From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; spf=none (no SPF record) smtp.mailfrom=linux.intel.com (client-ip=192.55.52.120; helo=mga04.intel.com; envelope-from=aleksandr.v.tereschenko@linux.intel.com; receiver=) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.intel.com Received: from mga04.intel.com (mga04.intel.com [192.55.52.120]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 48P9W950bnzDqkK for ; Fri, 21 Feb 2020 23:19:31 +1100 (AEDT) X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga008.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.65]) by fmsmga104.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 21 Feb 2020 04:19:27 -0800 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.70,468,1574150400"; d="scan'208";a="229834527" Received: from avteresc-mobl1.ger.corp.intel.com (HELO [172.22.245.179]) ([172.22.245.179]) by orsmga008.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 21 Feb 2020 04:19:26 -0800 Subject: Re: Security Working Group meeting - this Wednesday February 19 - summary results To: openbmc@lists.ozlabs.org References: <20200220162633.GB41328@patrickw3-mbp.dhcp.thefacebook.com> From: Alexander Tereschenko Message-ID: <2b30dde7-3415-8c7a-2001-28793e938339@linux.intel.com> Date: Fri, 21 Feb 2020 13:19:25 +0100 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/68.5.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20200220162633.GB41328@patrickw3-mbp.dhcp.thefacebook.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Language: en-US X-BeenThere: openbmc@lists.ozlabs.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Development list for OpenBMC List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 21 Feb 2020 12:19:35 -0000 On 20-Feb-20 17:26, Patrick Williams wrote: > Can we put something into bmcweb to detect its own > certificate has expired and generate a new one? The idea here is to discourage any prolonged use of the default self-signed certs at all, as they don't provide full protection from MitM attacks. That's why the 30 days validity period was suggested (compared to current 10 years) and discussed during the meeting. Adding an auto-regeneration feature would be going directly against that idea, so I personally wouldn't vote for that. > I know self-signed certs aren't great, but the minute I have more than 6 > systems I'm not going to want to follow some "BMC Admin Guide" to update > certificates by hand. So we're effectively forcing everyone to develop > some kind of certificate management infrastructure, without providing > (or pointing to an existing) implementation. I'd say that in such context, you'd be using one of the configuration management systems (Puppet/Chef/Salt/Ansible/homegrown scripts/whatnot) anyway, as that's a standard system administration BKM, so IMHO that's a reasonable assumption at the OpenBMC project end that it's not going to add any noticeable burden for BMC admins.