From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from lists.ozlabs.org (lists.ozlabs.org [112.213.38.117]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8E8F7C433F5 for ; Thu, 17 Mar 2022 09:10:43 +0000 (UTC) Received: from boromir.ozlabs.org (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4KK1Zn6V5Mz3bN8 for ; Thu, 17 Mar 2022 20:10:41 +1100 (AEDT) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; spf=pass (sender SPF authorized) smtp.mailfrom=sandelman.ca (client-ip=176.58.120.209; helo=relay.sandelman.ca; envelope-from=mcr@sandelman.ca; receiver=) X-Greylist: delayed 589 seconds by postgrey-1.36 at boromir; Thu, 17 Mar 2022 20:10:16 AEDT Received: from relay.sandelman.ca (unknown [176.58.120.209]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4KK1ZJ0Nv4z2xTq for ; Thu, 17 Mar 2022 20:10:11 +1100 (AEDT) Received: from dooku.sandelman.ca (unknown [62.218.44.74]) by relay.sandelman.ca (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 469871F4BF; Thu, 17 Mar 2022 09:00:02 +0000 (UTC) Received: by dooku.sandelman.ca (Postfix, from userid 179) id 3CEC71A0461; Wed, 16 Mar 2022 15:45:31 -0400 (EDT) From: Michael Richardson To: Joseph Reynolds Subject: Re: Security Working Group meeting - Wednesday March 16 - results In-reply-to: References: Comments: In-reply-to Joseph Reynolds message dated "Wed, 16 Mar 2022 12:51:11 -0500." X-Mailer: MH-E 8.6+git; nmh 1.7.1; GNU Emacs 26.3 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="=-=-="; micalg=pgp-sha512; protocol="application/pgp-signature" Date: Wed, 16 Mar 2022 15:45:31 -0400 Message-ID: <211577.1647459931@dooku> X-BeenThere: openbmc@lists.ozlabs.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Development list for OpenBMC List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: openbmc Errors-To: openbmc-bounces+openbmc=archiver.kernel.org@lists.ozlabs.org Sender: "openbmc" --=-=-= Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Joseph Reynolds wrote: > We also discussed encrypting data like logs, and storing keys in a > vault / trust zone /=C2=A0 TPM. Wouldn't it make most sense to encrypt them *to* an asymmetric (public) key= that is not on the BMC? Or one can send them over encrypted syslog, or netconf to another server for safe keeping. Or are you thinking that you need to sign the logs? If the key is stored locally, even in a TPM, and the point is to be able to review logs locally, then the logs need to get decrypted, and that means th= at the key needs to be enabled/opened/activated locally, and which point, if there was a compromised system, the bad guy wins. I guess I wonder what the goals are here. > See also encrypted volume https://github.com/openbmc/estoraged > Same issue: where is the key stored? =2D-=20 ] Never tell me the odds! | ipv6 mesh network= s [=20 ] Michael Richardson, Sandelman Software Works | network architect= [=20 ] mcr@sandelman.ca http://www.sandelman.ca/ | ruby on rails = [=20 =09 --=-=-= Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQGzBAEBCgAdFiEEow/1qDVgAbWL2zxYcAKuwszYgEMFAmIyPlsACgkQcAKuwszY gENwtQwAkAB+tV5zgUtANQvsLgzbQb0uee4sagVjCWbvnldkcx+vMouFdvzNYESf LYq9jXWWEW7xlyFqB3jwjUiP/efa8TJzfKzEZW4U6ltQdkTNPD4QTsFrrGqKzPer Sb7u492MnwZoNwT3l2wGYx8xqR5rgWytYsdG8xl6oFgv8gdSY4ZTA2uAQyI+EP39 GXAS9g1ExbgnDUAyJQn6DmWmEG8HblCLKP33ErkiKzLezdP/jJnSSTZFcJDkw95Y Xn3N6fW43wTJKc/WxPAHzESJGgrYunsqMjTdtgrrK7oOuZL/eUxk9le7/7reMBSV 5Hwcd+20eJ5FCxQaa1SnMdGJvWJnVfIHiBwMT0ShmzIpVv5zgpkZHioDYQlJn1I2 Bqgma3b4E0ypaEAaD5XkL1dVVufdTDU0qG/djNIzYqQZZOk9EQjykl85eZfn0syU l8SVAborB+DAWbaTG/cJZCuj2Jb/9RfisMIroCbQqTWvMQfFlSJJHoqJ7M1EqYSq CydvpyCG =c8Kk -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --=-=-=--