From: "Lee Chee Yang" <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
To: openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org
Subject: [PATCH][dunfell 2/2] qemu: fix and ignore several CVEs
Date: Wed, 14 Sep 2022 14:04:11 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220914060411.20436-2-chee.yang.lee@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220914060411.20436-1-chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
From: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
backport fixes:
CVE-2020-13754, backport patches as debian security tracker notes
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2020-13754
CVE-2021-3713
CVE-2021-3748
CVE-2021-3930
CVE-2021-4206
CVE-2021-4207
CVE-2022-0216, does not include qtest in patches, the qtest code were not available in v4.2.
Ignore:
CVE-2020-27661, issue introduced in v5.1.0-rc0
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2020-27661
Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
---
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc | 14 ++
.../qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13754-1.patch | 91 +++++++++++++
.../qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13754-2.patch | 69 ++++++++++
.../qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13754-3.patch | 65 +++++++++
.../qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13754-4.patch | 39 ++++++
.../qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3713.patch | 67 ++++++++++
.../qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3748.patch | 124 ++++++++++++++++++
.../qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3930.patch | 53 ++++++++
.../qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-4206.patch | 89 +++++++++++++
.../qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-4207.patch | 43 ++++++
.../qemu/qemu/CVE-2022-0216-1.patch | 42 ++++++
.../qemu/qemu/CVE-2022-0216-2.patch | 52 ++++++++
12 files changed, 748 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13754-1.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13754-2.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13754-3.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13754-4.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3713.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3748.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3930.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-4206.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-4207.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2022-0216-1.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2022-0216-2.patch
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc
index a773068499..c1db723e90 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc
@@ -100,6 +100,17 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.qemu.org/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \
file://CVE-2020-13791.patch \
file://CVE-2022-35414.patch \
file://CVE-2020-27821.patch \
+ file://CVE-2020-13754-1.patch \
+ file://CVE-2020-13754-2.patch \
+ file://CVE-2020-13754-3.patch \
+ file://CVE-2020-13754-4.patch \
+ file://CVE-2021-3713.patch \
+ file://CVE-2021-3748.patch \
+ file://CVE-2021-3930.patch \
+ file://CVE-2021-4206.patch \
+ file://CVE-2021-4207.patch \
+ file://CVE-2022-0216-1.patch \
+ file://CVE-2022-0216-2.patch \
"
UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "qemu-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)\.tar"
@@ -117,6 +128,9 @@ CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2007-0998"
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1609015#c11
CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2018-18438"
+# the issue introduced in v5.1.0-rc0
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2020-27661"
+
COMPATIBLE_HOST_mipsarchn32 = "null"
COMPATIBLE_HOST_mipsarchn64 = "null"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13754-1.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13754-1.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fdfff9d81d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13754-1.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+From 5d971f9e672507210e77d020d89e0e89165c8fc9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2020 09:47:49 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] memory: Revert "memory: accept mismatching sizes in
+ memory_region_access_valid"
+
+Memory API documentation documents valid .min_access_size and .max_access_size
+fields and explains that any access outside these boundaries is blocked.
+
+This is what devices seem to assume.
+
+However this is not what the implementation does: it simply
+ignores the boundaries unless there's an "accepts" callback.
+
+Naturally, this breaks a bunch of devices.
+
+Revert to the documented behaviour.
+
+Devices that want to allow any access can just drop the valid field,
+or add the impl field to have accesses converted to appropriate
+length.
+
+Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
+Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
+Fixes: CVE-2020-13754
+Fixes: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1842363
+Fixes: a014ed07bd5a ("memory: accept mismatching sizes in memory_region_access_valid")
+Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
+Message-Id: <20200610134731.1514409-1-mst@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+
+https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=patch;h=5d971f9e672507210e77d020d89e0e89165c8fc9
+CVE: CVE-2020-13754
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
+---
+ memory.c | 29 +++++++++--------------------
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/memory.c b/memory.c
+index 2f15a4b..9200b20 100644
+--- a/memory.c
++++ b/memory.c
+@@ -1352,35 +1352,24 @@ bool memory_region_access_valid(MemoryRegion *mr,
+ bool is_write,
+ MemTxAttrs attrs)
+ {
+- int access_size_min, access_size_max;
+- int access_size, i;
+-
+- if (!mr->ops->valid.unaligned && (addr & (size - 1))) {
++ if (mr->ops->valid.accepts
++ && !mr->ops->valid.accepts(mr->opaque, addr, size, is_write, attrs)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+- if (!mr->ops->valid.accepts) {
+- return true;
+- }
+-
+- access_size_min = mr->ops->valid.min_access_size;
+- if (!mr->ops->valid.min_access_size) {
+- access_size_min = 1;
++ if (!mr->ops->valid.unaligned && (addr & (size - 1))) {
++ return false;
+ }
+
+- access_size_max = mr->ops->valid.max_access_size;
++ /* Treat zero as compatibility all valid */
+ if (!mr->ops->valid.max_access_size) {
+- access_size_max = 4;
++ return true;
+ }
+
+- access_size = MAX(MIN(size, access_size_max), access_size_min);
+- for (i = 0; i < size; i += access_size) {
+- if (!mr->ops->valid.accepts(mr->opaque, addr + i, access_size,
+- is_write, attrs)) {
+- return false;
+- }
++ if (size > mr->ops->valid.max_access_size
++ || size < mr->ops->valid.min_access_size) {
++ return false;
+ }
+-
+ return true;
+ }
+
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13754-2.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13754-2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7354edc54d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13754-2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+From dba04c3488c4699f5afe96f66e448b1d447cf3fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
+Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2020 19:06:27 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] acpi: accept byte and word access to core ACPI registers
+
+All ISA registers should be accessible as bytes, words or dwords
+(if wide enough). Fix the access constraints for acpi-pm-evt,
+acpi-pm-tmr & acpi-cnt registers.
+
+Fixes: 5d971f9e67 (memory: Revert "memory: accept mismatching sizes in memory_region_access_valid")
+Fixes: afafe4bbe0 (apci: switch cnt to memory api)
+Fixes: 77d58b1e47 (apci: switch timer to memory api)
+Fixes: b5a7c024d2 (apci: switch evt to memory api)
+Buglink: https://lore.kernel.org/xen-devel/20200630170913.123646-1-anthony.perard@citrix.com/T/
+Buglink: https://bugs.debian.org/964793
+BugLink: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=964247
+BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1886318
+Reported-By: Simon John <git@the-jedi.co.uk>
+Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
+Message-Id: <20200720160627.15491-1-mjt@msgid.tls.msk.ru>
+Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
+Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
+
+https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=patch;h=dba04c3488c4699f5afe96f66e448b1d447cf3fb
+CVE: CVE-2020-13754
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
+---
+ hw/acpi/core.c | 9 ++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/acpi/core.c b/hw/acpi/core.c
+index f6d9ec4..ac06db3 100644
+--- a/hw/acpi/core.c
++++ b/hw/acpi/core.c
+@@ -458,7 +458,8 @@ static void acpi_pm_evt_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr, uint64_t val,
+ static const MemoryRegionOps acpi_pm_evt_ops = {
+ .read = acpi_pm_evt_read,
+ .write = acpi_pm_evt_write,
+- .valid.min_access_size = 2,
++ .impl.min_access_size = 2,
++ .valid.min_access_size = 1,
+ .valid.max_access_size = 2,
+ .endianness = DEVICE_LITTLE_ENDIAN,
+ };
+@@ -527,7 +528,8 @@ static void acpi_pm_tmr_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr, uint64_t val,
+ static const MemoryRegionOps acpi_pm_tmr_ops = {
+ .read = acpi_pm_tmr_read,
+ .write = acpi_pm_tmr_write,
+- .valid.min_access_size = 4,
++ .impl.min_access_size = 4,
++ .valid.min_access_size = 1,
+ .valid.max_access_size = 4,
+ .endianness = DEVICE_LITTLE_ENDIAN,
+ };
+@@ -599,7 +601,8 @@ static void acpi_pm_cnt_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr, uint64_t val,
+ static const MemoryRegionOps acpi_pm_cnt_ops = {
+ .read = acpi_pm_cnt_read,
+ .write = acpi_pm_cnt_write,
+- .valid.min_access_size = 2,
++ .impl.min_access_size = 2,
++ .valid.min_access_size = 1,
+ .valid.max_access_size = 2,
+ .endianness = DEVICE_LITTLE_ENDIAN,
+ };
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13754-3.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13754-3.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2a8781050f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13754-3.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+From 8e67fda2dd6202ccec093fda561107ba14830a17 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Laurent Vivier <lvivier@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2020 10:33:22 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] xhci: fix valid.max_access_size to access address registers
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+QEMU XHCI advertises AC64 (64-bit addressing) but doesn't allow
+64-bit mode access in "runtime" and "operational" MemoryRegionOps.
+
+Set the max_access_size based on sizeof(dma_addr_t) as AC64 is set.
+
+XHCI specs:
+"If the xHC supports 64-bit addressing (AC64 = â1â), then software
+should write 64-bit registers using only Qword accesses. If a
+system is incapable of issuing Qword accesses, then writes to the
+64-bit address fields shall be performed using 2 Dword accesses;
+low Dword-first, high-Dword second. If the xHC supports 32-bit
+addressing (AC64 = â0â), then the high Dword of registers containing
+64-bit address fields are unused and software should write addresses
+using only Dword accesses"
+
+The problem has been detected with SLOF, as linux kernel always accesses
+registers using 32-bit access even if AC64 is set and revealed by
+5d971f9e6725 ("memory: Revert "memory: accept mismatching sizes in memory_region_access_valid"")
+
+Suggested-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@au1.ibm.com>
+Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <lvivier@redhat.com>
+Message-id: 20200721083322.90651-1-lvivier@redhat.com
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+
+https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=patch;h=8e67fda2dd6202ccec093fda561107ba14830a17
+CVE: CVE-2020-13754
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
+---
+ hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c b/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c
+index b330e36..67a18fe 100644
+--- a/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c
++++ b/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c
+@@ -3184,7 +3184,7 @@ static const MemoryRegionOps xhci_oper_ops = {
+ .read = xhci_oper_read,
+ .write = xhci_oper_write,
+ .valid.min_access_size = 4,
+- .valid.max_access_size = 4,
++ .valid.max_access_size = sizeof(dma_addr_t),
+ .endianness = DEVICE_LITTLE_ENDIAN,
+ };
+
+@@ -3200,7 +3200,7 @@ static const MemoryRegionOps xhci_runtime_ops = {
+ .read = xhci_runtime_read,
+ .write = xhci_runtime_write,
+ .valid.min_access_size = 4,
+- .valid.max_access_size = 4,
++ .valid.max_access_size = sizeof(dma_addr_t),
+ .endianness = DEVICE_LITTLE_ENDIAN,
+ };
+
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13754-4.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13754-4.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6bad07d03f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13754-4.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+From 70b78d4e71494c90d2ccb40381336bc9b9a22f79 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
+Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2020 13:12:11 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] hw/riscv: Allow 64 bit access to SiFive CLINT
+
+Commit 5d971f9e672507210e77d020d89e0e89165c8fc9
+"memory: Revert "memory: accept mismatching sizes in
+memory_region_access_valid"" broke most RISC-V boards as they do 64 bit
+accesses to the CLINT and QEMU would trigger a fault. Fix this failure
+by allowing 8 byte accesses.
+
+Signed-off-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
+Reviewed-by: LIU Zhiwei<zhiwei_liu@c-sky.com>
+Message-Id: <122b78825b077e4dfd39b444d3a46fe894a7804c.1593547870.git.alistair.francis@wdc.com>
+
+https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=patch;h=70b78d4e71494c90d2ccb40381336bc9b9a22f79
+CVE: CVE-2020-13754
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
+---
+ hw/riscv/sifive_clint.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/riscv/sifive_clint.c b/hw/riscv/sifive_clint.c
+index b11ffa0..669c21a 100644
+--- a/hw/riscv/sifive_clint.c
++++ b/hw/riscv/sifive_clint.c
+@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ static const MemoryRegionOps sifive_clint_ops = {
+ .endianness = DEVICE_LITTLE_ENDIAN,
+ .valid = {
+ .min_access_size = 4,
+- .max_access_size = 4
++ .max_access_size = 8
+ }
+ };
+
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3713.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3713.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cdd9c38db9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3713.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+From a114d6baedf2cccb454a46d36e399fec1bc3e1c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 18 Aug 2021 14:05:05 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] uas: add stream number sanity checks.
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+The device uses the guest-supplied stream number unchecked, which can
+lead to guest-triggered out-of-band access to the UASDevice->data3 and
+UASDevice->status3 fields. Add the missing checks.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2021-3713
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Reported-by: Chen Zhe <chenzhe@huawei.com>
+Reported-by: Tan Jingguo <tanjingguo@huawei.com>
+Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
+Message-Id: <20210818120505.1258262-2-kraxel@redhat.com>
+
+https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/13b250b12ad3c59114a6a17d59caf073ce45b33a
+CVE: CVE-2021-3713
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
+---
+ hw/usb/dev-uas.c | 11 +++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/usb/dev-uas.c b/hw/usb/dev-uas.c
+index 6d6d1073..0b8cd4dd 100644
+--- a/hw/usb/dev-uas.c
++++ b/hw/usb/dev-uas.c
+@@ -830,6 +830,9 @@ static void usb_uas_handle_data(USBDevice *dev, USBPacket *p)
+ }
+ break;
+ case UAS_PIPE_ID_STATUS:
++ if (p->stream > UAS_MAX_STREAMS) {
++ goto err_stream;
++ }
+ if (p->stream) {
+ QTAILQ_FOREACH(st, &uas->results, next) {
+ if (st->stream == p->stream) {
+@@ -857,6 +860,9 @@ static void usb_uas_handle_data(USBDevice *dev, USBPacket *p)
+ break;
+ case UAS_PIPE_ID_DATA_IN:
+ case UAS_PIPE_ID_DATA_OUT:
++ if (p->stream > UAS_MAX_STREAMS) {
++ goto err_stream;
++ }
+ if (p->stream) {
+ req = usb_uas_find_request(uas, p->stream);
+ } else {
+@@ -892,6 +898,11 @@ static void usb_uas_handle_data(USBDevice *dev, USBPacket *p)
+ p->status = USB_RET_STALL;
+ break;
+ }
++
++err_stream:
++ error_report("%s: invalid stream %d", __func__, p->stream);
++ p->status = USB_RET_STALL;
++ return;
+ }
+
+ static void usb_uas_unrealize(USBDevice *dev, Error **errp)
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3748.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3748.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b291ade4e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3748.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+From bedd7e93d01961fcb16a97ae45d93acf357e11f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 2 Sep 2021 13:44:12 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] virtio-net: fix use after unmap/free for sg
+
+When mergeable buffer is enabled, we try to set the num_buffers after
+the virtqueue elem has been unmapped. This will lead several issues,
+E.g a use after free when the descriptor has an address which belongs
+to the non direct access region. In this case we use bounce buffer
+that is allocated during address_space_map() and freed during
+address_space_unmap().
+
+Fixing this by storing the elems temporarily in an array and delay the
+unmap after we set the the num_buffers.
+
+This addresses CVE-2021-3748.
+
+Reported-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
+Fixes: fbe78f4f55c6 ("virtio-net support")
+Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
+Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
+
+https://github.com/qemu/qemu/commit/bedd7e93d01961fcb16a97ae45d93acf357e11f6
+CVE: CVE-2021-3748
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
+---
+ hw/net/virtio-net.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/net/virtio-net.c b/hw/net/virtio-net.c
+index 16d20cdee52a..f205331dcf8c 100644
+--- a/hw/net/virtio-net.c
++++ b/hw/net/virtio-net.c
+@@ -1746,10 +1746,13 @@ static ssize_t virtio_net_receive_rcu(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf,
+ VirtIONet *n = qemu_get_nic_opaque(nc);
+ VirtIONetQueue *q = virtio_net_get_subqueue(nc);
+ VirtIODevice *vdev = VIRTIO_DEVICE(n);
++ VirtQueueElement *elems[VIRTQUEUE_MAX_SIZE];
++ size_t lens[VIRTQUEUE_MAX_SIZE];
+ struct iovec mhdr_sg[VIRTQUEUE_MAX_SIZE];
+ struct virtio_net_hdr_mrg_rxbuf mhdr;
+ unsigned mhdr_cnt = 0;
+- size_t offset, i, guest_offset;
++ size_t offset, i, guest_offset, j;
++ ssize_t err;
+
+ if (!virtio_net_can_receive(nc)) {
+ return -1;
+@@ -1780,6 +1783,12 @@ static ssize_t virtio_net_receive_rcu(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf,
+
+ total = 0;
+
++ if (i == VIRTQUEUE_MAX_SIZE) {
++ virtio_error(vdev, "virtio-net unexpected long buffer chain");
++ err = size;
++ goto err;
++ }
++
+ elem = virtqueue_pop(q->rx_vq, sizeof(VirtQueueElement));
+ if (!elem) {
+ if (i) {
+@@ -1791,7 +1800,8 @@ static ssize_t virtio_net_receive_rcu(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf,
+ n->guest_hdr_len, n->host_hdr_len,
+ vdev->guest_features);
+ }
+- return -1;
++ err = -1;
++ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (elem->in_num < 1) {
+@@ -1799,7 +1809,8 @@ static ssize_t virtio_net_receive_rcu(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf,
+ "virtio-net receive queue contains no in buffers");
+ virtqueue_detach_element(q->rx_vq, elem, 0);
+ g_free(elem);
+- return -1;
++ err = -1;
++ goto err;
+ }
+
+ sg = elem->in_sg;
+@@ -1836,12 +1847,13 @@ static ssize_t virtio_net_receive_rcu(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf,
+ if (!n->mergeable_rx_bufs && offset < size) {
+ virtqueue_unpop(q->rx_vq, elem, total);
+ g_free(elem);
+- return size;
++ err = size;
++ goto err;
+ }
+
+- /* signal other side */
+- virtqueue_fill(q->rx_vq, elem, total, i++);
+- g_free(elem);
++ elems[i] = elem;
++ lens[i] = total;
++ i++;
+ }
+
+ if (mhdr_cnt) {
+@@ -1851,10 +1863,23 @@ static ssize_t virtio_net_receive_rcu(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf,
+ &mhdr.num_buffers, sizeof mhdr.num_buffers);
+ }
+
++ for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
++ /* signal other side */
++ virtqueue_fill(q->rx_vq, elems[j], lens[j], j);
++ g_free(elems[j]);
++ }
++
+ virtqueue_flush(q->rx_vq, i);
+ virtio_notify(vdev, q->rx_vq);
+
+ return size;
++
++err:
++ for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
++ g_free(elems[j]);
++ }
++
++ return err;
+ }
+
+ static ssize_t virtio_net_do_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf,
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3930.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3930.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b1b5558647
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-3930.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+From b3af7fdf9cc537f8f0dd3e2423d83f5c99a457e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mauro Matteo Cascella <mcascell@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 4 Nov 2021 17:31:38 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] hw/scsi/scsi-disk: MODE_PAGE_ALLS not allowed in MODE SELECT
+ commands
+
+This avoids an off-by-one read of 'mode_sense_valid' buffer in
+hw/scsi/scsi-disk.c:mode_sense_page().
+
+Fixes: CVE-2021-3930
+Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
+Reported-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
+Fixes: a8f4bbe2900 ("scsi-disk: store valid mode pages in a table")
+Fixes: #546
+Reported-by: Qiuhao Li <Qiuhao.Li@outlook.com>
+Signed-off-by: Mauro Matteo Cascella <mcascell@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+
+https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/b3af7fdf9cc537f8f0dd3e2423d83f5c99a457e8
+CVE: CVE-2021-3930
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
+---
+ hw/scsi/scsi-disk.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/scsi/scsi-disk.c b/hw/scsi/scsi-disk.c
+index e8a547dbb7..d4914178ea 100644
+--- a/hw/scsi/scsi-disk.c
++++ b/hw/scsi/scsi-disk.c
+@@ -1087,6 +1087,7 @@ static int mode_sense_page(SCSIDiskState *s, int page, uint8_t **p_outbuf,
+ uint8_t *p = *p_outbuf + 2;
+ int length;
+
++ assert(page < ARRAY_SIZE(mode_sense_valid));
+ if ((mode_sense_valid[page] & (1 << s->qdev.type)) == 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+@@ -1428,6 +1429,11 @@ static int scsi_disk_check_mode_select(SCSIDiskState *s, int page,
+ return -1;
+ }
+
++ /* MODE_PAGE_ALLS is only valid for MODE SENSE commands */
++ if (page == MODE_PAGE_ALLS) {
++ return -1;
++ }
++
+ p = mode_current;
+ memset(mode_current, 0, inlen + 2);
+ len = mode_sense_page(s, page, &p, 0);
+--
+GitLab
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-4206.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-4206.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..80ad49e4ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-4206.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+From fa892e9abb728e76afcf27323ab29c57fb0fe7aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mauro Matteo Cascella <mcascell@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 7 Apr 2022 10:17:12 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] ui/cursor: fix integer overflow in cursor_alloc
+ (CVE-2021-4206)
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Prevent potential integer overflow by limiting 'width' and 'height' to
+512x512. Also change 'datasize' type to size_t. Refer to security
+advisory https://starlabs.sg/advisories/22-4206/ for more information.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2021-4206
+Signed-off-by: Mauro Matteo Cascella <mcascell@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
+Message-Id: <20220407081712.345609-1-mcascell@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+
+https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/fa892e9a
+CVE: CVE-2021-4206
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
+---
+ hw/display/qxl-render.c | 7 +++++++
+ hw/display/vmware_vga.c | 2 ++
+ ui/cursor.c | 8 +++++++-
+ 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/qxl-render.c b/hw/display/qxl-render.c
+index 237ed293ba..ca217004bf 100644
+--- a/hw/display/qxl-render.c
++++ b/hw/display/qxl-render.c
+@@ -247,6 +247,13 @@ static QEMUCursor *qxl_cursor(PCIQXLDevice *qxl, QXLCursor *cursor,
+ size_t size;
+
+ c = cursor_alloc(cursor->header.width, cursor->header.height);
++
++ if (!c) {
++ qxl_set_guest_bug(qxl, "%s: cursor %ux%u alloc error", __func__,
++ cursor->header.width, cursor->header.height);
++ goto fail;
++ }
++
+ c->hot_x = cursor->header.hot_spot_x;
+ c->hot_y = cursor->header.hot_spot_y;
+ switch (cursor->header.type) {
+diff --git a/hw/display/vmware_vga.c b/hw/display/vmware_vga.c
+index 98c83474ad..45d06cbe25 100644
+--- a/hw/display/vmware_vga.c
++++ b/hw/display/vmware_vga.c
+@@ -515,6 +515,8 @@ static inline void vmsvga_cursor_define(struct vmsvga_state_s *s,
+ int i, pixels;
+
+ qc = cursor_alloc(c->width, c->height);
++ assert(qc != NULL);
++
+ qc->hot_x = c->hot_x;
+ qc->hot_y = c->hot_y;
+ switch (c->bpp) {
+diff --git a/ui/cursor.c b/ui/cursor.c
+index 1d62ddd4d0..835f0802f9 100644
+--- a/ui/cursor.c
++++ b/ui/cursor.c
+@@ -46,6 +46,8 @@ static QEMUCursor *cursor_parse_xpm(const char *xpm[])
+
+ /* parse pixel data */
+ c = cursor_alloc(width, height);
++ assert(c != NULL);
++
+ for (pixel = 0, y = 0; y < height; y++, line++) {
+ for (x = 0; x < height; x++, pixel++) {
+ idx = xpm[line][x];
+@@ -91,7 +93,11 @@ QEMUCursor *cursor_builtin_left_ptr(void)
+ QEMUCursor *cursor_alloc(int width, int height)
+ {
+ QEMUCursor *c;
+- int datasize = width * height * sizeof(uint32_t);
++ size_t datasize = width * height * sizeof(uint32_t);
++
++ if (width > 512 || height > 512) {
++ return NULL;
++ }
+
+ c = g_malloc0(sizeof(QEMUCursor) + datasize);
+ c->width = width;
+--
+GitLab
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-4207.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-4207.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8418246247
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2021-4207.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+From 9569f5cb5b4bffa9d3ebc8ba7da1e03830a9a895 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mauro Matteo Cascella <mcascell@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 7 Apr 2022 10:11:06 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] display/qxl-render: fix race condition in qxl_cursor
+ (CVE-2021-4207)
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Avoid fetching 'width' and 'height' a second time to prevent possible
+race condition. Refer to security advisory
+https://starlabs.sg/advisories/22-4207/ for more information.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2021-4207
+Signed-off-by: Mauro Matteo Cascella <mcascell@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
+Message-Id: <20220407081106.343235-1-mcascell@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+
+https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/9569f5cb
+CVE: CVE-2021-4207
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
+---
+ hw/display/qxl-render.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/display/qxl-render.c b/hw/display/qxl-render.c
+index d28849b121..237ed293ba 100644
+--- a/hw/display/qxl-render.c
++++ b/hw/display/qxl-render.c
+@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ static QEMUCursor *qxl_cursor(PCIQXLDevice *qxl, QXLCursor *cursor,
+ }
+ break;
+ case SPICE_CURSOR_TYPE_ALPHA:
+- size = sizeof(uint32_t) * cursor->header.width * cursor->header.height;
++ size = sizeof(uint32_t) * c->width * c->height;
+ qxl_unpack_chunks(c->data, size, qxl, &cursor->chunk, group_id);
+ if (qxl->debug > 2) {
+ cursor_print_ascii_art(c, "qxl/alpha");
+--
+GitLab
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2022-0216-1.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2022-0216-1.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6a7ce0e26c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2022-0216-1.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+From 6c8fa961da5e60f574bb52fd3ad44b1e9e8ad4b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mauro Matteo Cascella <mcascell@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 22:05:43 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] scsi/lsi53c895a: fix use-after-free in lsi_do_msgout
+ (CVE-2022-0216)
+
+Set current_req->req to NULL to prevent reusing a free'd buffer in case of
+repeated SCSI cancel requests. Thanks to Thomas Huth for suggesting the patch.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2022-0216
+Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/972
+Signed-off-by: Mauro Matteo Cascella <mcascell@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
+Message-Id: <20220705200543.2366809-1-mcascell@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+
+https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/6c8fa961da5e60f574bb52fd3ad44b1e9e8ad4b8
+CVE: CVE-2022-0216
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
+---
+ hw/scsi/lsi53c895a.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/scsi/lsi53c895a.c b/hw/scsi/lsi53c895a.c
+index c8773f73f7..99ea42d49b 100644
+--- a/hw/scsi/lsi53c895a.c
++++ b/hw/scsi/lsi53c895a.c
+@@ -1028,8 +1028,9 @@ static void lsi_do_msgout(LSIState *s)
+ case 0x0d:
+ /* The ABORT TAG message clears the current I/O process only. */
+ trace_lsi_do_msgout_abort(current_tag);
+- if (current_req) {
++ if (current_req && current_req->req) {
+ scsi_req_cancel(current_req->req);
++ current_req->req = NULL;
+ }
+ lsi_disconnect(s);
+ break;
+--
+GitLab
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2022-0216-2.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2022-0216-2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..137906cd30
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2022-0216-2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+From 4367a20cc442c56b05611b4224de9a61908f9eac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mauro Matteo Cascella <mcascell@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2022 14:33:16 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] scsi/lsi53c895a: really fix use-after-free in lsi_do_msgout
+ (CVE-2022-0216)
+
+Set current_req to NULL, not current_req->req, to prevent reusing a free'd
+buffer in case of repeated SCSI cancel requests. Also apply the fix to
+CLEAR QUEUE and BUS DEVICE RESET messages as well, since they also cancel
+the request.
+
+Thanks to Alexander Bulekov for providing a reproducer.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2022-0216
+Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/972
+Signed-off-by: Mauro Matteo Cascella <mcascell@redhat.com>
+Tested-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
+Message-Id: <20220711123316.421279-1-mcascell@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+
+https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/4367a20cc4
+CVE: CVE-2022-0216
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
+---
+ hw/scsi/lsi53c895a.c | 3 +-
+ 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/scsi/lsi53c895a.c b/hw/scsi/lsi53c895a.c
+index 99ea42d49b..ad5f5e5f39 100644
+--- a/hw/scsi/lsi53c895a.c
++++ b/hw/scsi/lsi53c895a.c
+@@ -1030,7 +1030,7 @@ static void lsi_do_msgout(LSIState *s)
+ trace_lsi_do_msgout_abort(current_tag);
+ if (current_req && current_req->req) {
+ scsi_req_cancel(current_req->req);
+- current_req->req = NULL;
++ current_req = NULL;
+ }
+ lsi_disconnect(s);
+ break;
+@@ -1056,6 +1056,7 @@ static void lsi_do_msgout(LSIState *s)
+ /* clear the current I/O process */
+ if (s->current) {
+ scsi_req_cancel(s->current->req);
++ current_req = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* As the current implemented devices scsi_disk and scsi_generic
+--
+GitLab
+
--
2.36.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-09-14 6:04 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-09-14 6:04 [PATCH][dunfell 1/2] gst-plugins-good: fix several CVE chee.yang.lee
2022-09-14 6:04 ` Lee Chee Yang [this message]
2022-09-15 14:13 ` [OE-core] [PATCH][dunfell 2/2] qemu: fix and ignore several CVEs Steve Sakoman
2022-09-19 0:44 ` Mittal, Anuj
2022-09-21 2:41 ` Steve Sakoman
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