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From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
To: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Linux Doc Mailing List <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5.18 01/11] Documentation: Add documentation for Processor MMIO Stale Data
Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 20:25:07 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220615032507.go6t24dyzotpe3xv@guptapa-desk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <94468546-5571-b61f-0d98-8501626e30e3@gmail.com>

On Wed, Jun 15, 2022 at 08:06:37AM +0700, Bagas Sanjaya wrote:
>On 6/15/22 01:40, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
>> +  .. list-table::
>> +
>> +     * - 'Not affected'
>> +       - The processor is not vulnerable
>> +     * - 'Vulnerable'
>> +       - The processor is vulnerable, but no mitigation enabled
>> +     * - 'Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode'
>> +       - The processor is vulnerable, but microcode is not updated. The
>> +         mitigation is enabled on a best effort basis.
>> +     * - 'Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers'
>> +       - The processor is vulnerable and the CPU buffer clearing mitigation is
>> +         enabled.
>> +
>> +If the processor is vulnerable then the following information is appended to
>> +the above information:
>> +
>> +  ========================  ===========================================
>> +  'SMT vulnerable'          SMT is enabled
>> +  'SMT disabled'            SMT is disabled
>> +  'SMT Host state unknown'  Kernel runs in a VM, Host SMT state unknown
>> +  ========================  ===========================================
>> +
>
>Why is list-table used in sysfs table instead of usual ASCII table in SMT
>vulnerabilities list above? I think using ASCII table in both cases is enough
>for the purpose.

Maybe you are right (and I am no expert in this), but quite a few
documents use list-table for sysfs status:

   https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst
   https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
   https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst

  reply	other threads:[~2022-06-15  3:25 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-06-14 18:40 [PATCH 5.18 00/11] 5.18.5-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 5.18 01/11] Documentation: Add documentation for Processor MMIO Stale Data Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-15  1:06   ` Bagas Sanjaya
2022-06-15  3:25     ` Pawan Gupta [this message]
2022-06-15 14:28       ` Jonathan Corbet
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 5.18 02/11] x86/speculation/mmio: Enumerate Processor MMIO Stale Data bug Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 5.18 03/11] x86/speculation: Add a common function for MD_CLEAR mitigation update Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 5.18 04/11] x86/speculation/mmio: Add mitigation for Processor MMIO Stale Data Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 5.18 05/11] x86/bugs: Group MDS, TAA & Processor MMIO Stale Data mitigations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 5.18 06/11] x86/speculation/mmio: Enable CPU Fill buffer clearing on idle Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 5.18 07/11] x86/speculation/mmio: Add sysfs reporting for Processor MMIO Stale Data Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 5.18 08/11] x86/speculation/srbds: Update SRBDS mitigation selection Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 5.18 09/11] x86/speculation/mmio: Reuse SRBDS mitigation for SBDS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 5.18 10/11] KVM: x86/speculation: Disable Fill buffer clear within guests Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 5.18 11/11] x86/speculation/mmio: Print SMT warning Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 22:23 ` [PATCH 5.18 00/11] 5.18.5-rc1 review Florian Fainelli
2022-06-15  2:22 ` Fox Chen
2022-06-15  2:47 ` Shuah Khan
2022-06-15  5:54 ` Ron Economos
2022-06-15  6:59 ` Bagas Sanjaya
2022-06-15 14:06 ` Rudi Heitbaum
2022-06-15 18:12 ` Naresh Kamboju
2022-06-15 22:04 ` Guenter Roeck
2022-06-16 10:06 ` Jon Hunter
2022-06-16 12:54 ` Justin Forbes

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