* Re: [Bug 216073] New: [s390x] kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:101! usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc 'n o area' (offset 0, size 1)!
[not found] <bug-216073-27@https.bugzilla.kernel.org/>
@ 2022-06-06 22:13 ` Andrew Morton
2022-06-07 15:05 ` Alexander Gordeev
0 siblings, 1 reply; 15+ messages in thread
From: Andrew Morton @ 2022-06-06 22:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: zlang; +Cc: bugzilla-daemon, linux-s390, linux-xfs
(switched to email. Please respond via emailed reply-to-all, not via the
bugzilla web interface).
On Sun, 05 Jun 2022 01:00:15 +0000 bugzilla-daemon@kernel.org wrote:
> https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216073
>
> Bug ID: 216073
> Summary: [s390x] kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:101! usercopy:
> Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc
> 'n o area' (offset 0, size 1)!
> Product: Memory Management
> Version: 2.5
> Kernel Version: 5.19-rc0
> Hardware: All
> OS: Linux
> Tree: Mainline
> Status: NEW
> Severity: normal
> Priority: P1
> Component: Other
> Assignee: akpm@linux-foundation.org
> Reporter: zlang@redhat.com
> Regression: No
>
> Recently xfstests on s390x always hit below kernel BUG:
> usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc 'no area'
> (offset 0, size 1)!
Thanks. Do you know if this is specific to s390?
> It's reproducible on xfs with default mkfs options. But it's easier and 100%
> reproducible (for me) on xfs with 64k directory block size (-n size=65536).
>
> The kernel HEAD commit is:
> commit 032dcf09e2bf7c822be25b4abef7a6c913870d98
> Author: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
> Date: Fri Jun 3 20:01:25 2022 -0700
>
> Merge tag 'gpio-fixes-for-v5.19-rc1' of
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brgl/linux
>
>
> [20797.425894] XFS (loop1): Mounting V5 Filesystem
> [20797.433354] XFS (loop1): Ending clean mount
> [20823.669300] usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc
> 'n
> o area' (offset 0, size 1)!
> [20823.669339] ------------[ cut here ]------------
> [20823.669340] kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:101!
> [20823.669385] monitor event: 0040 ilc:2 [#1] SMP
> [20823.669415] Modules linked in: ext2 overlay dm_zero dm_log_writes
> dm_thin_poo
> l dm_persistent_data dm_bio_prison sd_mod t10_pi crc64_rocksoft_generic
> crc64_ro
> cksoft crc64 sg dm_snapshot dm_bufio ext4 mbcache jbd2 dm_flakey tls loop lcs
> ct
> cm fsm zfcp scsi_transport_fc dasd_fba_mod rfkill sunrpc vfio_ccw mdev
> vfio_iomm
> u_type1 zcrypt_cex4 vfio drm fuse i2c_core fb font drm_panel_orientation_quirks
> xfs libcrc32c ghash_s390 prng aes_s390 des_s390 sha3_512_s390 sha3_256_s390
> dasd
> _eckd_mod dasd_mod qeth_l2 bridge stp llc qeth qdio ccwgroup dm_mirror
> dm_region
> _hash dm_log dm_mod pkey zcrypt [last unloaded: scsi_debug]
> [20823.669520] CPU: 0 PID: 3774731 Comm: rm Kdump: loaded Tainted: G B W
> 5.18.0+ #1
> [20823.669530] Hardware name: IBM 8561 LT1 400 (z/VM 7.2.0)
> [20823.672501] Krnl PSW : 0704d00180000000 000000009df4a85a
> (usercopy_abort+0xaa
> /0xb0)
> [20823.672564] R:0 T:1 IO:1 EX:1 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:1 PM:0
> RI:
> 0 EA:3
> [20823.672575] Krnl GPRS: 0000000000000001 001c000018090e00 000000000000005c
> 000
> 0000000000004
> [20823.672584] 001c000000000000 000000009d332024 000000009e14b1a0
> 001
> bff8000000000
> [20823.672593] 0000000000000001 0000000000000001 0000000000000000
> 000
> 000009e14b1e0
> [20823.672601] 000000009e70d070 00000000a87bdac0 000000009df4a856
> 001
> bff8001f5f720
> [20823.672621] Krnl Code: 000000009df4a84c: b9040031 lgr %r3,%r1
> [20823.672621] 000000009df4a850: c0e5ffffbbfc brasl
> %r14,000
> 000009df42048
> [20823.672621] #000000009df4a856: af000000 mc 0,0
> [20823.672621] >000000009df4a85a: 0707 bcr 0,%r7
> [20823.672621] 000000009df4a85c: 0707 bcr 0,%r7
> [20823.672621] 000000009df4a85e: 0707 bcr 0,%r7
> [20823.672621] 000000009df4a860: c0040007b0a4 brcl
> 0,000000
> 009e0409a8
> [20823.672621] 000000009df4a866: eb6ff0480024 stmg
> %r6,%r15
> ,72(%r15)
> [20823.672789] Call Trace:
> [20823.672794] [<000000009df4a85a>] usercopy_abort+0xaa/0xb0
> [20823.672817] ([<000000009df4a856>] usercopy_abort+0xa6/0xb0)
> [20823.672825] [<000000009cd30c34>] check_heap_object+0x474/0x480
> [20823.672833] [<000000009cd30cb4>] __check_object_size+0x74/0x150
> [20823.672840] [<000000009cd8de06>] filldir64+0x296/0x530
> [20823.672849] [<001bffff805957dc>] xfs_dir2_leaf_getdents+0x40c/0xca0 [xfs]
> [20823.673277] [<001bffff80596e18>] xfs_readdir+0x3f8/0x740 [xfs]
> [20823.673522] [<000000009cd8c7ac>] iterate_dir+0x41c/0x580
> [20823.673529] [<000000009cd8d6b4>] __do_sys_getdents64+0xc4/0x1c0
> [20823.673537] [<000000009c4bda8c>] do_syscall+0x22c/0x330
> [20823.673546] [<000000009df5e8be>] __do_syscall+0xce/0xf0
> [20823.673554] [<000000009df87402>] system_call+0x82/0xb0
> [20823.673563] INFO: lockdep is turned off.
> [20823.673568] Last Breaking-Event-Address:
> [20823.673572] [<000000009df420f4>] _printk+0xac/0xb8
> [20823.673581] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
> [20829.875273] usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc
> 'n
> o area' (offset 0, size 1)!
> [20829.875316] ------------[ cut here ]------------
> [20829.875318] kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:101!
> [20829.875448] monitor event: 0040 ilc:2 [#2] SMP
> [20829.875468] Modules linked in: ext2 overlay dm_zero dm_log_writes
> dm_thin_poo
> l dm_persistent_data dm_bio_prison sd_mod t10_pi crc64_rocksoft_generic crc64_r
> cksoft crc64 sg dm_snapshot dm_bufio ext4 mbcache jbd2 dm_flakey tls loop lcs
> ct
> cm fsm zfcp scsi_transport_fc dasd_fba_mod rfkill sunrpc vfio_ccw mdev
> vfio_iomm
> u_type1 zcrypt_cex4 vfio drm fuse i2c_core fb font drm_panel_orientation_quirks
> xfs libcrc32c ghash_s390 prng aes_s390 des_s390 sha3_512_s390 sha3_256_s390
> dasd
> _eckd_mod dasd_mod qeth_l2 bridge stp llc qeth qdio ccwgroup dm_mirror
> dm_region
> _hash dm_log dm_mod pkey zcrypt [last unloaded: scsi_debug]
> [20829.875616] CPU: 0 PID: 3776251 Comm: find Kdump: loaded Tainted: G B D W
> 5.18.0+ #1
> [20829.875629] Hardware name: IBM 8561 LT1 400 (z/VM 7.2.0)
> [20829.879533] Krnl PSW : 0704d00180000000 000000009df4a85a
> (usercopy_abort+0xaa
> /0xb0)
> [20829.879554] R:0 T:1 IO:1 EX:1 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:1 PM:0
> RI:
> 0 EA:3
> [20829.879573] Krnl GPRS: 0000000000000001 001c000018090e00 000000000000005c
> 000
> 0000000000004
> [20829.879578] 001c000000000000 000000009d332024 000000009e14b1a0
> 001
> bff8000000000
> [20829.879583] 0000000000000001 0000000000000001 0000000000000000
> 000
> 000009e14b1e0
> [20829.879587] 000000009e70d070 00000000a21852c0 000000009df4a856
> 001
> bff8004fef728
> [20829.879599] Krnl Code: 000000009df4a84c: b9040031 lgr %r3,%r1
> [20829.879599] 000000009df4a850: c0e5ffffbbfc brasl
> %r14,000
> 000009df42048
> [20829.879599] #000000009df4a856: af000000 mc 0,0
> [20829.879599] >000000009df4a85a: 0707 bcr 0,%r7
> [20829.879599] 000000009df4a85c: 0707 bcr 0,%r7
> [20829.879599] 000000009df4a85e: 0707 bcr 0,%r7
> [20829.879599] 000000009df4a860: c0040007b0a4 brcl
> 0,000000
> 009e0409a8
> [20829.879599] 000000009df4a866: eb6ff0480024 stmg
> %r6,%r15
> ,72(%r15)
> [20829.879631] Call Trace:
> [20829.879634] [<000000009df4a85a>] usercopy_abort+0xaa/0xb0
> [20829.879639] ([<000000009df4a856>] usercopy_abort+0xa6/0xb0)
> [20829.879644] [<000000009cd30c34>] check_heap_object+0x474/0x480
> [20829.879650] [<000000009cd30cb4>] __check_object_size+0x74/0x150
> [20829.879654] [<000000009cd8de06>] filldir64+0x296/0x530
> [20829.879661] [<001bffff805957dc>] xfs_dir2_leaf_getdents+0x40c/0xca0 [xfs]
> [20829.879971] [<001bffff80596e18>] xfs_readdir+0x3f8/0x740 [xfs]
> [20829.880107] [<000000009cd8c7ac>] iterate_dir+0x41c/0x580
> [20829.880112] [<000000009cd8d6b4>] __do_sys_getdents64+0xc4/0x1c0
> [20829.880117] [<000000009c4bda8c>] do_syscall+0x22c/0x330
> [20829.880124] [<000000009df5e8be>] __do_syscall+0xce/0xf0
> [20829.880129] [<000000009df87402>] system_call+0x82/0xb0
> [20829.880135] INFO: lockdep is turned off.
> [20829.880138] Last Breaking-Event-Address:
> [20829.880141] [<000000009df420f4>] _printk+0xac/0xb8
> [20829.880148] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
> [20829.975537] XFS (loop0): Unmounting Filesystem
>
> --
> You may reply to this email to add a comment.
>
> You are receiving this mail because:
> You are the assignee for the bug.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* Re: [Bug 216073] New: [s390x] kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:101! usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc 'n o area' (offset 0, size 1)!
2022-06-06 22:13 ` [Bug 216073] New: [s390x] kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:101! usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc 'n o area' (offset 0, size 1)! Andrew Morton
@ 2022-06-07 15:05 ` Alexander Gordeev
2022-06-08 2:19 ` Zorro Lang
0 siblings, 1 reply; 15+ messages in thread
From: Alexander Gordeev @ 2022-06-07 15:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: zlang; +Cc: bugzilla-daemon, linux-s390, linux-xfs, Andrew Morton
On Mon, Jun 06, 2022 at 03:13:12PM -0700, Andrew Morton wrote:
> (switched to email. Please respond via emailed reply-to-all, not via the
> bugzilla web interface).
Hi Zorro,
Unfortunately, I am not able to reproduce the issue. Could you please
clarify your test environment details and share your xfstests config?
Thanks!
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* Re: [Bug 216073] New: [s390x] kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:101! usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc 'n o area' (offset 0, size 1)!
2022-06-07 15:05 ` Alexander Gordeev
@ 2022-06-08 2:19 ` Zorro Lang
2022-06-08 19:13 ` Alexander Gordeev
0 siblings, 1 reply; 15+ messages in thread
From: Zorro Lang @ 2022-06-08 2:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Alexander Gordeev; +Cc: bugzilla-daemon, linux-s390, linux-xfs, Andrew Morton
On Tue, Jun 07, 2022 at 05:05:01PM +0200, Alexander Gordeev wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 06, 2022 at 03:13:12PM -0700, Andrew Morton wrote:
> > (switched to email. Please respond via emailed reply-to-all, not via the
> > bugzilla web interface).
>
> Hi Zorro,
>
> Unfortunately, I am not able to reproduce the issue. Could you please
> clarify your test environment details and share your xfstests config?
One of the test environment details as [1]. The xfstests config as [2].
It's easier to reproduce on 64k directory size xfs by running xfstests
auto group.
Thanks,
Zorro
[1]
CPU
Vendor IBM/S390
Model Name 8561
Family 0
Model 3126312
Stepping 0
Speed 0.0
Processors 2
Cores 0
Sockets 0
Hyper True
Flags edat dfp vxp vx vxe ldisp sie vxe2 highgprs etf3eh te vxd gs sort zarch msa stfle dflt eimm esan3
Arch(s) s390x
Memory 4096 MB
NUMA Nodes 1
Disks
Model Size Logical sector size Physical sector size
3390/0c 41.03 GB / 38.21 GiB 4096 bytes 4096 bytes
[2]
# cat local.config
FSTYP=xfs
TEST_DEV=/dev/loop0
TEST_DIR=/mnt/fstests/TEST_DIR
SCRATCH_DEV=/dev/loop1
SCRATCH_MNT=/mnt/fstests/SCRATCH_DIR
LOGWRITES_DEV=/dev/loop2
MKFS_OPTIONS="-n size=65536 -m crc=1,finobt=1,reflink=1,rmapbt=0,bigtime=1,inobtcount=1"
TEST_FS_MOUNT_OPTS=""
>
> Thanks!
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* Re: [Bug 216073] New: [s390x] kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:101! usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc 'n o area' (offset 0, size 1)!
2022-06-08 2:19 ` Zorro Lang
@ 2022-06-08 19:13 ` Alexander Gordeev
2022-06-09 2:49 ` Zorro Lang
2022-06-12 4:42 ` Zorro Lang
0 siblings, 2 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: Alexander Gordeev @ 2022-06-08 19:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Zorro Lang; +Cc: bugzilla-daemon, linux-s390, linux-xfs, Andrew Morton
On Wed, Jun 08, 2022 at 10:19:22AM +0800, Zorro Lang wrote:
> One of the test environment details as [1]. The xfstests config as [2].
> It's easier to reproduce on 64k directory size xfs by running xfstests
> auto group.
Thanks for the details, Zorro!
Do you create test and scratch device with xfs_io, as README suggests?
If yes, what are sizes of the files?
Also, do you run always xfs/auto or xfs/294 hits for you reliably?
Thanks!
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* Re: [Bug 216073] New: [s390x] kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:101! usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc 'n o area' (offset 0, size 1)!
2022-06-08 19:13 ` Alexander Gordeev
@ 2022-06-09 2:49 ` Zorro Lang
2022-06-12 4:42 ` Zorro Lang
1 sibling, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: Zorro Lang @ 2022-06-09 2:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Alexander Gordeev; +Cc: bugzilla-daemon, linux-s390, linux-xfs, Andrew Morton
On Wed, Jun 08, 2022 at 09:13:12PM +0200, Alexander Gordeev wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 08, 2022 at 10:19:22AM +0800, Zorro Lang wrote:
> > One of the test environment details as [1]. The xfstests config as [2].
> > It's easier to reproduce on 64k directory size xfs by running xfstests
> > auto group.
>
>
> Thanks for the details, Zorro!
>
> Do you create test and scratch device with xfs_io, as README suggests?
> If yes, what are sizes of the files?
# fallocate -l 5G /home/test_dev.img
# fallocate -l 10G /home/scratch_dev.img
Then create loop devices.
> Also, do you run always xfs/auto or xfs/294 hits for you reliably?
100% for on my testing, I tried 10 times, then hit it 10 times last
weekend. Will test again this week.
>
> Thanks!
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* Re: [Bug 216073] New: [s390x] kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:101! usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc 'n o area' (offset 0, size 1)!
2022-06-08 19:13 ` Alexander Gordeev
2022-06-09 2:49 ` Zorro Lang
@ 2022-06-12 4:42 ` Zorro Lang
2022-06-12 11:58 ` Matthew Wilcox
1 sibling, 1 reply; 15+ messages in thread
From: Zorro Lang @ 2022-06-12 4:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Alexander Gordeev
Cc: bugzilla-daemon, linux-s390, linux-xfs, Andrew Morton, linux-mm
On Wed, Jun 08, 2022 at 09:13:12PM +0200, Alexander Gordeev wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 08, 2022 at 10:19:22AM +0800, Zorro Lang wrote:
> > One of the test environment details as [1]. The xfstests config as [2].
> > It's easier to reproduce on 64k directory size xfs by running xfstests
> > auto group.
>
>
> Thanks for the details, Zorro!
>
> Do you create test and scratch device with xfs_io, as README suggests?
> If yes, what are sizes of the files?
> Also, do you run always xfs/auto or xfs/294 hits for you reliably?
Looks likt it's not a s390x specific bug, I just hit this issue once (not 100%
reproducible) on aarch64 with linux v5.19.0-rc1+ [1]. So back to cc linux-mm
to get more review.
Thanks,
Zorro
[1]
[ 980.200947] usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc 'no area' (offset 0, size 1)!
[ 980.200968] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 980.200969] kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:101!
[ 980.201081] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP
[ 980.224192] Modules linked in: rfkill arm_spe_pmu mlx5_ib ast drm_vram_helper drm_ttm_helper ttm ib_uverbs acpi_ipmi drm_kms_helper ipmi_ssif fb_sys_fops syscopyarea sysfillrect ib_core sysimgblt arm_cmn arm_dmc620_pmu arm_dsu_pmu cppc_cpufreq sunrpc vfat fat drm fuse xfs libcrc32c mlx5_core crct10dif_ce ghash_ce sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sha1_ce sbsa_gwdt nvme igb mlxfw nvme_core tls i2c_algo_bit psample pci_hyperv_intf i2c_designware_platform i2c_designware_core xgene_hwmon ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler
[ 980.268449] CPU: 42 PID: 121940 Comm: rm Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.19.0-rc1+ #1
[ 980.275921] Hardware name: GIGABYTE R272-P30-JG/MP32-AR0-JG, BIOS F16f (SCP: 1.06.20210615) 07/01/2021
[ 980.285214] pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 980.292165] pc : usercopy_abort+0x78/0x7c
[ 980.296167] lr : usercopy_abort+0x78/0x7c
[ 980.300166] sp : ffff80002b007730
[ 980.303469] x29: ffff80002b007740 x28: ffff80002b007cc0 x27: ffffdc5683ecc880
[ 980.310595] x26: 1ffff00005600f9b x25: ffffdc5681c90000 x24: ffff80002b007cdc
[ 980.317722] x23: ffff800041a0004a x22: 0000000000000001 x21: 0000000000000001
[ 980.324848] x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffff800041a00049 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 980.331974] x17: 2720636f6c6c616d x16: 76206d6f72662064 x15: 6574636574656420
[ 980.339101] x14: 74706d6574746120 x13: 21293120657a6973 x12: ffff6106cbc4c03f
[ 980.346227] x11: 1fffe106cbc4c03e x10: ffff6106cbc4c03e x9 : ffffdc5681f36e30
[ 980.353353] x8 : ffff08365e2601f7 x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : ffff6106cbc4c03e
[ 980.360480] x5 : ffff08365e2601f0 x4 : 1fffe10044b11801 x3 : 0000000000000000
[ 980.367606] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff08022588c000 x0 : 000000000000005c
[ 980.374733] Call trace:
[ 980.377167] usercopy_abort+0x78/0x7c
[ 980.380819] check_heap_object+0x3dc/0x3e0
[ 980.384907] __check_object_size.part.0+0x6c/0x1f0
[ 980.389688] __check_object_size+0x24/0x30
[ 980.393774] filldir64+0x548/0x84c
[ 980.397165] xfs_dir2_block_getdents+0x404/0x960 [xfs]
[ 980.402437] xfs_readdir+0x3c4/0x4b0 [xfs]
[ 980.406652] xfs_file_readdir+0x6c/0xa0 [xfs]
[ 980.411127] iterate_dir+0x3a4/0x500
[ 980.414691] __do_sys_getdents64+0xb0/0x230
[ 980.418863] __arm64_sys_getdents64+0x70/0xa0
[ 980.423209] invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0xd8/0x1d0
[ 980.427991] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x224/0x2bc
[ 980.432858] do_el0_svc+0x4c/0x90
[ 980.436163] el0_svc+0x5c/0x140
[ 980.439294] el0t_64_sync_handler+0xb4/0x130
[ 980.443553] el0t_64_sync+0x174/0x178
[ 980.447206] Code: f90003e3 aa0003e3 91098100 97ffe24b (d4210000)
[ 980.453292] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 980.458162] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 980.462073] Bye!
>
> Thanks!
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* Re: [Bug 216073] New: [s390x] kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:101! usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc 'n o area' (offset 0, size 1)!
2022-06-12 4:42 ` Zorro Lang
@ 2022-06-12 11:58 ` Matthew Wilcox
2022-06-12 13:03 ` Uladzislau Rezki
0 siblings, 1 reply; 15+ messages in thread
From: Matthew Wilcox @ 2022-06-12 11:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Zorro Lang
Cc: Alexander Gordeev, bugzilla-daemon, linux-s390, linux-xfs,
Andrew Morton, linux-mm, Uladzislau Rezki, Kees Cook
On Sun, Jun 12, 2022 at 12:42:30PM +0800, Zorro Lang wrote:
> Looks likt it's not a s390x specific bug, I just hit this issue once (not 100%
> reproducible) on aarch64 with linux v5.19.0-rc1+ [1]. So back to cc linux-mm
> to get more review.
>
> [1]
> [ 980.200947] usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc 'no area' (offset 0, size 1)!
if (is_vmalloc_addr(ptr)) {
struct vm_struct *area = find_vm_area(ptr);
if (!area) {
usercopy_abort("vmalloc", "no area", to_user, 0, n);
Oh. Looks like XFS uses vm_map_ram() and vm_map_ram() doesn't allocate
a vm_struct.
Ulad, how does this look to you?
diff --git a/mm/usercopy.c b/mm/usercopy.c
index baeacc735b83..6bc2a1407c59 100644
--- a/mm/usercopy.c
+++ b/mm/usercopy.c
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ static inline void check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n,
}
if (is_vmalloc_addr(ptr)) {
- struct vm_struct *area = find_vm_area(ptr);
+ struct vmap_area *area = find_vmap_area((unsigned long)ptr);
unsigned long offset;
if (!area) {
@@ -181,8 +181,9 @@ static inline void check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n,
return;
}
- offset = ptr - area->addr;
- if (offset + n > get_vm_area_size(area))
+ /* XXX: We should also abort for free vmap_areas */
+ offset = (unsigned long)ptr - area->va_start;
+ if (offset + n >= area->va_end)
usercopy_abort("vmalloc", NULL, to_user, offset, n);
return;
}
diff --git a/mm/vmalloc.c b/mm/vmalloc.c
index 07db42455dd4..effd1ff6a4b4 100644
--- a/mm/vmalloc.c
+++ b/mm/vmalloc.c
@@ -1798,7 +1798,7 @@ static void free_unmap_vmap_area(struct vmap_area *va)
free_vmap_area_noflush(va);
}
-static struct vmap_area *find_vmap_area(unsigned long addr)
+struct vmap_area *find_vmap_area(unsigned long addr)
{
struct vmap_area *va;
> [ 980.200968] ------------[ cut here ]------------
> [ 980.200969] kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:101!
> [ 980.201081] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP
> [ 980.224192] Modules linked in: rfkill arm_spe_pmu mlx5_ib ast drm_vram_helper drm_ttm_helper ttm ib_uverbs acpi_ipmi drm_kms_helper ipmi_ssif fb_sys_fops syscopyarea sysfillrect ib_core sysimgblt arm_cmn arm_dmc620_pmu arm_dsu_pmu cppc_cpufreq sunrpc vfat fat drm fuse xfs libcrc32c mlx5_core crct10dif_ce ghash_ce sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sha1_ce sbsa_gwdt nvme igb mlxfw nvme_core tls i2c_algo_bit psample pci_hyperv_intf i2c_designware_platform i2c_designware_core xgene_hwmon ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler
> [ 980.268449] CPU: 42 PID: 121940 Comm: rm Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.19.0-rc1+ #1
> [ 980.275921] Hardware name: GIGABYTE R272-P30-JG/MP32-AR0-JG, BIOS F16f (SCP: 1.06.20210615) 07/01/2021
> [ 980.285214] pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
> [ 980.292165] pc : usercopy_abort+0x78/0x7c
> [ 980.296167] lr : usercopy_abort+0x78/0x7c
> [ 980.300166] sp : ffff80002b007730
> [ 980.303469] x29: ffff80002b007740 x28: ffff80002b007cc0 x27: ffffdc5683ecc880
> [ 980.310595] x26: 1ffff00005600f9b x25: ffffdc5681c90000 x24: ffff80002b007cdc
> [ 980.317722] x23: ffff800041a0004a x22: 0000000000000001 x21: 0000000000000001
> [ 980.324848] x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffff800041a00049 x18: 0000000000000000
> [ 980.331974] x17: 2720636f6c6c616d x16: 76206d6f72662064 x15: 6574636574656420
> [ 980.339101] x14: 74706d6574746120 x13: 21293120657a6973 x12: ffff6106cbc4c03f
> [ 980.346227] x11: 1fffe106cbc4c03e x10: ffff6106cbc4c03e x9 : ffffdc5681f36e30
> [ 980.353353] x8 : ffff08365e2601f7 x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : ffff6106cbc4c03e
> [ 980.360480] x5 : ffff08365e2601f0 x4 : 1fffe10044b11801 x3 : 0000000000000000
> [ 980.367606] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff08022588c000 x0 : 000000000000005c
> [ 980.374733] Call trace:
> [ 980.377167] usercopy_abort+0x78/0x7c
> [ 980.380819] check_heap_object+0x3dc/0x3e0
> [ 980.384907] __check_object_size.part.0+0x6c/0x1f0
> [ 980.389688] __check_object_size+0x24/0x30
> [ 980.393774] filldir64+0x548/0x84c
> [ 980.397165] xfs_dir2_block_getdents+0x404/0x960 [xfs]
> [ 980.402437] xfs_readdir+0x3c4/0x4b0 [xfs]
> [ 980.406652] xfs_file_readdir+0x6c/0xa0 [xfs]
> [ 980.411127] iterate_dir+0x3a4/0x500
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* Re: [Bug 216073] New: [s390x] kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:101! usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc 'n o area' (offset 0, size 1)!
2022-06-12 11:58 ` Matthew Wilcox
@ 2022-06-12 13:03 ` Uladzislau Rezki
2022-06-12 17:26 ` Matthew Wilcox
0 siblings, 1 reply; 15+ messages in thread
From: Uladzislau Rezki @ 2022-06-12 13:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Matthew Wilcox
Cc: Zorro Lang, Alexander Gordeev, bugzilla-daemon, linux-s390,
linux-xfs, Andrew Morton, linux-mm, Uladzislau Rezki, Kees Cook
> On Sun, Jun 12, 2022 at 12:42:30PM +0800, Zorro Lang wrote:
> > Looks likt it's not a s390x specific bug, I just hit this issue once (not 100%
> > reproducible) on aarch64 with linux v5.19.0-rc1+ [1]. So back to cc linux-mm
> > to get more review.
> >
> > [1]
> > [ 980.200947] usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc 'no area' (offset 0, size 1)!
>
> if (is_vmalloc_addr(ptr)) {
> struct vm_struct *area = find_vm_area(ptr);
> if (!area) {
> usercopy_abort("vmalloc", "no area", to_user, 0, n);
>
> Oh. Looks like XFS uses vm_map_ram() and vm_map_ram() doesn't allocate
> a vm_struct.
>
> Ulad, how does this look to you?
>
It looks like a correct way to me :) XFS uses per-cpu-vm_map_ram()-vm_unmap_ram()
API which do not allocate "vm_struct" because it is not needed.
>
> diff --git a/mm/usercopy.c b/mm/usercopy.c
> index baeacc735b83..6bc2a1407c59 100644
> --- a/mm/usercopy.c
> +++ b/mm/usercopy.c
> @@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ static inline void check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n,
> }
>
> if (is_vmalloc_addr(ptr)) {
> - struct vm_struct *area = find_vm_area(ptr);
> + struct vmap_area *area = find_vmap_area((unsigned long)ptr);
> unsigned long offset;
>
> if (!area) {
> @@ -181,8 +181,9 @@ static inline void check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n,
> return;
> }
>
> - offset = ptr - area->addr;
> - if (offset + n > get_vm_area_size(area))
> + /* XXX: We should also abort for free vmap_areas */
> + offset = (unsigned long)ptr - area->va_start;
>
I was a bit confused about "offset" and why it is needed here. It is always zero.
So we can get rid of it to make it less confused. From the other hand a zero offset
contributes to nothing.
>
> + if (offset + n >= area->va_end)
>
I think it is a bit wrong. As i see it, "n" is a size and what we would like to do
here is boundary check:
<snip>
if (n > va_size(area))
usercopy_abort("vmalloc", NULL, to_user, 0, n);
<snip>
--
Uladzislau Rezki
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* Re: [Bug 216073] New: [s390x] kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:101! usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc 'n o area' (offset 0, size 1)!
2022-06-12 13:03 ` Uladzislau Rezki
@ 2022-06-12 17:26 ` Matthew Wilcox
2022-06-12 17:59 ` Yu Zhao
2022-06-12 19:07 ` Uladzislau Rezki
0 siblings, 2 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: Matthew Wilcox @ 2022-06-12 17:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Uladzislau Rezki
Cc: Zorro Lang, Alexander Gordeev, bugzilla-daemon, linux-s390,
linux-xfs, Andrew Morton, linux-mm, Kees Cook
On Sun, Jun 12, 2022 at 03:03:20PM +0200, Uladzislau Rezki wrote:
> > @@ -181,8 +181,9 @@ static inline void check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n,
> > return;
> > }
> >
> > - offset = ptr - area->addr;
> > - if (offset + n > get_vm_area_size(area))
> > + /* XXX: We should also abort for free vmap_areas */
> > + offset = (unsigned long)ptr - area->va_start;
> >
> I was a bit confused about "offset" and why it is needed here. It is always zero.
> So we can get rid of it to make it less confused. From the other hand a zero offset
> contributes to nothing.
I don't think offset is necessarily zero. 'ptr' is a pointer somewhere
in the object, not necessarily the start of the object.
> >
> > + if (offset + n >= area->va_end)
> >
> I think it is a bit wrong. As i see it, "n" is a size and what we would like to do
> here is boundary check:
>
> <snip>
> if (n > va_size(area))
> usercopy_abort("vmalloc", NULL, to_user, 0, n);
> <snip>
Hmm ... we should probably be more careful about wrapping.
if (n > area->va_end - addr)
usercopy_abort("vmalloc", NULL, to_user, offset, n);
... and that goes for the whole function actually. I'll split that into
a separate change.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* Re: [Bug 216073] New: [s390x] kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:101! usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc 'n o area' (offset 0, size 1)!
2022-06-12 17:26 ` Matthew Wilcox
@ 2022-06-12 17:59 ` Yu Zhao
2022-06-12 18:05 ` Matthew Wilcox
2022-06-12 19:07 ` Uladzislau Rezki
1 sibling, 1 reply; 15+ messages in thread
From: Yu Zhao @ 2022-06-12 17:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Matthew Wilcox, Uladzislau Rezki
Cc: Zorro Lang, Alexander Gordeev, bugzilla-daemon, linux-s390,
linux-xfs, Andrew Morton, Linux-MM, Kees Cook
On Sun, Jun 12, 2022 at 11:27 AM Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> wrote:
>
> On Sun, Jun 12, 2022 at 03:03:20PM +0200, Uladzislau Rezki wrote:
> > > @@ -181,8 +181,9 @@ static inline void check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n,
> > > return;
> > > }
> > >
> > > - offset = ptr - area->addr;
> > > - if (offset + n > get_vm_area_size(area))
> > > + /* XXX: We should also abort for free vmap_areas */
> > > + offset = (unsigned long)ptr - area->va_start;
> > >
> > I was a bit confused about "offset" and why it is needed here. It is always zero.
> > So we can get rid of it to make it less confused. From the other hand a zero offset
> > contributes to nothing.
>
> I don't think offset is necessarily zero. 'ptr' is a pointer somewhere
> in the object, not necessarily the start of the object.
>
> > >
> > > + if (offset + n >= area->va_end)
> > >
> > I think it is a bit wrong. As i see it, "n" is a size and what we would like to do
> > here is boundary check:
> >
> > <snip>
> > if (n > va_size(area))
> > usercopy_abort("vmalloc", NULL, to_user, 0, n);
> > <snip>
>
> Hmm ... we should probably be more careful about wrapping.
>
> if (n > area->va_end - addr)
> usercopy_abort("vmalloc", NULL, to_user, offset, n);
>
> ... and that goes for the whole function actually. I'll split that into
> a separate change.
Please let me know if there is something we want to test -- I can
reproduce the problem reliably:
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:101!
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
CPU: 4 PID: 3259 Comm: iptables Not tainted 5.19.0-rc1-lockdep+ #1
pc : usercopy_abort+0x9c/0xa0
lr : usercopy_abort+0x9c/0xa0
sp : ffffffc010bd78d0
x29: ffffffc010bd78e0 x28: 42ffff80ac08d8ec x27: 42ffff80ac08d8ec
x26: 42ffff80ac08d8c0 x25: 000000000000000a x24: ffffffdf4c7e5120
x23: 000000000bec44c2 x22: efffffc000000000 x21: ffffffdf2896b0c0
x20: 0000000000000001 x19: 000000000000000b x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 2820636f6c6c616d x16: 0000000000000042 x15: 6574636574656420
x14: 74706d6574746120 x13: 0000000000000018 x12: 000000000000000d
x11: ff80007fffffffff x10: 0000000000000001 x9 : db174b7f89103400
x8 : db174b7f89103400 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 79706f6372657375
x5 : ffffffdf4d9c617e x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : ffffffdf4b7d017c
x2 : ffffff80eb188b18 x1 : 42ffff80ac08d8c8 x0 : 0000000000000066
Call trace:
usercopy_abort+0x9c/0xa0
__check_object_size+0x38c/0x400
xt_obj_to_user+0xe4/0x200
xt_compat_target_to_user+0xd8/0x18c
compat_copy_entries_to_user+0x278/0x424
do_ipt_get_ctl+0x7bc/0xb2c
nf_getsockopt+0x7c/0xb4
ip_getsockopt+0xee8/0xfa4
raw_getsockopt+0xf4/0x23c
sock_common_getsockopt+0x48/0x54
__sys_getsockopt+0x11c/0x2f8
__arm64_sys_getsockopt+0x60/0x70
el0_svc_common+0xfc/0x1cc
do_el0_svc_compat+0x38/0x5c
el0_svc_compat+0x68/0xf4
el0t_32_sync_handler+0xc0/0xf0
el0t_32_sync+0x190/0x194
Code: aa0903e4 a9017bfd 910043fd 9438be18 (d4210000)
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* Re: [Bug 216073] New: [s390x] kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:101! usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc 'n o area' (offset 0, size 1)!
2022-06-12 17:59 ` Yu Zhao
@ 2022-06-12 18:05 ` Matthew Wilcox
2022-06-12 18:43 ` Yu Zhao
0 siblings, 1 reply; 15+ messages in thread
From: Matthew Wilcox @ 2022-06-12 18:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Yu Zhao
Cc: Uladzislau Rezki, Zorro Lang, Alexander Gordeev, bugzilla-daemon,
linux-s390, linux-xfs, Andrew Morton, Linux-MM, Kees Cook
On Sun, Jun 12, 2022 at 11:59:58AM -0600, Yu Zhao wrote:
> Please let me know if there is something we want to test -- I can
> reproduce the problem reliably:
>
> ------------[ cut here ]------------
> kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:101!
The line right before cut here would have been nice ;-)
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/YqXU+oU7wayOcmCe@casper.infradead.org/
might fix your problem, but I can't be sure without that line.
> Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
> CPU: 4 PID: 3259 Comm: iptables Not tainted 5.19.0-rc1-lockdep+ #1
> pc : usercopy_abort+0x9c/0xa0
> lr : usercopy_abort+0x9c/0xa0
> sp : ffffffc010bd78d0
> x29: ffffffc010bd78e0 x28: 42ffff80ac08d8ec x27: 42ffff80ac08d8ec
> x26: 42ffff80ac08d8c0 x25: 000000000000000a x24: ffffffdf4c7e5120
> x23: 000000000bec44c2 x22: efffffc000000000 x21: ffffffdf2896b0c0
> x20: 0000000000000001 x19: 000000000000000b x18: 0000000000000000
> x17: 2820636f6c6c616d x16: 0000000000000042 x15: 6574636574656420
> x14: 74706d6574746120 x13: 0000000000000018 x12: 000000000000000d
> x11: ff80007fffffffff x10: 0000000000000001 x9 : db174b7f89103400
> x8 : db174b7f89103400 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 79706f6372657375
> x5 : ffffffdf4d9c617e x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : ffffffdf4b7d017c
> x2 : ffffff80eb188b18 x1 : 42ffff80ac08d8c8 x0 : 0000000000000066
> Call trace:
> usercopy_abort+0x9c/0xa0
> __check_object_size+0x38c/0x400
> xt_obj_to_user+0xe4/0x200
> xt_compat_target_to_user+0xd8/0x18c
> compat_copy_entries_to_user+0x278/0x424
> do_ipt_get_ctl+0x7bc/0xb2c
> nf_getsockopt+0x7c/0xb4
> ip_getsockopt+0xee8/0xfa4
> raw_getsockopt+0xf4/0x23c
> sock_common_getsockopt+0x48/0x54
> __sys_getsockopt+0x11c/0x2f8
> __arm64_sys_getsockopt+0x60/0x70
> el0_svc_common+0xfc/0x1cc
> do_el0_svc_compat+0x38/0x5c
> el0_svc_compat+0x68/0xf4
> el0t_32_sync_handler+0xc0/0xf0
> el0t_32_sync+0x190/0x194
> Code: aa0903e4 a9017bfd 910043fd 9438be18 (d4210000)
> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* Re: [Bug 216073] New: [s390x] kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:101! usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc 'n o area' (offset 0, size 1)!
2022-06-12 18:05 ` Matthew Wilcox
@ 2022-06-12 18:43 ` Yu Zhao
2022-06-12 19:52 ` Matthew Wilcox
0 siblings, 1 reply; 15+ messages in thread
From: Yu Zhao @ 2022-06-12 18:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Matthew Wilcox
Cc: Uladzislau Rezki, Zorro Lang, Alexander Gordeev, bugzilla-daemon,
linux-s390, linux-xfs, Andrew Morton, Linux-MM, Kees Cook
On Sun, Jun 12, 2022 at 12:05 PM Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> wrote:
>
> On Sun, Jun 12, 2022 at 11:59:58AM -0600, Yu Zhao wrote:
> > Please let me know if there is something we want to test -- I can
> > reproduce the problem reliably:
> >
> > ------------[ cut here ]------------
> > kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:101!
>
> The line right before cut here would have been nice ;-)
Right.
$ grep usercopy:
usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc (offset
2882303761517129920, size 11)!
usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc (offset
8574853690513436864, size 11)!
usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc (offset
7998392938210013376, size 11)!
...
> https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/YqXU+oU7wayOcmCe@casper.infradead.org/
>
> might fix your problem, but I can't be sure without that line.
Thanks, it worked!
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* Re: [Bug 216073] New: [s390x] kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:101! usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc 'n o area' (offset 0, size 1)!
2022-06-12 17:26 ` Matthew Wilcox
2022-06-12 17:59 ` Yu Zhao
@ 2022-06-12 19:07 ` Uladzislau Rezki
1 sibling, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: Uladzislau Rezki @ 2022-06-12 19:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Matthew Wilcox
Cc: Uladzislau Rezki, Zorro Lang, Alexander Gordeev, bugzilla-daemon,
linux-s390, linux-xfs, Andrew Morton, linux-mm, Kees Cook
> On Sun, Jun 12, 2022 at 03:03:20PM +0200, Uladzislau Rezki wrote:
> > > @@ -181,8 +181,9 @@ static inline void check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n,
> > > return;
> > > }
> > >
> > > - offset = ptr - area->addr;
> > > - if (offset + n > get_vm_area_size(area))
> > > + /* XXX: We should also abort for free vmap_areas */
> > > + offset = (unsigned long)ptr - area->va_start;
> > >
> > I was a bit confused about "offset" and why it is needed here. It is always zero.
> > So we can get rid of it to make it less confused. From the other hand a zero offset
> > contributes to nothing.
>
> I don't think offset is necessarily zero. 'ptr' is a pointer somewhere
> in the object, not necessarily the start of the object.
>
Right you are. Just checked the __find_vmap_area() it returns VA of the address it
belongs to. Initially i was thinking that addr have to be exactly as va->start only,
so i was wrong.
> > >
> > > + if (offset + n >= area->va_end)
> > >
> > I think it is a bit wrong. As i see it, "n" is a size and what we would like to do
> > here is boundary check:
> >
> > <snip>
> > if (n > va_size(area))
> > usercopy_abort("vmalloc", NULL, to_user, 0, n);
> > <snip>
>
> Hmm ... we should probably be more careful about wrapping.
>
> if (n > area->va_end - addr)
> usercopy_abort("vmalloc", NULL, to_user, offset, n);
>
> ... and that goes for the whole function actually. I'll split that into
> a separate change.
>
Based on that offset can be > 0, checking "offset + n" with va->va_end is OK.
<snip>
if (offset + n > area->va_end)
usercopy_abort("vmalloc", NULL, to_user, offset, n);
<snip>
--
Uladzislau Rezki
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* Re: [Bug 216073] New: [s390x] kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:101! usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc 'n o area' (offset 0, size 1)!
2022-06-12 18:43 ` Yu Zhao
@ 2022-06-12 19:52 ` Matthew Wilcox
2022-06-12 20:53 ` Yu Zhao
0 siblings, 1 reply; 15+ messages in thread
From: Matthew Wilcox @ 2022-06-12 19:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Yu Zhao
Cc: Uladzislau Rezki, Zorro Lang, Alexander Gordeev, bugzilla-daemon,
linux-s390, linux-xfs, Andrew Morton, Linux-MM, Kees Cook
On Sun, Jun 12, 2022 at 12:43:45PM -0600, Yu Zhao wrote:
> On Sun, Jun 12, 2022 at 12:05 PM Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> wrote:
> >
> > On Sun, Jun 12, 2022 at 11:59:58AM -0600, Yu Zhao wrote:
> > > Please let me know if there is something we want to test -- I can
> > > reproduce the problem reliably:
> > >
> > > ------------[ cut here ]------------
> > > kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:101!
> >
> > The line right before cut here would have been nice ;-)
>
> Right.
>
> $ grep usercopy:
> usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc (offset
> 2882303761517129920, size 11)!
> usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc (offset
> 8574853690513436864, size 11)!
> usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc (offset
> 7998392938210013376, size 11)!
That's a different problem. And, er, what? How on earth do we have
an offset that big?!
struct vm_struct *area = find_vm_area(ptr);
offset = ptr - area->addr;
if (offset + n > get_vm_area_size(area))
usercopy_abort("vmalloc", NULL, to_user, offset, n);
That first offset is 0x2800'0000'0000'30C0
You said it was easy to replicate; can you add:
printk("addr:%px ptr:%px\n", area->addr, ptr);
so that we can start to understand how we end up with such a bogus
offset?
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* Re: [Bug 216073] New: [s390x] kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:101! usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc 'n o area' (offset 0, size 1)!
2022-06-12 19:52 ` Matthew Wilcox
@ 2022-06-12 20:53 ` Yu Zhao
0 siblings, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: Yu Zhao @ 2022-06-12 20:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Matthew Wilcox
Cc: Uladzislau Rezki, Zorro Lang, Alexander Gordeev, bugzilla-daemon,
linux-s390, linux-xfs, Andrew Morton, Linux-MM, Kees Cook
On Sun, Jun 12, 2022 at 1:52 PM Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> wrote:
>
> On Sun, Jun 12, 2022 at 12:43:45PM -0600, Yu Zhao wrote:
> > On Sun, Jun 12, 2022 at 12:05 PM Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Sun, Jun 12, 2022 at 11:59:58AM -0600, Yu Zhao wrote:
> > > > Please let me know if there is something we want to test -- I can
> > > > reproduce the problem reliably:
> > > >
> > > > ------------[ cut here ]------------
> > > > kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:101!
> > >
> > > The line right before cut here would have been nice ;-)
> >
> > Right.
> >
> > $ grep usercopy:
> > usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc (offset
> > 2882303761517129920, size 11)!
> > usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc (offset
> > 8574853690513436864, size 11)!
> > usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc (offset
> > 7998392938210013376, size 11)!
>
> That's a different problem. And, er, what? How on earth do we have
> an offset that big?!
>
> struct vm_struct *area = find_vm_area(ptr);
> offset = ptr - area->addr;
> if (offset + n > get_vm_area_size(area))
> usercopy_abort("vmalloc", NULL, to_user, offset, n);
>
> That first offset is 0x2800'0000'0000'30C0
>
> You said it was easy to replicate; can you add:
>
> printk("addr:%px ptr:%px\n", area->addr, ptr);
>
> so that we can start to understand how we end up with such a bogus
> offset?
Here you go:
addr:96ffffdfebcd4000 ptr:ffffffdfebcd70c0
usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc (offset
7566047373982445760, size 11)!
And, not sure if it'd be helpful, with the vmap:
va_start:ffffffd83db0d000 va_end:ffffffd83db13000
addr:44ffffd83db0d000 ptr:ffffffd83db100c0
usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc (offset
13474770085092536512, size 11)!
which seems to explain why the fix worked.
+ if (offset + n > get_vm_area_size(area)) {
+ struct vmap_area *vmap =
find_vmap_area((unsigned long)ptr);
+
+ if (vmap)
+ printk("va_start:%px va_end:%px\n",
vmap->va_start, vmap->va_end);
+ printk("addr:%px ptr:%px\n", area->addr, ptr);
usercopy_abort("vmalloc", NULL, to_user, offset, n);
+ }
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2022-06-12 20:53 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
[not found] <bug-216073-27@https.bugzilla.kernel.org/>
2022-06-06 22:13 ` [Bug 216073] New: [s390x] kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:101! usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from vmalloc 'n o area' (offset 0, size 1)! Andrew Morton
2022-06-07 15:05 ` Alexander Gordeev
2022-06-08 2:19 ` Zorro Lang
2022-06-08 19:13 ` Alexander Gordeev
2022-06-09 2:49 ` Zorro Lang
2022-06-12 4:42 ` Zorro Lang
2022-06-12 11:58 ` Matthew Wilcox
2022-06-12 13:03 ` Uladzislau Rezki
2022-06-12 17:26 ` Matthew Wilcox
2022-06-12 17:59 ` Yu Zhao
2022-06-12 18:05 ` Matthew Wilcox
2022-06-12 18:43 ` Yu Zhao
2022-06-12 19:52 ` Matthew Wilcox
2022-06-12 20:53 ` Yu Zhao
2022-06-12 19:07 ` Uladzislau Rezki
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