From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from list by lists.gnu.org with archive (Exim 4.90_1) id 1p8tke-0005SI-46 for mharc-grub-devel@gnu.org; Fri, 23 Dec 2022 20:55:04 -0500 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:470:142:3::10]) by lists.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1p8tkb-0005S2-J4 for grub-devel@gnu.org; Fri, 23 Dec 2022 20:55:01 -0500 Received: from mail-pl1-x62f.google.com ([2607:f8b0:4864:20::62f]) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:128) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1p8tkV-0001KY-PQ for grub-devel@gnu.org; Fri, 23 Dec 2022 20:55:00 -0500 Received: by mail-pl1-x62f.google.com with SMTP id jl4so69006plb.8 for ; Fri, 23 Dec 2022 17:54:52 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=efficientek-com.20210112.gappssmtp.com; s=20210112; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:reply-to:references :in-reply-to:message-id:subject:cc:to:from:date:from:to:cc:subject :date:message-id:reply-to; bh=/Ouc3zVttc5tKXfewXZB2frhZctkGLPp9jP0fCOZ+hg=; b=ozWWD/Knawu7QIBpAr77H9Gv5imorq9evrl5J9dEnAiPjme4ThmV3CCGcyY5kKwQsJ sT0Q/6A+hJ5n+QVmhzlU80wLKpTRWgnzEYwpFyKcvwiR8sS1LTzI7Mq1+rh6JSN2gLXy Fa15FdaL5IDbsOIyAljW/RDv8TzogLhE/uXP/PvkKKDSK3Q8gBignscgEGcp9b6JB1uO pYxVZKqOIDEleVA2SINlWwfHHRZthTxH21xgHKjJo0PInkUHl6Azp9LvZvpr1/pQJiiH ChY3ws8XIyRgOiMDIQytC1lAcG7eqFHDzCHaEuH0MWAmZOVNcac3HeIxldGeHSm0DLAv FX0A== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:reply-to:references :in-reply-to:message-id:subject:cc:to:from:date:x-gm-message-state :from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=/Ouc3zVttc5tKXfewXZB2frhZctkGLPp9jP0fCOZ+hg=; b=DEFmVH03lopswo6GENrNqTFtW8XOlGb6gqmJPvnuR4hf49WG8LSy6tCAraGVXHrleQ ZxYdStgzMvefkBZUYCzlXZemb68yR+Zom8+pImj0lZEwanKGPlXi0/FOBC4kIlOlq1t5 rVSonx9rTtHAl/a6FNOpk4DPwD2zIYUfFKWD0t2qMr5RTlVW8OM5RUi/mq1uaBbG2KVB WKkwn7ObFR054OETwAByImEfZDyC9yvsXpBYVNuWk3IKCVwBb4NSig8bpe1Q8Y2UVnvI +SI7QZBdL3jyJL33aGD3krDuka1s2xXbelINBSoFYCDzOj/p6I3aNKnLQgHpfjSONEJ2 NRYA== X-Gm-Message-State: AFqh2kpZ47VQaH7jp/2LkH96HMx1SjLrdsL+BOXq1odBz49KzJ8mOTfU DYt9ybO4pyQdLTeTWunmdaOq3Q== X-Google-Smtp-Source: AMrXdXvqYcOIBjzPIlMB7CrdsIBcbm6DkU5AmftRQWbIN/MZ22mkcPuToZTMEkYGobHWZVTvfASuCA== X-Received: by 2002:a17:902:8693:b0:191:e0b0:f8df with SMTP id g19-20020a170902869300b00191e0b0f8dfmr11152147plo.58.1671846891513; Fri, 23 Dec 2022 17:54:51 -0800 (PST) Received: from crass-HP-ZBook-15-G2 ([204.13.164.84]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id t8-20020a170902e84800b0017849a2b56asm3023346plg.46.2022.12.23.17.54.50 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Fri, 23 Dec 2022 17:54:51 -0800 (PST) Date: Fri, 23 Dec 2022 19:54:47 -0600 From: Glenn Washburn To: Maxim Fomin Cc: "grub-devel@gnu.org" , "dkiper@net-space.pl" , "ps@pks.im" Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 1/1] plainmount: Support plain encryption mode Message-ID: <20221223195447.2c340af9@crass-HP-ZBook-15-G2> In-Reply-To: <3fIZJQVSGi0Q_eyZ7CvJppLpelCcx9lgm1OeHzGjU2Va9mdeCH-J9TXdebbdgE7PN4s_qDesWKgbXHItgrnT6_HlhUvRt_wYtYEDgnmvjsY=@fomin.one> References: <20221201150046.093d61f4@crass-HP-ZBook-15-G2> <3fIZJQVSGi0Q_eyZ7CvJppLpelCcx9lgm1OeHzGjU2Va9mdeCH-J9TXdebbdgE7PN4s_qDesWKgbXHItgrnT6_HlhUvRt_wYtYEDgnmvjsY=@fomin.one> Reply-To: development@efficientek.com X-Mailer: Claws Mail 4.1.0 (GTK 3.24.34; x86_64-pc-linux-gnu) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Received-SPF: pass client-ip=2607:f8b0:4864:20::62f; envelope-from=development@efficientek.com; helo=mail-pl1-x62f.google.com X-Spam_score_int: -18 X-Spam_score: -1.9 X-Spam_bar: - X-Spam_report: (-1.9 / 5.0 requ) BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001 autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no X-Spam_action: no action X-BeenThere: grub-devel@gnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: The development of GNU GRUB List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 24 Dec 2022 01:55:02 -0000 On Fri, 02 Dec 2022 17:11:23 +0000 Maxim Fomin wrote: > ------- Original Message ------- > On Friday, December 2nd, 2022 at 0:00, Glenn Washburn > wrote: > > I'm now compiling this patch and found a few compile issues below. > > You're compile testing this right? > > First versions of the patch were tested in pure grub src directory. > Later I switched to directly making and installing GRUB package for > my distro using its source script syntax. It seems this process was > affected by environment options which hided these errors/warnings. > > I test the patch on my two old laptops - one with UEFI BIOS > (x86_64-efi) and one is pre-UEFI (i386-pc). I was compiling i386-pc > target too, because otherwise the second laptop was unbootable. > During i386-pc compilation I noticed some warnings related to > 'PRIuGRUB_XXX' macros which were absent during efi target > compilation. I noticed that there are similar warnings in other > modules and decided that there are issues with 'PRIuGRUB_XXX' macros > at i386-pc platform at global level. In any case, these issues didn't > cause compilation fail in my working environment because I would not > be able to compile and boot pre-UEFI lap. Do you use -Werror? I didn't see this until just now. In case you're still interested, no I don't use -Werror or any special compiler flags. And I'm using gcc version 10.2.1 from a Debian 11 container. Glenn > > P.S. Also thanks for suggested fixes. > > Best regards, > Maxim Fomin > > > > diff --git a/docs/grub.texi b/docs/grub.texi > > > index 377969984..34ca6b4f1 100644 > > > --- a/docs/grub.texi > > > +++ b/docs/grub.texi > > > @@ -5138,13 +5138,13 @@ to generate password hashes. > > > @xref{Security}. > > > > > > Setup access to the encrypted device in plain mode. Offset of the > > > encrypted -data at the device is specified in terms of 512 byte > > > sectors with the blocklist +data at the device is specified in > > > terms of 512 byte sectors using the blocklist syntax and loopback > > > device. The following example shows how to specify 1MiB offset: > > > > > > @example > > > loopback node (hd0,gpt1)2048+ > > > -plainmount node > > > +plainmount node @var{...} > > > @end example > > > > > > The @command{plainmount} command can be used to open LUKS > > > encrypted volume @@ -5155,13 +5155,14 @@ The keyfile path > > > parameter has higher priority than the secret passphrase > > > parameter and is specified with the option @option{-d}. Password > > > data obtained from keyfiles is not hashed and is used directly as > > > a cipher key. An optional offset of password data in the keyfile > > > can be specified with the option -@option{-O} or directly with > > > the option @option{-d} and GRUB blocklist syntax. +@option{-O} or > > > directly with the option @option{-d} and GRUB blocklist syntax, > > > +if the keyfile data can be accessed from a device and is 512 > > > byte aligned. The following example shows both methods to specify > > > password data in the keyfile at offset 1MiB: > > > > > > @example > > > -plainmount -d (hd0,gpt1)2048+ > > > -plainmount -d (hd0,gpt1)+ -O 1048576 > > > +plainmount -d (hd0,gpt1)2048+ @var{...} > > > +plainmount -d (hd0,gpt1)+ -O 1048576 @var{...} > > > @end example > > > > > > If no keyfile is specified then the password is set to the string > > > specified diff --git a/grub-core/disk/plainmount.c > > > b/grub-core/disk/plainmount.c index 656c5d09f..85ada25bc 100644 > > > --- a/grub-core/disk/plainmount.c > > > +++ b/grub-core/disk/plainmount.c > > > @@ -146,8 +146,12 @@ plainmount_configure_password > > > (grub_cryptodisk_t dev, const char *hash, dev->hash = > > > grub_crypto_lookup_md_by_name (hash); len = dev->hash->mdlen; > > > > > > - alloc_size = password_size >= key_size ? password_size : > > > key_size; > > > - p = grub_zalloc (alloc_size + (alloc_size / len)); > > > + alloc_size = grub_max (password_size, key_size); > > > + /* > > > + * Allocate buffer for the password and for an added prefix > > > character > > > + * for each hash round ('alloc_size' may not be a multiple of > > > 'len'). > > > + */ > > > + p = grub_zalloc (alloc_size + (alloc_size / len) + 1); > > > derived_hash = grub_zalloc (GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MAX_KEYLEN * 2); > > > if (p == NULL || derived_hash == NULL) > > > { > > > @@ -170,9 +174,10 @@ plainmount_configure_password > > > (grub_cryptodisk_t dev, const char *hash, if (len > size) > > > len = size; > > > > > > - grub_crypto_hash (dev->hash, dh, p, password_size); > > > + grub_crypto_hash (dev->hash, dh, p, password_size + round); > > > } > > > - grub_memcpy (key_data, derived_hash, GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MAX_KEYLEN > > > * 2); > > > + grub_memcpy (key_data, derived_hash, key_size); > > > + > > > exit: > > > grub_free (p); > > > grub_free (derived_hash); > > > --- > > > docs/grub.texi | 81 +++++++ > > > grub-core/Makefile.core.def | 5 + > > > grub-core/disk/plainmount.c | 462 > > > ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 548 > > > insertions(+) create mode 100644 grub-core/disk/plainmount.c > > > > > > diff --git a/docs/grub.texi b/docs/grub.texi > > > index 2d6cd8358..34ca6b4f1 100644 > > > --- a/docs/grub.texi > > > +++ b/docs/grub.texi > > > @@ -4271,6 +4271,7 @@ you forget a command, you can run the > > > command @command{help} > > > * parttool:: Modify partition table entries > > > * password:: Set a clear-text password > > > * password_pbkdf2:: Set a hashed password > > > +* plainmount:: Open device encrypted in plain mode > > > * play:: Play a tune > > > * probe:: Retrieve device info > > > * rdmsr:: Read values from model-specific > > > registers @@ -4558,6 +4559,14 @@ function is supported, as Argon2 > > > is not yet supported. > > > Also, note that, unlike filesystem UUIDs, UUIDs for encrypted > > > devices must be specified without dash separators. > > > + > > > +Successfully decrypted disks are named as (cryptoX) and have > > > increasing numeration +suffix for each new decrypted disk. If the > > > encrypted disk hosts some higher level +of abstraction (like LVM2 > > > or MDRAID) it will be created under a separate device +namespace > > > in addition to the cryptodisk namespace. + > > > +Support for plain encryption mode (plain dm-crypt) is provided > > > via separate +@command{@pxref{plainmount}} command. > > > @end deffn > > > > > > @node cutmem > > > @@ -5120,6 +5129,78 @@ to generate password hashes. > > > @xref{Security}. @end deffn > > > > > > +@node plainmount > > > +@subsection plainmount > > > + > > > +@deffn Command plainmount device @option{-c} cipher @option{-s} > > > key size [@option{-h} hash] +[@option{-S} sector size] > > > [@option{-p} password] [@option{-u} uuid] +[[@option{-d} keyfile] > > > [@option{-O} keyfile offset]] + > > > + > > > +Setup access to the encrypted device in plain mode. Offset of the > > > encrypted +data at the device is specified in terms of 512 byte > > > sectors using the blocklist +syntax and loopback device. The > > > following example shows how to specify 1MiB +offset: > > > + > > > +@example > > > +loopback node (hd0,gpt1)2048+ > > > +plainmount node @var{...} > > > +@end example > > > + > > > +The @command{plainmount} command can be used to open LUKS > > > encrypted volume +if its master key and parameters (key size, > > > cipher, offset, etc) are known. + > > > +There are two ways to specify a password: a keyfile and a secret > > > passphrase. +The keyfile path parameter has higher priority than > > > the secret passphrase +parameter and is specified with the option > > > @option{-d}. Password data obtained +from keyfiles is not hashed > > > and is used directly as a cipher key. An optional +offset of > > > password data in the keyfile can be specified with the option > > > +@option{-O} or directly with the option @option{-d} and GRUB > > > blocklist syntax, +if the keyfile data can be accessed from a > > > device and is 512 byte aligned. +The following example shows both > > > methods to specify password data in the +keyfile at offset 1MiB: + > > > +@example > > > +plainmount -d (hd0,gpt1)2048+ @var{...} > > > +plainmount -d (hd0,gpt1)+ -O 1048576 @var{...} > > > +@end example > > > + > > > +If no keyfile is specified then the password is set to the string > > > specified +by option @option{-p} or is requested interactively > > > from the console. In both +cases the provided password is hashed > > > with the algorithm specified by the +option @option{-h}. This > > > option is mandatory if no keyfile is specified, but +it can be > > > set to @samp{plain} which means that no hashing is done and such > > > +password is used directly as a key. + > > > +Cipher @option{-c} and keysize @option{-s} options specify the > > > cipher algorithm +and the key size respectively and are mandatory > > > options. Cipher must be specified +with the mode separated by a > > > dash (for example, @samp{aes-xts-plain64}). Key size +option > > > @option{-s} is the key size of the cipher in bits, not to be > > > confused with +the offset of the key data in a keyfile specified > > > with the @option{-O} option. It +must not exceed 1024 bits, so a > > > 32 byte key would be specified as 256 bits + +The optional > > > parameter @option{-S} specifies encrypted device sector size. It > > > +must be at least 512 bytes long (default value) and a power of > > > 2. @footnote{Current +implementation of cryptsetup supports only > > > 512/1024/2048/4096 byte sectors}. +Disk sector size is configured > > > when creating the encrypted volume. Attempting +to decrypt > > > volumes with a different sector size than it was created with > > > will +not result in an error, but will decrypt to random bytes > > > and thus prevent +accessing the volume (in some cases the > > > filesystem driver can detect the presence +of a filesystem, but > > > nevertheless will refuse to mount it). + +By default new > > > plainmount devices will be given a UUID starting with > > > +'109fea84-a6b7-34a8-4bd1-1c506305a401' where the last digits are > > > incremented +by one for each plainmounted device beyond the first > > > up to 2^10 devices. + +All encryption arguments (cipher, hash, > > > key size, disk offset and disk sector +size) must match the > > > parameters used to create the volume. If any of them does +not > > > match the actual arguments used during the initial encryption, > > > plainmount +will create virtual device with the garbage data and > > > GRUB will report unknown +filesystem for such device. Writing > > > data to such virtual device will result in +the data loss if the > > > underlying partition contained desired data. +@end deffn + + > > > @node play > > > @subsection play > > > > > > diff --git a/grub-core/Makefile.core.def > > > b/grub-core/Makefile.core.def index 98714c68d..f4153608c 100644 > > > --- a/grub-core/Makefile.core.def > > > +++ b/grub-core/Makefile.core.def > > > @@ -1184,6 +1184,11 @@ module = { > > > common = disk/cryptodisk.c; > > > }; > > > > > > +module = { > > > + name = plainmount; > > > + common = disk/plainmount.c; > > > +}; > > > + > > > module = { > > > name = json; > > > common = lib/json/json.c; > > > diff --git a/grub-core/disk/plainmount.c > > > b/grub-core/disk/plainmount.c new file mode 100644 > > > index 000000000..85ada25bc > > > --- /dev/null > > > +++ b/grub-core/disk/plainmount.c > > > @@ -0,0 +1,462 @@ > > > +/* > > > + * GRUB -- GRand Unified Bootloader > > > + * Copyright (C) 2022 Free Software Foundation, Inc. > > > + * > > > + * GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify > > > + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as > > > published by > > > + * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the > > > License, or > > > + * (at your option) any later version. > > > + * > > > + * GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, > > > + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of > > > + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the > > > + * GNU General Public License for more details. > > > + * > > > + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public > > > License > > > + * along with GRUB. If not, see http://www.gnu.org/licenses/. > > > + / > > > + > > > +/ plaimount.c - Open device encrypted in plain mode. / > > > + > > > +#include > > > +#include > > > +#include > > > +#include > > > +#include > > > +#include > > > + > > > + > > > +GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+"); > > > + > > > +#define PLAINMOUNT_DEFAULT_SECTOR_SIZE 512 > > > +#define PLAINMOUNT_DEFAULT_UUID > > > "109fea84-a6b7-34a8-4bd1-1c506305a400" + > > > + > > > +enum PLAINMOUNT_OPTION > > > + { > > > + OPTION_HASH, > > > + OPTION_CIPHER, > > > + OPTION_KEY_SIZE, > > > + OPTION_SECTOR_SIZE, > > > + OPTION_PASSWORD, > > > + OPTION_KEYFILE, > > > + OPTION_KEYFILE_OFFSET, > > > + OPTION_UUID > > > + }; > > > + > > > + > > > +static const struct grub_arg_option options[] = > > > + { > > > + / TRANSLATORS: It's still restricted to this module only. / > > > + {"hash", 'h', 0, N_("Password hash"), 0, ARG_TYPE_STRING}, > > > + {"cipher", 'c', 0, N_("Password cipher"), 0, ARG_TYPE_STRING}, > > > + {"key-size", 's', 0, N_("Key size (in bits)"), 0, ARG_TYPE_INT}, > > > + {"sector-size", 'S', 0, N_("Device sector size"), 0, > > > ARG_TYPE_INT}, > > > + {"password", 'p', 0, N_("Password (key)"), 0, ARG_TYPE_STRING}, > > > + {"keyfile", 'd', 0, N_("Keyfile path"), 0, ARG_TYPE_STRING}, > > > + {"keyfile-offset", 'O', 0, N_("Keyfile offset"), 0, > > > ARG_TYPE_INT}, > > > + {"uuid", 'u', 0, N_("Set device UUID"), 0, ARG_TYPE_STRING}, > > > + {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0} > > > + }; > > > + > > > + > > > +/ Cryptodisk setkey() function wrapper */ > > > +static grub_err_t > > > +plainmount_setkey (grub_cryptodisk_t dev, grub_uint8_t key, > > > + grub_size_t size) > > > +{ > > > + gcry_err_code_t code = grub_cryptodisk_setkey (dev, key, size); > > > + if (code != GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR) > > > + { > > > + grub_dprintf ("plainmount", "failed to set cipher key with > > > code: %d\n", code); > > > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("cannot set > > > specified key")); > > > + } > > > + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; > > > +} > > > + > > > + > > > +/ Configure cryptodisk uuid */ > > > +static void plainmount_set_uuid (grub_cryptodisk_t dev, const > > > char user_uuid) +{ > > > + grub_size_t pos = 0; > > > + > > > + / Size of user_uuid is checked in main func / > > > + if (user_uuid != NULL) > > > + grub_memcpy (dev->uuid, user_uuid, grub_strlen (user_uuid)); > > > + else > > > + { > > > + / > > > + * Set default UUID. Last digits start from 1 and are > > > incremented for > > > + * each new plainmount device by snprintf(). > > > + / > > > + grub_snprintf (dev->uuid, sizeof (dev->uuid)-1, "%36lx", > > > dev->id+1); > > > + while (dev->uuid[++pos] == ' '); > > > + grub_memcpy (dev->uuid, PLAINMOUNT_DEFAULT_UUID, pos); > > > + } > > > + COMPILE_TIME_ASSERT (sizeof (dev->uuid) >= sizeof > > > (PLAINMOUNT_DEFAULT_UUID)); +} > > > + > > > + > > > +/ Configure cryptodevice sector size (-S option) / > > > +static grub_err_t > > > +plainmount_configure_sectors (grub_cryptodisk_t dev, grub_disk_t > > > disk, > > > + grub_size_t sector_size) > > > +{ > > > + dev->total_sectors = grub_disk_native_sectors (disk); > > > + if (dev->total_sectors == GRUB_DISK_SIZE_UNKNOWN) > > > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_DEVICE, N_("cannot determine > > > disk %s size"), > > > + disk->name); > > > + > > > + / Convert size to sectors */ > > > + dev->log_sector_size = grub_log2ull (sector_size); > > > + dev->total_sectors = grub_convert_sector (dev->total_sectors, > > > + GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_BITS, > > > + dev->log_sector_size); > > > + if (dev->total_sectors == 0) > > > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_DEVICE, > > > + N_("cannot set specified sector size on disk > > > %s"), > > > + disk->name); > > > + > > > + grub_dprintf ("plainmount", "log_sector_size=%d, > > > total_sectors=%" > > > + PRIuGRUB_SIZE"\n", dev->log_sector_size, > > > dev->total_sectors); > > > > > > s/PRIuGRUB_SIZE/PRIuGRUB_UINT64_T/ > > > > This compiles fine on x86_64 as is, but fails to compile on i386. > > > > > + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; > > > +} > > > + > > > + > > > +/* Hashes a password into a key and stores it with the cipher. */ > > > +static grub_err_t > > > +plainmount_configure_password (grub_cryptodisk_t dev, const char > > > *hash, > > > + grub_uint8_t *key_data, grub_size_t > > > key_size, > > > + grub_size_t password_size) > > > +{ > > > + grub_uint8_t *derived_hash, dh; > > > + char p; > > > + unsigned int round, i, len, size; > > > + grub_size_t alloc_size; > > > + grub_err_t err = GRUB_ERR_NONE; > > > + > > > + / Support none (plain) hash / > > > + if (grub_strcmp (hash, "plain") == 0) > > > + { > > > + dev->hash = NULL; > > > + return err; > > > + } > > > + > > > + / Hash argument was checked at main func / > > > + dev->hash = grub_crypto_lookup_md_by_name (hash); > > > + len = dev->hash->mdlen; > > > + > > > + alloc_size = grub_max (password_size, key_size); > > > + / > > > + * Allocate buffer for the password and for an added prefix > > > character > > > + * for each hash round ('alloc_size' may not be a multiple of > > > 'len'). > > > + / > > > + p = grub_zalloc (alloc_size + (alloc_size / len) + 1); > > > + derived_hash = grub_zalloc (GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MAX_KEYLEN * 2); > > > + if (p == NULL || derived_hash == NULL) > > > + { > > > + err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory"); > > > + goto exit; > > > + } > > > + dh = derived_hash; > > > + > > > + / > > > + * Hash password. Adapted from cryptsetup. > > > + * > > > https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/-/blob/main/lib/crypt_plain.c > > > + / > > > + for (round = 0, size = alloc_size; size; round++, dh += len, > > > size -= len) > > > + { > > > + for (i = 0; i < round; i++) > > > + p[i] = 'A'; > > > + > > > + grub_memcpy (p + i, (char) key_data, password_size); > > > + > > > + if (len > size) > > > + len = size; > > > + > > > + grub_crypto_hash (dev->hash, dh, p, password_size + round); > > > + } > > > + grub_memcpy (key_data, derived_hash, key_size); > > > + > > > +exit: > > > + grub_free (p); > > > + grub_free (derived_hash); > > > + return err; > > > +} > > > + > > > + > > > +/ Read key material from keyfile */ > > > +static grub_err_t > > > +plainmount_configure_keyfile (char *keyfile, grub_uint8_t > > > *key_data, > > > + grub_size_t key_size, grub_size_t > > > keyfile_offset) +{ > > > + grub_file_t g_keyfile = grub_file_open (keyfile, > > > GRUB_FILE_TYPE_NONE); > > > + if (g_keyfile == NULL) > > > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND, N_("cannot open > > > keyfile %s"), > > > + keyfile); > > > + > > > + if (grub_file_seek (g_keyfile, keyfile_offset) == > > > (grub_off_t)-1) > > > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_FILE_READ_ERROR, > > > + N_("cannot seek keyfile at offset > > > %"PRIuGRUB_SIZE), > > > + keyfile_offset); > > > + > > > + if (key_size > (g_keyfile->size - keyfile_offset)) > > > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("Specified key size > > > (%" > > > + PRIuGRUB_SIZE") is too small for keyfile size > > > (%" > > > + PRIuGRUB_SIZE") and offset > > > (%"PRIuGRUB_SIZE")"), > > > > > > Also, this compiles fine on x86_64 as is, but fails to compile on > > i386. > > > > The format code for g_keyfile->size should be PRIuGRUB_UINT64_T. > > > > > + key_size, g_keyfile->size, keyfile_offset); > > > + > > > + if (grub_file_read (g_keyfile, key_data, key_size) != > > > (grub_ssize_t) key_size) > > > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_FILE_READ_ERROR, N_("error reading > > > key file")); > > > + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; > > > +} > > > + > > > + > > > +/* Plainmount command entry point */ > > > +static grub_err_t > > > +grub_cmd_plainmount (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt, int argc, char > > > **args) +{ > > > + struct grub_arg_list *state = ctxt->state; > > > + grub_cryptodisk_t dev = NULL; > > > + grub_disk_t disk = NULL; > > > + const gcry_md_spec_t *gcry_hash; > > > + char *diskname, *disklast = NULL, *cipher, *mode, *hash, > > > *keyfile, *uuid; > > > + grub_size_t len, key_size, sector_size, keyfile_offset = 0, > > > password_size = 0; > > > + grub_err_t err; > > > + const char *p; > > > + grub_uint8_t key_data; > > > + > > > + if (argc < 1) > > > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("device name > > > required")); + > > > + / Check whether required arguments are specified / > > > + if (!state[OPTION_CIPHER].set || !state[OPTION_KEY_SIZE].set) > > > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, "cipher and key size > > > must be set"); > > > + if (!state[OPTION_HASH].set && !state[OPTION_KEYFILE].set) > > > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, "hash algorithm must > > > be set"); + > > > + / Check hash / > > > + if (!state[OPTION_KEYFILE].set) > > > + { > > > + gcry_hash = grub_crypto_lookup_md_by_name > > > (state[OPTION_HASH].arg); > > > + if (!gcry_hash) > > > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND, N_("couldn't load > > > hash %s"), > > > + state[OPTION_HASH].arg); > > > + > > > + if (gcry_hash->mdlen > GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MAX_KEYLEN) > > > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, > > > + N_("hash length %"PRIuGRUB_SIZE" exceeds > > > maximum %d bits"), > > > + gcry_hash->mdlen * GRUB_CHAR_BIT, > > > + GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MAX_KEYLEN * GRUB_CHAR_BIT); > > > + } > > > + > > > + / Check cipher mode / > > > + if (!grub_strchr (state[OPTION_CIPHER].arg,'-')) > > > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, > > > + N_("invalid cipher mode, must be of format > > > cipher-mode")); + > > > + / Check password size / > > > + if (state[OPTION_PASSWORD].set && grub_strlen > > > (state[OPTION_PASSWORD].arg) > > > > + > > > GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MAX_PASSPHRASE) > > > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, > > > + N_("password exceeds maximium size")); > > > + > > > + / Check uuid length */ > > > + if (state[OPTION_UUID].set && grub_strlen > > > (state[OPTION_UUID].arg) > > > > > > + sizeof (PLAINMOUNT_DEFAULT_UUID)) > > > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, > > > + N_("specified UUID exceeds maximum size")); > > > + > > > + /* Parse plainmount arguments */ > > > + grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE; > > > + keyfile_offset = state[OPTION_KEYFILE_OFFSET].set ? > > > + grub_strtoull (state[OPTION_KEYFILE_OFFSET].arg, > > > &p, 0) : 0; > > > + if (state[OPTION_KEYFILE_OFFSET].set && > > > + (state[OPTION_KEYFILE_OFFSET].arg[0] == '\0' || *p != '\0' || > > > + grub_errno != GRUB_ERR_NONE)) > > > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("unrecognized > > > keyfile offset")); + > > > + sector_size = state[OPTION_SECTOR_SIZE].set ? > > > + grub_strtoull (state[OPTION_SECTOR_SIZE].arg, &p, 0) > > > : > > > + PLAINMOUNT_DEFAULT_SECTOR_SIZE; > > > + if (state[OPTION_SECTOR_SIZE].set && > > > (state[OPTION_SECTOR_SIZE].arg[0] == '\0' || > > > + p != '\0' || grub_errno != > > > GRUB_ERR_NONE)) > > > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("unrecognized > > > sector size")); + > > > + / Check key size */ > > > + key_size = grub_strtoull (state[OPTION_KEY_SIZE].arg, &p, 0); > > > + if (state[OPTION_KEY_SIZE].arg[0] == '\0' || p != '\0' || > > > + grub_errno != GRUB_ERR_NONE) > > > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("unrecognized key > > > size")); > > > + if ((key_size % GRUB_CHAR_BIT) != 0) > > > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, > > > + N_("key size is not multiple of %d bits"), > > > GRUB_CHAR_BIT); > > > + key_size = key_size / GRUB_CHAR_BIT; > > > + if (key_size > GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MAX_KEYLEN) > > > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, > > > + N_("key size %"PRIuGRUB_SIZE" exceeds maximum > > > %d bits"), > > > + key_size * GRUB_CHAR_BIT, > > > + GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MAX_KEYLEN * GRUB_CHAR_BIT); > > > + > > > + / Check disk sector size / > > > + if (sector_size < GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_SIZE) > > > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, > > > + N_("sector size -S must be at least %d"), > > > + GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_SIZE); > > > + if ((sector_size & (sector_size - 1)) != 0) > > > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, > > > + N_("sector size -S %"PRIuGRUB_SIZE" is not > > > power of 2"), > > > + sector_size); > > > + > > > + / Allocate all stuff here */ > > > + hash = state[OPTION_HASH].set ? grub_strdup > > > (state[OPTION_HASH].arg) : NULL; > > > + cipher = grub_strdup (state[OPTION_CIPHER].arg); > > > + keyfile = state[OPTION_KEYFILE].set ? > > > + grub_strdup (state[OPTION_KEYFILE].arg) : NULL; > > > + dev = grub_zalloc (sizeof dev); > > > + key_data = grub_zalloc (GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MAX_PASSPHRASE); > > > + uuid = state[OPTION_UUID].set ? grub_strdup > > > (state[OPTION_UUID].arg) : NULL; > > > + if ((hash == NULL && state[OPTION_HASH].set) || cipher == NULL > > > || dev == NULL || > > > + (keyfile == NULL && state[OPTION_KEYFILE].set) || key_data == > > > NULL || > > > + (uuid == NULL && state[OPTION_UUID].set)) > > > + { > > > + err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory"); > > > + goto exit; > > > + } > > > + > > > + / Copy user password from -p option / > > > + if (state[OPTION_PASSWORD].set) > > > + { > > > + / > > > + * Password from the '-p' option is limited to C-string. > > > + * Arbitrary data keys are supported via keyfiles. > > > + / > > > + password_size = grub_strlen (state[OPTION_PASSWORD].arg); > > > + grub_memcpy (key_data, state[OPTION_PASSWORD].arg, > > > password_size); > > > + } > > > + > > > + / Copy user UUID from -u option / > > > + if (state[OPTION_UUID].set) > > > + grub_memcpy (uuid, state[OPTION_UUID].arg, > > > + grub_strlen (state[OPTION_UUID].arg)); > > > + > > > + / Set cipher mode (tested above) */ > > > + mode = grub_strchr (cipher,'-'); > > > + mode++ = '\0'; > > > + > > > + / Check cipher / > > > + if (grub_cryptodisk_setcipher (dev, cipher, mode) != > > > GRUB_ERR_NONE) > > > + { > > > + err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("invalid cipher > > > %s"), cipher); > > > + goto exit; > > > + } > > > + > > > + / Open SOURCE disk */ > > > + diskname = args[0]; > > > + len = grub_strlen (diskname); > > > + if (len && diskname[0] == '(' && diskname[len - 1] == ')') > > > + { > > > + disklast = &diskname[len - 1]; > > > + *disklast = '\0'; > > > + diskname++; > > > + } > > > + disk = grub_disk_open (diskname); > > > + if (disk == NULL) > > > + { > > > + if (disklast) > > > + disklast = ')'; > > > + err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("cannot open disk > > > %s"), diskname); > > > + goto exit; > > > + } > > > + > > > + / Get password from console */ > > > + if (!state[OPTION_KEYFILE].set && key_data[0] == '\0') > > > + { > > > + char part = grub_partition_get_name (disk->partition); > > > + grub_printf_ (N_("Enter passphrase for %s%s%s: "), disk->name, > > > + disk->partition != NULL ? "," : "", > > > + part != NULL ? part : N_("UNKNOWN")); > > > + grub_free (part); > > > + > > > + if (!grub_password_get ((char)key_data, > > > GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MAX_PASSPHRASE-1)) > > > > > > Space between cast and key_data. > > > > > + { > > > + err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("error reading > > > password")); > > > + goto exit; > > > + } > > > + /* > > > + * Password from interactive console is limited to C-string. > > > + * Arbitrary data keys are supported via keyfiles. > > > + */ > > > + password_size = grub_strlen (key_data); > > > > > > This caused x86_64 to fail to compile with sign mismatch. Should > > probably cast to char * as above. > > > > Glenn > > > > > + } > > > + > > > + /* Warn if hash and keyfile are both provided / > > > + if (state[OPTION_KEYFILE].set && state[OPTION_HASH].arg) > > > + grub_printf_ (N_("warning: hash is ignored if keyfile is > > > specified\n")); + > > > + / Warn if -p option is specified with keyfile / > > > + if (state[OPTION_PASSWORD].set && state[OPTION_KEYFILE].set) > > > + grub_printf_ (N_("warning: password specified with -p option " > > > + "is ignored if keyfile is provided\n")); > > > + > > > + / Warn of -O is provided without keyfile / > > > + if (state[OPTION_KEYFILE_OFFSET].set && > > > !state[OPTION_KEYFILE].set) > > > + grub_printf_ (N_("warning: keyfile offset option -O " > > > + "specified without keyfile option -d\n")); > > > + > > > + grub_dprintf ("plainmount", "parameters: cipher=%s, hash=%s, > > > key_size=%" > > > + PRIuGRUB_SIZE", keyfile=%s, keyfile > > > offset=%"PRIuGRUB_SIZE"\n", > > > + cipher, hash, key_size, keyfile, keyfile_offset); > > > + > > > + err = plainmount_configure_sectors (dev, disk, sector_size); > > > + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE) > > > + goto exit; > > > + > > > + / Configure keyfile or password */ > > > + if (state[OPTION_KEYFILE].set) > > > + err = plainmount_configure_keyfile (keyfile, key_data, key_size, > > > keyfile_offset); > > > + else > > > + err = plainmount_configure_password (dev, hash, key_data, > > > key_size, password_size); > > > + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE) > > > + goto exit; > > > + > > > + err = plainmount_setkey (dev, key_data, key_size); > > > + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE) > > > + goto exit; > > > + > > > + err = grub_cryptodisk_insert (dev, diskname, disk); > > > + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE) > > > + goto exit; > > > + > > > + dev->modname = "plainmount"; > > > + dev->source_disk = disk; > > > + plainmount_set_uuid (dev, uuid); > > > + > > > +exit: > > > + grub_free (hash); > > > + grub_free (cipher); > > > + grub_free (keyfile); > > > + grub_free (key_data); > > > + grub_free (uuid); > > > + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE && disk) > > > + grub_disk_close (disk); > > > + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE && dev) > > > + grub_free (dev); > > > + return err; > > > +} > > > + > > > +static grub_extcmd_t cmd; > > > +GRUB_MOD_INIT (plainmount) > > > +{ > > > + cmd = grub_register_extcmd ("plainmount", grub_cmd_plainmount, > > > 0, > > > + N_("-c cipher -s key-size [-h hash] > > > [-S sector-size]" > > > + " [-o offset] [-p password] [-u uuid] " > > > + " [[-d keyfile] [-O keyfile offset]] > > > "), > > > + N_("Open partition encrypted in plain > > > mode."), > > > + options); > > > +} > > > + > > > +GRUB_MOD_FINI (plainmount) > > > +{ > > > + grub_unregister_extcmd (cmd); > > > +}