From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
To: speck@linutronix.de
Subject: [MODERATED] Re: [PATCH 3/5] SSB extra 1
Date: Sun, 6 May 2018 15:40:43 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <325e107b-3c9a-0c55-1c69-24cf604fb026@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.DEB.2.21.1805062338160.1685@nanos.tec.linutronix.de>
On 05/06/2018 02:48 PM, speck for Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> 1) I read about trusted and untrusted BPF programs. How is that
> determined/defined?
There's a rather steep learning curve, I fear.
There's bpf_map->unpriv_array which tells whether or not you have to
deploy Spectre V1 mitigations. That's just derived from CAP_SYS_ADMIN
when the map is allocated.
Separately, I've seen some hard-coded checks against BPF_PROG_TYPE_*,
like may_access_direct_pkt_data().
So I think the trust ends up being anchored in the interfaces that
allocated the program (or map?) to begin with, but it's somewhat hard to
follow.
Is that what you meant?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-05-06 22:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-05-03 22:29 [MODERATED] [PATCH 0/5] SSB extra 0 Dave Hansen
2018-05-03 22:29 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH 1/5] SSB extra 2 Dave Hansen
2018-05-03 22:29 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH 2/5] SSB extra 3 Dave Hansen
2018-05-03 22:29 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH 3/5] SSB extra 1 Dave Hansen
2018-05-03 22:29 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH 4/5] SSB extra 5 Dave Hansen
2018-05-03 22:29 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH 5/5] SSB extra 4 Dave Hansen
2018-05-03 23:27 ` [MODERATED] Re: [PATCH 0/5] SSB extra 0 Kees Cook
2018-05-04 1:37 ` Dave Hansen
2018-05-04 22:26 ` Kees Cook
2018-05-23 7:17 ` [MODERATED] cBPF affectedness (was Re: [PATCH 0/5] SSB extra 0) Jiri Kosina
2018-05-23 13:56 ` [MODERATED] " Alexei Starovoitov
2018-05-04 9:20 ` [MODERATED] Re: [PATCH 1/5] SSB extra 2 Peter Zijlstra
2018-05-04 14:04 ` Dave Hansen
2018-05-04 15:50 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-05-04 15:54 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-05-04 13:33 ` [PATCH 3/5] SSB extra 1 Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-04 14:22 ` [MODERATED] " Dave Hansen
2018-05-04 14:26 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-04 16:04 ` [MODERATED] " Andi Kleen
2018-05-04 16:09 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-04 16:28 ` [MODERATED] " Andi Kleen
2018-05-04 16:32 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-04 16:43 ` [MODERATED] " Dave Hansen
2018-05-04 18:39 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-06 8:32 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-06 21:48 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-06 22:40 ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2018-05-07 6:19 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-04 17:01 ` [MODERATED] Re: [PATCH 4/5] SSB extra 5 Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-05-21 9:56 ` [MODERATED] Re: [PATCH 5/5] SSB extra 4 Jiri Kosina
2018-05-21 13:38 ` Thomas Gleixner
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