All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.19 16/16] x86/speculation/mmio: Print SMT warning
Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 20:40:17 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220614183724.778516077@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220614183720.928818645@linuxfoundation.org>

From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>

commit 1dc6ff02c8bf77d71b9b5d11cbc9df77cfb28626 upstream

Similar to MDS and TAA, print a warning if SMT is enabled for the MMIO
Stale Data vulnerability.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c |   11 +++++++++++
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1215,6 +1215,7 @@ static void update_mds_branch_idle(void)
 
 #define MDS_MSG_SMT "MDS CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.html for more details.\n"
 #define TAA_MSG_SMT "TAA CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.html for more details.\n"
+#define MMIO_MSG_SMT "MMIO Stale Data CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.html for more details.\n"
 
 void arch_smt_update(void)
 {
@@ -1259,6 +1260,16 @@ void arch_smt_update(void)
 		break;
 	}
 
+	switch (mmio_mitigation) {
+	case MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW:
+	case MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED:
+		if (sched_smt_active())
+			pr_warn_once(MMIO_MSG_SMT);
+		break;
+	case MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF:
+		break;
+	}
+
 	mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
 }
 



  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-06-14 18:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-06-14 18:40 [PATCH 4.19 00/16] 4.19.248-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 4.19 01/16] x86/cpu: Add Elkhart Lake to Intel family Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 4.19 02/16] cpu/speculation: Add prototype for cpu_show_srbds() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 4.19 03/16] x86/cpu: Add Jasper Lake to Intel family Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 4.19 04/16] x86/cpu: Add Lakefield, Alder Lake and Rocket Lake models to the to Intel CPU family Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 4.19 05/16] x86/cpu: Add another Alder Lake CPU to the Intel family Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 4.19 06/16] Documentation: Add documentation for Processor MMIO Stale Data Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 4.19 07/16] x86/speculation/mmio: Enumerate Processor MMIO Stale Data bug Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 4.19 08/16] x86/speculation: Add a common function for MD_CLEAR mitigation update Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 4.19 09/16] x86/speculation/mmio: Add mitigation for Processor MMIO Stale Data Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 4.19 10/16] x86/bugs: Group MDS, TAA & Processor MMIO Stale Data mitigations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 4.19 11/16] x86/speculation/mmio: Enable CPU Fill buffer clearing on idle Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 4.19 12/16] x86/speculation/mmio: Add sysfs reporting for Processor MMIO Stale Data Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 4.19 13/16] x86/speculation/srbds: Update SRBDS mitigation selection Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 4.19 14/16] x86/speculation/mmio: Reuse SRBDS mitigation for SBDS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 4.19 15/16] KVM: x86/speculation: Disable Fill buffer clear within guests Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2022-06-15  2:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 00/16] 4.19.248-rc1 review Shuah Khan
2022-06-15  9:26 ` Sudip Mukherjee
2022-06-15 18:05 ` Naresh Kamboju
2022-06-15 22:02 ` Guenter Roeck
2022-06-16  1:58 ` Samuel Zou
2022-06-16  8:29 ` Jon Hunter
2022-06-16 11:07 ` Pavel Machek

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20220614183724.778516077@linuxfoundation.org \
    --to=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=cascardo@canonical.com \
    --cc=jpoimboe@kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.