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From: Dorine Tipo <dorine.a.tipo@gmail.com>
To: mic@digikod.net, skhan@linuxfoundation.org, outreachy@lists.linux.dev
Cc: Dorine Tipo <dorine.a.tipo@gmail.com>,
	"Fabio M . De Francesco"
	<fabio.maria.de.francesco@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2] Add Landlock test for io_uring IORING_OP_OPENAT operation
Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2024 13:20:01 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240327132001.30576-1-dorine.a.tipo@gmail.com> (raw)

This patch expands Landlock test coverage to include io_uring operations.
It introduces a test for IORING_OP_OPENAT with Landlock rules, verifying
allowed and disallowed access. This mitigates potential security
vulnerabilities by ensuring Landlock controls access through io_uring.

It also updates the Makefile to include -luring in the LDLIBS.
This ensures the test code has access to the necessary liburing
library for io_uring operations.

Signed-off-by: Dorine Tipo <dorine.a.tipo@gmail.com>
---
Changes since V1:
V2: - Consolidated two dependent patches in the V1 series into one patch
      as suggested by <fabio.maria.de.francesco@linux.intel.com>
    - Updated the subject line to be more descriptive.

 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/Makefile  |   4 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 132 +++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 134 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/Makefile
index 348e2dbdb4e0..ab47d1dadb62 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/Makefile
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/Makefile
@@ -13,11 +13,11 @@ TEST_GEN_PROGS := $(src_test:.c=)
 TEST_GEN_PROGS_EXTENDED := true

 # Short targets:
-$(TEST_GEN_PROGS): LDLIBS += -lcap
+$(TEST_GEN_PROGS): LDLIBS += -lcap -luring
 $(TEST_GEN_PROGS_EXTENDED): LDFLAGS += -static

 include ../lib.mk

 # Targets with $(OUTPUT)/ prefix:
-$(TEST_GEN_PROGS): LDLIBS += -lcap
+$(TEST_GEN_PROGS): LDLIBS += -lcap -luring
 $(TEST_GEN_PROGS_EXTENDED): LDFLAGS += -static
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
index 9a6036fbf289..9c8247995d42 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
@@ -21,7 +21,10 @@
 #include <sys/stat.h>
 #include <sys/sysmacros.h>
 #include <sys/vfs.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
+#include <liburing.h>
+#include <linux/io_uring.h>

 #include "common.h"

@@ -4874,4 +4877,133 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout3_fs, release_inodes)
 	ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(TMP_DIR, O_RDONLY));
 }

+/* Test io_uring openat access control with landlock rules */
+static int test_ioring_op_openat(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata, const __u64 access, const char **paths, const int paths_size)
+{
+	struct io_uring ring;
+	struct io_uring_sqe *sqe;
+
+	const char *allowed_paths[] = {
+		file1_s1d1, file2_s1d1,
+		file1_s1d2, file2_s1d2,
+		file1_s1d3, file2_s1d3,
+		file1_s2d1, file1_s2d2,
+		file1_s2d3, file2_s2d3,
+		file1_s3d1,
+	};
+	const char *disallowed_paths[] = {
+		/* dir_s3d2 is a mount point. */
+		dir_s3d2,
+		dir_s3d3,
+	};
+
+	/* Test Allowed Access */
+	const struct rule allowed_rule[] = {
+		{
+			.path = allowed_paths[0],
+			.access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE |
+				  LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE,
+		},
+	};
+	int allowed_ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, allowed_rule[0].access, allowed_rule);
+
+	ASSERT_LE(0, allowed_ruleset_fd);
+
+	int ret = io_uring_queue_init(32, &ring, 0);
+
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+	/* Test each allowed path */
+	for (int i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(allowed_paths); ++i) {
+		sqe = io_uring_get_sqe(&ring);
+		io_uring_prep_openat(sqe, AT_FDCWD, allowed_paths[i], O_RDONLY,
+				     allowed_ruleset_fd);
+		/* Verify successful SQE preparation */
+		ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+		if (ret != 0)
+			return ret;
+
+		ret = io_uring_submit(&ring);
+		/* Verify 1 submission completed */
+		ASSERT_EQ(1, ret);
+	}
+
+	/* Test Disallowed Access */
+	const struct rule disallowed_rule[] = {
+		{
+			.path = disallowed_paths[0],
+			.access = 0,
+		}
+
+	};
+	int disallowed_ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, disallowed_rule[0].access, disallowed_rule);
+
+	ASSERT_LE(0, disallowed_ruleset_fd);
+
+	/* Test each disallowed path */
+	for (int i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(disallowed_paths); ++i) {
+		sqe = io_uring_get_sqe(&ring);
+		io_uring_prep_openat(sqe, AT_FDCWD, disallowed_paths[i], O_RDONLY, disallowed_ruleset_fd);
+		/* Verify successful SQE preparation */
+		ASSERT_EQ(1, ret);
+
+		if (ret != 0)
+			return ret;
+
+		ret = io_uring_submit(&ring);
+		/* Verify 1 submission completed */
+		ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+	}
+
+	/*  Cleanup: close ruleset fds, etc. */
+	close(allowed_ruleset_fd);
+	close(disallowed_ruleset_fd);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE(openat_test) {
+	struct __test_metadata *metadata;
+	const char *allowed_paths[11];
+	const char *disallowed_paths[2];
+};
+
+/* clang-format on */
+
+FIXTURE_SETUP(openat_test)
+{
+	/* initialize metadata, allowed_paths, and disallowed_paths */
+	self->metadata = _metadata;
+	const char *temp_allowed_paths[] = {
+		file1_s1d1, file2_s1d1, file1_s1d2, file2_s1d2,
+		file1_s1d3, file2_s1d3, file1_s2d1, file1_s2d2,
+		file1_s2d3, file2_s2d3, file1_s3d1};
+
+	memcpy(self->allowed_paths, temp_allowed_paths, sizeof(temp_allowed_paths));
+
+	const char *temp_disallowed_paths[] = {dir_s3d2, dir_s3d3};
+
+	memcpy(self->disallowed_paths, temp_disallowed_paths, sizeof(temp_disallowed_paths));
+}
+
+FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(openat_test)
+{
+	/* Clean up test environment */
+}
+
+TEST_F_FORK(openat_test, test_ioring_op_openat_allowed)
+{
+	test_ioring_op_openat(self->metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE |
+			      LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE, self->allowed_paths,
+			      ARRAY_SIZE(self->allowed_paths));
+}
+
+TEST_F_FORK(openat_test, test_ioring_op_openat_disallowed)
+{
+	test_ioring_op_openat(self->metadata, 0, self->disallowed_paths,
+			      ARRAY_SIZE(self->disallowed_paths));
+}
+
 TEST_HARNESS_MAIN
--
2.25.1


             reply	other threads:[~2024-03-27 15:52 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-03-27 13:20 Dorine Tipo [this message]
2024-03-27 16:12 ` [PATCH v2] Add Landlock test for io_uring IORING_OP_OPENAT operation Shuah Khan
2024-03-28 14:43 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-03-28 16:04 ` Fabio M. De Francesco

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