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From: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
To: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
	Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>,
	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] stackleak: Disable ftrace for stackleak.c
Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2018 19:51:00 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <31b45d77-7b49-3984-a1e5-17993f50eee3@linux.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181112115058.39e98750750c91eeb349cfdf@kernel.org>

Hello Steven and Masami,

Thanks for your comments.

On 12.11.2018 5:50, Masami Hiramatsu wrote:
> Hi Alexander and Steve,
> 
> On Sun, 11 Nov 2018 20:53:51 -0500
> Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> wrote:
> 
>> On Sun, 11 Nov 2018 13:19:45 +0300
>> Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com> wrote:
>>
>>> On 11.11.2018 2:30, Steven Rostedt wrote:
>>>> On Sun, 11 Nov 2018 01:05:30 +0300
>>>> Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com> wrote:
>>>>   
>>>>> The stackleak_erase() function is called on the trampoline stack at the
>>>>> end of syscall. This stack is not big enough for ftrace operations,
>>>>> e.g. it can be overflowed if we enable kprobe_events for stackleak_erase().  
>>>>
>>>> Is the issue with kprobes or with function tracing? Because this stops
>>>> function tracing which I only want disabled if function tracing itself
>>>> is an issue, not for other things that may use the function tracing
>>>> infrastructure.  
>>>
>>> Hello Steven,
>>>
>>> I believe that stackleak erasing is not compatible with function tracing itself.
>>> That's what the kernel testing robot has hit:
>>> https://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2018/11/09/1
>>>
>>> I used kprobe_events just to reproduce the problem:
>>> https://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2018/11/09/4
>>
>> Have you tried adding a "notrace" to stackleak_erase()?
>>
>> Not tracing the entire file is a bit of overkill. There's no reason
>> ftrace can't trace stack_erasing_sysctl() or perhaps even
>> stackleak_track_stack() as that may be very interesting to trace.

Yes, thank you. It's much better.

> I think it is not enough for stopping kprobes. If you want to stop the kprobes
> (int3 version) on stackleak_erase(), you should use NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(stackleak_erase),
> since kprobes can work without ftrace. 

Thanks!

I learned how to use kprobes without ftrace and managed to reproduce the problem
as well (I modified kprobe_example.c and kretprobe_example.c). NOKPROBE_SYMBOL()
allowed to avoid it.

I'll send the patch soon.

By the way, are there any other tracing/instrumentation mechanisms that should
be disabled?

Best regards,
Alexander

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-11-12 16:58 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-11-10 22:05 [PATCH 1/1] stackleak: Disable ftrace for stackleak.c Alexander Popov
2018-11-10 23:30 ` Steven Rostedt
2018-11-11 10:19   ` Alexander Popov
2018-11-12  1:53     ` Steven Rostedt
2018-11-12  2:50       ` Masami Hiramatsu
2018-11-12 14:53         ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2018-11-12 16:52           ` Steven Rostedt
2018-11-12 16:51         ` Alexander Popov [this message]
2018-11-12 17:21           ` Steven Rostedt
2018-11-13 18:21             ` Masami Hiramatsu

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