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From: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
To: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
	James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>, kernel <kernel@pengutronix.de>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	horia geanta <horia.geanta@nxp.com>,
	aymen sghaier <aymen.sghaier@nxp.com>,
	Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	davem <davem@davemloft.net>, Udit Agarwal <udit.agarwal@nxp.com>,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
	Jan Luebbe <j.luebbe@pengutronix.de>, david <david@sigma-star.at>,
	Franck Lenormand <franck.lenormand@nxp.com>,
	Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>,
	"open list, ASYMMETRIC KEYS" <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux Doc Mailing List <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-integrity <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 6/6] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys
Date: Fri, 2 Jul 2021 10:00:05 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2f608e5a-5a12-6db1-b9bd-a2cd9e3e3671@pengutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1850833581.13438.1625172175436.JavaMail.zimbra@nod.at>

Hello Richard,

On 01.07.21 22:42, Richard Weinberger wrote:
> Ahmad,
> 
> ----- Ursprüngliche Mail -----
>> Von: "Ahmad Fatoum" <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
>> +static struct caam_blob_priv *blobifier;
>> +
>> +#define KEYMOD "kernel:trusted"
> 
> I'm still think that hard coding the key modifier is not wise.
> As I said[0], there are folks out there that want to provide their own modifier,
> so it is not only about being binary compatible with other CAAM blob patches in the wild.

I don't think the characterization as a salt is accurate. AFAIU it's more
of a namespace, so blobs being loaded are "type-checked" against the modifier.

> I'll happily implement that feature after your patches got merged but IMHO we should first agree on an interface.
> How about allowing another optional parameter to Opt_new and Opt_load

Sound good to me. pcrlock for TPM trusted keys has the same interface.

I'd prefer the new option to accept strings, not hex though.


> and having a key modifier per struct trusted_key_payload instance?

Ye, possibly a void *backend_data, which other trust sources could leverage
as well. But that should be separate discussion.


Cheers,
Ahmad

> 
> Thanks,
> //richard
> 
> [0]
> https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-crypto/patch/319e558e1bd19b80ad6447c167a2c3942bdafea2.1615914058.git-series.a.fatoum@pengutronix.de/#24085397
> 
> 

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  reply	other threads:[~2021-07-02  8:00 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-06-22 12:37 [PATCH v2 0/6] " Ahmad Fatoum
2021-06-22 12:37 ` [PATCH v2 1/6] KEYS: trusted: allow use of TEE as backend without TCG_TPM support Ahmad Fatoum
2021-07-19  8:04   ` Sumit Garg
2021-07-19  9:09     ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-06-22 12:37 ` [PATCH v2 3/6] KEYS: trusted: allow users to use kernel RNG for key material Ahmad Fatoum
2021-06-22 12:37 ` [PATCH v2 4/6] KEYS: trusted: allow trust sources " Ahmad Fatoum
2021-06-22 12:37 ` [PATCH v2 5/6] crypto: caam - add in-kernel interface for blob generator Ahmad Fatoum
2021-07-02  8:03   ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-06-22 12:37 ` [PATCH v2 6/6] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys Ahmad Fatoum
2021-07-01 20:42   ` Richard Weinberger
2021-07-02  8:00     ` Ahmad Fatoum [this message]
2021-07-02 10:53       ` Richard Weinberger
2021-07-02 12:33         ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-07-20 19:19           ` Richard Weinberger
2021-07-20 20:24             ` Mimi Zohar
2021-07-20 20:37               ` Richard Weinberger
2021-07-21 17:02             ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-07-14  6:36 ` [PATCH v2 0/6] " Ahmad Fatoum

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