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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
	Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
	netdev@vger.kernel.org, Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>,
	Abel Wu <wuyun.abel@bytedance.com>,
	Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>,
	Alexander Mikhalitsyn <alexander@mihalicyn.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] sock: Use unsafe_memcpy() for sock_copy()
Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2024 12:44:24 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240216204423.work.066-kees@kernel.org> (raw)

While testing for places where zero-sized destinations were still
showing up in the kernel, sock_copy() was found, which is using very
specific memcpy() offsets for both avoiding a portion of struct sock,
and copying beyond the end of it (since struct sock is really just a
common header before the protocol-specific allocation). Instead of
trying to unravel this historical lack of container_of(), just switch
to unsafe_memcpy(), since that's effectively what was happening already
(memcpy() wasn't checking 0-sized destinations while the code base was
being converted away from fake flexible arrays).

Avoid the following false positive warning with future changes to
CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE:

  memcpy: detected field-spanning write (size 3068) of destination "&nsk->__sk_common.skc_dontcopy_end" at net/core/sock.c:2057 (size 0)

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
---
 net/core/sock.c | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c
index 0a7f46c37f0c..b7ea358eb18f 100644
--- a/net/core/sock.c
+++ b/net/core/sock.c
@@ -2053,8 +2053,9 @@ static void sock_copy(struct sock *nsk, const struct sock *osk)
 
 	memcpy(nsk, osk, offsetof(struct sock, sk_dontcopy_begin));
 
-	memcpy(&nsk->sk_dontcopy_end, &osk->sk_dontcopy_end,
-	       prot->obj_size - offsetof(struct sock, sk_dontcopy_end));
+	unsafe_memcpy(&nsk->sk_dontcopy_end, &osk->sk_dontcopy_end,
+		      prot->obj_size - offsetof(struct sock, sk_dontcopy_end),
+		      /* alloc is larger than struct, see sk_prot_alloc() */);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
 	nsk->sk_security = sptr;
-- 
2.34.1


             reply	other threads:[~2024-02-16 20:44 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-02-16 20:44 Kees Cook [this message]
2024-02-16 22:06 ` [PATCH] sock: Use unsafe_memcpy() for sock_copy() Kuniyuki Iwashima

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