From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 03B88848C for ; Fri, 10 Mar 2023 14:21:39 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 29BC8C433D2; Fri, 10 Mar 2023 14:21:38 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1678458099; bh=InHjlbWT79bv4wu0NpzWY9+/c2CQwkORqRuHqCxPxzA=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=vLsQKzUzFGcUhAMyEAhIfiXonDa+JYygaSbezXLplGkJJZj9LhPfESDVHDZsvMA3W javQuuSVo1Mq7Vwleh9gwwm2F8pLWy1iO3NOpESH/83VbjQYfq5DpS0o2jdGaCG8Tn Z41RgPHljvaBRbkVP8yZMMeJWQhIUof9JHzCm9xg= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, =?UTF-8?q?Jos=C3=A9=20Oliveira?= , Rodrigo Branco , KP Singh , "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" Subject: [PATCH 4.19 164/252] x86/speculation: Allow enabling STIBP with legacy IBRS Date: Fri, 10 Mar 2023 14:38:54 +0100 Message-Id: <20230310133723.821913781@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.39.2 In-Reply-To: <20230310133718.803482157@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20230310133718.803482157@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.67 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit From: KP Singh commit 6921ed9049bc7457f66c1596c5b78aec0dae4a9d upstream. When plain IBRS is enabled (not enhanced IBRS), the logic in spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() determines that STIBP is not needed. The IBRS bit implicitly protects against cross-thread branch target injection. However, with legacy IBRS, the IBRS bit is cleared on returning to userspace for performance reasons which leaves userspace threads vulnerable to cross-thread branch target injection against which STIBP protects. Exclude IBRS from the spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode() check to allow for enabling STIBP (through seccomp/prctl() by default or always-on, if selected by spectre_v2_user kernel cmdline parameter). [ bp: Massage. ] Fixes: 7c693f54c873 ("x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRS") Reported-by: José Oliveira Reported-by: Rodrigo Branco Signed-off-by: KP Singh Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230220120127.1975241-1-kpsingh@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230221184908.2349578-1-kpsingh@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -983,14 +983,18 @@ spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(void) return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO; } -static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) +static inline bool spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) { - return mode == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS || - mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS || + return mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS || mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE || mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE; } +static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) +{ + return spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode) || mode == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS; +} + static void __init spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void) { @@ -1053,12 +1057,19 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void) } /* - * If no STIBP, IBRS or enhanced IBRS is enabled, or SMT impossible, - * STIBP is not required. + * If no STIBP, enhanced IBRS is enabled, or SMT impossible, STIBP + * is not required. + * + * Enhanced IBRS also protects against cross-thread branch target + * injection in user-mode as the IBRS bit remains always set which + * implicitly enables cross-thread protections. However, in legacy IBRS + * mode, the IBRS bit is set only on kernel entry and cleared on return + * to userspace. This disables the implicit cross-thread protection, + * so allow for STIBP to be selected in that case. */ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) || !smt_possible || - spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) + spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) return; /* @@ -2110,7 +2121,7 @@ static ssize_t mmio_stale_data_show_stat static char *stibp_state(void) { - if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) + if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) return ""; switch (spectre_v2_user_stibp) {