All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, bp@alien8.de,
	pbonzini@redhat.com, peterz@infradead.org, jpoimboe@kernel.org,
	cascardo@canonical.com, surajjs@amazon.com, ssouhlal@FreeBSD.org,
	suleiman@google.com
Subject: [PATCH 4.19 00/34] Intel RETBleed mitigations for 4.19.
Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2022 18:19:18 +0900	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20221117091952.1940850-1-suleiman@google.com> (raw)

This series backports the mitigations for RETBleed for Intel CPUs to
the 4.19 kernel.

It's based on the 5.4 [1] and 4.14 [2] backports.

Tested on Skylake Chromebook.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/stable/20221003131038.12645-1-cascardo@canonical.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20221027204801.13146-1-surajjs@amazon.com/

Alexandre Chartre (2):
  x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability
  x86/bugs: Add AMD retbleed= boot parameter

Andrew Cooper (1):
  x86/cpu/amd: Enumerate BTC_NO

Daniel Sneddon (1):
  x86/speculation: Add RSB VM Exit protections

Ingo Molnar (1):
  x86/cpufeature: Fix various quality problems in the
    <asm/cpu_device_hd.h> header

Josh Poimboeuf (8):
  x86/speculation: Fix RSB filling with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n
  x86/speculation: Fix firmware entry SPEC_CTRL handling
  x86/speculation: Fix SPEC_CTRL write on SMT state change
  x86/speculation: Use cached host SPEC_CTRL value for guest entry/exit
  x86/speculation: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_mask
  KVM: VMX: Prevent guest RSB poisoning attacks with eIBRS
  KVM: VMX: Fix IBRS handling after vmexit
  x86/speculation: Fill RSB on vmexit for IBRS

Kan Liang (1):
  x86/cpufeature: Add facility to check for min microcode revisions

Mark Gross (1):
  x86/cpu: Add a steppings field to struct x86_cpu_id

Nathan Chancellor (1):
  x86/speculation: Use DECLARE_PER_CPU for x86_spec_ctrl_current

Pawan Gupta (4):
  x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRS
  x86/bugs: Add Cannon lake to RETBleed affected CPU list
  x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behavior
  x86/bugs: Warn when "ibrs" mitigation is selected on Enhanced IBRS
    parts

Peter Zijlstra (10):
  x86/cpufeatures: Move RETPOLINE flags to word 11
  x86/bugs: Keep a per-CPU IA32_SPEC_CTRL value
  x86/entry: Remove skip_r11rcx
  x86/entry: Add kernel IBRS implementation
  x86/bugs: Optimize SPEC_CTRL MSR writes
  x86/bugs: Split spectre_v2_select_mitigation() and
    spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation()
  x86/bugs: Report Intel retbleed vulnerability
  intel_idle: Disable IBRS during long idle
  x86/speculation: Change FILL_RETURN_BUFFER to work with objtool
  x86/common: Stamp out the stepping madness

Suleiman Souhlal (2):
  Revert "x86/speculation: Add RSB VM Exit protections"
  Revert "x86/cpu: Add a steppings field to struct x86_cpu_id"

Thomas Gleixner (2):
  x86/devicetable: Move x86 specific macro out of generic code
  x86/cpu: Add consistent CPU match macros

 .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         |  13 +
 arch/x86/entry/calling.h                      |  68 +++-
 arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S                     |   2 -
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S                     |  34 +-
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S              |  11 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h          | 168 +++++++-
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h            |  18 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h           |   6 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h              |  10 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h          |  53 ++-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c                     |  21 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                    | 368 ++++++++++++++----
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c                  |  60 +--
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c                   |  44 ++-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c               |   1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/process.c                     |   2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c                            |   1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c                            |  53 ++-
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                            |   4 +-
 drivers/base/cpu.c                            |   8 +
 drivers/cpufreq/acpi-cpufreq.c                |   1 +
 drivers/cpufreq/amd_freq_sensitivity.c        |   1 +
 drivers/idle/intel_idle.c                     |  43 +-
 include/linux/cpu.h                           |   2 +
 include/linux/kvm_host.h                      |   2 +-
 include/linux/mod_devicetable.h               |   4 +-
 tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h      |   1 +
 27 files changed, 813 insertions(+), 186 deletions(-)

-- 
2.38.1.431.g37b22c650d-goog


             reply	other threads:[~2022-11-17  9:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-11-17  9:19 Suleiman Souhlal [this message]
2022-11-17  9:19 ` [PATCH 4.19 01/34] Revert "x86/speculation: Add RSB VM Exit protections" Suleiman Souhlal
2022-11-17  9:19 ` [PATCH 4.19 02/34] Revert "x86/cpu: Add a steppings field to struct x86_cpu_id" Suleiman Souhlal
2022-11-17  9:19 ` [PATCH 4.19 03/34] x86/cpufeature: Add facility to check for min microcode revisions Suleiman Souhlal
2022-11-17  9:19 ` [PATCH 4.19 04/34] x86/cpufeature: Fix various quality problems in the <asm/cpu_device_hd.h> header Suleiman Souhlal
2022-11-17  9:19 ` [PATCH 4.19 05/34] x86/devicetable: Move x86 specific macro out of generic code Suleiman Souhlal
2022-11-17  9:19 ` [PATCH 4.19 06/34] x86/cpu: Add consistent CPU match macros Suleiman Souhlal
2022-11-17  9:19 ` [PATCH 4.19 07/34] x86/cpu: Add a steppings field to struct x86_cpu_id Suleiman Souhlal
2022-11-17  9:19 ` [PATCH 4.19 08/34] x86/cpufeatures: Move RETPOLINE flags to word 11 Suleiman Souhlal
2022-11-17  9:19 ` [PATCH 4.19 09/34] x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability Suleiman Souhlal
2022-11-17  9:19 ` [PATCH 4.19 10/34] x86/bugs: Add AMD retbleed= boot parameter Suleiman Souhlal
2022-11-17  9:19 ` [PATCH 4.19 11/34] x86/bugs: Keep a per-CPU IA32_SPEC_CTRL value Suleiman Souhlal
2022-11-17  9:19 ` [PATCH 4.19 12/34] x86/entry: Remove skip_r11rcx Suleiman Souhlal
2022-11-17  9:19 ` [PATCH 4.19 13/34] x86/entry: Add kernel IBRS implementation Suleiman Souhlal
2022-11-17  9:19 ` [PATCH 4.19 14/34] x86/bugs: Optimize SPEC_CTRL MSR writes Suleiman Souhlal
2022-11-17  9:19 ` [PATCH 4.19 15/34] x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRS Suleiman Souhlal
2022-11-17  9:19 ` [PATCH 4.19 16/34] x86/bugs: Split spectre_v2_select_mitigation() and spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() Suleiman Souhlal
2022-11-17  9:19 ` [PATCH 4.19 17/34] x86/bugs: Report Intel retbleed vulnerability Suleiman Souhlal
2022-11-17  9:19 ` [PATCH 4.19 18/34] intel_idle: Disable IBRS during long idle Suleiman Souhlal
2022-11-17  9:19 ` [PATCH 4.19 19/34] x86/speculation: Change FILL_RETURN_BUFFER to work with objtool Suleiman Souhlal
2022-11-17  9:19 ` [PATCH 4.19 20/34] x86/speculation: Fix RSB filling with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n Suleiman Souhlal
2022-11-17  9:19 ` [PATCH 4.19 21/34] x86/speculation: Fix firmware entry SPEC_CTRL handling Suleiman Souhlal
2022-11-17  9:19 ` [PATCH 4.19 22/34] x86/speculation: Fix SPEC_CTRL write on SMT state change Suleiman Souhlal
2022-11-17  9:19 ` [PATCH 4.19 23/34] x86/speculation: Use cached host SPEC_CTRL value for guest entry/exit Suleiman Souhlal
2022-11-17  9:19 ` [PATCH 4.19 24/34] x86/speculation: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_mask Suleiman Souhlal
2022-11-17  9:19 ` [PATCH 4.19 25/34] KVM: VMX: Prevent guest RSB poisoning attacks with eIBRS Suleiman Souhlal
2022-11-17  9:19 ` [PATCH 4.19 26/34] KVM: VMX: Fix IBRS handling after vmexit Suleiman Souhlal
2022-11-17  9:19 ` [PATCH 4.19 27/34] x86/speculation: Fill RSB on vmexit for IBRS Suleiman Souhlal
2022-11-17  9:19 ` [PATCH 4.19 28/34] x86/common: Stamp out the stepping madness Suleiman Souhlal
2022-11-17  9:19 ` [PATCH 4.19 29/34] x86/cpu/amd: Enumerate BTC_NO Suleiman Souhlal
2022-11-17  9:19 ` [PATCH 4.19 30/34] x86/bugs: Add Cannon lake to RETBleed affected CPU list Suleiman Souhlal
2022-11-17  9:19 ` [PATCH 4.19 31/34] x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behavior Suleiman Souhlal
2022-11-17  9:19 ` [PATCH 4.19 32/34] x86/speculation: Use DECLARE_PER_CPU for x86_spec_ctrl_current Suleiman Souhlal
2022-11-17  9:19 ` [PATCH 4.19 33/34] x86/bugs: Warn when "ibrs" mitigation is selected on Enhanced IBRS parts Suleiman Souhlal
2022-11-17  9:19 ` [PATCH 4.19 34/34] x86/speculation: Add RSB VM Exit protections Suleiman Souhlal
2022-11-21 12:26 ` [PATCH 4.19 00/34] Intel RETBleed mitigations for 4.19 Greg KH

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20221117091952.1940850-1-suleiman@google.com \
    --to=suleiman@google.com \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=cascardo@canonical.com \
    --cc=jpoimboe@kernel.org \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=ssouhlal@FreeBSD.org \
    --cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=surajjs@amazon.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.