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From: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Linux Audit <linux-audit@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: Limiting SECCOMP audit events
Date: Thu, 14 Dec 2017 10:29:38 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <3367743.fjAuTK8mJQ@x2> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHC9VhRdPCwfOx8KuZBm3Ybj1c31XXH22Z1AnK7sD5CUjVwZ1Q@mail.gmail.com>


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On Thursday, December 14, 2017 7:42:26 AM EST Paul Moore wrote:
> >> Looking at the kernel code, it looks like the actions_logged knob
> >> isn't really intended to filter/drop seccomp events,
> > 
> > That's unfortunate. I thought this was a way to suppress generation of
> > events. We have a requirement that audit events be selective by the
> > administrator. We need a knob to drop some events. I guess, the only knob
> > right now is the exclude filter. That is probably too course.
> > 
> >> but rather force seccomp events to be loggged. Look at seccomp_log() to
> >> see what I mean; there is still a call to audit_seccomp() at the end.
> > 
> > Hmm. What do we do?
> 
> I imagine we could put together a rather coarse grained action filter,
> similar to what we have with "actions_logged" (maybe
> "actions_silent"?), and perhaps add some additional audit filters for
> seccomp for those who happen to have audit enabled.  Both should be
> relatively easy, the "actions_silent" field especially so.

OK. That would be helpful. This is eating up my log space. The biggest offenders 
seem to be doing trap kind of events. I suppose if an errno was returned the 
program would respond by erroring out. But since its a trap, I suspect something 
looks around at data and then OK's it to proceed on which results in another trap.

-Steve

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  reply	other threads:[~2017-12-14 15:29 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-12-13 23:58 Limiting SECCOMP audit events Steve Grubb
2017-12-14  0:16 ` Kees Cook
2017-12-14  0:31   ` Steve Grubb
2017-12-14  1:43     ` Paul Moore
2017-12-14  3:30       ` Steve Grubb
2017-12-14 12:42         ` Paul Moore
2017-12-14 15:29           ` Steve Grubb [this message]
2017-12-14 15:04 ` Tyler Hicks
2017-12-14 15:19   ` Steve Grubb
2017-12-14 23:06     ` Tyler Hicks
2017-12-14 23:16       ` Kees Cook
2017-12-15 14:08       ` Paul Moore
2017-12-15 15:47         ` Tyler Hicks
2017-12-15 16:09           ` Steve Grubb
2017-12-15 20:54           ` Paul Moore
2017-12-15 16:02       ` Steve Grubb
2018-01-02 20:03         ` Steve Grubb
2018-01-03  2:52           ` Tyler Hicks
2018-01-03 14:25             ` Paul Moore
2018-04-17 22:54               ` Steve Grubb
2018-04-18  1:57                 ` Paul Moore
2018-04-25  0:00                   ` Tyler Hicks
2018-04-26 14:41                     ` Paul Moore

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