From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from bombadil.infradead.org (bombadil.infradead.org [198.137.202.133]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 42C19C43219 for ; Thu, 24 Nov 2022 11:40:23 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=lists.infradead.org; s=bombadil.20210309; h=Sender: Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-Type:List-Subscribe:List-Help:List-Post: List-Archive:List-Unsubscribe:List-Id:MIME-Version:References:In-Reply-To: Message-ID:Subject:Cc:To:From:Date:Reply-To:Content-ID:Content-Description: Resent-Date:Resent-From:Resent-Sender:Resent-To:Resent-Cc:Resent-Message-ID: List-Owner; bh=la5gfdn9Rzr2UPxCYqwJy3vOo0ri6SGV1WYoTCJ/H5k=; b=SxPnU1kU53O65d 6i3g5arBoll70DRJMzUA5hKLjU0LnXvOTnS1+orEFerzSWNTwfH4aiJGoMXmn92th7HuC4PslLxxr 4CCx+opxJvb0a+YTsoO6cK07ZabYkrsaFJDzsmRIxIu3SUiOw7hxa2lpB/sNsrUtF48yAl14+yzXP dCidHXlKm5bSrPzRCxWDFpa+nZM45cMF7/WKu56VBdi9lZqwsL50Ab4DN3QEIK0Ecimu+GuQ46QFS KmBRrtkMSAwxk0wnfY8ShLTHEiUC2UOzUp4JAOVa6nvdFbr1Yh+hfWVzecatq9eEBgp1TwIy/6D+X Q/mZflHGtdaShCLpm5QA==; Received: from localhost ([::1] helo=bombadil.infradead.org) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.94.2 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1oyAaX-0089Yq-Sq; Thu, 24 Nov 2022 11:40:17 +0000 Received: from us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com ([170.10.133.124]) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.94.2 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1oyAaU-0089Xd-Tk for kexec@lists.infradead.org; Thu, 24 Nov 2022 11:40:16 +0000 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1669290010; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=xeJPL0Q85hFYyjMF/QRY1ECHSUxO12v86yg+wbAbiJk=; b=iau5hUhsgVrMJpbTQcwATwcE0uOshgfAafvSydghI/KmrSxOMJ3EWNgEa2wL5xkQgNFvWa 7G3nTQ36OBHexA89ldzr8+ovYVnMnspJpxrOfBfOPc9lw3KB9nM/Kxfim/85GAImf/TvIs DrglBOCMbRVmrIen8k1x+iHSZ+OegMk= Received: from mimecast-mx02.redhat.com (mx3-rdu2.redhat.com [66.187.233.73]) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP with STARTTLS (version=TLSv1.2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id us-mta-632-XQ-oJRN_PeGzZkyfDOT27A-1; Thu, 24 Nov 2022 06:40:06 -0500 X-MC-Unique: XQ-oJRN_PeGzZkyfDOT27A-1 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx06.intmail.prod.int.rdu2.redhat.com [10.11.54.6]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx02.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 80DB43826A45; Thu, 24 Nov 2022 11:40:05 +0000 (UTC) Received: from rotkaeppchen (unknown [10.39.193.142]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D2CC42166B26; Thu, 24 Nov 2022 11:40:03 +0000 (UTC) Date: Thu, 24 Nov 2022 12:40:00 +0100 From: Philipp Rudo To: Ricardo Ribalda Cc: Eric Biederman , Jonathan Corbet , Sergey Senozhatsky , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org, Ross Zwisler , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, "Joel Fernandes (Google)" , Steven Rostedt Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 2/2] kexec: Introduce kexec_reboot_disabled Message-ID: <20221124124000.5af23cad@rotkaeppchen> In-Reply-To: References: <20221114-disable-kexec-reset-v1-0-fb51d20cf871@chromium.org> <20221114-disable-kexec-reset-v1-2-fb51d20cf871@chromium.org> <20221117160650.16e06b37@rotkaeppchen> <20221121150948.6f7c1f1f@rotkaeppchen> Organization: Red Hat inc. MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 3.1 on 10.11.54.6 X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20221124_034015_088272_6104DB88 X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 64.38 ) X-BeenThere: kexec@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.34 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: "kexec" Errors-To: kexec-bounces+kexec=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org Hi Ricardo, On Wed, 23 Nov 2022 09:58:08 +0100 Ricardo Ribalda wrote: > Hi Philipp > > Thanks for your review. > > My scenario is a trusted system, where even if you are root, your > access to the system is very limited. > > Let's assume LOADPIN and verity are enabled. My point is that on such systems I expect that a sysadmin also wants to control the crash kernel including its initramfs (which also has to be part of the signed kernel?). But if that's the case a sysadmin can simply arm kdump early during boot and then toggle kexec_load_disabled. With that LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_KEXEC also gets disabled as no kexec kernel can be loaded while kdump works. Thus there is no need to add the new interface. Or am I missing anything? Thanks Philipp > > On Mon, 21 Nov 2022 at 15:10, Philipp Rudo wrote: > > > > Hi Ricardo, > > > > On Thu, 17 Nov 2022 16:15:07 +0100 > > Ricardo Ribalda wrote: > > > > > Hi Philipp > > > > > > Thanks for your review! > > > > happy to help. > > > > > > > > On Thu, 17 Nov 2022 at 16:07, Philipp Rudo wrote: > > > > > > > > Hi Ricardo, > > > > > > > > all in all I think this patch makes sense. However, there is one point > > > > I don't like... > > > > > > > > On Mon, 14 Nov 2022 14:18:39 +0100 > > > > Ricardo Ribalda wrote: > > > > > > > > > Create a new toogle that disables LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_KEXEC, reducing the > > > > > attack surface to a system. > > > > > > > > > > Without this toogle, an attacker can only reboot into a different kernel > > > > > if they can create a panic(). > > > > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Ricardo Ribalda > > > > > > > > > > diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst > > > > > index 97394bd9d065..25d019682d33 100644 > > > > > --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst > > > > > +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst > > > > > @@ -462,6 +462,17 @@ altered. > > > > > Generally used together with the `modules_disabled`_ sysctl. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > +kexec_reboot_disabled > > > > > +===================== > > > > > + > > > > > +A toggle indicating if ``LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_KEXEC`` has been disabled. > > > > > +This value defaults to 0 (false: ``LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_KEXEC`` enabled), > > > > > +but can be set to 1 (true: ``LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_KEXEC`` disabled). > > > > > +Once true, kexec can no longer be used for reboot and the toggle > > > > > +cannot be set back to false. > > > > > +This toggle does not affect the use of kexec during a crash. > > > > > + > > > > > + > > > > > kptr_restrict > > > > > ============= > > > > > > > > > > diff --git a/include/linux/kexec.h b/include/linux/kexec.h > > > > > index 41a686996aaa..15c3fad8918b 100644 > > > > > --- a/include/linux/kexec.h > > > > > +++ b/include/linux/kexec.h > > > > > @@ -407,6 +407,7 @@ extern int kimage_crash_copy_vmcoreinfo(struct kimage *image); > > > > > extern struct kimage *kexec_image; > > > > > extern struct kimage *kexec_crash_image; > > > > > extern int kexec_load_disabled; > > > > > +extern int kexec_reboot_disabled; > > > > > > > > > > #ifndef kexec_flush_icache_page > > > > > #define kexec_flush_icache_page(page) > > > > > diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c > > > > > index cb8e6e6f983c..43063f803d81 100644 > > > > > --- a/kernel/kexec.c > > > > > +++ b/kernel/kexec.c > > > > > @@ -196,6 +196,10 @@ static inline int kexec_load_check(unsigned long nr_segments, > > > > > if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) || kexec_load_disabled) > > > > > return -EPERM; > > > > > > > > > > + /* Check if the system admin has disabled kexec reboot. */ > > > > > + if (!(flags & KEXEC_ON_CRASH) && kexec_reboot_disabled) > > > > > + return -EPERM; > > > > > > > > ... Allowing to load a crashkernel doesn't make sense in my opinion. If > > > > an attacker is capable of creating a malicious kernel, planting it on > > > > the victims system and then find a way to boot it via kexec this > > > > attacker also knows how to load the malicious kernel as crashkernel and > > > > trigger a panic. So you haven't really gained anything. That's why I > > > > would simply drop this hunk (and the corresponding one from > > > > kexec_file_load) and let users who worry about this use a combination of > > > > kexec_load_disabled and kexec_reboot_disabled. > > > > > > If for whatever reason your sysadmin configured kexec_reboot_disabed > > > it can be nice that when a user try to load it they get a warning. > > > It is easier to debug than waiting two steps later when they run kexec -e.... > > > > I'm having second thoughts about this patch. My main problem is that I > > don't see a real use case where kexec_reboot_disabled is advantageous > > over kexec_load_disabled. The point is that disabling > > LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_KEXEC is almost identical to toggling kexec_load_disabled without > > a loaded kernel (when you don't have a kernel loaded you cannot reboot > > into it). With this the main use case of kexec_reboot_disabled is > > already covered by kexec_load_disabled. > > > > > However, there are two differences > > > > 1) with kexec_reboot_disable you can still (re-)load a crash kernel > > e.g. to update the initramfs after a config change. But as discussed in > > my first mail this comes on the cost that an attacker could still load a > > malicious crash kernel and then 'panic into it'. > > That crash kernel must be already in the signed malicious kernel. > which reduces the chances of attack. > Plus an attacker must be able to panic the current kernel at will, > instead of just call reset. > > > > > 2) kexec_load_disabled also prevents unloading of a loaded kernel. So > > once loaded kexec_load_disabled cannot prevent the reboot into this > > kernel. > > > > > > For 1) I doubt that this is desired at all. My expectation is that on > > systems where a sysadmin restricts a user to reboot via kexec the > > sysadmin also wants to prevent the user to load an arbitrary crash > > kernel. Especially as this still keeps the loophole open you are trying > > to close. > > > > So only 2) is left as real benefit. But that is an extremely specific > > scenario. How often does this scenario happen in real life? What > > problem does kexec_reboot_disable solve different implementation > > (also in userspace) cannot? > > > > Sorry about being this pedantic but you want to introduce some new uapi > > which will be hard if not impossible to change once introduced. That's > > why I want to be a 100% sure it is really needed. > > No worries. Completely understand :). Thanks for taking this seriously.. > > > Best regards! > > > > Thanks > > Philipp > > > > > > > That is why I added it. But i am also ok removing it > > > > > > > > > > > Thanks > > > > Philipp > > > > > > > > > + > > > > > /* Permit LSMs and IMA to fail the kexec */ > > > > > result = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE, false); > > > > > if (result < 0) > > > > > diff --git a/kernel/kexec_core.c b/kernel/kexec_core.c > > > > > index ca2743f9c634..fe82e2525705 100644 > > > > > --- a/kernel/kexec_core.c > > > > > +++ b/kernel/kexec_core.c > > > > > @@ -929,6 +929,7 @@ int kimage_load_segment(struct kimage *image, > > > > > struct kimage *kexec_image; > > > > > struct kimage *kexec_crash_image; > > > > > int kexec_load_disabled; > > > > > +int kexec_reboot_disabled; > > > > > #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL > > > > > static struct ctl_table kexec_core_sysctls[] = { > > > > > { > > > > > @@ -941,6 +942,16 @@ static struct ctl_table kexec_core_sysctls[] = { > > > > > .extra1 = SYSCTL_ONE, > > > > > .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE, > > > > > }, > > > > > + { > > > > > + .procname = "kexec_reboot_disabled", > > > > > + .data = &kexec_reboot_disabled, > > > > > + .maxlen = sizeof(int), > > > > > + .mode = 0644, > > > > > + /* only handle a transition from default "0" to "1" */ > > > > > + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, > > > > > + .extra1 = SYSCTL_ONE, > > > > > + .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE, > > > > > + }, > > > > > { } > > > > > }; > > > > > > > > > > @@ -1138,7 +1149,7 @@ int kernel_kexec(void) > > > > > > > > > > if (!kexec_trylock()) > > > > > return -EBUSY; > > > > > - if (!kexec_image) { > > > > > + if (!kexec_image || kexec_reboot_disabled) { > > > > > error = -EINVAL; > > > > > goto Unlock; > > > > > } > > > > > diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c > > > > > index 45637511e0de..583fba6de5cb 100644 > > > > > --- a/kernel/kexec_file.c > > > > > +++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c > > > > > @@ -333,6 +333,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(kexec_file_load, int, kernel_fd, int, initrd_fd, > > > > > if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) || kexec_load_disabled) > > > > > return -EPERM; > > > > > > > > > > + /* Check if the system admin has disabled kexec reboot. */ > > > > > + if (!(flags & (KEXEC_FILE_ON_CRASH | KEXEC_FILE_UNLOAD)) > > > > > + && kexec_reboot_disabled) > > > > > + return -EPERM; > > > > > + > > > > > /* Make sure we have a legal set of flags */ > > > > > if (flags != (flags & KEXEC_FILE_FLAGS)) > > > > > return -EINVAL; > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ kexec mailing list kexec@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8FB24C433FE for ; Thu, 24 Nov 2022 11:41:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230202AbiKXLlJ (ORCPT ); Thu, 24 Nov 2022 06:41:09 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:44926 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S230167AbiKXLlE (ORCPT ); Thu, 24 Nov 2022 06:41:04 -0500 Received: from us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com (us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com [170.10.133.124]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 663226A68D for ; 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Thu, 24 Nov 2022 11:40:05 +0000 (UTC) Received: from rotkaeppchen (unknown [10.39.193.142]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D2CC42166B26; Thu, 24 Nov 2022 11:40:03 +0000 (UTC) Date: Thu, 24 Nov 2022 12:40:00 +0100 From: Philipp Rudo To: Ricardo Ribalda Cc: Eric Biederman , Jonathan Corbet , Sergey Senozhatsky , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org, Ross Zwisler , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, "Joel Fernandes (Google)" , Steven Rostedt Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 2/2] kexec: Introduce kexec_reboot_disabled Message-ID: <20221124124000.5af23cad@rotkaeppchen> In-Reply-To: References: <20221114-disable-kexec-reset-v1-0-fb51d20cf871@chromium.org> <20221114-disable-kexec-reset-v1-2-fb51d20cf871@chromium.org> <20221117160650.16e06b37@rotkaeppchen> <20221121150948.6f7c1f1f@rotkaeppchen> Organization: Red Hat inc. MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 3.1 on 10.11.54.6 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Hi Ricardo, On Wed, 23 Nov 2022 09:58:08 +0100 Ricardo Ribalda wrote: > Hi Philipp > > Thanks for your review. > > My scenario is a trusted system, where even if you are root, your > access to the system is very limited. > > Let's assume LOADPIN and verity are enabled. My point is that on such systems I expect that a sysadmin also wants to control the crash kernel including its initramfs (which also has to be part of the signed kernel?). But if that's the case a sysadmin can simply arm kdump early during boot and then toggle kexec_load_disabled. With that LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_KEXEC also gets disabled as no kexec kernel can be loaded while kdump works. Thus there is no need to add the new interface. Or am I missing anything? Thanks Philipp > > On Mon, 21 Nov 2022 at 15:10, Philipp Rudo wrote: > > > > Hi Ricardo, > > > > On Thu, 17 Nov 2022 16:15:07 +0100 > > Ricardo Ribalda wrote: > > > > > Hi Philipp > > > > > > Thanks for your review! > > > > happy to help. > > > > > > > > On Thu, 17 Nov 2022 at 16:07, Philipp Rudo wrote: > > > > > > > > Hi Ricardo, > > > > > > > > all in all I think this patch makes sense. However, there is one point > > > > I don't like... > > > > > > > > On Mon, 14 Nov 2022 14:18:39 +0100 > > > > Ricardo Ribalda wrote: > > > > > > > > > Create a new toogle that disables LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_KEXEC, reducing the > > > > > attack surface to a system. > > > > > > > > > > Without this toogle, an attacker can only reboot into a different kernel > > > > > if they can create a panic(). > > > > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Ricardo Ribalda > > > > > > > > > > diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst > > > > > index 97394bd9d065..25d019682d33 100644 > > > > > --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst > > > > > +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst > > > > > @@ -462,6 +462,17 @@ altered. > > > > > Generally used together with the `modules_disabled`_ sysctl. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > +kexec_reboot_disabled > > > > > +===================== > > > > > + > > > > > +A toggle indicating if ``LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_KEXEC`` has been disabled. > > > > > +This value defaults to 0 (false: ``LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_KEXEC`` enabled), > > > > > +but can be set to 1 (true: ``LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_KEXEC`` disabled). > > > > > +Once true, kexec can no longer be used for reboot and the toggle > > > > > +cannot be set back to false. > > > > > +This toggle does not affect the use of kexec during a crash. > > > > > + > > > > > + > > > > > kptr_restrict > > > > > ============= > > > > > > > > > > diff --git a/include/linux/kexec.h b/include/linux/kexec.h > > > > > index 41a686996aaa..15c3fad8918b 100644 > > > > > --- a/include/linux/kexec.h > > > > > +++ b/include/linux/kexec.h > > > > > @@ -407,6 +407,7 @@ extern int kimage_crash_copy_vmcoreinfo(struct kimage *image); > > > > > extern struct kimage *kexec_image; > > > > > extern struct kimage *kexec_crash_image; > > > > > extern int kexec_load_disabled; > > > > > +extern int kexec_reboot_disabled; > > > > > > > > > > #ifndef kexec_flush_icache_page > > > > > #define kexec_flush_icache_page(page) > > > > > diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c > > > > > index cb8e6e6f983c..43063f803d81 100644 > > > > > --- a/kernel/kexec.c > > > > > +++ b/kernel/kexec.c > > > > > @@ -196,6 +196,10 @@ static inline int kexec_load_check(unsigned long nr_segments, > > > > > if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) || kexec_load_disabled) > > > > > return -EPERM; > > > > > > > > > > + /* Check if the system admin has disabled kexec reboot. */ > > > > > + if (!(flags & KEXEC_ON_CRASH) && kexec_reboot_disabled) > > > > > + return -EPERM; > > > > > > > > ... Allowing to load a crashkernel doesn't make sense in my opinion. If > > > > an attacker is capable of creating a malicious kernel, planting it on > > > > the victims system and then find a way to boot it via kexec this > > > > attacker also knows how to load the malicious kernel as crashkernel and > > > > trigger a panic. So you haven't really gained anything. That's why I > > > > would simply drop this hunk (and the corresponding one from > > > > kexec_file_load) and let users who worry about this use a combination of > > > > kexec_load_disabled and kexec_reboot_disabled. > > > > > > If for whatever reason your sysadmin configured kexec_reboot_disabed > > > it can be nice that when a user try to load it they get a warning. > > > It is easier to debug than waiting two steps later when they run kexec -e.... > > > > I'm having second thoughts about this patch. My main problem is that I > > don't see a real use case where kexec_reboot_disabled is advantageous > > over kexec_load_disabled. The point is that disabling > > LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_KEXEC is almost identical to toggling kexec_load_disabled without > > a loaded kernel (when you don't have a kernel loaded you cannot reboot > > into it). With this the main use case of kexec_reboot_disabled is > > already covered by kexec_load_disabled. > > > > > However, there are two differences > > > > 1) with kexec_reboot_disable you can still (re-)load a crash kernel > > e.g. to update the initramfs after a config change. But as discussed in > > my first mail this comes on the cost that an attacker could still load a > > malicious crash kernel and then 'panic into it'. > > That crash kernel must be already in the signed malicious kernel. > which reduces the chances of attack. > Plus an attacker must be able to panic the current kernel at will, > instead of just call reset. > > > > > 2) kexec_load_disabled also prevents unloading of a loaded kernel. So > > once loaded kexec_load_disabled cannot prevent the reboot into this > > kernel. > > > > > > For 1) I doubt that this is desired at all. My expectation is that on > > systems where a sysadmin restricts a user to reboot via kexec the > > sysadmin also wants to prevent the user to load an arbitrary crash > > kernel. Especially as this still keeps the loophole open you are trying > > to close. > > > > So only 2) is left as real benefit. But that is an extremely specific > > scenario. How often does this scenario happen in real life? What > > problem does kexec_reboot_disable solve different implementation > > (also in userspace) cannot? > > > > Sorry about being this pedantic but you want to introduce some new uapi > > which will be hard if not impossible to change once introduced. That's > > why I want to be a 100% sure it is really needed. > > No worries. Completely understand :). Thanks for taking this seriously.. > > > Best regards! > > > > Thanks > > Philipp > > > > > > > That is why I added it. But i am also ok removing it > > > > > > > > > > > Thanks > > > > Philipp > > > > > > > > > + > > > > > /* Permit LSMs and IMA to fail the kexec */ > > > > > result = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE, false); > > > > > if (result < 0) > > > > > diff --git a/kernel/kexec_core.c b/kernel/kexec_core.c > > > > > index ca2743f9c634..fe82e2525705 100644 > > > > > --- a/kernel/kexec_core.c > > > > > +++ b/kernel/kexec_core.c > > > > > @@ -929,6 +929,7 @@ int kimage_load_segment(struct kimage *image, > > > > > struct kimage *kexec_image; > > > > > struct kimage *kexec_crash_image; > > > > > int kexec_load_disabled; > > > > > +int kexec_reboot_disabled; > > > > > #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL > > > > > static struct ctl_table kexec_core_sysctls[] = { > > > > > { > > > > > @@ -941,6 +942,16 @@ static struct ctl_table kexec_core_sysctls[] = { > > > > > .extra1 = SYSCTL_ONE, > > > > > .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE, > > > > > }, > > > > > + { > > > > > + .procname = "kexec_reboot_disabled", > > > > > + .data = &kexec_reboot_disabled, > > > > > + .maxlen = sizeof(int), > > > > > + .mode = 0644, > > > > > + /* only handle a transition from default "0" to "1" */ > > > > > + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, > > > > > + .extra1 = SYSCTL_ONE, > > > > > + .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE, > > > > > + }, > > > > > { } > > > > > }; > > > > > > > > > > @@ -1138,7 +1149,7 @@ int kernel_kexec(void) > > > > > > > > > > if (!kexec_trylock()) > > > > > return -EBUSY; > > > > > - if (!kexec_image) { > > > > > + if (!kexec_image || kexec_reboot_disabled) { > > > > > error = -EINVAL; > > > > > goto Unlock; > > > > > } > > > > > diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c > > > > > index 45637511e0de..583fba6de5cb 100644 > > > > > --- a/kernel/kexec_file.c > > > > > +++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c > > > > > @@ -333,6 +333,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(kexec_file_load, int, kernel_fd, int, initrd_fd, > > > > > if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) || kexec_load_disabled) > > > > > return -EPERM; > > > > > > > > > > + /* Check if the system admin has disabled kexec reboot. */ > > > > > + if (!(flags & (KEXEC_FILE_ON_CRASH | KEXEC_FILE_UNLOAD)) > > > > > + && kexec_reboot_disabled) > > > > > + return -EPERM; > > > > > + > > > > > /* Make sure we have a legal set of flags */ > > > > > if (flags != (flags & KEXEC_FILE_FLAGS)) > > > > > return -EINVAL; > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >