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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Theodore Tso <tytso@mit.edu>,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>,
	Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>,
	"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5.10 065/163] random: get rid of secondary crngs
Date: Fri, 27 May 2022 10:49:05 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220527084837.063430163@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220527084828.156494029@linuxfoundation.org>

From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>

commit a9412d510ab9a9ba411fea612903631d2e1f1601 upstream.

As the comment said, this is indeed a "hack". Since it was introduced,
it's been a constant state machine nightmare, with lots of subtle early
boot issues and a wildly complex set of machinery to keep everything in
sync. Rather than continuing to play whack-a-mole with this approach,
this commit simply removes it entirely. This commit is preparation for
"random: use simpler fast key erasure flow on per-cpu keys" in this
series, which introduces a simpler (and faster) mechanism to accomplish
the same thing.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/char/random.c |  227 +++++++++++---------------------------------------
 1 file changed, 54 insertions(+), 173 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -323,14 +323,11 @@ static struct crng_state primary_crng =
  * its value (from 0->1->2).
  */
 static int crng_init = 0;
-static bool crng_need_final_init = false;
 #define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 1))
 static int crng_init_cnt = 0;
-static unsigned long crng_global_init_time = 0;
 #define CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH (2 * CHACHA_KEY_SIZE)
-static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]);
-static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng,
-				    u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used);
+static void extract_crng(u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]);
+static void crng_backtrack_protect(u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used);
 static void process_random_ready_list(void);
 static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
 
@@ -365,7 +362,7 @@ static struct {
 
 static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
 
-static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng);
+static void crng_reseed(void);
 
 /*
  * This function adds bytes into the entropy "pool".  It does not
@@ -464,7 +461,7 @@ static void credit_entropy_bits(int nbit
 	trace_credit_entropy_bits(nbits, entropy_count, _RET_IP_);
 
 	if (crng_init < 2 && entropy_count >= POOL_MIN_BITS)
-		crng_reseed(&primary_crng);
+		crng_reseed();
 }
 
 /*********************************************************************
@@ -477,16 +474,7 @@ static void credit_entropy_bits(int nbit
 
 static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait);
 
-/*
- * Hack to deal with crazy userspace progams when they are all trying
- * to access /dev/urandom in parallel.  The programs are almost
- * certainly doing something terribly wrong, but we'll work around
- * their brain damage.
- */
-static struct crng_state **crng_node_pool __read_mostly;
-
 static void invalidate_batched_entropy(void);
-static void numa_crng_init(void);
 
 static bool trust_cpu __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU);
 static int __init parse_trust_cpu(char *arg)
@@ -495,24 +483,6 @@ static int __init parse_trust_cpu(char *
 }
 early_param("random.trust_cpu", parse_trust_cpu);
 
-static bool crng_init_try_arch(struct crng_state *crng)
-{
-	int i;
-	bool arch_init = true;
-	unsigned long rv;
-
-	for (i = 4; i < 16; i++) {
-		if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) &&
-		    !arch_get_random_long(&rv)) {
-			rv = random_get_entropy();
-			arch_init = false;
-		}
-		crng->state[i] ^= rv;
-	}
-
-	return arch_init;
-}
-
 static bool __init crng_init_try_arch_early(void)
 {
 	int i;
@@ -531,100 +501,17 @@ static bool __init crng_init_try_arch_ea
 	return arch_init;
 }
 
-static void crng_initialize_secondary(struct crng_state *crng)
-{
-	chacha_init_consts(crng->state);
-	_get_random_bytes(&crng->state[4], sizeof(u32) * 12);
-	crng_init_try_arch(crng);
-	crng->init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1;
-}
-
-static void __init crng_initialize_primary(void)
+static void __init crng_initialize(void)
 {
 	extract_entropy(&primary_crng.state[4], sizeof(u32) * 12);
 	if (crng_init_try_arch_early() && trust_cpu && crng_init < 2) {
 		invalidate_batched_entropy();
-		numa_crng_init();
 		crng_init = 2;
 		pr_notice("crng init done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)\n");
 	}
 	primary_crng.init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1;
 }
 
-static void crng_finalize_init(void)
-{
-	if (!system_wq) {
-		/* We can't call numa_crng_init until we have workqueues,
-		 * so mark this for processing later. */
-		crng_need_final_init = true;
-		return;
-	}
-
-	invalidate_batched_entropy();
-	numa_crng_init();
-	crng_init = 2;
-	crng_need_final_init = false;
-	process_random_ready_list();
-	wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
-	kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
-	pr_notice("crng init done\n");
-	if (unseeded_warning.missed) {
-		pr_notice("%d get_random_xx warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n",
-			  unseeded_warning.missed);
-		unseeded_warning.missed = 0;
-	}
-	if (urandom_warning.missed) {
-		pr_notice("%d urandom warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n",
-			  urandom_warning.missed);
-		urandom_warning.missed = 0;
-	}
-}
-
-static void do_numa_crng_init(struct work_struct *work)
-{
-	int i;
-	struct crng_state *crng;
-	struct crng_state **pool;
-
-	pool = kcalloc(nr_node_ids, sizeof(*pool), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL);
-	for_each_online_node(i) {
-		crng = kmalloc_node(sizeof(struct crng_state),
-				    GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL, i);
-		spin_lock_init(&crng->lock);
-		crng_initialize_secondary(crng);
-		pool[i] = crng;
-	}
-	/* pairs with READ_ONCE() in select_crng() */
-	if (cmpxchg_release(&crng_node_pool, NULL, pool) != NULL) {
-		for_each_node(i)
-			kfree(pool[i]);
-		kfree(pool);
-	}
-}
-
-static DECLARE_WORK(numa_crng_init_work, do_numa_crng_init);
-
-static void numa_crng_init(void)
-{
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NUMA))
-		schedule_work(&numa_crng_init_work);
-}
-
-static struct crng_state *select_crng(void)
-{
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NUMA)) {
-		struct crng_state **pool;
-		int nid = numa_node_id();
-
-		/* pairs with cmpxchg_release() in do_numa_crng_init() */
-		pool = READ_ONCE(crng_node_pool);
-		if (pool && pool[nid])
-			return pool[nid];
-	}
-
-	return &primary_crng;
-}
-
 /*
  * crng_fast_load() can be called by code in the interrupt service
  * path.  So we can't afford to dilly-dally. Returns the number of
@@ -702,68 +589,71 @@ static int crng_slow_load(const u8 *cp,
 	return 1;
 }
 
-static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng)
+static void crng_reseed(void)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
-	int i;
+	int i, entropy_count;
 	union {
 		u8 block[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE];
 		u32 key[8];
 	} buf;
 
-	if (crng == &primary_crng) {
-		int entropy_count;
-		do {
-			entropy_count = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count);
-			if (entropy_count < POOL_MIN_BITS)
-				return;
-		} while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, entropy_count, 0) != entropy_count);
-		extract_entropy(buf.key, sizeof(buf.key));
-		wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait);
-		kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT);
-	} else {
-		_extract_crng(&primary_crng, buf.block);
-		_crng_backtrack_protect(&primary_crng, buf.block,
-					CHACHA_KEY_SIZE);
-	}
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags);
+	do {
+		entropy_count = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count);
+		if (entropy_count < POOL_MIN_BITS)
+			return;
+	} while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, entropy_count, 0) != entropy_count);
+	extract_entropy(buf.key, sizeof(buf.key));
+	wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait);
+	kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT);
+
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
 	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
-		crng->state[i + 4] ^= buf.key[i];
+		primary_crng.state[i + 4] ^= buf.key[i];
 	memzero_explicit(&buf, sizeof(buf));
-	WRITE_ONCE(crng->init_time, jiffies);
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags);
-	if (crng == &primary_crng && crng_init < 2)
-		crng_finalize_init();
+	WRITE_ONCE(primary_crng.init_time, jiffies);
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
+	if (crng_init < 2) {
+		invalidate_batched_entropy();
+		crng_init = 2;
+		process_random_ready_list();
+		wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
+		kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
+		pr_notice("crng init done\n");
+		if (unseeded_warning.missed) {
+			pr_notice("%d get_random_xx warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n",
+				  unseeded_warning.missed);
+			unseeded_warning.missed = 0;
+		}
+		if (urandom_warning.missed) {
+			pr_notice("%d urandom warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n",
+				  urandom_warning.missed);
+			urandom_warning.missed = 0;
+		}
+	}
 }
 
-static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE])
+static void extract_crng(u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE])
 {
 	unsigned long flags, init_time;
 
 	if (crng_ready()) {
-		init_time = READ_ONCE(crng->init_time);
-		if (time_after(READ_ONCE(crng_global_init_time), init_time) ||
-		    time_after(jiffies, init_time + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL))
-			crng_reseed(crng);
-	}
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags);
-	chacha20_block(&crng->state[0], out);
-	if (crng->state[12] == 0)
-		crng->state[13]++;
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags);
-}
-
-static void extract_crng(u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE])
-{
-	_extract_crng(select_crng(), out);
+		init_time = READ_ONCE(primary_crng.init_time);
+		if (time_after(jiffies, init_time + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL))
+			crng_reseed();
+	}
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
+	chacha20_block(&primary_crng.state[0], out);
+	if (primary_crng.state[12] == 0)
+		primary_crng.state[13]++;
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
 }
 
 /*
  * Use the leftover bytes from the CRNG block output (if there is
  * enough) to mutate the CRNG key to provide backtracking protection.
  */
-static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng,
-				    u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used)
+static void crng_backtrack_protect(u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 	u32 *s, *d;
@@ -774,17 +664,12 @@ static void _crng_backtrack_protect(stru
 		extract_crng(tmp);
 		used = 0;
 	}
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags);
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
 	s = (u32 *)&tmp[used];
-	d = &crng->state[4];
+	d = &primary_crng.state[4];
 	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
 		*d++ ^= *s++;
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags);
-}
-
-static void crng_backtrack_protect(u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used)
-{
-	_crng_backtrack_protect(select_crng(), tmp, used);
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
 }
 
 static ssize_t extract_crng_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes)
@@ -1371,10 +1256,7 @@ static void __init init_std_data(void)
 int __init rand_initialize(void)
 {
 	init_std_data();
-	if (crng_need_final_init)
-		crng_finalize_init();
-	crng_initialize_primary();
-	crng_global_init_time = jiffies;
+	crng_initialize();
 	if (ratelimit_disable) {
 		urandom_warning.interval = 0;
 		unseeded_warning.interval = 0;
@@ -1544,8 +1426,7 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f,
 			return -EPERM;
 		if (crng_init < 2)
 			return -ENODATA;
-		crng_reseed(&primary_crng);
-		WRITE_ONCE(crng_global_init_time, jiffies - 1);
+		crng_reseed();
 		return 0;
 	default:
 		return -EINVAL;



  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-05-27 11:53 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 177+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-05-27  8:48 [PATCH 5.10 000/163] 5.10.119-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 001/163] lockdown: also lock down previous kgdb use Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 002/163] staging: rtl8723bs: prevent ->Ssid overflow in rtw_wx_set_scan() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 003/163] KVM: x86: Properly handle APF vs disabled LAPIC situation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 004/163] KVM: x86/mmu: fix NULL pointer dereference on guest INVPCID Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 005/163] tcp: change source port randomizarion at connect() time Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 006/163] secure_seq: use the 64 bits of the siphash for port offset calculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 007/163] media: vim2m: Register video device after setting up internals Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 008/163] media: vim2m: initialize the media device earlier Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 009/163] ACPI: sysfs: Make sparse happy about address space in use Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 010/163] ACPI: sysfs: Fix BERT error region memory mapping Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 011/163] random: avoid arch_get_random_seed_long() when collecting IRQ randomness Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 012/163] random: remove dead code left over from blocking pool Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 013/163] MAINTAINERS: co-maintain random.c Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 014/163] MAINTAINERS: add git tree for random.c Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 015/163] crypto: lib/blake2s - Move selftest prototype into header file Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 016/163] crypto: blake2s - define shash_alg structs using macros Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 017/163] crypto: x86/blake2s " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 018/163] crypto: blake2s - remove unneeded includes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 019/163] crypto: blake2s - move update and final logic to internal/blake2s.h Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 020/163] crypto: blake2s - share the "shash" API boilerplate code Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 021/163] crypto: blake2s - optimize blake2s initialization Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 022/163] crypto: blake2s - add comment for blake2s_state fields Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 023/163] crypto: blake2s - adjust include guard naming Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 024/163] crypto: blake2s - include <linux/bug.h> instead of <asm/bug.h> Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 025/163] lib/crypto: blake2s: include as built-in Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 026/163] lib/crypto: blake2s: move hmac construction into wireguard Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 027/163] lib/crypto: sha1: re-roll loops to reduce code size Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 028/163] lib/crypto: blake2s: avoid indirect calls to compression function for Clang CFI Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 029/163] random: document add_hwgenerator_randomness() with other input functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 030/163] random: remove unused irq_flags argument from add_interrupt_randomness() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 031/163] random: use BLAKE2s instead of SHA1 in extraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 032/163] random: do not sign extend bytes for rotation when mixing Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 033/163] random: do not re-init if crng_reseed completes before primary init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 034/163] random: mix bootloader randomness into pool Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 035/163] random: harmonize "crng init done" messages Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 036/163] random: use IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NUMA) instead of ifdefs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 037/163] random: early initialization of ChaCha constants Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 038/163] random: avoid superfluous call to RDRAND in CRNG extraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 039/163] random: dont reset crng_init_cnt on urandom_read() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 040/163] random: fix typo in comments Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 041/163] random: cleanup poolinfo abstraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 042/163] random: cleanup integer types Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 043/163] random: remove incomplete last_data logic Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 044/163] random: remove unused extract_entropy() reserved argument Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 045/163] random: rather than entropy_store abstraction, use global Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 046/163] random: remove unused OUTPUT_POOL constants Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 047/163] random: de-duplicate INPUT_POOL constants Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 049/163] random: cleanup fractional entropy shift constants Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 050/163] random: access input_pool_data directly rather than through pointer Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 051/163] random: selectively clang-format where it makes sense Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 052/163] random: simplify arithmetic function flow in account() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 053/163] random: continually use hwgenerator randomness Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 054/163] random: access primary_pool directly rather than through pointer Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 055/163] random: only call crng_finalize_init() for primary_crng Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 056/163] random: use computational hash for entropy extraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 057/163] random: simplify entropy debiting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 058/163] random: use linear min-entropy accumulation crediting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 059/163] random: always wake up entropy writers after extraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 060/163] random: make credit_entropy_bits() always safe Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 061/163] random: remove use_input_pool parameter from crng_reseed() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 062/163] random: remove batched entropy locking Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 063/163] random: fix locking in crng_fast_load() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 064/163] random: use RDSEED instead of RDRAND in entropy extraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 066/163] random: inline leaves of rand_initialize() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 067/163] random: ensure early RDSEED goes through mixer on init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 068/163] random: do not xor RDRAND when writing into /dev/random Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 069/163] random: absorb fast pool into input pool after fast load Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 070/163] random: use simpler fast key erasure flow on per-cpu keys Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 071/163] random: use hash function for crng_slow_load() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 072/163] random: make more consistent use of integer types Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 073/163] random: remove outdated INT_MAX >> 6 check in urandom_read() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 074/163] random: zero buffer after reading entropy from userspace Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 075/163] random: fix locking for crng_init in crng_reseed() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 076/163] random: tie batched entropy generation to base_crng generation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 077/163] random: remove ifdefd out interrupt bench Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 078/163] random: remove unused tracepoints Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 079/163] random: add proper SPDX header Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 080/163] random: deobfuscate irq u32/u64 contributions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 081/163] random: introduce drain_entropy() helper to declutter crng_reseed() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 082/163] random: remove useless header comment Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 083/163] random: remove whitespace and reorder includes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 084/163] random: group initialization wait functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 085/163] random: group crng functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 086/163] random: group entropy extraction functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 087/163] random: group entropy collection functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 088/163] random: group userspace read/write functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 089/163] random: group sysctl functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 090/163] random: rewrite header introductory comment Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 091/163] random: defer fast pool mixing to worker Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 092/163] random: do not take pool spinlock at boot Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 093/163] random: unify early init crng load accounting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 094/163] random: check for crng_init == 0 in add_device_randomness() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 095/163] random: pull add_hwgenerator_randomness() declaration into random.h Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 096/163] random: clear fast pool, crng, and batches in cpuhp bring up Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 097/163] random: round-robin registers as ulong, not u32 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 098/163] random: only wake up writers after zap if threshold was passed Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 099/163] random: cleanup UUID handling Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 100/163] random: unify cycles_t and jiffies usage and types Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 101/163] random: do crng pre-init loading in worker rather than irq Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 102/163] random: give sysctl_random_min_urandom_seed a more sensible value Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 103/163] random: dont let 644 read-only sysctls be written to Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 104/163] random: replace custom notifier chain with standard one Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 105/163] random: use SipHash as interrupt entropy accumulator Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 106/163] random: make consistent usage of crng_ready() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 107/163] random: reseed more often immediately after booting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 108/163] random: check for signal and try earlier when generating entropy Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 109/163] random: skip fast_init if hwrng provides large chunk of entropy Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 110/163] random: treat bootloader trust toggle the same way as cpu trust toggle Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 111/163] random: re-add removed comment about get_random_{u32,u64} reseeding Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 112/163] random: mix build-time latent entropy into pool at init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 113/163] random: do not split fast init input in add_hwgenerator_randomness() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 114/163] random: do not allow user to keep crng key around on stack Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 115/163] random: check for signal_pending() outside of need_resched() check Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 116/163] random: check for signals every PAGE_SIZE chunk of /dev/[u]random Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 117/163] random: allow partial reads if later user copies fail Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 118/163] random: make random_get_entropy() return an unsigned long Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 119/163] random: document crng_fast_key_erasure() destination possibility Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 120/163] random: fix sysctl documentation nits Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 121/163] init: call time_init() before rand_initialize() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 122/163] ia64: define get_cycles macro for arch-override Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 123/163] s390: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 124/163] parisc: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 125/163] alpha: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 126/163] powerpc: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 127/163] timekeeping: Add raw clock fallback for random_get_entropy() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 128/163] m68k: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 129/163] riscv: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 130/163] mips: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of just c0 random Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 131/163] arm: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 132/163] nios2: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 133/163] x86/tsc: Use " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 134/163] um: use " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 135/163] sparc: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 136/163] xtensa: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 137/163] random: insist on random_get_entropy() existing in order to simplify Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 138/163] random: do not use batches when !crng_ready() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 139/163] random: use first 128 bits of input as fast init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 140/163] random: do not pretend to handle premature next security model Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 141/163] random: order timer entropy functions below interrupt functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 142/163] random: do not use input pool from hard IRQs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 143/163] random: help compiler out with fast_mix() by using simpler arguments Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 144/163] siphash: use one source of truth for siphash permutations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 145/163] random: use symbolic constants for crng_init states Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 146/163] random: avoid initializing twice in credit race Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 147/163] random: move initialization out of reseeding hot path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 148/163] random: remove ratelimiting for in-kernel unseeded randomness Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 149/163] random: use proper jiffies comparison macro Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 150/163] random: handle latent entropy and command line from random_init() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 151/163] random: credit architectural init the exact amount Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 152/163] random: use static branch for crng_ready() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 153/163] random: remove extern from functions in header Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 154/163] random: use proper return types on get_random_{int,long}_wait() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 155/163] random: make consistent use of buf and len Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 156/163] random: move initialization functions out of hot pages Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 157/163] random: move randomize_page() into mm where it belongs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 158/163] random: unify batched entropy implementations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 159/163] random: convert to using fops->read_iter() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 160/163] random: convert to using fops->write_iter() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 161/163] random: wire up fops->splice_{read,write}_iter() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 162/163] random: check for signals after page of pool writes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 163/163] ALSA: ctxfi: Add SB046x PCI ID Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 14:14 ` [PATCH 5.10 000/163] 5.10.119-rc1 review Pavel Machek
2022-05-27 15:53   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 16:59     ` Guenter Roeck
2022-05-27 17:39       ` Guenter Roeck
2022-05-27 21:10       ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-05-27 22:38         ` Guenter Roeck
2022-05-28  6:03           ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-05-27 21:04   ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-06-01  6:13     ` Chris Paterson
2022-05-27 22:38 ` Guenter Roeck
2022-05-28 11:07 ` Naresh Kamboju
2022-05-28 15:29 ` Sudip Mukherjee
2022-05-28 22:24 ` Fox Chen
2022-05-30  1:09 ` Samuel Zou

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