From: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
To: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
Kirill Marinushkin <k.marinushkin@gmail.com>,
security@kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6] security/keys: rewrite all of big_key crypto
Date: Wed, 20 Sep 2017 13:45:07 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2545404.XUVGGHhd0i@tauon.chronox.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHmME9pvZ-Q8qoUGjQjXX_DYNVv43C7MJRDzKZAAotM5UZircA@mail.gmail.com>
Am Mittwoch, 20. September 2017, 12:52:21 CEST schrieb Jason A. Donenfeld:
Hi Jason,
>
> This sounds incorrect to me. Choosing a fresh, random, one-time-use
> 256-bit key and rolling with a zero nonce is a totally legitimate way
> of using GCM. There's no possible reuse of the key stream this way.
> However, on the off chance that you know what you're talking about,
> could you outline the cryptographic attack you have in mind, or if
> that's too difficult, simply link to the relevant paper on eprint?
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/documents/Joux_comments.pdf
Ciao
Stephan
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
To: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
Kirill Marinushkin <k.marinushkin@gmail.com>,
security@kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6] security/keys: rewrite all of big_key crypto
Date: Wed, 20 Sep 2017 15:45:07 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2545404.XUVGGHhd0i@tauon.chronox.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHmME9pvZ-Q8qoUGjQjXX_DYNVv43C7MJRDzKZAAotM5UZircA@mail.gmail.com>
Am Mittwoch, 20. September 2017, 12:52:21 CEST schrieb Jason A. Donenfeld:
Hi Jason,
>
> This sounds incorrect to me. Choosing a fresh, random, one-time-use
> 256-bit key and rolling with a zero nonce is a totally legitimate way
> of using GCM. There's no possible reuse of the key stream this way.
> However, on the off chance that you know what you're talking about,
> could you outline the cryptographic attack you have in mind, or if
> that's too difficult, simply link to the relevant paper on eprint?
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/documents/Joux_comments.pdf
Ciao
Stephan
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: smueller@chronox.de (Stephan Mueller)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v6] security/keys: rewrite all of big_key crypto
Date: Wed, 20 Sep 2017 15:45:07 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2545404.XUVGGHhd0i@tauon.chronox.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHmME9pvZ-Q8qoUGjQjXX_DYNVv43C7MJRDzKZAAotM5UZircA@mail.gmail.com>
Am Mittwoch, 20. September 2017, 12:52:21 CEST schrieb Jason A. Donenfeld:
Hi Jason,
>
> This sounds incorrect to me. Choosing a fresh, random, one-time-use
> 256-bit key and rolling with a zero nonce is a totally legitimate way
> of using GCM. There's no possible reuse of the key stream this way.
> However, on the off chance that you know what you're talking about,
> could you outline the cryptographic attack you have in mind, or if
> that's too difficult, simply link to the relevant paper on eprint?
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/documents/Joux_comments.pdf
Ciao
Stephan
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
To: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
Kirill Marinushkin <k.marinushkin@gmail.com>,
security@kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v6] security/keys: rewrite all of big_key crypto
Date: Wed, 20 Sep 2017 15:45:07 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2545404.XUVGGHhd0i@tauon.chronox.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHmME9pvZ-Q8qoUGjQjXX_DYNVv43C7MJRDzKZAAotM5UZircA@mail.gmail.com>
Am Mittwoch, 20. September 2017, 12:52:21 CEST schrieb Jason A. Donenfeld:
Hi Jason,
>
> This sounds incorrect to me. Choosing a fresh, random, one-time-use
> 256-bit key and rolling with a zero nonce is a totally legitimate way
> of using GCM. There's no possible reuse of the key stream this way.
> However, on the off chance that you know what you're talking about,
> could you outline the cryptographic attack you have in mind, or if
> that's too difficult, simply link to the relevant paper on eprint?
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/documents/Joux_comments.pdf
Ciao
Stephan
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-09-20 13:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 79+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-09-16 13:00 [PATCH v4] security/keys: rewrite all of big_key crypto Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-09-16 13:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-09-16 13:00 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-09-16 13:00 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-09-16 13:05 ` [PATCH v5] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-09-16 13:05 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-09-16 13:05 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-09-16 13:05 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-09-17 6:04 ` Eric Biggers
2017-09-17 6:04 ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric Biggers
2017-09-17 6:04 ` Eric Biggers
2017-09-17 6:04 ` Eric Biggers
2017-09-17 11:50 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-09-17 11:50 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-09-17 11:50 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-09-17 11:50 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-09-17 11:52 ` [PATCH v6] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-09-17 11:52 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-09-17 11:52 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-09-17 11:52 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-09-20 5:30 ` Stephan Mueller
2017-09-20 5:30 ` [kernel-hardening] " Stephan Mueller
2017-09-20 5:30 ` Stephan Mueller
2017-09-20 5:30 ` Stephan Mueller
2017-09-20 10:52 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-09-20 10:52 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-09-20 10:52 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-09-20 10:52 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-09-20 13:45 ` Stephan Mueller [this message]
2017-09-20 13:45 ` [kernel-hardening] " Stephan Mueller
2017-09-20 13:45 ` Stephan Mueller
2017-09-20 13:45 ` Stephan Mueller
2017-09-20 14:01 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-09-20 14:01 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-09-20 14:01 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-09-20 14:01 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-09-20 14:06 ` Stephan Mueller
2017-09-20 14:06 ` [kernel-hardening] " Stephan Mueller
2017-09-20 14:06 ` Stephan Mueller
2017-09-20 14:06 ` Stephan Mueller
2017-09-20 14:09 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-09-20 14:09 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-09-20 14:09 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-09-20 14:09 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-09-19 15:38 ` David Howells
2017-09-19 15:38 ` [kernel-hardening] " David Howells
2017-09-19 15:38 ` David Howells
2017-09-19 15:38 ` David Howells
2017-09-20 14:56 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-09-20 14:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-09-20 14:56 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-09-20 14:56 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-09-18 8:49 ` [PATCH v4] " Stephan Mueller
2017-09-18 8:49 ` [kernel-hardening] " Stephan Mueller
2017-09-18 8:49 ` Stephan Mueller
2017-09-18 8:49 ` Stephan Mueller
2017-09-18 9:04 ` [kernel-hardening] " Greg KH
2017-09-18 9:04 ` Greg KH
2017-09-18 9:04 ` Greg KH
2017-09-18 9:12 ` Stephan Mueller
2017-09-18 9:12 ` Stephan Mueller
2017-09-18 9:12 ` Stephan Mueller
2017-09-18 11:24 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-09-18 11:24 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-09-18 11:24 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-09-18 11:24 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-09-19 13:39 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-09-19 13:39 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-09-19 13:39 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-09-19 13:39 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-09-19 19:04 ` [kernel-hardening] " Sandy Harris
2017-09-19 19:04 ` Sandy Harris
2017-09-19 19:04 ` Sandy Harris
2017-09-19 19:17 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-09-19 19:17 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-09-19 19:17 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-09-20 1:16 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-09-20 1:16 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-09-20 1:16 ` Theodore Ts'o
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