[PATCH v4] fuse: Add module param for CAP_SYS_ADMIN access bypassing allow_other

[Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com>]

Since commit 73f03c2b4b52 ("fuse: Restrict allow_other to the
superblock's namespace or a descendant"), access to allow_other FUSE
filesystems has been limited to users in the mounting user namespace or
descendants. This prevents a process that is privileged in its userns -
but not its parent namespaces - from mounting a FUSE fs w/ allow_other
that is accessible to processes in parent namespaces.

While this restriction makes sense overall it breaks a legitimate
usecase: I have a tracing daemon which needs to peek into
process' open files in order to symbolicate - similar to 'perf'. The
daemon is a privileged process in the root userns, but is unable to peek
into FUSE filesystems mounted by processes in child namespaces.

This patch adds a module param, allow_sys_admin_access, to act as an
escape hatch for this descendant userns logic and for the allow_other
mount option in general. Setting allow_sys_admin_access allows
processes with CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the initial userns to access FUSE
filesystems irrespective of the mounting userns or whether allow_other
was set. A sysadmin setting this param must trust FUSEs on the host to
not DoS processes as described in 73f03c2b4b52.

Signed-off-by: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com>
---

v3 -> v4: lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20220617004710.621301-1-davemarchevsky@fb.com
  * Add discussion of new module option and allow_other userns
    interaction in docs (Christian)

v2 -> v3: lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20220601184407.2086986-1-davemarchevsky@fb.com
  * Module param now allows initial userns CAP_SYS_ADMIN to bypass allow_other
    check entirely

v1 -> v2: lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20211111221142.4096653-1-davemarchevsky@fb.com
  * Use module param instead of capability check

 Documentation/filesystems/fuse.rst | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 fs/fuse/dir.c                      | 10 ++++++++++
 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/fuse.rst b/Documentation/filesystems/fuse.rst
index 8120c3c0cb4e..1e31e87aee68 100644
--- a/Documentation/filesystems/fuse.rst
+++ b/Documentation/filesystems/fuse.rst
@@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ How are requirements fulfilled?
 	the filesystem or not.
 
 	Note that the *ptrace* check is not strictly necessary to
-	prevent B/2/i, it is enough to check if mount owner has enough
+	prevent C/2/i, it is enough to check if mount owner has enough
 	privilege to send signal to the process accessing the
 	filesystem, since *SIGSTOP* can be used to get a similar effect.
 
@@ -288,10 +288,29 @@ I think these limitations are unacceptable?
 
 If a sysadmin trusts the users enough, or can ensure through other
 measures, that system processes will never enter non-privileged
-mounts, it can relax the last limitation with a 'user_allow_other'
-config option.  If this config option is set, the mounting user can
-add the 'allow_other' mount option which disables the check for other
-users' processes.
+mounts, it can relax the last limitation in several ways:
+
+  - With the 'user_allow_other' config option. If this config option is
+    set, the mounting user can add the 'allow_other' mount option which
+    disables the check for other users' processes.
+
+    User namespaces have an unintuitive interaction with 'allow_other':
+    an unprivileged user - normally restricted from mounting with
+    'allow_other' - could do so in a user namespace where they're
+    privileged. If any process could access such an 'allow_other' mount
+    this would give the mounting user the ability to manipulate
+    processes in user namespaces where they're unprivileged. For this
+    reason 'allow_other' restricts access to users in the same userns
+    or a descendant.
+
+  - With the 'allow_sys_admin_access' module option. If this option is
+    set, super user's processes have unrestricted access to mounts
+    irrespective of allow_other setting or user namespace of the
+    mounting user.
+
+Note that both of these relaxations expose the system to potential
+information leak or *DoS* as described in points B and C/2/i-ii in the
+preceding section.
 
 Kernel - userspace interface
 ============================
diff --git a/fs/fuse/dir.c b/fs/fuse/dir.c
index 9dfee44e97ad..d325d2387615 100644
--- a/fs/fuse/dir.c
+++ b/fs/fuse/dir.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
 #include <linux/file.h>
 #include <linux/fs_context.h>
+#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/namei.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
@@ -21,6 +22,12 @@
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 
+static bool __read_mostly allow_sys_admin_access;
+module_param(allow_sys_admin_access, bool, 0644);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(allow_sys_admin_access,
+ "Allow users with CAP_SYS_ADMIN in initial userns "
+ "to bypass allow_other access check");
+
 static void fuse_advise_use_readdirplus(struct inode *dir)
 {
 	struct fuse_inode *fi = get_fuse_inode(dir);
@@ -1229,6 +1236,9 @@ int fuse_allow_current_process(struct fuse_conn *fc)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred;
 
+	if (allow_sys_admin_access && capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+		return 1;
+
 	if (fc->allow_other)
 		return current_in_userns(fc->user_ns);
 
-- 
2.30.2