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From: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
To: Jincheng Wang <jc.w4ng@gmail.com>,
	Joao Marcos Costa <joaomarcos.costa@bootlin.com>,
	Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>,
	Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
Cc: u-boot@lists.denx.de
Subject: Re: Out of bounds write vulnerability in the sqfs_readdir() function
Date: Wed, 1 Jun 2022 10:18:42 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220601141842.GF25375@bill-the-cat> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALO=DHFB+yBoXxVr5KcsK0iFdg+e7ywko4-e+72kjbcS8JBfPw@mail.gmail.com>

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On Thu, May 26, 2022 at 04:28:07PM +0800, Jincheng Wang wrote:

> Hello u-boot list,
> 
> I found the sqfs_readdir() function is vulnerable to Out-of-Bound write,
> which will cause arbitrary code execution.
> 
> ```
> int sqfs_readdir(struct fs_dir_stream *fs_dirs, struct fs_dirent **dentp)
> {
> ......
> /* Set entry name */
> 
> strncpy(dent->name, dirs->entry->name, dirs->entry->name_size + 1);
> dent->name[dirs->entry->name_size + 1] = '\0';
> 
> offset = dirs->entry->name_size + 1 + SQFS_ENTRY_BASE_LENGTH;
> dirs->entry_count--;
> .......
> }
> 
> 
> struct squashfs_dir_stream {
> struct fs_dir_stream fs_dirs;
> struct fs_dirent dentp;
> size_t size;
> int entry_count;
> struct squashfs_directory_header *dir_header;
> struct squashfs_directory_entry *entry;
> ......
> };
> 
> 
> static int sqfs_search_dir(struct squashfs_dir_stream *dirs, char
> **token_list,
>   int token_count, u32 *m_list, int m_count)
> {
> ......
> while (!sqfs_readdir(dirsp, &dent)) {
> ret = strcmp(dent->name, token_list[j]);
> if (!ret)
> break;
> free(dirs->entry);
> dirs->entry = NULL;
> }
> ......
> }
> 
> ```
> 
> The sqfs_readdir() function  use strncpy to  set entry name, while the type
> of dirs->entry->name_size is defined as "u16" in the struct
> squashfs_directory_entry
> and dent->name
> is defined as "char[256]" in the struct fs_dirent.
> 
> We can overwrite *dirs_header and *entry in the struct squashfs_dir_stream,
> so that  we can use the sqfs_search_dir() function to free a fake
> chunk which causes arbitrary code execution.
> You can see the Poc in the attachment.
> 
>      host bind 0 test4.sqfs
>      ls host 0 /dirs

Adding the listed maintainers...

-- 
Tom

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      reply	other threads:[~2022-06-01 14:18 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-05-26  8:28 Out of bounds write vulnerability in the sqfs_readdir() function Jincheng Wang
2022-06-01 14:18 ` Tom Rini [this message]

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