Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH 17/21] virtio-channel: parse qga stream for VMDUMP_INFO event

[Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>]

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On 04/05/2017 11:12 AM, Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
> On Sat, Mar 11, 2017 at 05:22:52PM +0400, Marc-André Lureau wrote:
>> On virtio channel "org.qemu.guest_agent.0", parse the json stream until
>> the VMDUMP_INFO is received and retrieve the dump details.
>>

> 
> so we just continually feed data into the json parser until we see the
> event we care about....
> 
> What kind of denial of service protection does our JSON parser have. Now
> that QEMU is directly parsing JSON from QEMU guest agent, it is exposed
> to malicious attack by the guest agent.

Our JSON parser rejects input that exceeds various limits:

json-lexer.c:
#define MAX_TOKEN_SIZE (64ULL << 20)

json-streamer.c:
#define MAX_TOKEN_SIZE (64ULL << 20)
#define MAX_TOKEN_COUNT (2ULL << 20)
#define MAX_NESTING (1ULL << 10)

> 
> eg what happens if the 'vmcoreinfo' string in the JSON doc received from
> the guest ends up being 10GB in size ? Is that going to cause our JSON
> parser to allocate QString which is 10GB in size which we'll further
> try to strdup just below too...

The parser will have rejected the guest data long before the 10GB mark.
But our error recovery from that rejection may not be ideal...


-- 
Eric Blake   eblake redhat com    +1-919-301-3266
Libvirt virtualization library http://libvirt.org


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