-MC-Unique: ljxCVuoTN-K3LkGg_XOsMg-1 Received: by mail-pj1-f72.google.com with SMTP id i12-20020a17090a64cc00b001dccafbd493so3893998pjm.3 for ; Wed, 11 May 2022 19:34:17 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=Mevjy/DGPy4eqIk5EbdLPFrJaGfCXH1nWhTn6iIdPnc=; b=QvkRJcTn34rpYSzaa4hGo16l77eSba+PBFDT8wV7oz2MVpPNruQQ0V8dex/KI5/O8S kEP/v56NTdS/P/w6pHwWYkFE9AIhuvwsxNGFao18Vc6pC+QXFQDSIdlFXxAXfdp4r5hZ nRO7mrLKF3hGhrjMtq9LOGfp3mU28Mc5Dp60G/usdwn8r49X6DTYrSuVjMiOB1S1gGML FlcfmATv7M8rAMldp8OM/9RDhba54zf+rSyKpYUMSx+vkBDNb42bHgHWRnAEhPkzv9lh m9z0BabRJqEbxZyYim1lbd38b0HPORqFqzN8bTmy9qwAm5Fhjr24IBO9WkRMwuK5aRmp 0H9g== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM530HDSouJMFI8aGMD0fYimhzwj8t5BIk8Z/9a9PNLxq73rIMiHYP zPeb+dM/ukRHHjh9WhoOn79L3bmvS3kAjvmLm8sY3+mJ3H4N5w5JyVbcGAWN7HXyKJBvP6N2Hbi uxT/z47tJfaL3Mk1++ls= X-Received: by 2002:a17:902:e2d3:b0:15f:249c:2002 with SMTP id l19-20020a170902e2d300b0015f249c2002mr11088900plc.159.1652322856313; Wed, 11 May 2022 19:34:16 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJz9LkeoNzgkhvJe2G/nNW6B61+lIVcB9AUrQUpNwSPTqFnrd5nuO38SjXptMGMSRgAnNekqVQ== X-Received: by 2002:a17:902:e2d3:b0:15f:249c:2002 with SMTP id l19-20020a170902e2d300b0015f249c2002mr11088880plc.159.1652322856077; Wed, 11 May 2022 19:34:16 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost ([209.132.188.80]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id q10-20020a170902f34a00b0015e8d4eb1d8sm2551452ple.34.2022.05.11.19.34.15 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Wed, 11 May 2022 19:34:15 -0700 (PDT) From: Coiby Xu To: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, Michal Suchanek , Baoquan He , Dave Young , Will Deacon , "Eric W . Biederman" , Mimi Zohar , Chun-Yi Lee , stable@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Catalin Marinas , James Morse , AKASHI Takahiro , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org (open list) Subject: [PATCH v7 3/4] arm64: kexec_file: use more system keyrings to verify kernel image signature Date: Thu, 12 May 2022 10:34:01 +0800 Message-Id: <20220512023402.9913-4-coxu@redhat.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.35.3 In-Reply-To: <20220512023402.9913-1-coxu@redhat.com> References: <20220512023402.9913-1-coxu@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Currently, a problem faced by arm64 is if a kernel image is signed by a MOK key, loading it via the kexec_file_load() system call would be rejected with the error "Lockdown: kexec: kexec of unsigned images is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7". This happens because image_verify_sig uses only the primary keyring that contains only kernel built-in keys to verify the kexec image. This patch allows to verify arm64 kernel image signature using not only .builtin_trusted_keys but also .platform and .secondary_trusted_keys keyring. Fixes: 732b7b93d849 ("arm64: kexec_file: add kernel signature verification support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 34d5960af253: kexec: clean up arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 83b7bb2d49ae: kexec, KEYS: make the code in bzImage64_verify_sig generic Acked-by: Baoquan He Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Co-developed-by: Michal Suchanek Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek Acked-by: Will Deacon Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu --- arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c | 11 +---------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c index 9ec34690e255..5ed6a585f21f 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c @@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ #include #include #include -#include #include #include #include @@ -130,18 +129,10 @@ static void *image_load(struct kimage *image, return NULL; } -#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_IMAGE_VERIFY_SIG -static int image_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len) -{ - return verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len, NULL, - VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE); -} -#endif - const struct kexec_file_ops kexec_image_ops = { .probe = image_probe, .load = image_load, #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_IMAGE_VERIFY_SIG - .verify_sig = image_verify_sig, + .verify_sig = kexec_kernel_verify_pe_sig, #endif }; -- 2.35.3 From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from bombadil.infradead.org (bombadil.infradead.org [198.137.202.133]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3FB31C433F5 for ; Thu, 12 May 2022 02:38:42 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=lists.infradead.org; s=bombadil.20210309; h=Sender: Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-Type:List-Subscribe:List-Help:List-Post: List-Archive:List-Unsubscribe:List-Id:MIME-Version:References:In-Reply-To: Message-Id:Date:Subject:Cc:To:From:Reply-To:Content-ID:Content-Description: Resent-Date:Resent-From:Resent-Sender:Resent-To:Resent-Cc:Resent-Message-ID: List-Owner; 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Wed, 11 May 2022 19:34:16 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJz9LkeoNzgkhvJe2G/nNW6B61+lIVcB9AUrQUpNwSPTqFnrd5nuO38SjXptMGMSRgAnNekqVQ== X-Received: by 2002:a17:902:e2d3:b0:15f:249c:2002 with SMTP id l19-20020a170902e2d300b0015f249c2002mr11088880plc.159.1652322856077; Wed, 11 May 2022 19:34:16 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost ([209.132.188.80]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id q10-20020a170902f34a00b0015e8d4eb1d8sm2551452ple.34.2022.05.11.19.34.15 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Wed, 11 May 2022 19:34:15 -0700 (PDT) From: Coiby Xu To: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, Michal Suchanek , Baoquan He , Dave Young , Will Deacon , "Eric W . Biederman" , Mimi Zohar , Chun-Yi Lee , stable@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Catalin Marinas , James Morse , AKASHI Takahiro , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org (open list) Subject: [PATCH v7 3/4] arm64: kexec_file: use more system keyrings to verify kernel image signature Date: Thu, 12 May 2022 10:34:01 +0800 Message-Id: <20220512023402.9913-4-coxu@redhat.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.35.3 In-Reply-To: <20220512023402.9913-1-coxu@redhat.com> References: <20220512023402.9913-1-coxu@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Authentication-Results: relay.mimecast.com; auth=pass smtp.auth=CUSA124A263 smtp.mailfrom=coxu@redhat.com X-Mimecast-Spam-Score: 0 X-Mimecast-Originator: redhat.com X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20220511_193419_870124_8FF1B38D X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 14.63 ) X-BeenThere: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.34 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org Currently, a problem faced by arm64 is if a kernel image is signed by a MOK key, loading it via the kexec_file_load() system call would be rejected with the error "Lockdown: kexec: kexec of unsigned images is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7". This happens because image_verify_sig uses only the primary keyring that contains only kernel built-in keys to verify the kexec image. This patch allows to verify arm64 kernel image signature using not only .builtin_trusted_keys but also .platform and .secondary_trusted_keys keyring. Fixes: 732b7b93d849 ("arm64: kexec_file: add kernel signature verification support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 34d5960af253: kexec: clean up arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 83b7bb2d49ae: kexec, KEYS: make the code in bzImage64_verify_sig generic Acked-by: Baoquan He Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Co-developed-by: Michal Suchanek Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek Acked-by: Will Deacon Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu --- arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c | 11 +---------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c index 9ec34690e255..5ed6a585f21f 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c @@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ #include #include #include -#include #include #include #include @@ -130,18 +129,10 @@ static void *image_load(struct kimage *image, return NULL; } -#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_IMAGE_VERIFY_SIG -static int image_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len) -{ - return verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len, NULL, - VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE); -} -#endif - const struct kexec_file_ops kexec_image_ops = { .probe = image_probe, .load = image_load, #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_IMAGE_VERIFY_SIG - .verify_sig = image_verify_sig, + .verify_sig = kexec_kernel_verify_pe_sig, #endif }; -- 2.35.3 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Coiby Xu Date: Thu, 12 May 2022 10:34:01 +0800 Subject: [PATCH v7 3/4] arm64: kexec_file: use more system keyrings to verify kernel image signature In-Reply-To: <20220512023402.9913-1-coxu@redhat.com> References: <20220512023402.9913-1-coxu@redhat.com> Message-ID: <20220512023402.9913-4-coxu@redhat.com> List-Id: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: kexec@lists.infradead.org Currently, a problem faced by arm64 is if a kernel image is signed by a MOK key, loading it via the kexec_file_load() system call would be rejected with the error "Lockdown: kexec: kexec of unsigned images is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7". This happens because image_verify_sig uses only the primary keyring that contains only kernel built-in keys to verify the kexec image. This patch allows to verify arm64 kernel image signature using not only .builtin_trusted_keys but also .platform and .secondary_trusted_keys keyring. Fixes: 732b7b93d849 ("arm64: kexec_file: add kernel signature verification support") Cc: stable at vger.kernel.org # 34d5960af253: kexec: clean up arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig Cc: stable at vger.kernel.org # 83b7bb2d49ae: kexec, KEYS: make the code in bzImage64_verify_sig generic Acked-by: Baoquan He Cc: kexec at lists.infradead.org Cc: keyrings at vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module at vger.kernel.org Co-developed-by: Michal Suchanek Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek Acked-by: Will Deacon Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu --- arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c | 11 +---------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c index 9ec34690e255..5ed6a585f21f 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c @@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ #include #include #include -#include #include #include #include @@ -130,18 +129,10 @@ static void *image_load(struct kimage *image, return NULL; } -#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_IMAGE_VERIFY_SIG -static int image_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len) -{ - return verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len, NULL, - VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE); -} -#endif - const struct kexec_file_ops kexec_image_ops = { .probe = image_probe, .load = image_load, #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_IMAGE_VERIFY_SIG - .verify_sig = image_verify_sig, + .verify_sig = kexec_kernel_verify_pe_sig, #endif }; -- 2.35.3