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From: Zhi Wang <zhi.wang.linux@gmail.com>
To: "Kalra, Ashish" <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de,
	mingo@redhat.com, jroedel@suse.de, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
	hpa@zytor.com, ardb@kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com,
	seanjc@google.com, vkuznets@redhat.com, jmattson@google.com,
	luto@kernel.org, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, slp@redhat.com,
	pgonda@google.com, peterz@infradead.org,
	srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com, rientjes@google.com,
	dovmurik@linux.ibm.com, tobin@ibm.com, bp@alien8.de,
	vbabka@suse.cz, kirill@shutemov.name, ak@linux.intel.com,
	tony.luck@intel.com, marcorr@google.com,
	sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com, alpergun@google.com,
	dgilbert@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org, nikunj.dadhania@amd.com,
	Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v8 24/56] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy TMR allocation when SNP is enabled
Date: Tue, 21 Feb 2023 23:15:14 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230221231514.00004b27@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <f70a2398-bd78-24aa-b0ae-9171465d50ff@amd.com>

On Tue, 21 Feb 2023 09:31:01 -0600
"Kalra, Ashish" <ashish.kalra@amd.com> wrote:

> >> +static int snp_reclaim_pages(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int npages, bool locked)
> >> +{
> >> +	/* Cbit maybe set in the paddr */
> > 
> > This is confusing.
> > 
> > I suppose C-bit is treated as a attribute of PTE in the kernel not part of the
> > PA. It means only a PTE might carry a C-bit.
> > 
> 
> snp_reclaim_pages() is also called for reclaiming guest memory, in which 
> case the (guest) paddr will have the C-bit set. Hence this C-bit 
> handling is done within snp_reclaim_pages() so that the callers don't 
> need to handle it explicitly.

Thanks for the explanation.

Do you mean it will be used like that in the later patch? Sorry if it is in the
later patch as I was making progress slowly. It is quite a big patch set.

At least, I don't see that kind of usage in the current patch. Feel free to
correct me if I am wrong.

The call chains:

__snp_free_firmware_page()
    snp_reclaim_pages();

As __snp_free_firmware_page() takes struct page*, all the follwing coversion
from it would not carry C-bit.

__snp_alloc_firmware_pages()
  rmp_mark_pages_firmware()
    snp_reclaim_pages()

As __snp_alloc_firmware_page() allocates page with struct page*, the same
conclusion as above.

> 
> 
> > The paddr is from __pa(page_address()). It is not extracted from a PTE. Thus, the
> > return from them should never have a C-bit.
> > 
> > BTW: Wouldn't it be better to have pfn as input param instead of paddr?
> > 
> > The caller has struct page, calling snp_reclaim_pages(page_to_pfn(page), xxxxx)
> > would be much clearer than the current conversion:
> > page_address() (struct page is converted to VA), __pa() (VA is converted to PA)
> > in the caller and then PA is converted to pfn here.
> > 
> >> +	unsigned long pfn = __sme_clr(paddr) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> >> +	int ret, err, i, n = 0;
> >> +
> > 
> > should be unsigned int i, n; as the input param npage is unsigned int.
> > 
> >> +	if (!pfn_valid(pfn)) {
> >> +		pr_err("%s: Invalid PFN %lx\n", __func__, pfn);
> >> +		return 0;
> >> +	}
> >> +
> >> +	for (i = 0; i < npages; i++, pfn++, n++) {
> >> +		paddr = pfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
> >> +
> >> +		if (locked)
> >> +			ret = __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_SNP_PAGE_RECLAIM, &paddr, &err);
> >> +		else
> >> +			ret = sev_do_cmd(SEV_CMD_SNP_PAGE_RECLAIM, &paddr, &err);
> >> +
> >> +		if (ret)
> >> +			goto cleanup;
> >> +
> >> +		ret = rmp_make_shared(pfn, PG_LEVEL_4K);
> >> +		if (ret)
> >> +			goto cleanup;
> >> +	}
> >> +
> >> +	return 0;
> >> +
> >> +cleanup:
> >> +	/*
> >> +	 * If failed to reclaim the page then page is no longer safe to
> >> +	 * be release back to the system, leak it.
> >> +	 */
> >> +	snp_mark_pages_offline(pfn, npages - n);
> >> +	return ret;
> >> +}
> >> +
> >> +static int rmp_mark_pages_firmware(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int npages, bool locked)
> > 
> > The same comment as above. Better take pfn or page instead of paddr with
> > redundant conversions.
> > 
> 
> Again, the paddr can point to guest memory so it can have C-bit set.
> 
> Thanks,
> Ashish
> 
> >> +{
> >> +	/* Cbit maybe set in the paddr */
> >> +	unsigned long pfn = __sme_clr(paddr) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> >> +	int rc, n = 0, i;
> >> +
> >> +	for (i = 0; i < npages; i++, n++, pfn++) {
> >> +		rc = rmp_make_private(pfn, 0, PG_LEVEL_4K, 0, true);
> >> +		if (rc)
> >> +			goto cleanup;
> >> +	}
> >> +
> >> +	return 0;
> >> +
> >> +cleanup:
> >> +	/*
> >> +	 * Try unrolling the firmware state changes by
> >> +	 * reclaiming the pages which were already changed to the
> >> +	 * firmware state.
> >> +	 */
> >> +	snp_reclaim_pages(paddr, n, locked);
> >> +
> >> +	return rc;
> >> +}
> >> +


  reply	other threads:[~2023-02-21 21:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 148+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-02-20 18:37 [PATCH RFC v8 00/56] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:37 ` [PATCH RFC v8 01/56] KVM: x86: Add 'fault_is_private' x86 op Michael Roth
2023-03-01 10:25   ` Zhi Wang
2023-03-18  4:51   ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-03-20 17:46     ` Michael Roth
2023-03-18  4:53   ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-02-20 18:37 ` [PATCH RFC v8 02/56] KVM: x86: Add 'update_mem_attr' " Michael Roth
2023-03-18  4:56   ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-03-20 18:05     ` Michael Roth
2023-03-21 11:21       ` Zhi Wang
2023-03-22  1:58         ` Michael Roth
2023-03-23 18:17           ` Zhi Wang
2023-03-28  4:36             ` Michael Roth
2023-03-28 23:00               ` Zhi Wang
2023-03-29 23:50                 ` Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:37 ` [PATCH RFC v8 03/56] KVM: x86: Add platform hooks for private memory invalidations Michael Roth
2023-03-18  5:13   ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-03-20 18:09     ` Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:37 ` [PATCH RFC v8 04/56] KVM: Add HVA range operator Michael Roth
2023-02-20 21:37   ` Zhi Wang
2023-03-27  0:34     ` Michael Roth
2023-04-04 14:40       ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-20 18:37 ` [PATCH RFC v8 05/56] KVM: SEV: Require KVM_PROTECTED_VM when AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT is enabled Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:37 ` [PATCH RFC v8 06/56] KVM: Split out memory attribute xarray updates to helper function Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:37 ` [PATCH RFC v8 07/56] KVM: SEV: Populate private memory fd during LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:37 ` [PATCH RFC v8 08/56] KVM: SEV: Rename sev_{pin,unpin}_memory Michael Roth
2023-03-03 14:00   ` Vlastimil Babka
2023-03-06 11:01     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 09/56] KVM: SEV: Handle memory backed by restricted memfd Michael Roth
2023-03-03 14:05   ` Vlastimil Babka
2023-03-06 11:03     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 10/56] x86/cpufeatures: Add SEV-SNP CPU feature Michael Roth
2023-02-21 21:21   ` Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
2023-02-22 23:27     ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 11/56] x86/sev: Add the host SEV-SNP initialization support Michael Roth
2023-02-20 20:12   ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 12/56] x86/sev: Add RMP entry lookup helpers Michael Roth
2023-03-03 15:28   ` Vlastimil Babka
2023-03-29 22:59     ` Michael Roth
2023-04-20 16:31       ` Vlastimil Babka
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 13/56] x86/fault: Add helper for dumping RMP entries Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 14/56] x86/sev: Add helper functions for RMPUPDATE and PSMASH instruction Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 15/56] x86/sev: Invalidate pages from the direct map when adding them to the RMP table Michael Roth
2023-03-01 12:07   ` Tom Dohrmann
2023-03-01 16:15   ` Dave Hansen
2023-03-28 22:12     ` Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 16/56] x86/traps: Define RMP violation #PF error code Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 17/56] x86/fault: Add support to handle the RMP fault for user address Michael Roth
2023-03-01 16:21   ` Dave Hansen
2023-03-28 23:31     ` Michael Roth
2023-04-11 18:27       ` Dave Hansen
2023-03-03 15:31   ` Vlastimil Babka
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 18/56] x86/fault: fix handle_split_page_fault() to work with memfd backed pages Michael Roth
2023-02-20 19:57   ` Hugh Dickins
2023-02-20 20:31     ` Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 19/56] x86/fault: Return pfn from dump_pagetable() for SEV-specific fault handling Michael Roth
2023-02-20 21:13   ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-28 10:53   ` Wu Zongyong
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 20/56] crypto:ccp: Define the SEV-SNP commands Michael Roth
2023-04-17 14:54   ` Sabin Rapan
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 21/56] crypto: ccp: Add support to initialize the AMD-SP for SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 22/56] crypto:ccp: Provide API to issue SEV and SNP commands Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 23/56] crypto: ccp: Introduce snp leaked pages list Michael Roth
2023-03-03 15:54   ` Vlastimil Babka
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 24/56] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy TMR allocation when SNP is enabled Michael Roth
2023-02-21  9:28   ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-21 15:31     ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-02-21 21:15       ` Zhi Wang [this message]
2023-02-21 22:06         ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 25/56] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy SEV command " Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 26/56] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS command Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 27/56] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_{SET,GET}_EXT_CONFIG command Michael Roth
2023-02-22 12:32   ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-22 16:50     ` Tom Lendacky
2023-02-22 22:43     ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-02-23  6:38       ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-23 14:19         ` Tom Lendacky
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 28/56] crypto: ccp: Provide APIs to query extended attestation report Michael Roth
2023-02-22 20:24   ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-22 22:35     ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-02-23  8:14       ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 29/56] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle AP reset MSR protocol Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 30/56] KVM: SVM: Provide the Hypervisor Feature support VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 31/56] KVM: SVM: Make AVIC backing, VMSA and VMCB memory allocation SNP safe Michael Roth
2023-02-22 20:42   ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 32/56] KVM: SVM: Add initial SEV-SNP support Michael Roth
2023-02-23 17:46   ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 33/56] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SNP_INIT command Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 34/56] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START command Michael Roth
2023-02-23 21:41   ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-24 16:22     ` Tom Lendacky
2023-04-26 17:06   ` Sabin Rapan
2023-04-26 18:02     ` Tom Lendacky
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 35/56] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE command Michael Roth
2023-02-24 11:55   ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 36/56] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command Michael Roth
2023-03-24 14:40   ` Alexander Graf
2023-04-17 13:42   ` Alexander Graf
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 37/56] KVM: X86: Keep the NPT and RMP page level in sync Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 38/56] KVM: x86: Define RMP page fault error bits for #NPF Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 39/56] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle GHCB GPA register VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 40/56] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_EXIT_VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 41/56] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle MSR based Page State Change VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2023-02-24 15:06   ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 42/56] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle " Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 43/56] KVM: x86: Export the kvm_zap_gfn_range() for the SNP use Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 44/56] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle the RMP nested page fault Michael Roth
2023-02-28 19:11   ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 45/56] KVM: SVM: Provide support for SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event Michael Roth
2023-02-24 11:01   ` Alexander Graf
2023-02-28 19:34   ` Zhi Wang
2023-04-17 13:05   ` Alexander Graf
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 46/56] KVM: SVM: Use a VMSA physical address variable for populating VMCB Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 47/56] KVM: SVM: Support SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event Michael Roth
2023-02-24 12:37   ` Alexander Graf
2023-02-28 20:47     ` Zhi Wang
2023-03-01 21:14       ` Alexander Graf
2023-04-05  0:54         ` Michael Roth
2023-04-04 22:48     ` Michael Roth
2023-04-05 15:20       ` Tom Lendacky
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 48/56] KVM: SVM: Add SNP-specific handling for memory attribute updates Michael Roth
2023-03-01 23:37   ` Dave Hansen
2023-04-05 23:48     ` Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 49/56] KVM: SVM: Implement .fault_is_private callback for SNP Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 50/56] KVM: SEV: Handle restricted memory invalidations " Michael Roth
2023-03-01 10:41   ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 51/56] KVM: SVM: Add module parameter to enable the SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2023-03-01 10:45   ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 52/56] ccp: Add support to decrypt the page Michael Roth
2023-03-01 21:20   ` Zhi Wang
2023-03-02  5:59     ` Dov Murik
2023-03-02 14:33       ` Tom Lendacky
2023-03-02 21:11         ` Dov Murik
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 53/56] KVM: SVM: Make VMSAVE target area memory allocation SNP safe Michael Roth
2023-03-01 21:23   ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 54/56] x86/sev: Add KVM commands for instance certs Michael Roth
2023-02-21 12:40   ` Dov Murik
2023-03-02  0:02   ` Zhi Wang
2023-03-02  1:41     ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-03-02 11:27       ` Zhi Wang
2023-03-02 11:34   ` Dov Murik
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 55/56] x86/sev: Document KVM_SEV_SNP_{G,S}ET_CERTS Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 56/56] iommu/amd: Add IOMMU_SNP_SHUTDOWN support Michael Roth
2023-03-01 16:56 ` [PATCH RFC v8 00/56] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support Dave Hansen
2023-03-01 22:59   ` Zhi Wang
2023-03-01 23:39     ` Dave Hansen
2023-08-03 18:27 ` Schander, Johanna 'Mimoja' Amelie
2023-08-04  1:01   ` Kalra, Ashish

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